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ABSTRACT 
 
Government reform projects fail at an alarming rate (Cabinet Office, 2014), wasting billions of 
pounds in public spending and sustaining what has been termed the “performance paradox” 
(Flyvbjerg et al,. 2003, p.3). The paradox suggests that despite ever increasing numbers and 
magnitudes of major projects, the rate of failure continues to grow too.  In addressing this 
paradox, this research responds to Flyvbjerg’s (2001), call for phronetic social science that 
concerns itself with society’s improvement and enters into public dialogue and praxis.  In so 
doing, the research promotes a second order approach to understanding project failure to 
challenge taken-for-granted evaluation processes and concerns itself with working towards 
improving what and how we learn lessons. 
The study presents a detailed and reflexive account of an exemplar case of Government project 
failure, from an alternative perspective.  The case exposes the political conceptualisations 
underpinning unsuccessful attempts to regionalise parts of the English fire service via the 
structural reform project called ‘FiReControl1’.  The FiReControl project was initiated in 2004 
under the Labour Government and was cancelled by the Coalition Government in 2010. The 
Public Accounts Committee inquiry into the failure of FiReControl labelled it one of the worst 
cases of project failure that the Committee had seen (Hodge, Public Accounts Committee, 
2011), and blamed project and ministerial department staff for the failure.  
The research challenges the adequacy of taken-for-granted evaluations of the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC), that typically finds project delivery agents to blame after reform projects 
are considered to have failed. A phronetic approach would be sceptical of the PAC 
methodology alone to provide definitive answers after reform projects fail, since social and 
particularly political actions from which reform projects emerge, are complex and unfold over 
time in the unobservable realms of Government institutions.  A truer understanding of reform 
projects requires knowledge of both their context and their history emergence (Archer, 1995), 
that is not accessible through theory alone (Flyvbjerg et al. 2012).   
The intention of this study was to explore these concepts of time and context to ascertain if 
alternative theoretical perspectives and analytic methods can help us to understand more about 
                                                 
1 The FiReControl logo will be written as such throughout this manuscript for consistency.  The capitalisation represented 
the ‘Fire and Resilience’ section of Department of Communities and Local Government and Control being the fire service 
function that was to be regionalised under the reform. 
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why many large-scale public reform projects do not complete successfully, or are considered 
failures.  A fundamental concept underpinning the research was ontological, asking not just 
where project failure begins, but also, what exactly is project failure.  The study premised its 
perspective of reform project failure on the idea of it being a loss of support, or a loss of 
legitimacy and not an objective state of reality (McConnell, 2003). The study departs from 
traditional ‘flat ontology’ of much foundationalist and resource-based research and evaluation 
in the field and set out to explore where and how legitimacy for FiReControl began, what 
sustained it and by what power the final, contested reform idea was approved.  The approach 
sought to reveal more of the power-relations that underlie policy reforms, working beneath the 
more obvious levels of policy-effectiveness assessment found in conventional post-project 
evaluation approaches. 
Using the overarching philosophy of critical realism, the realist social theory method approach 
of the morphogenetic sequence (Archer, 1995), is adopted, as well as critical hermeneutic 
methods, to operationalise the idea that society consists of parts and people, the social and the 
individual, structures and agents.  
The methods revealed changing situational logics (Archer, 1995), as organisational relations 
ebbed and flowed across the sequence of events.  The logics influenced the decisions and 
actions of agents which served their vested interests to a greater or lesser extent, depending on 
which groups held more agency at the time.  The hermeneutic analyses of key texts revealed 
how the Government was not only predisposed to act by the institutional legitimacy of new 
public management, but also how powerful legitimating devices were deployed to further their 
ideas over any alternatives. The methods gave explanatory power to understanding the 
emergent properties of mechanisms of legitimacy and institutionalism in building support for 
structural reform.  Moreover, the methods revealed the power by which Government ideas 
finally succeeded in 2004, where they had failed in 1999, by the morphogenesis 
(transformation), of corporate agency.  Corporate agents promote their own interests to define 
and redefine organisational goals; they “pack more punch in defining and redefining structural 
forms” (Archer, 1995, p. 191). The influence of these mechanisms in shaping the FiReControl 
project, regardless of any reliable evidence to suggest the reform could succeed, was not 
explored by the Public Accounts Committee. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The failure of the FiReControl1 project: “This is one of the worst cases of project failure 
that the Committee has seen in many years” (Hodge, Public Accounts Committee, 2011, 
p.3). 
1.0 Introduction and background 
The high failure rate of Government projects in the public sector and in particular those that are 
designed to implement Government policy through organisational reform is a putative reality, 
especially amongst the large-scale change programmes underpinned by complex IT systems.  
The ‘performance paradox’ (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, p.3) of major projects describes this 
phenomenon; the more projects and the bigger they are, the more they seem to suffer from 
extremely poor records of accomplishment (Merrow et al. 1988).  
Evaluating and learning the right lessons after public projects fail is not an easy undertaking. 
In the UK policy cycle framework, evaluation attempts are made to learn lessons after the 
implementation phase are fed back into the decision-making process. This is supposed to ensure 
Government action is continually refined to reflect what best achieves objectives and promotes 
the public interest (HM Treasury, 2014). Ontologically, there appears a taken for granted 
acceptance that rational, clearly defined objectives indicate capacity for effective achievement 
of goals and in the event of failure, equally rational goal oriented evaluation will provide 
sufficient evidence on attribution and causality (Sanderson, 2000).  This research suggests that 
such approaches may not only be inaccurate but quite misleading and may be part of the reason 
why the projects paradox remains a reoccurring feature of public spending in this area.  
Extant literature and sources of understanding in UK Government project failure generally 
assume a positivist approach based on foundationalist principles of project management and 
evaluation.  These approaches generally subscribe to the ‘flat ontological’ position that 
conflates structure with agency (Archer, 1995) and generally reveal determinants of reform 
failure in terms of delivery agents’ behaviours at implementation stages.  In light of the fact 
that reform projects continue to fail, this research suggests there is potential to promote an 
alternative perspective that does not see failure as an absolute objective reality, ‘caused’ only 
by delivery agents, during the project itself.    
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The empiral case for this research was a project called FiReControl, a major transformation 
programme in the English fire service, designed to implement Government policy through 
organisational reform and technology. The research was prompted by my own professional 
experiences in the field of  emergency services technology transformation programmes, of 
which five years were spent delivering the FiReControl project. The project was launched in 
2004 by the Labour Government’s Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).  Following 
a series of delays and difficulties, the project was cancelled in December 2010 by the Coalition 
Government with none of the original objectives achieved and a minimum of £469 million 
being wasted (Public Accounts Committee, 2011).  
Critical of foundationalist perspectives that viewed FiReControl as a failed project, the research 
introduces an alternative theoretical lens for the case.  Institutional theory and its key constructs 
can be used to view failure as a loss of legitimacy and from here the research asks where and 
how legitimacy for  reform projects begin.  To explore reform project failure in this way 
requires knowing not just about the parts and the people involved in delivering reforms but also 
those involved in idealising, shaping and ultimately legitimating them and this requires an 
approach that recognises that the entities of social life, the parts (structure) and people (agents), 
are ‘analytically separable’ (Archer, 1996, p.xvi). Based on critical realist philosophy (Bhaskar, 
1977), the morphogenetic sequence approach of realist social theory (Archer, 1995), and critical 
hermeneutic methods, the complex interplay of parts and people were analysed over a 
designated time sequence and conceptualised over multiple levels of reality (Bhaskar, 1978).   
In seeking to understand more about the failure of reform projects, the research uses the 
empirical case to illustrate the process of legitimation by illuminating its context-rich backstory 
(Suddaby, 2015) using the morphogenetic sequence approach. From this analytic perspective 
different questions can be asked of the genesis and legitimation of FiReControl that may have 
influenced its framing and ultimately its capacity for successful implementation. Using this 
methodological framework, the back story of the FiReControl reform project was told from the 
five years that preceded its approval in 2004.  A morphogenetic approach can reveal shifts in 
the situational logics between key agents (the fire service, the unions and the government), that 
predispose them to courses of action in efforts to protect vested interests (Archer, 1995).  Using 
institutional theory constructs as a lens, these decisions and actions either enabled or 
constrained legitimacy of ideas between the groups.  The methods also expose the power-
relations that underlay the project, working beneath the more obvious levels of project 
management or delivery assessment.  
15 
 
Using the empirical case to illustrate the complex interplay of cultures, structures and agents in 
the shaping of a reform project and the power shifts that constrained and enabled its 
legitimation, the study makes wider contributions. 
The research makes contributions to the project management and evaluation fields by 
challenging taken-for-granted assumptions that project failure is an objective state of reality 
that exists, and that causes of failure can only be found within the boundary of the 
implementation stages of project itself.  
The methods to operationalise the philosophical approach (critical hermeneutics and the 
morphogenetic approach), are both under theorised in the projects’ field. This unique layering 
of methods makes a methodological contribution that exposes causal mechanisms that constrain 
or enable agents in ways that conventional methods typically cannot, since the scope of their 
inquiry is limited to personal accounts and financial audits.  Their application in this study 
enabled greater understanding of what is happening at the policy level to impact decisions and 
actions that helped to legitimate and realise FiReControl. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.0 Introduction: major projects, modernity and the projects’ paradox 
As distinctive features of modernisation, major projects combine large financial and human 
resources with technical innovation in temporary coalitions of firms (Winch 2008), involving 
public and or private sector organisations.  Projects are temporary endeavours, undertaken to 
deliver a unique product or service (Meredith and Mantel, 2011).  Projects are increasingly 
recognised as a versatile and flexible form of work organisation (Cicmil and Hodgson 2006), 
if not the new organisation (Weick, 1995).  The term “project” has broadened through concepts 
such as projectification (Whittington et al., 1999; Maylor et al., 2006), emergence of service 
delivery projects (Levene, 2002), organisational change and the phenomenon of 
programification (Maylor et al., 2006). This research is concerned specifically with public 
sector projects, which are often called reform projects, delivered by the UK Government to 
transform public services and deliver infrastructure.  It is such projects, totalling in 2013 some 
£488bn that are amongst the most ambitious and important in the country (The Cabinet Office, 
2014), to which, this research aims to contribute further understanding. 
Project-based organising is now a prevalent and dominant concept occurring at every echelon 
of the economy, interconnecting all sectors and industries (Beck, 2009).  Society’s quest for 
mobility that knows no boundaries; a “zero-friction society” (Canzler et al., 2008, p.84), has 
resulted in a world of flows and mobilities linking the local and the global. In the frictionless 
movement of people, goods, energy, information and money, infrastructure, technology and 
reengineering of processes play a key role.  The scope of such work to build the mobility-
enabling systems and facilities, such as airports, hospitals, schools, train stations, roads and the 
technologies that connect them is extensive (Baumann, 1998; Canzler et al., 2008; Flyvbjerg, 
2006).   As universal solutions to organisational problems (Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006), projects 
represent a different stage of social and economic development and major projects have become 
the zeitgeist of global contemporary society.  Describing the virtual shrinking of distance and 
time through major technological projects, Baumann, (1998, p.6) called this progress the “Great 
War of Independence from Space” and along with the delivery teams, projects have evolved 
into the economic and social processes upon which the new world order now depends 
(Flyvbjerg, et al., 2003). 
Large-scale Government projects seek to regenerate urban communities, develop transport 
routes, improve health and well-being, prepare and respond to disasters, provide better 
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education, or protect against terrorism.  They require the engagement and management of 
complex networks of stakeholders, including central and local Governments, private 
businesses, consultants, contractors and non-profit institutions (Winch, 2008).  The 
organisational model used to deliver public services and fulfil public policy goals, is known as 
networked Government (Eggers, 2003). In public management, inter-organisational networks 
are recognized as fundamentally important as complex arrays of organisations work in 
partnership to deliver public services (Knight and Pye, 2004).  The networked Government of 
the UK, subject to competition and market forces means public sector projects must be justified 
on economic grounds and fulfil the requirements of regulations and current policy aims.  
Typically, they are commissioned by ministerial departments and delivered through networks 
of public-private partnerships or by contracting out to private agencies.   
Although they are ubiquitous in both the public and private sector organisations, there is a 
problem with large-scale projects; they are vulnerable to a “performance paradox” (Flyvbjerg 
et al., 2003, p.3).  Despite ever increasing numbers and magnitudes of major projects, the rate 
of failure continues to grow too (Flybjerg, 2003; 2007).  Many suffer from extremely poor 
records of accomplishment in terms of completion times, cost escalations and shortfalls in 
projected revenues and economic benefits (Merrow et al.. 1988). This performance paradox 
applies to both private and public sector projects.   
In late 2004 (during the unit of analysis for this study), the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown emphasised the role of information technology in enabling the public sector to 
make the billions of pounds worth of spending savings, proposed in the Gershon Efficiency 
Review (HM Treasury, 2004), Brown’s talk in Parliament (Brown, HC Deb 12 July 2004 
c1131), discussed how billions of pounds of investment in IT was and would continue to bring 
efficiencies through thousands of civil service job cuts and improved processes.  However, a 
glance back to that period shows some of the results of that investment against a long list of 
public sector IT project failures.  The point of this is that a similar story exists today.  All of 
those major projects were scrutinised by the Government’s public spending watchdog and 
oversight agencies, such as the National Audit Office and Select Committees of the House of 
Commons. Back in 2004, statements made by these agencies are remarkably similar to those 
we still hear today; “The history of failure of major IT-enabled projects has been characterised 
by overspend, delays, poor performance and abandonment of projects at major cost” (NAO, 
2004).  Similarly, a 2004 Public Accounts Committee member, Richard Bacon, spelled out the 
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long list of IT based project failures that had come to the group’s attention  (Bacon, HC Deb 29 
June, 2004 c232). The list included: 
 
• Inland Revenue tax credit system 
• Passport office modernisation 
• Operation Telic, the UK's military operation in Iraq 
• Wessex regional health authority 
• London ambulance system 
• Inland Revenue self-assessment 
• Central Veterinary Laboratory database for tracking BSE 
• National insurance recording system 
• Immigration and nationality directorate 
• Libra project for magistrates courts in England 
• National probation service's information systems strategy 
• Criminal Records Bureau 
• GCHQ computer modernisation 
• National Air Traffic Services system 
• National Strategy for Police Information Systems (NSPIS) 
• OASys, the joint probation service and Prison Service offender assessment System 
 
In 2014, a decade later, the Major Projects Authority (MPA), advised that successful delivery 
of about one in five Government projects was in doubt and required urgent action; a total of 41 
out of 199 projects, with a collective value of close to £500bn, were given a ‘red’ or ‘amber-
red’ rating, compared with 31 projects the previous year (Cabinet Office, 2014). Examples of 
such projects are numerous.  A small selection is described below. 
 
Department of Work and Pensions’ Universal Credit System  
Universal Credit, the Government’s flagship welfare reform, was launched in 2013 to replace 
six means-tested benefits and tax credits. The Department of Work and Pension (DWP), 
originally estimated £2.2billion for the administration costs to rollout the Universal Credit 
system.  By August 2014 this estimate was revised upwards to £12.8billion.  Following the 
19 
 
MPA’s 2013-2014 annual assessment, the project fell into the “amber-red” category (Cabinet 
Office, 2014). 
Department of Work and Pensions’ Child Support Agency and CS2 system  
CS2 was the DWP’s £456m Private Finance Initiative (PFI), project to create the new IT system 
for the Child Support Agency (CSA). The supplier of the CS2 system signed the ten-year deal 
in 2000, the system was due to go live in 2001, but was delayed until 2003. The system would 
not meet the original 2001 specification until 2007. The system initially processed claims so 
slowly that it made a backlog of 30,000 new cases every quarter. Since its introduction the CSA 
has written off £1bn in claims and CS2 was finally axed in 2006 (Public Accounts Committee, 
2007). 
NHS National Programme for IT  
The NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT), commenced in 2002.  It was considered the 
world’s largest civil computer project.  In 2009 it was running four years late with a budget that 
had escalated from £5bn to around £20bn with specifications changing continuously.  In 
September 2011, ministers announced they would dismantle the National Programme but in an 
effort to salvage something from the project, said they would keep the component parts in place 
with separate management and accountability structures. However, in 2013 the Public 
Accounts Committee examined the new structures and again found a number of significant 
failures in the sub projects (Public Accounts Committee, 2013). 
The Magistrates Courts system, Libra  
 
The Lord Chancellor’s Department decided in 1996 to procure a PFI contract for a national 
standard IT system called Libra. The Department received only one bid, from ICL (now called 
Fujitsu Services), for £146 million. ICL raised its bid by 25% after being named preferred 
bidder and in December 1998 the Department signed a deal with ICL for a 10.5 year contract 
at a price of £184 million. By October 2003, the total cost of the project was estimated at £390 
million for just 8.5 years of service, rather than the original 10.5 years.  At completion, costs 
for this PFI project had escalated to £557m (Public Accounts Committee, 2003).  
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2.1 Defining failure 
Despite the ever-growing dilemma of project failure, attempts to establish a complete 
understanding of the causes seems to be a difficult task for both academic researchers and 
practitioners, largely because the concept of project failure is nebulous (Cicmil et al., 2006). 
Despite their societal and economic impact, major projects are less well understood by 
organisation and management theory than the improved social and economic processes they 
seek to enable (Winch, 2008), particularly in Government reforms. There are a variety of 
definitions of failure, which have largely been promoted through the project management 
literature and organisations such as the Project Management Institute (PMI), which advocates 
cost, time and scope as the fundamental control triangle for successful projects.  For example, 
in project management terms, a project may be deemed a failure if it overruns beyond an agreed 
end date or if it exceeds budget or does not deliver its agreed scope (c.f. Prince 2 or PMI 
methodology).  
 
This research is based on a project called FiReControl, a major reform project in the English 
fire service.  Like many projects of its kind, it was designed to implement Government policy 
through organisational reform, using complex IT systems. Therefore when discussing the 
failure of projects to deliver reform policy, we are necessarily in the realms of discussing policy 
failure.  Policies can fail because they cannot be implemented or because they do not fulfil their 
intended purpose.  Kerr (1976) claims that a policy is successful, simply when it does not fail; 
assuming that anything short of total failure is therefore successful.  Whilst this may be 
politically controversial or sensitive, especially in reform policies, it is an important concept to 
underpin the thinking around this study, insofar as it highlights the criticality of asking who 
actually defines success and failure.  From this position, other fundamental questions are raised 
including for example, who defines current methods of policy and project evaluation and are 
those methods sufficient to identify causes of that which is defined as a success or a failure?  
Can policies be considered successful if they are not considered outright failures or if the 
implementation of the delivery project ‘went well’ (Kerr, 1976)? Likewise if project delivery 
is disastrous and prevents policy implementation, or if delivery goes well but the policy fails to 
deliver its intended purpose, what are we evaluating exactly?  Such questions add to the 
complexity of our understanding and analysis of project failure and indeed project success 
(Cicmil et al., 2006).  The overlap between failed policies and/or failed projects also muddies 
the waters of both defining and evaluating success and failure.  Moreover, the stage at which 
many public projects are cancelled and labelled as failures varies between Governments and 
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contexts.  Many projects complete that have well exceeded budgets and under-delivered on 
scope.  This study sought to ask if we take the notion of failure for granted. Fundamentally the 
question is ontological; is failure (or success) an objective state of affairs or simply a matter of 
interpretation (McConnell, 2010)? 
 
This research challenges current Government methods of evaluating public reform projects, 
that Government ministers have labelled as failures.  In the quest to address the performance 
paradox (Flyvbjerg, 2001), there may be other places to look for causal mechanisms influencing 
project delivery failure, such as further back in the policy formation stages.  The results of this 
study show that scrutinising failed project delivery by the final PAC analysis fails to account 
for the full story of a major reform project.  Furthermore, if defining success and failure also 
remains misunderstood, there is scope to build on current methods of understanding failure in 
major public projects. 
 
2.2 Project failure research 
In the traditional policy cycle framework, in an attempt to learn lessons, evaluation takes place 
after the policy implementation phase (McConnell, 2010). The UK Government assures us that 
“evaluation examines the outturn of a policy, programme or project against what was expected, 
and is designed to ensure that the lessons learned are fed back into the decision-making process. 
This ensures Government action is continually refined to reflect what best achieves objectives 
and promotes the public interest” (HM Treasury, 2003, p.45). 
 
Thus in understanding failed public sector reform policy, ex-poste evaluation takes place after 
the implementation project is either cancelled or has reached a state of completion, after any 
number of budget, time or scope changes or escalations. Our main sources of understanding of 
this stage of implementation project failure, traditionally takes a foundationalist perspective, 
where success and failure are generally considered objective states of reality (McConnell, 
2003). As well as the limited perspectives of Government evaluations, despite the complexity 
of and multi-stakeholder involvement in the perceived success or failure of major projects, 
academic research in this area often tends towards narrow, functionalist approaches.  Such 
approaches have built on earlier studies, which identified issues such as budget and schedule 
over-runs, lack of clear objectives and scope creep (Merrow et al., 1988; Merrow, 2011; Scott-
Young and Samson, 2008).  
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2.3 Escalation of commitment to failing projects 
In essence, the research into projects has broadly taken two functionalist routes. The first route 
is called the Factor School, which has led to the development of standardised tools and methods 
to improve project control and efficiency (Styhre, 2006), based on statistical research of project 
success and failure criteria (Söderlund 2011).  The Decision School in comparison tends to 
favour interpretative methods to describe the role of politics and decision-making in projects, 
and covers issues of over-optimism (Lovallo, 2003), and the reluctance to cancel failing 
projects (Green, et al., 2003). Decision School research originates from early experimental 
studies of escalation of commitment, a phenomenon where otherwise rational people commit 
additional resources to a failing course of action (Fox and Staw 1979; Staw, 1976; Staw and 
Fox 1977). Such experimental studies, rooted in positivism, elicited important theories, which 
were combined together into a theoretical framework developed by Staw and Ross (1987), 
containing four major determinants of escalation of commitment: project (original 
commitments of the project), psychological (internal views of the project managers), social 
(expectations and influences of individuals or groups on the project), and organisational 
(hierarchical structures and cultures of the organisation). Staw and Ross (1987), prescribed 
actions to reduce or eliminate decision makers’ tendency to escalate commitment by controlling 
for these factors in various ways, for example removing a sense of responsibility from project 
managers. This approach illustrates the narrow focus on people (agents) behaviours, as the main 
determinants of project failure through escalation. 
 
The evolution of the commitment escalation field has led to alternative explanations for project 
failure.  Escalation of commitment to a failing project can be caused more by decision dilemmas 
than by cavalier attitudes of throwing good money after bad (Bowen 1987). Drummond (1996; 
1998), introduces the idea that in commitment escalation, people create decision rationales for 
themselves.  In her study of the London Stock Exchange’s Taurus Project, Drummond finds 
evidence of both decision dilemmas and social psychological factors as motivating factors in 
escalation (Drummond, 1996).  Self-interest is identified for escalation through the elevation 
of individual changes over the greater interests of the project resulting in unmanageable 
complexity. In addition, people engage in superficial levels of due diligence decision-making, 
thus carrying out roles expected of them without challenge as attention is engrossed in solving 
the problem rather than questioning the problem itself (Drummond, 1996).  
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Drummond (1996, p.187) takes the escalation research into new directions, when concluding 
her analysis of the failed Taurus project that “Escalation begins with the establishment of a 
myth....persistence is political will, destructive logic characterised by due diligence, project and 
organisational factors combine to obscure reality, everyone carries on because that’s what some 
committee says we do”. Inevitably, the myths “become so deeply embedded as to be taken-for-
granted, like some inviolate rule beyond individual discretion leading”, (ibid, p.76).   
 
2.4 Future perfect strategies 
Decision dilemmas are compounded by dominant myths (Drummond 1996) and are created 
partly through the use of future perfect strategies (Clegg, et al., 2002; Pitsis, et. al, 2003).  In 
future perfect strategising, the forward-looking projection of ends is combined with a 
visualization of the means by which that projected future may be accomplished (Weick, 1979) 
including shaping the decision-making process through overestimating benefits and 
underestimating costs (Atkin, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2008; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Miller and Lessard, 
2001), which only serve to affirm and deepen the myths.   
 
Future perfect strategising generally relates to functional views of costs and benefits.  Reform 
projects that comprise new organisational configurations based on new technology systems, by 
their very nature lack evidence of their potential results (Georgiadou, 2003), and forward-
looking projections are necessary to some degree.  The idea that success is more likely if project 
participants share a vision underpins the future perfect strategising concept.  However, research 
suggests (Clegg, et al., 2006; Winch, 2008; Kriener and Winch, 2008) that future perfect 
thinking as a project management strategy necessitates constant revisiting and reinforcement 
of the projections, which complicates project implementation.  Such research explores project 
delivery and the role played by future perfect strategies, which may be contributing to project 
failure up at the delivery stage. Their findings indicate future perfect strategies or projections 
are not useful in providing realistic foundations for delivering projects but may play a role in 
rallying political and financial support. This study is not concerned with implementation failure 
per se as it seeks to look elsewhere for other causal influences.   
 
The idea that visioning the future to rally political and financial support (Kriener and Winch, 
2008), is therefore not to be underestimated or relegated as an incidental finding when exploring 
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implementation failure.  This study argues that it is an important place to explore the very seeds 
of failure. 
 
From the literature review, questions can begin to be asked to orient the research.  For example, 
were powerful myths (Drummond, 1996), or political imperatives used to create the vision 
necessary to ensure actors took part without being fully convinced that the project was 
practicable in economic, contractual and technical respects (Kreiner & Winch, 2008).  Could 
such myths serve to generate commitment to the course of action, the reform?  Did such myths 
form the antecedents to escalation of commitment once the project started to lose its way and 
were they accounted for by the oversight agencies seeking to learn lessons after failure?  Based 
on these early challenges to extant literature on failed projects, the specific research questions 
for this study will be detailed in Section 3.3.5. 
 
2.5 Oversight and learning lessons after project failure 
The strategic policy initiatives of the UK Governments, become the complex, large-scale 
programmes of change, or reform, which are often driven by complex information system 
technologies and it is these programmes to which this study refers.  These programmes are 
beset by delivery problems that frequently end in failure, whether through cancellation or 
through unmanaged or unmanageable scope creep, budget or timescale escalations, (Meredith 
and Mantel, 2011; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Anderson, 2006).  Lessons learned after the failure 
of major public projects is delivered by oversight agencies such as the National Audit Office 
(NAO), the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and the Major Projects Authority (MPA).  In 
light of the continued problems around Government projects, the MPA was formed in 2011 as 
a partnership between the Home Office and HM Treasury and is tasked with overseeing all 
Government major projects.  The fourth operational pillar of the MPA is its remit for lessons 
learned, called ‘achievements and learning’.  The aim of which is to establish an innovative, 
electronic platform to capture and communicate lessons learned and best practice, to enable 
direct access to project material (Cabinet Office, 2014). However, as with other oversight 
agencies in Government projects, vital information can still be withheld from the process which 
can contribute to lack of genuine transparency. 
More traditional sources of Government learning are the NAO and the PAC, the two key audit 
institutions of the UK Government. The NAO is a parliamentary, rather than a Government 
agency working alongside audit agencies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland with the 
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objective of generating financial savings. The NAO is responsible for the financial auditing of 
central Government accounts and annually produces approximately 60 Value for Money (VfM) 
audit reports on selected issues (Dunleavy and Britain, 2009). However, whilst apparently 
independent from the political process, the NAO still performs a continuous balancing act; it 
needs its reports to be controversial enough to remind Parliament and the public of its 
usefulness, but not so controversial as to cause the PAC to divide along party political lines 
(Roberts and Pollitt, 1994).  
The main work of the all-party Public Accounts Committee (PAC) is to examine the VfM 
reports made by the head of the National Audit Office – the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(C&AG). PAC reviews are concerned with Government departments’ economic, efficient and 
effective use of resources to further their policy objectives. The PAC is concerned with 
performance accountability and represents the highest level in a parliamentary democracy 
where organisations can be called to account for their performance (Jones and Jacobs, 2006). 
The PAC’s objective is to draw lessons from past successes and failures, which can be applied 
to future activity either by the organisations examined or by holding to account the Government 
for its use of taxpayers’ money. The PAC is arguably the ultimate purveyor of received wisdom 
in lessons learned for public projects. 
However, like the NAO, the PAC has also been criticised for not examining public accounts 
per se, as it only considers the reports produced by the NAO, therefore narrowly focusing on 
the financial probity of public spending (McGee, 2002).  For the public sector reform agenda, 
the underpinning role of the PAC is considered paradoxical (Jones & Jacobs, 2006) given that 
their focus is on managerialism2 rather than political oversight (Gray & Jenkins, 1993). The 
economic bias of the PAC compromises its ability to challenge the evidence base on which 
policies are developed and on which projects decisions are made.  The taken-for-granted 
assumption of the PAC is that the policy and its implementation project had the potential for 
success because another government process, the OGC Gateway Process has established this.  
The OGC Gateway examines programmes and projects at key decision points in their 
lifecycle to provide assurance that they can progress successfully to the next stage; the 
process is best practice in central civil government, the health sector, local government and 
Defence.  By the time the PAC investigates (OGC-gateway approved) failures, the 
                                                 
2 The Oxford Dictionary defines Managerialism  as the belief  in or reliance on the use of professional managers in 
administering or planning an activity. 
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assumption of the project’s capacity to succeed is taken-for-granted.  This assumption 
prevents learning in the areas of evidence-based decisions or political rhetoric and conflates 
learning to functional failures.  
In relation to project failure, the PAC typically indicates procurement and project 
management inadequacies as the common conclusions for failure. Such findings support 
much of the functionalist project research (c.f. Anderson, 2006; Meredith and Mantell, 2011; 
Flyvbjerg, 2003; 2006; Merrow, 1988), that determines over optimism, future perfect 
strategizing, or poor adherence to standards as causes of failure. Findings from Government 
inquiries are also predominantly deterministic using conventional lessons learned approaches 
to describe event level observations.  Yet it is the taken-for-granted assumptions implicit in 
public inquiry methods that are often not acknowledged.  Evaluation reports of public 
projects from the PAC, NAO and more recently the MPA indicate they are fundamentally 
political and primarily concerned with accountability for public resources used and the 
delivery mechanisms employed (Klecun et al., 2014). The methods used have been criticised 
for being entrenched in the realms of economics and focusing on cost-benefit analysis or 
financially sustainability, and based on methods “rooted in objectivist assumptions” 
(Friedman and Wyatt, 2006, p.32).  They are “built on a comparison of “outcome variables” 
across contexts or time, assessing performance by pre-established metrics, or focusing on a 
narrow range of anticipated effects” (Kelcun, et al., 2014, p.148).   
Ontologically, such methods consider failure as an objective fact, and seek to determine 
definitive causes of failure using positivist frameworks of performance and measurement 
against identifiable standards.  Consequently another question emerges to guide the focus of 
this research; does there exist a phenomenon of project failure (or an aspect of it) that is 
independent of our knowledge of it, which current project evaluation methods cannot reveal 
but which may help us to understand more about Government project failure? 
2.5 Summary of project research perspective 
In problematising public sector project failure research, this study challenges both the 
ideological and field assumptions that are made by Government oversight agencies and the 
procedures by which they deliver lessons learned after projects fail. It also seeks to challenge 
the prominent positivist paradigm assumptions of such inquiries and other projects’ research 
that look to the same places for singular explanations of the causes of failure. 
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The issues arising from our extant sources of understanding of reform project failure prompts 
the following challenges; 
1] That failure is an objective state of reality that exists,  
2] That causes of failure can only be found within the boundary of the project itself, and  
3] That project-related people (agents) are usually to blame.   
Functional approaches have revealed much in terms of the numerous determinants of project 
implementation failure, yet true and definitive causes remain elusive.  At the heart of the issue 
is an understanding of and challenge of the term ‘failure’.  This research will advocate the 
concept that failure is not itself an absolute truth, but rather a concept of understanding that is 
reached when support is withdrawn (Drummond and Hodgson, 2003). The study looks beyond 
the traditional spheres of inquiry, such as functional failures during implementation or the 
escalation of commitment during project delivery.  Instead it will bound its unit of analysis 
towards the antecedents of failure, towards the complex interplay of the people, the institutions 
and environments that pre-exist the reform project, where reform ideas are generated and 
legitimated.   
2.7 Broad questions arising from the reform projects literature 
 Do projects fail only because delivery agents underperform through bad management 
practice or over estimating outcomes? 
 Are powerful myths (perhaps described as political imperatives), used to create the 
vision that secures resources and commitment for projects, despite contrary evidence? 
 How do ideas emerge and develop into projects? 
 What is project failure?  
 Does project failure exist independent of our knowledge of it, and which current project 
evaluation methods cannot truly reveal? 
These guiding questions helped to shape the research questions which are stated in Section 
3.3.5. 
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2.8 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS  
2.8.0 Introduction 
The research explores the early political stages before the delivery project begins, where ideas 
are formed, politicised, legitimated and transformed into strategic reform policy.  Exploring the 
antecedents of escalation of commitment and delivery failure requires the examination of how 
early reform ideas are framed and rationalised into policy.  Building support to gain policy 
approval and to secure public resources for implementation, locates the research within the 
fields of legitimacy, institutionalism and public management.  Therefore, the first conceptual 
lens of institutional theory and the key conceptual component of legitimacy will be used to 
explore the build-up to the approval of a major reform project.  
Challenging both the traditional, foundationalist, positivist approaches (which evaluate project 
failure as an indisputable fact), as well socially constructivist views (which suggest failure is a 
matter of interpretation), an argument is advocated that straddles both standpoints, which 
emphasises the very political nature of policy and project failure (McConnell, 2003).  
An analytic lens has been chosen, which has its foundations in social theory to explore the 
political nature of project failure.  Social theory is concerned with the fundamental assumptions 
of social inquiry that questions the nature of human agency and its relationship to social and 
cultural structures (Wendt, 1999).  The variant of social theory that better suits the analytic 
requirements of this research is realist social theory.  As the analytic framework to the study, 
realist social theory will be discussed in Section 2.8.   
Realist social theory represents Archer’s (1995), contribution to the field and is based on the 
overarching philosophy of critical realism, which informed the methodology of this research.  
Critical realism is discussed in Section 3.1.4. 
The realist social theory approach can illuminate what is partly unobservable (Bhaskar, 1978).  
In the realm of reform politics, where decisions and actions take place in the rooms and halls 
of Westminster, there are unobservable structures that exert influence on actors and vice versa.  
Through these relations, legitimacy builds to enable or constrain action. In the search for 
understanding and explanation of how ideas are legitimated and transformed into policies and 
scoped into delivery projects, the research explores how and by what power, reform policies 
are framed as rational programmes of change, who stands to gain or lose by the process and 
whether it is desirable.  This value and power focus leads the research towards the concept of 
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phronesis as described in Aristotle’s, Nicomachean Ethics (trans. Irwin, 1999). The phronetic 
aims of the research are discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
2.8.1 Institutional theory: Towards answering the question, what is there?  
The following section provides the theoretical framework and an examination of the literature 
related to institutional theory, legitimacy, rhetoric and new public management. I will first 
introduce institutional theory and its philosophical evolutions.  I will then discuss and position 
legitimacy as a central imperative of the theory. DiMaggio & Powell (1991) refer to the 
‘legitimacy imperative’ of institutional theory describing legitimacy as a source of inertia in 
organisations to develop and maintain the practices that align specifically with appropriate 
organisational behaviour as per the social myths that prevail. The rationale for discussing 
legitimacy in the context of institutional theory is to establish the conceptual links to other 
concepts that are relevant to this study of a Government reform project, such as rhetoric and 
new public management (NPM).  Rhetoric can be strategically deployed to create legitimacy 
(build myth), and NPM (Hood, 1991), as a form of institutional legitimacy can both influence 
and be influenced by actors in the field.  These concepts form parts of the theory lens for the 
research. 
Institutional Theory has evolved through many research perspectives and has become a 
dominant approach to understanding organisations.  The modern foundations were established 
by the works of key institutional researchers, such as Zucker (1977), DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977). Their perspectives portrayed organisations as “agentic 
actors responding to situational circumstances...influenced by their institutional context, i.e. by 
widespread social understandings (rational myths)” that define what it means to be rational 
(Greenwood et al., 2008, p.3).  By the 1980s, a defining theme of institutionalism had been 
established; that organisations use “particular arrangements that defy rational explanations” 
(ibid, p.31) that are explained by Institutional Theory, which emphasizes the criticality of 
shared and taken-for-granted social values and ideas (Greenwood et al., 2008).  This view is 
based on claims that organisations can be described as dramatic enactments of rationalised 
myths based on the widespread norms of modern societies.  Further, these formal organisational 
structures are influenced by institutional context that has more to do with social values and the 
rules or myths that abound, than with the demands of the work itself (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
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A key assumption of the early institutional theory literature is that by conforming to 
institutional norms, organisations gain legitimacy and improve their prospects of survival 
(Powell 1991).  The work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), features legitimacy as a key concept, 
suggesting it can protect an organisation from external pressures such as scrutiny or challenges 
to its conduct. Conforming to rationalised myths or societal expectations about what constitutes 
a proper organisation results in another phenomena; institutional isomorphism (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focused on the idea that organisations converge 
upon the same response to their institutional environments and sought to understand this 
homogeneity of organisational forms.  Their seminal work put forward early explanations for 
isomorphism, where either through imitation or independent development under similar 
constraints, organisations share similarity of the processes or structures.  Explanations include 
the structuration of organisational fields, suggesting “powerful forces emerge that lead them 
(organisations) to become more similar to one another” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.148).  
Becoming isomorphic with one’s institutional context “signals social fitness and gains 
legitimacy in the eyes of critical constituents” (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006, p.4), giving the 
appearance of being rational (Scott, 1983). Finding that isomorphism was facilitated by the 
diffusion of ideas, practices and knowledge about prescribed organisational structures among 
other organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), led to a significant contribution to the field.   
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) put forward three diffusion mechanisms by which organisations 
come to mimic each other; coercive (organisations are forced to change by external forces), 
normative (where professional standards influence changes in organisations) and mimetic 
isomorphism (when organisations imitate each other’s structures or processes in the belief they 
are beneficial).   
Once isomorphism became apparent it led to research about why and how organisations adopt 
these processes.  From an organisation’s perspective, conforming to institutional rules might 
not always match rational business aims and may in fact conflict with business requirements in 
respect of technical efficiency (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008).  To address this paradox, 
organisations end up decoupling their practice from their structure to enable them to achieve 
legitimacy which ensures survival, whilst remaining efficient or consistent (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).  The phenomena of organisational decoupling was taken up by researchers such as 
Brunsson (1989), to explore public sector management and reforms, where the goal of 
modernisation has little effect on operational practice, and is explored further in Section 2.7   
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Returning to the evolution of institutional theory and the concept of isomorphism, the lack of 
theorisation outside of the public sector field and confusion around the very concept of 
isomorphism itself led to ambiguities in the theory (Fombrun 1989). If isomorphism is about 
the relationship between an organisation and its institutional context, questions began to be 
asked about why all organisations do not respond to their relative institutional forces in the 
same way.  Meyer and Rowan had already identified that “institutional myths differ in [their] 
completeness” (1977, p.354), which suggested that choice and strategy could be used towards 
interpreting them.  Furthermore, the realisation that organisations and groups competing for 
power may or may not exploit the legitimating effect of isomorphism to varying degrees 
highlighted the fact that they will not all align with their institutional contexts in the same way.   
Expanding the scope of institutional theory, organisational researchers began to embrace the 
ideas that DiMaggio and Powell (1988) had raised in relation to agency. (c.f. Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Dacin et al., 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Agency theory suggests that organisations 
(actors) are not entirely at the mercy of institutional norms (Eisenhardt, 1988; Carstensen, 
2011), otherwise how were new organisational forms created and legitimated and by whom, 
and with what power?  DiMaggio (1988), had called for the influences of agency to be 
considered as organisational responses to their institutional contexts and suggested agency may 
be more intentional than many had acknowledged.  Furthermore, strategic choice may be 
involved and contingent on the environmental context.  Prior to this perspective, institutional 
theory had fallen short in accounting for the role of actors (organisations) in promoting their 
institutional context through legitimating activities, implying that “institutional contexts were 
‘out there’, as constraints on an organisation rather than as something with which the 
organisation interacts and constructs” (Greenwood et al., 2008, p.13).  It was from here that the 
notion of intentionally promoting institutional contexts evolved and the concept of legitimacy 
re-emerged, which had previously been recognised as an institutional phenomenon (Meyer and 
Scott 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977, Weber 1978).  
The previous discussion outlines the key concepts that have defined institutional theory as it 
emerged through organisational studies.  In essence these defining concepts suggest that 
organisational practices and structures are shaped by socially constructed rules or beliefs that 
are influenced by the wider context.  When organisations conform to institutional norms, they 
do so to gain legitimacy.  Prevailing norms pressurise organisations such that they become 
isomorphic with others in their field to maintain their legitimacy and thus their survival 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1988: Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006).  
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2.7.2 Legitimacy 
As a central theme in organisational institutionalism, the work of Meyer and Scott (1983), 
highlighted the significance of legitimacy in institutional theory, describing it in terms of an 
explanatory concept relating to the stage at which no questions can be raised about an 
organisation.  A single definition that fully captures the conceptual diversity of legitimacy is 
difficult to find but it can broadly be defined as a generalised perception that within a socially 
constructed set of norms, values and beliefs, particular actions are perceived as desirable, 
proper or appropriate (Suchman, 1995). Influence cannot easily be exerted by solely possessing 
and using power.  It is legitimacy that leads people to believe that the entity is appropriate, 
proper, and just (Berger and Luckmann, 1991).  It enables people to feel that they ought to defer 
to decisions and rules, and that they can follow them voluntarily out of obligation rather than 
out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward (Tyler, 2006).  Thus legitimacy is a broadly 
applied concept and can be ascribed (or denied), (Patty and Penn, 2013), to “an act, a rule, a 
procedure, a routine, a distribution, a position, a group or team, a group’s status structure, 
teamwork, a system of positions, an authority structure, an organization, organizational 
symbols, an organizations form, practices, services, programs, a regime, a system of power, 
and a system of inequality (to name a few)” (Johnson, 2004, p.17). Legitimacy is essential for 
the survival of an organisation (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) as it sets boundaries, thereby 
limiting what people may or may not do and it shapes perceptions, determines agendas and 
informs decisions (Berger and Luckmann, 1991).   
Suchman (1995), differentiates between concepts of legitimacy; institutional legitimacy and 
strategic legitimacy.  The institutional perspective of legitimacy is viewed as a set of norms, 
values and beliefs which embed practices, enable shared meanings, and convey expectations 
and values (Colyvas and Powell, 2006).  This institutional perspective of legitimacy relates to 
the cognitive process by which an entity becomes embedded in norms through taken-for-
granted assumptions that effects collective action (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Hannah and 
Carroll, 1992).  
Strategic legitimacy in comparison is gained through intentional pursuit of organisational goals 
(Suchman, 1995). The theories of institutional and strategic legitimacy support two key 
concepts in the context of this research.  The first concept is rhetoric; a source of strategic 
legitimacy deployed to achieve organisational goals by the New Labour administration in the 
context of this research.  The second concept is New Public Management, which at the time of 
the FiReControl project was the dominant institutional framework for public sector governance 
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in UK that could legitimate, and render taken-for-granted, the talk and actions of political actors 
in power. The discussion then moves to discuss these sources of legitimacy, common to the 
early stages of reform projects, in the context of social theory and the complex interplay 
between structures, cultures and agency.  Based on Archer’s (1995), concepts of analytic 
dualism and morphogenetic cycles (c.f. Section 2.8), the conceptual framework presents the 
backdrop to the data analysis, where structures, cultures and agency will be explored to tease 
out how actions can be both influenced by, and influential to, the process of acquiring or 
strategically deploying legitimacy.   
2.7.3 Strategic legitimacy, discourse and rhetoric 
Fundamental to strategic legitimacy is understanding language, specifically, “how meanings of 
discourse are shared and processed for decisions and how they give meaning to actions” 
(Phillips et al., 2004, p. 637).  Philips et al., (2004), argue that it is not actions per se that define 
institutions but rather, they are constituted through discourse and the texts that describe and 
communicate those actions, postulating that institutions can be understood as products of the 
discursive activity that influence action. 
Legitimacy and legitimation are conceptually close to institutionalization (Brinkerhoff, 2005) 
and there is a fundamental relationship between institutions and language from which 
organisational meanings are sustained (Foucault, 1972). The wider influences of language and 
discourse enhance the traditional scope of institutional theory, which was otherwise concerned 
with only organizational practice.  Discourse is the structured collections of meaningful texts 
(Parker, 1992), and through their analysis we can learn more about institutionalization to move 
the concept of institution beyond just action, to discourse. Discourse affects action through the 
production of institutions; social constructions that embody sets of sanctions which make 
certain viewpoints dominant and thus make contradictory actions problematic (Fairclough, 
2005; Fleetwood, 2008). The underlying assumptions of institutions, which are often 
unexamined, are deeply held, and form a framework within which reasoning takes place (Horn, 
1983, p.1).  
Major projects can be viewed as new organisational forms (Weick, 2005), and those who are 
affected will seek to attach or deny legitimacy to the new project and what it promises.  Suddaby 
and Greenwood (2005), advance the three tenets of institutional research in explaining the 
emergence of a new organisational form.  Firstly, a new organisational form emerges via a 
growing knowledge of legitimacy, as alternative forms are rejected by actors, followed 
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(secondly), by shifts in the underlying logic that underpins their frameworks for reason and 
belief. Finally, such shifts are enabled through strategic use of the persuasive language of 
rhetoric. While discourse views language as a form of social practice, rhetoric restricts its focus 
to explicitly interest-laden discourse and enables a situational focus on how actors seek to 
achieve change (Fairclough, 2005). 
Rhetoric does not feature heavily in the political literature (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). The 
dynamics and outcomes are rarely proved with theoretical frameworks and “rhetoric can play 
a role in explaining outcomes and those holding the reins of power can and must deploy it” 
(ibid, p.38).  Gaining and keeping power relies as much on legitimacy as it does on physical 
coercion and legitimacy can only be established through rhetorical action (Wolf, 2006).  The 
framing of political activity (through rhetoric) is as important to furthering political agendas 
harnessing physical resources towards those aims and as such should be explored in political 
analysis (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). 
“Public sector organisations are prone to make the mistake of supposing that organisational 
statements and decisions agree with organisational actions’ (Brunsson, 1989, p.231). This 
statement suggests there is more talk than action (Pollitt, 2001), explained in terms of what are 
essentially normal organisational and political procedures.  In other words, people are simply 
doing what they do; behaving rationally within their own frames of reference, following their 
institutional logics or the master principles (Greenwood et al., 2008), to guide them on how to 
carry out their work. 
Talk can have a life of its own, and talk and decisions are tools used in politics to win legitimacy 
(Brunsson, 1989). In major public projects, for example, legitimacy begins at a political 
ideological level, where a project is legitimated into existence by the macro, context-laden myth 
(Drummond, 1996), and rhetoric that successfully secure resources for that project over others.  
The project survives for as long as it can command the necessary social support and is 
influenced in this survival challenge by multiple legitimating forces.  Brunsson (1989), 
distinguishes between talk, decision and actions, to which Pollitt (2001), adds ‘results’, 
asserting that in public administration even determined implementations (actions) do not 
necessarily lead to uniform or expected results. It is especially the case for political 
organisations, “since most of the ‘production’ of ministerial departments consists of talk, 
statements and decisions, rather than concrete goods, services or, more atomistically, actions” 
(Pollitt, 2001, p.936). Whilst talk and decisions are commonplace in politics, there isn’t always 
35 
 
the follow-up action. However, the decision itself is useful to achieve and maintain legitimacy.  
Talk and decisions indicate the way forward, the frames of thinking, they allocate responsibility 
whether implicitly or explicitly and they essentially affect activity in a direction even if the 
intended outcome is not completed or delivered.  It is the framing of activity, the direction of 
travel, the allocation of resources towards an ideal, the ‘movement’ that people can get behind 
and those who oppose can also look busy opposing.  Whether actions take place is sometimes 
secondary. 
2.7.4 Institutional legitimacy and new public management  
This research is located within the sphere of public sector reform projects.  The public sector is 
the part of national economy providing basic goods or services that are either not, or cannot be, 
provided by the private sector. It consists of national and local Governments and the network 
of associated agencies and bodies. How the sector is managed will be influenced by the 
economic methods and models of the Government in power (Ironside and Seifert, 2004).  The 
rise and fall of different schools of economics is related to shifts in the balance of political, 
social and economic power and economic theories are independent of each other, they do not 
supersede each other (Skidelsky, 2010). Thus the economic methods of Maynard Keynes, for 
example, whose welfare solutions were devised in the 1930s after the Great Depression 
(whereby, increased Government spending and deficits were intended to increase demand in 
the economy for more production, causing producers to increase supply to meet that demand, 
hiring more workers and reducing unemployment in the process, (Seddon, 2008), still have 
followers today.  Keynesian economics re-emerged across the world as potential recovery 
solutions following the 2008 crash, with USA, China and the UK, for example increasing 
Government spending to kick start the economy (Rafiq, 2008).   
European centre-left Governments arguably regard Keynesianism and social democracy 
(which, advocates economic and social interventions to promote social justice within the 
framework of a capitalist economy (Giddens, 2013), with derision (Ironside and Seifert, 2004).  
Comments by  ex-Conservative Secretary of State, Michael Heseltine; “by 1979 local 
Government had become a barely controllable free-wheeling employment machine, which, for 
year after year had been run largely for the benefit of the machine-minders” (Heseltine, 1987, 
p.43), backed up by scholars (e.g. Dunleavy, 2006), normed such views of inefficiency at the 
hands of bureaucrats.  
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The perspective of state inefficiency favours the opinion that the relatively poor performance 
of public sector organisations is due to the lack of the competition machinery of private sector 
firms.  In the neo-classical model of the pursuit of profit, this notion is the motor that drives 
increases in efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in private companies (Ironside and Seifert, 
2004).  Centre-left Governments have adopted the neo-liberal alternative to Keynesianism or 
social democracy, embracing the New Right’s ‘public choice’ theories. This approach rejects 
socialist economic ideology, which involves welfare state provisions, collective bargaining 
arrangements and regulation of the economy in the general interest and redistribution of wealth 
(Heywood, 2012).  Institutional logics are systems of socially constructed cultural symbols and 
material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which organizations provide 
meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce experiences (Thornton 
and Ocasio, 2008). Advocating public choice theories, the institutional logic of neo-liberals 
favours involvement of private firms in the delivery of public services, asserting that it results 
in the best allocation and delivery of services.  The practical application of the public choice 
ideals to public service became known as New Public Management (Hood, 1991).   
New Public Management (NPM), is an overarching term denoting the administrative reforms 
that have been implemented across many countries’ public sectors over the last 25 years (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004). The early growth of NPM was heavily influenced by the business-like 
attitudes to Government of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, which resulted in a set of 
recipes for public sector reform. By the early 1990s this became known as NPM or (in the US) 
Re-inventing Government (Hood, 1991). The consultants, Du Gay, Osborne and Gaebler, 
(1993), advisors to the US Government, spoke of ‘entrepreneurial Government’ and of global 
trends in public sector reforms.  Coupled with claims by ministers that the UK was at the 
forefront of a global movement and supported by research publications, the general consensus 
was that most of the developed world was implementing policies of NPM.  NPM involved 
developing performance management, introducing competition, offering quality and choice to 
citizens, and shifting Government roles from operations to strategy. However, it was argued 
that in retrospect, the whole of the world was not following the same path (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011), yet “it remains true that NPM ideas spread widely, and are often still seen as 
the most obvious route to modernization” (Pollitt and Dan, 2011, p.5). 
Since 2003, the post-NPM landscape has been described variously as the ‘new public 
governance’ (Osborne, 2006), ‘digital-era governance’ (Dunleavy et al., 2006) and the ‘neo-
Weberian state’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). However, the reform objectives of these various 
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versions of NPM policies have all had similar goals: “to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the public sector; to enhance the responsiveness of public agencies to their clients 
and customers; to reduce public expenditure; and to improve managerial accountability” 
(Lægreid 2011, p.2). Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Raegan were the first leaders to introduce 
the ideas of NPM around 1979/80 and Australia and New Zealand soon followed throughout 
the 1980s.  NPM reforms have spread throughout the world through the forces of globalisation 
and particularly where countries have had influence through Commonwealth connections and 
international organisation networks (Lægreid, 2011).  
Public records are steeped in the ministerial visionary rhetoric of NPM (Pollitt, 2001).  New 
Labour advocated and promoted themes of modernisation, partnership and innovation (Clarke 
at al., 2000).  When such talk wins legitimacy and support, a new language emerges, and the 
new club of people who speak this language hold the power (Pollitt, 2001). In reform, ‘truth’ 
is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements (Foucault, 1980). NPM is a reform system, 
invariably influenced and tweaked by the high politics of the time, where the adversarial 
conduct of politicians, institutional structures and ideological politics shapes the behaviour of 
decision-makers inside Government (Moran, 2001), but in essence the ideologies are geared 
towards objectives of efficiency and accountability.   It is with these objectives that public 
reform projects can be conceived based on ideologies that are unproven, yet without evidence 
of success, why do policies such as the Private Finance Initiative, (PFI), regionalisation and 
outsourcing continue? Functionalist approaches say that if there is increased take-up then they 
must be more efficient solutions, and so the cycle of adoption continues (Wise, 2002). Whilst 
the pursuit of efficiency can remain the guiding purpose, if there is more talk of achieving 
efficiency than seeing it in action, then perhaps this has just come to be expected of political 
organisations (Pollit, 2001).  
“Studies of organisational and political change routinely point to findings that are hard 
to square with either rational actor or functionalist accounts, administrators and 
politicians champion programmes that are established but not implemented, managers 
gather information assiduously but fail to analyse it; experts are hired not for advice but 
to signal legitimacy” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p.3) 
Pollitt (2001), highlights the deterministic, functionalist mind-set at the root of the general 
conviction that there is global convergence towards reforming the public sector for smarter, 
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more efficient working.  The taken-for-granted causal link between the popularity of such 
change programmes as an indicator of their success, and justification to continue in the same 
direction has been challenged (Pollitt, 2001, 2011; Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010; Polidano, 
2001).  These critics suggest the functionalist, deterministic tendency to explain the similarity 
of the pursuit of efficiency through reform is based on a strong surviving brand of contingency.  
Such challengers contend that functionalist, received notions of global convergence lead to the 
taken-for-granted behaviour of Governments to be seen to be doing something under the remit 
of NPM.  There is still, however, a paucity of evidence for efficiency gains achieved through 
the innovations of NPM (Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010).  Major reform projects might contribute 
towards the aim of doing something in line with taken-for-grantedness that legitimates public 
management agendas.  There is little evidence of efficiency for the projects that do complete, 
and if there is any efficiency gained in one sector it does not follow this will be the case in 
every sector, (Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010; Polidano, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 1995; Pollitt, 
2001). 
Thus if NPM policies lack evidence of capacity to deliver, there must be an alternative 
explanation for the spread of public sector reforms that claim to deliver efficiency. Pollit 
(2001), suggests the answer is to be found in new institutionalism, whereby the copying of 
organisational forms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is less to do with 
improving performance through efficiency and more to do with, as previously discussed, 
legitimacy.  Earlier in this chapter, legitimacy was described in the context of institutionalism 
and the two categories, strategic (Suchman, 1995), and institutional (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Deephouse, 1996), that frame legitimacy in relation to this research.  Rhetoric was linked 
to strategic legitimacy (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) and NPM to institutional legitimacy 
(Pollitt, 2001), or isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Returning to the three categories of isomorphism introduced earlier, coercive, mimetic and 
normative  (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), a Government agency exhibiting coercive 
isomorphism can exert power to force institutional reform over the lower tiers of Government 
who acquiesce in exchange for receiving assistance associated with the reform (Pollitt, 2001).  
As an example, in the case of FiReControl, Chief Fire Officers were not explicitly instructed 
to regionalise and retained the right to reject transferring their control room to a regional, 
limited company facility.  However, to do so would have left them out of the significant 
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technological investment and the additional New Burdens3 funding that was associated with 
the reform.  Another example of such a reform still around in the early New Labour years was 
the Conservative party’s policy of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, which resulted in EU 
financial assistance for those who implemented the policy. 
When organisations find themselves in conditions of signiﬁcant uncertainty, particularly new 
organisations or new groups in power, for example, following Government changes, mimetic 
isomorphism can occur (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  In these situations, the safest option is 
to copy what appears to be existing formulae already considered modern or successful, such as 
public sector reform (Pollitt 2001).  As with legitimacy, the strategy to play it safe may be 
intentional and strategic, or it may be something that occurs naturally because of exposure to 
institutional structures and cultures (Suchman, 1995; Archer, 1995). The proliferation of NPM 
policies and their apparent convergence across organisations and countries may be better 
explained by isomorphism and not necessarily the result of global economic pressures, or gains 
in efficiency or effectiveness (Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010; Pollitt, 2001, Common, 1998).  
Supporting evidence is found in an extensive Europe-wide meta-analysis research programme, 
which assessed the impact of 520 NPM reforms (Pollitt and Dan, 2011).  Findings suggest that 
the claims which NPM policies make towards achieving efficiency remain common, yet 
outputs and outcomes are still insufficiently evidenced. The (rarely defined) use of terms 
efficiency, productivity or quality and the lack of data or financial evidence that supports claims 
(which say systems work faster or better and activities have improved) “are especially salient” 
(ibid, p. 32). Figure 1. summarises the key theoretical concepts for the study. 
                                                 
 
3 Governments aim to limit pressure on council tax bills through the ‘new burdens doctrine’. This requires all Whitehall 
departments to justify and fund any new duties, powers, targets and other bureaucratic burdens placed on local authorities 
(including parishes, police and fire and rescue authorities) by central Government, New burdens doctrine (Department for 
Communities & Local Government, 2011). 
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Figure.1 Theoretical concepts for the research  
What is there?
Institutional 
legitimacy: NPM
Strategic 
legitimacy: rhetoric
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2.8 Realist Social Theory: Towards answering the question: How should we study it?   
The theoretical lens of legitimacy was introduced to help answer the question ‘what is there?’ 
Answering the next question; ‘how should we study it?’ is also conceptually fundamental to the 
aims of the research, in its quest to ask different questions of reform project failure. 
Contextualised against the project management literature that highlighted the projects’ paradox 
and the relative myopia of learning lessons, the conceptual framework aims to offer both 
theoretical and analytic direction towards achieving a second order approach.  The aim of the 
second order approach is to look outside of the taken-for-granted domains of inquiry and ask 
different questions.  
The analytic lens is discussed here and not in Chapter 3 (Methodology), for a specific reason.  
Reform politics take place in an unobservable realm.  As researchers, we cannot easily access 
the places where political talk and decisions are made, especially if the threads of discourse 
reach back through years of political administrations.  An analytic approach is therefore 
advocated to help to recreate the contextual components of these unobservable realms to reveal 
hidden mechanisms that may be influencing discourse and behaviour, which ultimately build 
legitimacy for decisions and actions.  Thus, using an analytic lens to challenge more traditional 
ontological views and to offer a different viewpoint to project failure is crucial to the research 
aims. The following section describes that analytic theory lens and is located here in Chapter 2 
as part of the overall conceptual framework for the research. The over-arching philosophy and 
methods used to operationalise the analytic lens will be described in Chapter 3. 
2.9.0 An introduction to structure and agency 
The ontological focus of this research aims to contribute to the more critical debates around 
projects and project failure (Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2001).  In searching for 
causal influences and asking what is there and how should we study introduces the relevance 
of social theory and the debate over the primacy of structure or agency in shaping human 
behaviour.  The key question is an issue of socialisation against autonomy in determining 
whether an individual acts as a free agent or in a manner dictated by social structure (Barker, 
2003). For the purpose of this introduction, structure may be briefly defined as the recurrent 
patterned arrangements that influence or limit the choices and opportunities available, and 
agency as the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices 
(ibid).  
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Describing the linguistic/cultural turn in organisations research, Reed (2005), identifies the 
typical position taken by management research, based on ontologies and epistemologies that 
take for granted the existence of organisations as material entities that are ‘out there’.  This 
view privileges structure over the cultural processes and discursive practices, through which 
organisational structures are created and maintained and accords with a similar objectification 
of projects and their failure.  Projects do not exist, ready-made for us to scrutinise and classify 
but are constituted instead by the actions of independent actors (Weick, 1969).  However, the 
taken-for-granted discourse of influential organisations, such as the Project Management 
Institute (PMI) and its Project Management Body of Knowledge  (PMBOK) management 
principles or even the Public Accounts Committee, labelling a variety of co-ordinated and time-
limited undertakings as ‘projects’ (Pakendorf, 1995)  leads to and maintains their reification 
(Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006).  Attempts to discover the true nature of projects from this 
perspective serves instead to further their reification (ibid).  
Juxtaposing this view is the radical social constructionist position of researchers who insist 
organisations are “discursive constructions and cultural forms that have no ontological status 
or epistemological signiﬁcance beyond their textually created and mediated existence” (Reed, 
2005, p.1622).  Social constructionists also face issues that to critics are as limiting as those of 
the empiricist positivists who objectively seek universality, in that organisations are reduced to 
discourse, limited by language, limiting what can be said and what can be known about it.  The 
organisation has no autonomous, stable or structural status outside the text that constitutes it; 
“The notion of structure is illusionary, representing only an ideological practice”, (Linstead, 
2001, pp. 4–5; in Reed, 2005, p.1622) 
In relation to the concept of projectification of society (Lundin and Soderholm, 1998; Mayor 
et al., 2006), the roles of structure and agency and their relationship to organisational behaviour, 
must encompass project organisations.  Social constructionists dismiss the role of structure and 
prioritise the primacy of the individual, of agency, of conduct, asserting that the study of society 
must focus on how individuals construct it (Berger & Luckman, 1966).  Alvesson (2009, p.36), 
invites us to explore this apparently self-evident notion that social constructionists have 
continued to take for granted, asking “How do we know, for example, that the individual is not 
secondary and that overarching structures are, in fact the primary constructors – or rather 
creators – of individuals in the first place?” Alvesson lists several examples of approaches 
where individuals do not have primacy, including Fuchs’ (2001), theory of how individuals and 
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individuality are ‘constructed’ by networks, or, how for postmodernists and poststructuralists, 
texts or discourses create individuals, where text/discourse is primary.   
Vandenberghe (2009), suggests the very situation of understanding is primary, and the 
individual is a result of this.  A major criticism of social constructionism and one that is 
advocated by this research approach is that if reality is a social construction, then the only thing 
worth investigating is how the construction is carried out (Alvesson, 2009).  Much social 
constructionist research tends not to go beyond the construction once it is identified, except 
perhaps to “criticize, change, or destroy some X that they dislike in the established order of 
things” (Hacking, 1999, p.7).  It generally lacks any further inquiry of the construction, such as 
the reasons why people construct society in the way they do and how those constructions 
function as patterns of social reality, once they have been constructed (Alvesson, 2009). 
Alvesson, (2009, p.37) contradicts received notions of knowledge as being theory-laden and 
neglects the role of theories in research leading to “anti-theoretical tendencies, descriptivism 
and to a reduction to the individual level of analysis”.   
Such an approach falls short of furthering our understanding of the phenomena and indeed of 
aspiring to any phronetic research goals that may be aimed at social commentary or social 
action, or, praxis (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Alvesson, (2009) also draws to our attention the second 
major concern for the social constructivism ontology; its fundamental objections to 
essentialism, or to the concept that phenomena have immutable core of properties, social 
constructivism would ask, how could there be something ‘out there’ if everything is 
constructed?  The construction process itself is mystically ongoing and perpetual, and it has 
“obvious characteristics of a social constructionist ‘essence’, an inherent, unchangeable, 
constant property of our reality” (Alvesson, 2009, p.38).  Whilst social constructivism has its 
merits and accords in places with this research aim to explore hidden meaning, it typically looks 
to agency, where the individual has primacy in the construction of reality (Berger and Luckman, 
1995). This study looks for and goes beyond just hidden meaning to explore structural, cultural, 
and agential influences. Alvesson (2009), invites us to ask how we know that the individual is 
not the creation of some overarching structure, and could they not have primacy in the 
construction of reality?  Thus, whilst the research opposes positivism as a paradigm suitable to 
illuminate that which is revealed or concealed by legitimating devices, and what causal 
mechanisms trigger legitimacy, likewise the confusions of social constructivism as an anti-
realist approach also fall short.  Social constructivist perspectives can be “self-destructive in 
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that they fail to acknowledge the fact that if everything is a social construction, including the 
researchers finding, it gives no reason for us to believe in it” (ibid, p38). 
2.9.1 Realist social theory and Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic approach 
Reform politics take place in the relatively unobservable realm of Government chambers over 
space and timeframes and sometimes different political administrations that are not always 
clearly or fully represented by the final delivery project evaluations.  Social theory was 
considered a useful starting point from which to explore the reform politics of FiReControl 
because it provides a conceptual and analytic framework to explore the powerful groups who 
shape society and who supply us with methods to use to see it with.  Social theory allows us to 
challenge the foundational assumptions and beliefs buried in taken-for-granted world generated 
by power groups (Rossides, 1998).  However, in problematizing the extant methods of 
evaluating failed projects, the tendency to blame actors or agents (as in PAC evaluations); social 
theory alone was deemed insufficient.  Social theory advocates the idea that society consists of 
parts and people, the social and the individual, structures and agents, or the micro and the 
macro.  However, realist social theory asserts that neither component (parts/people or 
macro/micro) is irreducible to the other another and each is analytically separable from the 
other (Archer, 1995).  Expanding social theory, Archer (1995), introduced the term, 
‘elisionism’ as a philosophical standpoint, which assumes that the social and the individual 
cannot be separated.  From this position, society or social reality is stratified (Bhaskar, 
1975;1978), but the macro (social) and micro (individual) levels are not exclusive to any 
stratum of reality (Archer, 1995).  Each stratum has influential powers that are irreducible to 
those of its components.  What justifies the differentiation of strata is the existence of emergent 
properties (Archer, 1995; 1996) from the specific combination of components therein and the 
particular interactions of parts and people.  Archer furthered the critical realism4 philosophy of 
Roy Bhaskar and based on her concept of elisionism, that the social and the individual cannot 
be separated, she developed the principle called analytic dualism.   
2.9.2 Analytic dualism 
Analytical dualism acknowledges the differences between structure and agency and the unique 
powers that each possesses and is based on two propositions:  
                                                 
4 The philosophy of critical realism will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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(i) That structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) leading to its reproduction or 
transformation.  
(ii) That structural change (transformation) necessarily post-dates the action sequences, 
which gave rise to it (Archer, 1995). 
Analytic dualism is a method that recognises that the entities of social life, the "parts and 
people", are "analytically separable" (Archer, 1996, p.xvi). The parts, refers to structure and 
culture.  Archer (1996) was suggesting the central problem of structure and agency has been 
considered the basic issue in modern social theory and that in its centrality has overshadowed 
the problem of culture and agency.  This is despite as Archer argues the substantive difference 
between structural and cultural domains and their relative autonomy from one another (ibid, p. 
vi). The substantive differences between structures and culture need to be captured otherwise 
these would simply be “clamped together in a conceptual vice, doing violence to our subject 
matter by eliding the material and the ideational aspects of social life”, (ibid, p.vi).  If we elide 
the material (structure), ideational (culture) and agential (agency) aspects of lived 
organisational reality, how for example, are we to understand the arguments around 
Government policy or the corporate strategy to develop, maintain or change the direction of an 
organisation? (Willmott, 2000). 
 
The dangers of entangling structure and culture or for example viewing social structure as 
objective, material, observable and measurable, while culture as perhaps hidden, subjective and 
requiring interpretation can lead to conceptual confusion (Hays, 1994).  Not only do they create 
misleading interpretations of these crucial concepts “structure is treated as the concept with the 
muscle, while agency and culture become its weak-kneed younger cousins” (ibid, p.58). In 
realist social theory, Archer (1995), urges research about social agents and structures to be 
cognisant of the relative autonomy of structure and culture to enable us to understand social 
life as the interplay between interests and ideas concerning a social reality consisting of three 
elements; 
 Culture – the ideational aspects of social life such as values, beliefs, theories 
 Structure – the material aspects of social life such as resources, positions, roles 
 Agency – the human aspect of social life, that is, who is doing what to whom. 
The complexity of the relationship between structure, culture and agency remains indeﬁnite 
unless the interplay between them is unravelled over time to specify the where, when, who and 
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how (Archer, 1995; 1996; Willmott, 2000).  Social research should determine the ongoing 
interconnections between systems of meaning and systems of social relations, which aims to 
recognise that these systems are “empirically connected but analytically distinct, with an 
underlying logic and dynamics of their own” (Hays, 1994, p. 71).  
 
The key elements of the social system are now discussed in relation to realist social theory; 
structure, agency and culture. 
2.9.3 Culture 
Culture may be defined as the structure ordering social life, which includes knowledge, belief, 
art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society (Tyler, 1974). The domain of culture focuses on ideas and beliefs of society where one 
finds “all things capable of being grasped, deciphered, understood or known by someone” 
(Archer, 1996, p.104). Whether people are “willing or able to grasp, know or understand them” 
belongs to the domain of agency (ibid, p.104). Elaborating on the concept of culture: 
 
Analysis at the cultural level requires an understanding that the cultural system “has an 
objective existence and autonomous relations amongst its components (theories, beliefs, values, 
arguments) in the sense that these are independent of anyone’s claim to know, to believe, to 
assert or to assent to them” (ibid, p.107). Culture is a social, durable, layered pattern of 
cognitive and normative systems (Mische, 2011), which may be viewed as both material and 
ideal, objective and subjective, embodied in artefacts and embedded in behaviour and 
exchanged through social interactions (see Berger and Luckerman, 1966).  Culture may be 
internalized in personalities and also externalized in institutions (Geertz 1973). 
 
If culture is durable and a resilient pattern that provides for the continuity of social life, which 
both conditions and is itself conditioned by social interactions, it transcends individual agents. 
Agents can use knowledge, ideas and beliefs to determine, justify and pursue their interests 
through actions in particular social settings (Archer, 1995). Cultural systems can influence 
those social structures but are only able to do so indirectly and mediatory by structuring the 
situation of actions through constraints and enablements (Hays, 1994).  Located here in what 
Bourdieu (1990), terms fields are the “impositions from those in power” and the implications 
of power relations, (Archer, 1996, p.105). Power relations are causal elements in that they 
influence behaviour but they do not guarantee behavioural conformity. Instead, power relations 
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can provoke any kind of behaviour from ritualistic acceptance to outright rejection of the 
culture imposed. Society does not create the cultural system at the time of experiencing it, it 
confronts us ready-made (Hays, 1994); the product of people’s past practices. The cultural 
system is continuously transformed through people’s actions as they continue to encounter it.   
 
The cultural domain emerges from the interaction that occurs between existing cultures created 
and laid down by previous interactions and practices of people gone before and thus has 
properties and powers of its own (c.f. Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Geertz, 1973). Applying 
this to major reforms for example, civil servants in Government departments may seek to 
change working arrangements based on a consultant report, learning from practitioner training 
and literature, or from beliefs about organisational rules based on previous experiences in other 
departments or change programmes.  Politicians may seek to change working arrangements in 
public sector organisations based on cultural political belief systems or public management 
concepts or beliefs about funding and economic models. Understanding reforms necessitates 
accounting for cultural systems and how through situated interactions they may constrain or 
enable, or may or may not be transformed. 
 
2.9.4 Structure 
The word structure can have two closely related meanings. A structure can be an “ensemble of 
various objects whose relationships create a single overall object that ‘has’ a structure” (Olsen, 
2010, p.8), such as an institution, the class structure, or the age-group structure. A second 
meaning of structure stresses that the “whole has emergent properties that differ from the 
properties of the things inside the structure” (ibid). If it is a social structure, the emergent 
properties are changing over time, whereas in a physical structure, such as water molecules, for 
example, the emergent properties might be somewhat constant over time.  
Structure usually refers to both the internal organisation of something and to the relations 
between the parts that make it work/act the way it typically does. A single structure is not 
determining of action because so many different structures and institutions are overlapping and 
interwoven in the social and natural worlds at one time (Olsen, 2010). Three important 
characteristics of structure influence how it should be analysed; autonomy, anterior, and causal 
influence (Archer, 1995). The autonomous existence of structures means, although 
interconnected, they are different from culture and people, hence analytically, structure ought 
not to be conflated with culture or agency.  Secondly, since people are born into pre-existing 
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structures, “their prior existence frequently constrains the meanings which can be imposed or 
made to stick” (ibid, p.176). The third characteristic is that structures and their component 
elements have causal powers and it is these which are explored in the structural domain. 
Sometimes causal powers are exerted and have influence on people’s actions, sometimes not, 
and sometimes the influence is obscured at the event level.  Furthermore, people can exercise 
their creative powers; they can be reflexive and innovative.  Thus, whilst structure and agency 
are existentially independent (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004), they are contingent and not 
deterministic. Structure can structurally condition but not determine action.  To determine 
action would be to conflate what it is, with what we think it is (Archer, 1995; 1996). 
2.9.5 Agency 
Agency refers to the reflexive, creative, innovative, and purposeful actions of people and the 
choices they make in their daily lives (Barker, 2003), that reinforce existing structures and 
cultures or transform them (Archer, 1996).  The intention and motivation of an agent (an 
individual with the capacity to act) is based on certain beliefs and values and these will shape 
his/her action.  Actions may be constrained or enabled depending on a number of elements, 
such as the availability of resources, the value and belief systems, the dominance of a particular 
ideology, and power (Bhaskar, 2013). Analysing at the agency level avoids the conflation of 
people with structure or culture. It recognises and incorporates the power that people have in 
shaping social reality. People are not passive beings whose actions are automatically triggered 
by the forces of structure and culture (Garfinkel, 1967).  Whilst structures and cultures can 
enable and constrain action, people are reflexive actors with power to shape social reality 
through choices, notwithstanding the impositions made upon them from the socio-cultural 
system (ibid). The actions of people do not mirror the cultural system but “can show a 
significant degree of independent variation” (Archer, 1996, p.185), crucially accounting for 
change or stability of structure and culture (ibid).  
An agent’s intentions are formed by belief systems, the power of circumstances, and 
opportunity (Archer, 1995). As a result of social interactions, transformed structures and 
cultures can thereafter be “held to exert a causal influence upon subsequent interaction, by 
shaping the situations in which later ‘generations’ of actors find themselves and by endowing 
various agents with different vested interests according to the positions they occupy in the 
structures they inherit” (Archer, 1995, p.90). Though often unintended, and existing 
independently of our wishes for what society should be like, the agency of people can shape 
society, and is therefore real.  
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In this study, for example, the imposition of reform indicates a public sector configuration that 
was desired by New Labour. By what agential power was it realised or resisted?  Depending 
on the beliefs of the key parties involved, their positions, roles and circumstances they could 
choose to accept or decline some or all of these impositions. Agency is therefore fundamental 
towards the success of the change, towards the possibility of shifting institutional logics to 
create new organisations (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
2.9.6 Corporate agency 
Agency is dynamic, it changes, it is not static; people in different settings have different 
emergent properties (Horrocks, 2009). Humans can possess agency as individuals, as people 
with roles and positions, and as groups and collectivities who may be more or less ‘powerful’ 
in decision-making situations (Archer, 1995). Thus we can differentiate between two types of 
agent, the corporate and the primary agent (Bourdieu, 1986; Archer, 1995, 2000; 2003; Scott, 
2001; List and Pettit, 2011). The sociologist Mills (1956), drew attention to the notion of the 
elite as holders of positions of command (Scott, 2001). The term corporate agents refers to 
groups such as “self-conscious vested interest groups, promotive interest groups, social 
movements and defensive associations” that are defined essentially by their ability to articulate 
and organise (Archer, 1995, p.258).  Corporate agents have the capacity to influence stability 
and change. “For only those who are aware of what they want, can articulate it to themselves 
and others, and have organized in order to get it, can engage in concerted action to re-shape or 
retain the structural or cultural feature in question” (ibid). This study utilises the concept of 
corporate agents, through analysing and reflecting upon the prevailing dominance of groups 
and how power shifts through the ascension of new groups to positions of dominance, from 
positions of less authority, as primary agents.  
 
Primary agents lack a say in structural or cultural modelling in either society or in a given 
institutional sector. This is not to say they do not affect such organisation or reorganisation, but 
the effects of primary agents are not practically or verbally articulated; they have no strategic 
aim.  Archer (1995; 2000; 2003), depicts corporate agents as social subjects who through 
interest groups in decision-making arenas, engage in strategic actions, which effect outcomes. 
Those who are agentially effective in "evaluating their social context, creatively envisaging 
alternatives, and collaborating with others to bring about its transformation” (Archer, 2000, 
p.308) may be likened to Bourdieu’s (1986), notion of agents acting reflexively in the field of 
power.  
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Who becomes a corporate agent is mostly defined by institutional regulation usually established 
by the state, and within corporate agents, there may be influential individual actors or smaller 
groups of actors that dominate the action of corporate agents (Bork, et al., 2011). The 
morphogenesis of structure and of agency, though relatively independent from each other, 
nevertheless interact with each other and elicit different types of emergent properties. Archer 
(1995, p.175), distinguishes structural emergent properties through their “primary dependence 
upon material resources, both physical and human”.  Agential emergent properties on the other 
hand develop from the interaction between groups, as in corporate and primary agents.  
 
Important for this study is the notion that a primary agent in one domain can generate powerful 
unintended aggregate effects, and may be a corporate agent in another domain at any specific 
time.  Agency categories are not fixed but are mobile over time. This is what makes everyone 
an agent (Archer, 2000). In this research, the agency of industry and political groups is explored 
over time and through contexts, to establish how decisions and actions evolved. Traditional 
project management research and Government inquiries that follow public project 
implementations often link reform project failure to poor procurement and execution, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Not only does this conflate failure to the 'people', ignoring the relevance 
of the 'parts', but also confines the event of project failure to the implementation stage only and 
not to its antecedents. 
 
In considering all three aspects of the social system (structure, culture, agency), the force of 
social structures depends objectively on the social position of the agents and subjectively on 
their projects (Archer, 1996). As individuals and groups are acting in situations to defend their 
interests, fulfil their intentions or realise their projects, they transform or reproduce the 
structural and cultural conditions to which they interface or impinge upon.   
In Archer’s realist social theory, the morphogenetic approach, describing structural or cultural 
transformation is termed morphogenesis and reproduction is known as morphostasis. Both of 
these terms will be explored further in Section 2.8 as the process of analysing structures, 
cultures and agency is operationalised.  For now this has completed the introduction of the 
‘parts’ and the ‘people’, fundamental to the methodological approach that aspires to analytic 
dualism. The ontological premise for analytical dualism is the notion of society's emergent 
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properties, which, in terms of structure and agency, is their interplay over time and space, and 
the resulting casual effects of those interactions. 
2.9.7 Emergent properties 
Society has no pre-set form; instead, it is shaped as a product of the social relations between its 
parts (structure and culture) and its people, acting as agents with varying degrees of agency 
(Archer, 1995; Giddens, 1987; Whalen, 2012).  From these interactions emerge outcomes, 
whether intended or not (Archer, 1995). In social realism, the concept of emergence explains 
that which results from the complex interplay of the relations between the parts and the people 
over time.  It may result in change (morphogenesis) or it may be that structures or cultures or 
agents behaviours remain the same (morphostasis).   
In Archer’s (1995) social realism, change in the social system mainly depends on material 
resources. The social system evolves from the actions and interactions of people and their 
varying powers as agents.  The social interactions (S-I) of agents relating to material resources 
give rise to structural emergent properties (SEPs).  The interactions of agents relating to ideas 
or beliefs in the cultural system (socio-cultural interactions or S-Cs), generate cultural emergent 
properties (CEPs), (Nijihia and Merali, 2013).  People’s emergent properties (PEPs) result 
when agents interact with varying degrees of power to transform or maintain agency (Archer, 
1995).  
2.9.8 Temporality and time cycles 
Archer (1995), describes the necessity of temporality to be able to distinguish and understand 
cycles of structural/cultural conditioning, in what she terms morphogenetic cycles. The 
principal of temporal separability and analytic dualism for structure and agency underpin two 
fundamental theorems of the Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic approach that were introduced at 
the beginning of this section: 
 Structure predates actions that transform it 
 Structural change (elaboration) post-dates the action sequences that gave rise to it. 
Thus, it becomes necessary to add temporality to the other tenets of social realism; that reality 
is stratified and what justifies the differentiation of strata is the existence of emergent properties 
(Archer, 1995, 1996), from the specific combination of components resulting in the particular 
interactions of parts and people.  From  a social realist perspective, understanding and explain 
events such as reform projects and the causes of human actions, therefore depends on 
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acknowledgement of the three concepts now discussed as tenets of this philosophy; a stratified 
reality, emergent properties of complex interplay of parts and people, which effect outcomes 
over time, (temporality).  The social realist approach also advocates the 
separability/inseparability of human action and social structure and the morphogenetic cycles 
of social conditioning. This, as Bhaskar, (1989, p.9) stresses is because “properties possessed 
by social forms may be very different from those possessed by the individuals upon whose 
activity they depend”.   
The reasons for action may be both due to the intentionality of human beings as well as to the 
structures governing the reproduction and transformation of their social activities.  It is these 
morphogenetic cycles, which “provide social realism with a method of explaining social 
structuring over time as the interplay between structure and agency”, (Archer, 1998, p.202). 
Failure to separate the two analytically, (Archer’s fallacy of conflation) by regarding structure 
and agency as a “mutually constitutive amalgam” (ibid, p.203) will only ever attribute causation 
to both structure and agency, but not to either specifically.  This will obstruct the ability to 
analyse the important process by which structure and agency shape and re-shape one another 
over time and limits explanations of how change occurs at different times.  This is important in 
our understanding of the lessons to be learnt from project failure since much of the literature 
fails to account for temporality, particularly the conditioning influence of structures and 
cultures that predate projects. This section has introduced the morphogenetic approach.  
Operationalising the morphogenetic approach will be described in Chapter 3. 
2.9.9 Summary 
Realist social theory and Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach provides the theory of 
analytic dualism to separate out the relationship between structure, culture and agency to 
understand the influence of the situated emergent properties.  They provide a framework by 
which the situated combinations of parts and people can be sequenced to map resulting 
outcomes of social and socio-cultural and agential interactions and to capture change or stasis 
in the social world.  Methods that operationalise these concepts will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
Figure 2 summaries the key analytic concepts for the study. 
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Figure 2.  Key analytic concepts for the research 
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Figure 3. Value questions underpinning phronetic research. 
The diagram below summaries the key theoretical, analytical and philosophical concepts that 
will drive the research direction in the search for alternative causes of reform project failure. 
 
Figure 4.  Key theoretical, analytic and phronetic concepts for this research. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction   
This chapter presents the philosophical underpinnings and practical applications of the 
methodology chosen to explore the research propositions.  Chapter 2 provided a review of the 
project management literature to highlight the more dominant theories and perspectives in the 
field of project failure, whilst endeavouring to identify space for alternative research concepts 
to be considered.  Exploring new concepts by asking different questions can contribute towards 
a deeper understanding of failed reform projects, especially how and why they begin.  The 
review of extant project management literature supports the call for viewing public projects 
more critically (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006), challenging the dominant 
epistemological and ontological commitments of much project research.  The review offered a 
conceptual scaffolding of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Scott, 1983), as well as its multiple sources (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Pollitt, 
2001; Dunleavy et al., 2006), and the devices that create it (Brunsson, 1989; Krebs and Jackson, 
2007; Greenwood et. al, 2011).   
The legitimacy landscape serves as the theoretical backdrop for what has become a common 
story, that is, public projects that fail.  This research aims to re-tell the story of one such failure 
(the FiReControl Project), from a different starting point; asking questions, not of project 
delivery but of the political ideation and approval of the policy that preceded it.   
The projects and escalation literature suggests there is scope for project failure research that 
looks more widely and more deeply beyond the delivery lifecycle, from political inception to 
final public inquiry analysis to find explanations for the phenomenon (Drummond, 1996; Jones 
and Jacobs, 2006; Kelcun et.al, 2014). Therefore, the guiding philosophy of this research to 
find out ‘what else is there’ offers a coherent ontological approach towards this explanatory 
aim to consider wider context and greater depth, than taken-for-granted approaches. The project 
management literature also indicates there is a diverse range of possible influences on decision 
making to approve complex public reform projects (Georgiado, 2003; Weick, 1979; Flyvbjerg, 
2008), suggesting a need for research to adopt a multi-level analysis of failing projects. In the 
quest for explanatory research that can provide greater theoretical understanding by 
acknowledging the complex interactions of multi-stakeholder reform projects, the research 
adopts a critical realist (Bhaskar, 1975, 1978, 1998; Archer, 1995, 1996), perspective.  This 
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perspective facilitates greater theoretical understanding of the events that caused the 
FiReControl project to be approved.   
Critical realism, as both a guiding philosophy and as a method, facilitates looking beyond single 
layers of influence such as structure or agency and supports multi-level analysis (Archer, 1995).  
It recognises that reality manifests across three domains, the real, the actual and the empirical 
(Bhaskar, 1978), and is not located in a single level of investigation, for example, an individual 
Government minister, the project or procurement teams or public sector departments, or the 
sponsoring or supply organisations.  Furthermore, critical realism acknowledges fundamentally 
the interaction of the reality domains, of individuals with society (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 
1998), through the identification of causal tendencies.  These are distinct from cause and affect 
concepts of the positivist tradition.  Analysing the tendencies of causal mechanisms to interact 
in certain ways (Potter, 2001), enables the interactive natures of structures, cultures and agents, 
involved  in public service reform policy that leads to major public sector projects to be exposed 
(Sayer, 2000).   
This chapter explains in detail the philosophical rationale for the research design to answer the 
research questions which will be stated in Section 3.3.5    
3.1 Philosophical orientations of the research design 
 
Yin (1994, p.19) provides an instructive definition of research design: 
“Colloquially, a research design is an action plan for getting from here to there, where 
here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some set 
of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between “here” and “there” may be 
found a number of major steps”.   
Accordingly, research design refers to the ontological and epistemological foundations of the 
research project that justify the chosen methodological approach and the appropriate research 
methods used for the collection and analysis of the relevant data.  Coherence and utility is 
required between each elemental step in the research design to facilitate cogent answering of 
the research questions. 
Research philosophy mainly considers the ontology and epistemology of the researcher 
embracing personal beliefs and how they view the world (Yin, 1994). Thus, research questions 
will depend on the world view of the researcher and their ontological notions about the nature 
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of reality, and their epistemology, the researcher’s relationship to that reality, and the “general 
set of assumptions about the best ways of inquiring into the nature of the world' (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2003). Similarly, the choice of research methods must also be based on the 
researcher’s philosophy of inquiry and the level of congruence between the inquiry paradigms 
(Denzin, 2011).  The choice of methods will ultimately determine the ability for research to 
answer the questions it poses. 
3.1.2 Ontology 
Three dominant ontological perspectives are relativism, representationalism and nominalism 
(Easterby-smith et al., 2003). Adherents to the relativist paradigm assert that the truth requires 
consensus between different viewpoints and that ‘facts’ are dependent on the viewpoint of the 
observer. Representationalists perceive facts to be real or concrete but not directly accessible 
and they understand truth to be discoverable through the verification of predictions about those 
facts. The perspective of nominalism considers all facts to be human creations and truth 
depends on who is establishing it (Van Maanen, 2011). 
Responding to the ontological question on the nature of reality, this research adopts a mixed 
ontological view that appreciates aspects of both representationalism and relativism.  The 
research appreciates that social conditions have real consequences whether they are observed 
or not (representationalism), and from a relativist perspective, that social life is generated by 
the actions of individuals and also has an external impact on them (Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 
2004).  Avoiding the ontological dichotomy inherent to quantitative and qualitative approaches 
critical realists’ talk of intensive and extensive research, embracing both approaches and their 
usefulness in the search for generative mechanisms and in how they manifest themselves in 
various social contexts (Danermark et al., 2002; Sayer, 2000).  The potential problem is then 
one of aligning congruently such a hybrid ontology with an epistemology (Easterby-Smith, 
2003). Fortunately, it is possible to de-couple the epistemological question of how we obtain 
knowledge of reality from the ontological debate based on the assumption that social reality is 
independent of us and exists regardless of whether we are aware of it (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
The ontological perspective has been briefly defined for the research; however, this will be 
explored in greater detail as the guiding philosophy of the research is discussed in Section 3.1.4.   
3.1.3 Epistemology 
The continuum of epistemological perspectives spans three main categories, positivism, 
interpretivism and constructivism, which loosely correspond to the aforementioned ontological 
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continuum of representationalism, relativism, and nominalism (Easterby-Smith, 2003).  
However, these couplings are not fixed since one’s views on the nature of reality may be 
independent of one’s views on the nature of knowledge. With its emphasis on quantitative 
methods of investigation, empirical data collection, reductionism and cause and effect 
orientation, positivism favours research methods such as experiments, surveys, quantitative 
data and statistical analysis (Morgan, 2006). Interpretive studies on the other hand generally 
attempt to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them (Myers, 
1997). Unlike positivism, interpretive research does not predefine dependent and independent 
variables, it rejects the notions of theory-neutral observations and the idea of universal laws but 
focuses on the full complexity of human sense making as the situation emerges (Kaplan and 
Maxwell, 2005). Interpretivism asserts there are multiple realities and multiple truths. There is 
no one objective, universal reality, nor truth.  
The ‘weak’ version of interpretivism considers there may be a reality ‘out there’ external to 
human social actors but we have no direct access to this. For interpretevists at the other ‘strong’ 
end of the spectrum, all reality is a construction, there is no reality outside of our social 
constructions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). This perspective is called social 
constructionism/constructivism, which adheres to the existence of multiple truths, no objective, 
universal truth, just contrasting (sometimes-competing) definitions of truth (Rogers, 2012). 
People may hold apparently conflicting ‘truths’ simultaneously. Thus, proponents of 
intrepretivism and constructivism share goals of understanding meaning and the complex world 
of the lived experience from the point of view of those who live it (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  
Interpretive researchers start out with the assumption that access to reality (given or socially 
constructed) is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness and shared 
meanings (Berger and Luckmann, 1991).  Positivism is oriented towards an external and true 
reality and interpretivism recognises multiple realities based on different observers. In 
opposition to positivism, constructivism advocates that there is no independent reality and that 
all facts and notions of reality are human constructions (ibid). Furthermore, such social 
constructions of reality are also in a constant state of revision and reinvention as a result of 
ongoing social interactions (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
Positivist approaches to epistemology do not chime with the researcher’s personal worldview.  
Notwithstanding this however, this study is situated in the very real and frequently occurring 
phenomena of public project failure, which has real consequences and implications to the 
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affected public sector and the economy in general.  The dataset is qualitative, historic, and as 
such beyond any current control.  Furthermore, the research aspires to the concept of phronesis 
and uses practical wisdom (Flyvbjerg, 2001) to contribute to making a difference to the specific 
problem of failure in major Government reform projects in the UK.  A significant element of 
socially constructed phenomena will be explored given the theoretical lenses of legitimating 
devices (rhetoric) and structures (Government institutions).  As well as rejecting that there is a 
single objective truth, the notion that everything is constructed as in extreme social 
constructivism, is also rejected.    
However, there can “be an objective reality that is what it is only because we think it is what it 
is” through the “collective attribution of status functions” (Searle, 1998, p. 113). In other words, 
through collective intentions, we assign to physical entities various symbolic functions. 
Alvesson (2009), gives us the example of money. Once there is agreement that a paper slip or 
digital symbol on a computer screen, represents money, then any number of complex monetary 
functions can be applied to it, as well as to many further status functions, such as corporations, 
markets and Governments; ‘This is a never-ending game, with real pieces from social life’(ibid, 
p.39).  
For example, a university, an employment contract or a project may be considered social 
constructions based upon a set of ideas.  However, they are always something more, in that on 
its own, each social construction cannot “ensure the effects it is intended to produce, but 
depends on other conditions, particularly trust and certain shared assumptions and social 
norms”. (Sayer, 2004, p.7).   
In other words, reality exists if we think it is such. Therefore between positivist and social 
constructionist paradigms, and when it is logical and practically useful to do so, there is a 
convincing argument that truth may be accessed if we can bridge paradigms suggesting that 
though polarised, both of the traditional epistemological viewpoints can rightfully claim their 
truths (Tsoukas, 2000): 
“Realists (positivists) can be right in saying that there is a social world outside our heads. 
Constructivists can also claim that the social world is constituted by language-based 
distinctions which are socially defined and established”. (Tsoukas, 2000, p.531) 
Tsoukas (2000) asserts that both perspectives have a point and their differences can be 
reconciled if it is accepted that social reality is causally independent of actors and what social 
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reality is depends on how it has been historically defined.  How reality is defined depends on 
what cultural meanings and distinctions are attributed to it.  Therefore, the possibilities that are 
available if elements of differing epistemological paradigms can be fused, are helpful in 
accommodating both the researcher’s ontological tendencies as well as the epistemological 
needs of this research project. Bridging the concepts of positivism and interpretivisim, is the 
philosophy (and method) known as critical realism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2010).   
3.1.4 Critical realism 
Critical realism is a philosophical approach that combines a general philosophy of science with 
a philosophy of social science to describe an interface between the natural and social worlds 
(Danermark et al., 2002).  Critical realism allows us to assert that reality is encountered in 
experience, whilst accepting that our understanding of it is necessarily limited by our historical, 
cultural and linguistic situation (Bhaskar, 1975). Experience is constituted by, and constitutive 
of, language and concepts, and is mediated by imagination (ibid).  As well as being guided by 
critical realist philosophy, this research also aspires to be phronetic, seeking to explain as well 
as contribute to change.  To achieve these aims, a more radical approach than only identifying 
social constructs or rejecting positivist claims is required.  
Bhaskar (1975; 1978), is credited with the seminal developments in critical realism, whose 
advocates consider positivism and social constructionism as too superficial and non-theoretical 
in their research methods. Fundamental to Bhaskar’s philosophy is the concept distinguishing 
between intransitive (ontological) and transitive (epistemological) objects. He formulated the 
concept of a differentiated and layered reality that distinguishes the intransitive, the relatively 
enduring causal mechanisms of the world, such as physical processes or social phenomena, 
from the events and experiences they generate; the transitive dimension. The transitive 
dimension is where theories about those objects of study are located (Mingers, 2000), opposing 
ontological approaches that would conflate the two, in what Bhaskar terms the “epistemic 
fallacy” (Sayer 2000, p.10). When Bhaskar developed his concept of stratification he indicated 
two aspects.  The first is a differentiated reality consisting of three levels; the real, the actual, 
and the empirical (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. The philosophy of critical realism; a stratified reality 
 
The second relates to the concept of emergence; that one layer is emergent from the one below 
it (Bhaskar, 1975), from where “two or more features or aspects give rise to new phenomena, 
which are irreducible to those of their constituents” (Sayer 2000, p.12). 
The empirical is the layer of reality that refers to our observations and experiences of the world 
and comprises that which is deemed to exist because it is observable.  It is the layer of reality 
that is most accessible to us, where the things we ‘know’ are dependent on theoretical 
conceptions.  As such, it is open to revision and modifications (Danermark et. al 2002), since 
knowledge is fallible. The observed events or experiences in the empirical domain are reflected 
in the positivist’s view of the world. In projects for example, empirical knowledge might consist 
of the PMBOK5, Prince 26, conceptions of project team roles, consultants’ roles, and an 
understanding of the public sector reform agenda.  Bhaskar (1975), rejects the notion that this 
knowledge can be relied upon since it fails to account for reality that exists independently of 
human knowledge of it.  Conversely, those of a relativist outlook would rely on such knowledge 
to explain reality, such as the Government and its auditors. 
                                                 
5 PMBOK: Project Management Body of Knowledge 
6 Prince 2: Projects in Controlled Environments; A project management standard 
Real: 
mechanisms that 
generate events
Actual : actual 
events that have 
been generated 
by mechanisms
Empirical: 
observable 
experiences
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As a philosophy of science, Reed (2005), asserts that three core ontological domain 
assumptions are central to critical realism; 
 Underlying causal mechanisms produce events, they are not the events themselves 
 Retroduction as a mode of inference to conceptualise these underlying mechanisms that 
are not directly accessible to senses 
 Findings offer explanatory power.  
First, there are underlying structures and mechanisms that produce the empirical events; they 
are not the events themselves (as positivists would have it).  Second, in contrast to the naive 
empirical realism and material determinism characteristic of empiricist and positivistic 
philosophies of science, critical realism promotes the concept of retroduction.  Retroduction 
means “moving backwards” and that is what the process involves.  It is the conceptual 
abstraction or modelling through theoretical constructions of those underlying structures, which 
according to the paradigm are not directly accessible to sense experience (Blaikie, 2000).  
Retroduction is then a “…mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them…” (Sayer, 1992, p.107)  
Whereas inductive/deductive methods of inference are concerned with movements at the level 
of events from the particular to the general and vice versa, retroduction involves moving from 
a conception of some phenomenon of interest to a conception of a different kind of thing that 
could have generated the given phenomenon (Lawson, 1997).  
The third assumption of critical realism is the challenge it makes to scientific theories that, 
since they too are human constructions, can offer only provisional descriptions of phenomena. 
Critical realism insists  that it is possible to “assess competing scientiﬁc theories and 
explanations in relation to the comparative explanatory power of the descriptions and accounts 
that they provide of the underlying structures and mechanisms that generate observable patterns 
of events and outcomes” (Reed, 2005, p.1630).  
 
Application of critical realism differs between social and natural sciences. In the social 
sciences, culture and society is a product of human activities (‘agency’) and there is a mutual 
relationship between the actions of humans in shaping society and the influence of society, 
which in turn affects human activities (Archer, 1995). Bhaskar (1998), advances the notion that 
society should be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices, and relationships, which 
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individuals both reproduce and transform, without which society would not exist. According to 
a critical realist approach, this study creates or re-creates the observable events.  It recognizes 
that the results of that event will have been shaped or caused by the underlying laws and 
mechanisms, the unobservable, underlying structures and causal mechanisms.  It is these which 
the research seeks to understand and explain.  Structures and mechanisms are fundamental 
concepts in critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975; Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2000; Danermark, 2002), and 
the next section defines these in the context of this research. 
 
3.1.5 Mechanisms 
At a general level, a mechanism is a causal structure that can trigger events (Bhaskar 1998), 
and they are at the centre of a critical realist methodology.  Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005, 
p.423) describe a mechanism as “a structure performing a function in virtue of its component 
parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the 
mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena”.  The component parts and operations 
may be entities and activities such as managers, directors, policies or departments, for example.  
Thus, entities are seen as the objects in mechanisms and activities are what these entities do, 
and it is the interaction of parts as a core element of a mechanism’s productive behaviour 
(Archer, 1995; Danermark, 2002). However, critical realists reject the idea that mechanisms 
have linear causality producing the same outcome each time, emphasizing instead that the 
outcome of a mechanism is contextual, i.e. dependent on other mechanisms. Thus, a mechanism 
may produce an outcome in one context, and another in a different context. The concept of 
emergence is central to the workings of mechanisms and it is the complex interplay of the 
objects that make up the unique, contextualised combination that will trigger a mechanism, and 
produce an outcome that is dependent on, but not reducible to the objects (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen, 2005). 
3.1.6 Structures 
Structure can be interpreted in two closely related ways.  Firstly, it can be seen as a collection 
of various objects whose combined relationships create a single overall object which has a 
structure (such as the class structure, or the age-group structure).  Secondly, it can be seen as a 
whole structure which has emergent properties that differ from the properties of the things 
inside the structure (Olsen 2010). Due to the combination of objects, which make up a structure, 
for example the social structure, the contextually contingent emergent properties of the 
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structure as a whole are changing over time.  However, the objects which make up a physical 
structure might, by contrast be somewhat constant over time (e.g. water molecules) (ibid).  
3.1.7 Section Summary 
The research is interpretive and aspires to a critical realist paradigm to reflect a coherent 
linkage, both philosophically and methodologically.  Whilst the critical realist approach 
concerns multiple perceptions about a single, mind-independent reality (Krauss, 2005), the 
interpretive, subjectivist epistemology acknowledges and embraces the fundamental role 
played by researcher in the process of understanding and acknowledging that explanations are 
reached by an inevitable fusion of the researcher’s perspectives and experiences with that of 
others which exist in the interpretation (Gadamer, 1975).  This approach does not strive for a 
one-best explanation as does much public project research and evaluation (c.f. Public Accounts 
Committee; National Audit Commission; Lovallo, 2003; Styhre, 2006; Merrow, 2011; Scott-
Young and Samson, 2008), that potentially results in findings that lack the power to make any 
practical difference (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006).  Rather, this research opens 
up the possibility of understanding the multiple underlying mechanisms at play and 
acknowledges that several explanations may coexist (Hodgkinson and Starkey, 2012) and 
knowing them may expand our understanding of antecedents that contribute to the failure of 
large-scale public reform projects. 
3.2 Phronetic orientations  
Critical research indicates the need to look more broadly at the issues surrounding projects and 
the policies they are designed to implement by focusing on “who is included in and who is 
excluded from the decision-making process” and by “analysing what determines the position, 
agendas and power of different participants” (Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006, p.12).  Such research 
promotes the criticality of context and the relevance of the particular in projects research, 
advocating the notion that there is more to be learnt beyond rules-based behaviour, logic and 
rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This perspective chimes well with the concept of phronetic 
research, which has inspired this study. Aristotle’s phronesis represented exercising practical 
wisdom, practical judgment, common sense, or prudence.  Phronesis has as much, if not more 
importance in understanding behaviour as either of Aristotle’s other better known intellectual 
virtues, episteme (scientific knowledge) and techne (skill). Aristotle defined phronesis as; 
“an intellectual virtue that is ‘reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things 
that are good or bad for man, which is not simply a skill (technē), but involves an ability 
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to decide how to achieve a result, but also the ability to reflect upon and determine good 
results that will enhance life” (quoted in Flyvbjerg, 2001).   
In the revival of this notion and recognising the relevance of all three of Aristotle’s modes of 
knowledge, phronesis is now considered “the best bet for the relevance of the social sciences 
in society” (Flyvbjerg, 2012, p.1).  As a society we have become familiar with scientific 
(episteme) and technical (techne) knowledge, however, knowledge attained through practice, 
or praxis (phronesis) has taken a back seat and is often overlooked as a “relational mode of 
knowing that is founded on virtues and standards of excellence that are pursued on the way to 
perfection” (Antonocopoulou, 2010, p.S7).    
 
The main focus for phronetic research is to clarify values, interests, and power relations as a 
basis for praxis (Flyvbjerg, 2004). Social science researchers who support phronetic research 
advocate the idea that “intelligent social action” requires phronesis, to which the social sciences 
can best contribute and the natural sciences cannot with their emphasis on ‘epistem´e’ 
(universal truth) and ‘techn´e’ (technical know-how) (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.1). 
 
Research that cultivates phronesis is primarily concerned with values and involves judgements 
and decisions (Antonocopoulou, 2010).  Phronetic research takes its point of departure from 
more traditional inquiry in its focus on values, asking questions like; where are we going?  Is 
it desirable? What should be done? (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  The focus on values forces phronetic 
researchers to: 
“face the question of foundationalism versus relativism, that is, the view that central 
values exist that can be rationally and universally grounded, versus the view that one set 
of values is just as good as another” (ibid, p130). 
This ontological dichotomy builds on from Chapter 2 which attempted to problematize 
contemporary methods of evaluating public projects that favour the view that failure is an 
indisputable fact (PAC, NAO; Lovallo, 2003; Styhre, 2006; Merrow, 2011),  It also informs 
the methodological approach of this research, which advocates the idea that neither positivist 
or interpretive approaches work fully, and as such alternatives, such as a critical or social realist 
perspective may help to address the ontological problem.  
Phronetic research does not rely on potentially personal and idiosyncratic views to the situation 
being studied; rather it expects to contribute to wider discussions and opinions of relevant 
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reference groups to arrive at a common view.  An important aspect of phronetic research is that 
its interpretation of events does not claim universality, but aspires to establish a better 
alternative, one that is ultimately defined by validity (Flyvbjerg, 2001).   
3.2.1 Who gains, who loses and by what mechanisms of power? * 
Revitalising Aristotle's definition of phronesis for modern times, Flybjerg (2001*) incorporates 
Nietzsche's and particularly Foucault's belief that power is always present in human interaction.  
Flyvbjerg (2001) advocates that social sciences ought to keep the 'value' aspect of Aristotle's 
phronesis, asking still where are we going; is it desirable; and what should be done? 
Importantly, for contemporary organisational research, he argues for the inclusion of power to 
answer additional questions; who gains and who loses, and through what kinds of power 
relations? (ibid).  Flyvbjerg juxtaposes the arguments of Weber and Nietzsche to make this 
point.  Defining power, Weber (1998), described it as the chance of a man or a number of men 
to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are 
participating in the action. Therefore, his view of political power and governance was that in 
all human interactions and social structures, there are dominators at one end and egalitarians at 
the other (in Levine 2006).  Nietzsche on the other hand suggested life was full of cruelty, 
injustice and uncertainty but through man’s power over other men, life had become governed 
by rationalities and this had weakened some men.  He asserted that man must understand that 
life is not governed by rational principles and there are no absolute standards of good and evil.  
Instead good and evil are defined as man-made constructions and rationalisations.  Flyvbjerg 
(2001) suggests it is not only about asking who governs (Weberian) but also about asking what 
Governmental rationalities (Nietzche) are at work when those who govern, govern? For 
example, what Governmental rationalities are at work when Governments approve a specific 
reform policy, or a policy to go to war, for example? Research needs to look deeper towards 
the less visible, even inaccessible levels of reality to reveal more complex causal mechanisms.  
The challenge in this study is to look further than empirical events and conflated constructions 
or universal claims of what ‘caused’ the failures. 
Working from this phronetic perspective (Flyvbjerg, 2001), early value propositions to direct 
this research can begin to be framed thus; the predicted direction of travel in today’s public 
projects is that too many Government projects will fail.  We are not short of information to 
attest to this, indicating therefore, that we do sense where we are going.  The depressing 
statistics around public projects are not desirable on many levels including cost and time and 
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the impact on the public sectors and industries they leave exposed.  Therefore, advocating 
Flyvbjerg’s (2001), call for phronetic research, we must ask what should be done, with the 
intention of actually making an effort to change something. This study seeks to look beyond 
traditional, potentially conflationary viewpoints that lack phronetic perspective, and which may 
be “marginalized in the intellectual scheme of things, where scientific and technological 
development take place without the ethical checks and balances that Aristotle saw as all-
important” (Flyvbjerg,  2006, p.373). The research attempts to illuminate aspects of the taken-
for-granted behaviour that traditional approaches (such as PAC) consider needs no challenges.   
Aspiring to acknowledge the particular and move beyond generalising perspectives, the 
phronetic approach is considered complementary to the research methods that will be now be 
described in the rest of this chapter.  Phronetic research must focus on the minutiae, directly 
opposing much conventional wisdom about focusing only on important problems, much like 
the PAC inquiry methodology, for example. Geertz, (1995, p.40) discussing the idea of 
overlooking the detail argues that “the problem with skipping it is that it leaves us helpless in 
the face of the very difference we need to explore”.   
The phronetic approach to projects joins the movement of critical research scholars (Flyvbjerg, 
2001; 2003; 2006; Cicmil at al., 2006; Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006, Hodgson and Cicmil, 2006; 
Blomquist et al., 2010; Antonocopoulou, 2010), whose aim is to contribute something beyond 
findings that simply conclude tighter project controls are required.  This study advocates that 
critical thinking plus political engagement is necessary to understand the sources of complexity 
in major public reform programmes along with a phronetic approach; practical wisdom on how 
to address and act on social problems in a particular context Flyvbjerg (2001), is needed if we 
are to make project research more impactful. Figure 3 summaries the key value questions 
driving phronetic research. Based on this phronetic foundation the theoretical and analytic 
undrpinnings of this study will now be discussed. 
3.3 Research design  
3.3.1 The intensive approach 
Extensive research methods seek patterns and frequencies and such research employs large 
scale surveys, formal questionnaires and statistical analyses, privileges replication and has 
restricted ability to generalise to other populations and limited explanatory power (Easton, 
2010). Intensive research uses interviews, ethnography and qualitative analysis and seeks to 
understand agents in their cultural contexts, asking the question -what produces change?  
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(Sayer, 2000).  Intensive research employs looks for mechanisms that account for the 
phenomena in question or ‘demi-regularities’ (Danermark et al., 2002), which by the nature of 
the research will be limited to the situation studied, so that testing is by corroboration (ibid). 
According to Sayer, “extensive research shows us mainly how wide-spread certain phenomena 
and patterns are in a population, while intensive research is primarily concerned with what 
makes things happen in specific cases” (2000, p.20). This research adopts the intensive 
approach, which accords with the methodological imperatives outlined in Section 3.1.2, to 
acknowledge the particular through ontological depth. 
3.3.2 Case study strategy in critical realism 
Case study research explores in great detail, specific phenomena relating to an individual 
person, an event, or an organisation as the case, or cases (Yin, 2009).  Case researchers such as 
Flyvbjerg (2001; 2003; 2004; 2006), and Yin (1981; 2009; 2011), provide insight into 
traditional misgivings of case research, thus addressing the misunderstandings relating to 
generalizability, theory generation, context-dependency and researcher bias.  Case research is 
considered essential for the development of social science to provide the necessary depth, 
which can complement large sample research that on its own may only provide breadth (Glaser, 
1966; Denzin, 2011). 
Flyvbjerg (2006), revival of Aristotle’s phronesis, explicitly identifies knowledge of particular 
circumstances as a main ingredient of phronetic organisational research and advocates the 
benefits from focusing on case studies, precedents, and exemplars. Furthermore, critical realism 
is particularly well suited as a companion to case research. “It justiﬁes the study of any 
situation, regardless of the numbers of research units involved, but only if the process involves 
thoughtful in-depth research with the objective of understanding why things are as they are” 
(Easton, 2010, p.119). Challengers of the positivist approach to case research that seeks 
generalisation across high numbers of similar cases, (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007; Dubois and Araujo, 2007) suggest that the flexibility of case research should not only be 
allowed but also pursued and encouraged.  Quoting Khunian insight that a scientific discipline 
without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic 
production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one, Flyvberg 
(2006), contends that social science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater numbers 
of good case studies. 
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3.3.3 An exemplary case 
Yin (2003, p.185) describes five characteristics of an exemplar case study which makes a 
lasting contribution to research; 
1. The case must be significant.  The case, (FiReControl), which will be introduced in Section 
5.2.6) was of general public interest for several reasons.  It represented a significant component 
of New Labour’s public sector modernisation programme, which was a well-publicised element 
of their manifesto.  It represented significant change of a much-respected historical institution 
that had hitherto been out of the public eye unlike, for example, the constant media coverage 
(to this day) of the NHS.  This disconnect would come to play a role in shifting belief systems 
about the reform programme.  It was initiated in the wake of the ‘9/11’ terrorist events which 
became part of the general public psyche and upon which Government claims were made that 
the project would improve national security. The reform project was fiercely rejected by one of 
the largest and most active unions of the era, the FBU, (Fire Brigades Union), which was in a 
high profile battle with the then Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, further adding to the 
new public interest in the fire service.  Finally, following its cancellation, the FiReControl 
project was publicly criticised by the Public Accounts Committee as “one of the worst cases of 
project failure that the Committee has seen in many years” (Hodge, 2011, p.3). 
2. The case must be complete.  This may be demonstrated by the breadth and depth of the 
evidence collected for the study.  Evidence spans the project from before its inception, the 
political debate and industry reviews that led to it, throughout its delivery, to its final public 
accounts inquiry.  This complete evidential range enabled a feel for what may be influencing 
actions at different stages of major projects that fail.  However, this study selected one key 
stage with which to demonstrate the methodological benefits of a critical realist approach. The 
delineated slice in time for this study appertains to the build-up and approval stage of the project 
and this informed the data selection, 2000 to 2004.  
3. The case study must consider alternative perspectives.  This requires the consideration of 
alternative propositions by examining the evidence from different perspectives.  Since the high 
profile demise of the FiReControl project, many official and unofficial, academic and otherwise 
perspectives have been published through various sources.  For example, the Public Accounts 
Committee report (2011); the National Audit Office report (2011); Hughes, (2012).  All were 
considered for their differing perspectives on failure of the project. 
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4. The case must display sufficient evidence.  To enable the reader to reach an independent 
judgement of the analysis presented, care has been taken to include a balanced and sufficient 
level of critical evidence within the report as can hopefully be demonstrated by Table 1 (c.f. 
Section 3.4), and the large number of additional sources cited. 
5. The case must be composed in an engaging manner.  The research angle offers a new 
perspective to the common problem of project failure.  It seeks to be engaging by offering a 
novel approach that combines an uncommon project research methodology (critical realism), 
with two critical methods (critical hermeneutics and morphogenetic sequence analysis).  The 
combination offers the ontological depth required for phronetic research, the aim of which is 
to contribute something beyond findings that simply conclude tighter project controls are 
required, as found by Government evaluation reports (PAC, 2011; NAO, 2011).   
 
3.3.4 Problematising for research questions  
Case study questions typically take the form of ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin, 2009).  Before the 
research questions were formulated a process of problematisation occurred by reading a broad 
range of literature spanning several fields connected to the concept of project failure.  Whilst 
much has been written about causes of failure endogenous to projects and their delivery (Staw 
and Ross, 1987; Lovallo, 2003; Styhre, 2006; Meredith and Mantel, 2011) , there is a paucity 
linking project failure to the exogenous events occurring before projects even begin that 
influence their ideation, and which can further influence their failing trajectory, significantly.  
It is useful at this stage to explain the journey this research took in arriving at a methodological 
approach.  Initially after deciding to look beyond project delivery to the early stages of policy 
ideation and the influence of legitimacy in the politics of projects, the first methodological 
choice was critical hermeneutics.  This methodology would have enabled underlying meaning 
to be revealed in the key documents illuminating how devices such as rhetoric may be used to 
enable or constrain decisions and action. After further reading, revealing the presence of 
rhetoric as a mechanism of influence, though not explored in Government project evaluations, 
would nevertheless seem to be a highly likely outcome of probing into political debates about 
reform.  I ventured that this level of analysis may not be sufficient; there may be other less 
visible causal influences.  It was at this stage that critical realism came to my attention.  
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A critical realist perspective was found to be less common in the public policy and project field, 
thus indicating there may be more to know from different ontological and methodological 
perspectives. Notwithstanding these ‘discoveries’, the research questions did take into 
consideration scholarly advice from Alvesson and Sandberg (2011, p.252) who suggest that 
although “many of the paradigm warriors and proponents of more radical orientations 
forcefully critique existing theories, their problematisations are often secondary in the sense 
that they are more or less ‘ready-made’ by master thinkers, such as a Baudrillardian or a 
Foucauldian perspective on a particular field”. 
Problematisation is first and foremost an “endeavour to know how and to what extent it might 
be possible to think differently, instead of what is already known” (Foucault, 1985, p.9).  
My research questions were not definitive at the beginning of the research, but emerged after a 
process of reflecting, reading and writing about legitimating processes in project organisational 
settings. Hence, instead of spotting gaps within a literature domain or applying a pre-packaged 
problematisation to challenge the assumptions of others, the aim of the problematisation 
methodology proposed here is to come up with novel research questions through an 
interrogation of my own familiar position, other stances, and the domain of literature targeted 
for assumption challenging; “…without understanding the assumptions that underlie existing 
theories, it is not possible to problematize them and, based on that, to construct research 
questions that may lead to the development of more interesting and influential theories” 
(Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011, p.253). This process included broad reading and thinking about 
what could be challenged to probe new directions in projects research, such as:  
 Challenging ideology of Government lessons learned or of projects and failure and the 
taken-for-granted notion that the Government’s process identifies definitive failings in 
Government projects,  
 Challenging extant theory about project failure and escalation of commitment, asking 
not what causes it but what causal mechanisms contribute/sustain the phenomena? 
 Challenging field assumptions that say project management techniques are how we 
should manage projects or public account/select committee inquiries are how we should 
do lessons learned. 
 Challenging paradigm assumptions, where the intention was not to become fixated that 
a critical realist ontology could find definitive answers but in addition to more 
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traditional project research paradigms (positivist and social constructivist) it may open 
up other lines for discussion in the social debate.   
3.3.5 Research Questions 
From the problemetisation exercise and responding to the gaps identified in the literature and 
extant methods of evaluating failed Government projects, and aspiring to conduct phronetic 
research, the following questions guided the study. 
 
1. How do cultural, structural and agential mechanisms enable and constrain the 
legitimation of public reforms?  
2. By what emergent powers do Government reform ideas prevail over alternatives? 
3. How can causal mechanisms of legitimacy influence the scope of reforms? 
4. How do government evaluations account for such antecedent influences in delivering 
lessons learned after implementation failure? 
 
As phronetic research, the study will ask, 
5. What can be done to make a difference? 
 
3.3.6 The case: FiReControl: An English fire service reform project 
The reform project which serves as the empirical case for this research was known as 
FiReControl.  The FiReControl project was part of the UK Government’s Department of 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Resilience Programme. The project’s aim was 
to improve the resilience, efficiency and technology of the English Fire and Rescue Service by 
replacing 46 local control rooms with a network of nine, purpose-built, regional control centres 
using a single national computer system and infrastructure to handle calls, mobilise equipment 
and manage incidents. FiReControl commenced in 2004 and was expected to be completed by 
October 2009. It would be three years later in 2007 that DCLG would contract European Air 
and Defence Systems (EADS, now known as Cassidian) to design, develop and install the 
computer system underpinning the project. The project was subject to delays and costs 
escalated over its lifetime. DCLG cancelled the project in December 2010 after concluding that 
it could not be delivered to an acceptable timeframe. At the point the decision to cancel was 
made, DCLG estimated it had spent £469 million on the project and calculated that completion 
73 
 
would take the total project cost to £635 million, more than five times the original estimate of 
£120 million. 
FiReControl was a long and complex project and an outcome of several years of high profile 
conflict between the government and the Fire Brigade Union.  In terms of the research 
questions, the preceding years offered the rich backstory to the case within which to look for 
causal mechanisms that helped legitimate the ideas encapsulated by the reform policy and the 
implementation project (FiReControl), as well as the power shifts between key actors 
throughout this period.  Significant data was available in the publc domain from various and 
numerous sources for this much publicised period for the fire service and for the ‘new’ 
governement’s manifesto for public services.  Moreover, my personal involvement in the case 
provided me with first hand access and experience from which to draw.  However, the rich 
backstory also highlighted the complexity and diversity of influences from which the project 
emerged and in so doing revealed how ex ante evaluations fall short in accounting for such 
effects.  Yin (2009), warns of the dangers of such cases, which are not easily defined compared 
to the case of an individual, for example, since the start and end-points may be difficult to 
define.  This issue is addressed by specifying the unit of analysis as a timeframe that ends with 
the event (Fire Service Act 2004) and extrapolates back to when the same government 
attempted to restructure the fire service under a different piece of legislation - (Local 
Government Act, 1999).  As well as this, in selecting the method that would encapsulate the 
timeframe in a sequence of analysis, the approach could reveal the history from which 
FiReControl emerged and the casual mechanisms that legitimated it. 
3.3.7 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis represents the specific stage of the project that will be subject to the search 
for causal mechanisms for legitimation.  For the purpose of this study it was termed the Ideation 
and Approval stage, which preceded the start date of the project itself.  This unit of analysis 
represents a timeline from 1999, when the Local Government Act was passed, which introduced 
Best Value reviews of public services, to 2004 when the new Fire Service Act was passed, 
which legislated for reforms to move control room responsibility from local fire and rescue 
services to a regional level of organisation and management.  
3.4 Data  
The research design engaged a large textual dataset drawn from a wide range of sources relating 
to the genesis and lifecycle of the FiReControl project.  The research relied fully on documented 
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evidence that was available in the public domain.  The data sources include Government 
consultants’ reports and industry reviews, Government debates and reports about modernising 
the fire service, reports of oversight agencies, press/media coverage and the National Audit 
Office reports and Public Accounts and Select Committee inquiry transcripts and subsequent 
reports. The goal in assembling and analysing such a wide dataset is to provide the researcher 
with a chain of evidence to provide an understanding of the whole project in the first instance 
with specific analysis to identify the mechanisms that are at work in the Ideation and Approval 
stage. Thus, whilst data was collected and indeed ‘lightly’ read for the full lifecycle of the case 
study, critical realist analysis was restricted to the unit of analysis and the dominant texts that 
preceded the reform project. 
The data selection plan provides the logic linking the data to the proposition.  The nature of 
reconstructing the course of a major project would inevitably lead to a myriad of people, groups 
and organisations that have communicated and interacted in various ways (Bovens and t’Hart, 
1996). The potential for complexity in reconstructing the complex case of FiReControl, from 
its policy cradle to its failed PAC inquiry grave is considerable, and any claims of revealing 
through a whole picture analysis, a better understanding of causal mechanisms is over 
ambitious for a single study.  Therefore, the focus of analysis was to collect data at the slice of 
time from 1999 to 2004.  The unit of analysis covers a temporal sequence that suggests 
numerous mechanisms generate various forms of legitimacy and develop at different project 
(and policy-making) stages and influence events.  This informed the data selection plan, 
allowing allocation of documents and data sources to take shape in relation to stages of the 
sequence. 
Documents can be particularly useful for tracking change over time.  The morphogenetic 
approach highlights the importance of temporality in capturing causal mechanisms that both 
condition agents a pre-existing structures and cultures, and which emerge as the results of social 
interactions over time.  The key reform texts that were analysed and the numerous other (current 
at the time), media and parliamentary debate data sources, which were used to create a rich 
chronological picture, provided an historical account of emergence.  This is the overall aim of 
the critical (social) realist methods. Secondary data and evidence are recognised because data 
becomes evidence when related to theory and neither data nor evidence exists apart from any 
theory (Foucault, 1985; Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011; Lipscomb, 2009). 
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Documentary evidence was considered to be of greater value to this research than primary 
sources. The temptation to use traditional ‘safer’ interview data collection methods which ‘are 
typically the quickest and easiest of the tools to use’ if publication is the goal (Bain, 1995, p14) 
was resisted.  The ideation and approval and final PAC analysis of a failed FiReControl project 
are largely Governmental in source, and thus were unlikely to gain candid collaborative 
involvement.  Thus secondary documentary evidence was rich and abundant and considered 
more appropriate to the aims of the study to reveal a situated history of emergence (Archer, 
1995).  The data offers a real-time context, where there were no ethical issues imposing on 
participants’ recollections, where the data was less selective and thus could be more general to 
seeing the bigger picture. This method allows a temporal restoration of the past to avoid 
retrospective constructions of social realities and informant framing (Wagner et al., 2010) and 
it limits simplistic, mono-causal conclusions through the layering of evidence (Soeffner, 1997). 
The intention was to develop an historical narrative of the political genesis of the FiReControl 
project so as to understand the interplay of structures, agents and cultures and the subsequent 
causal mechanisms that develop and influence action so as to offer a better explanation for the 
project’s failure, beyond the PAC analysis. It is possible to tell a rich and detailed story of a 
case using documents (Flybjerg, 2001; Bowen, 2009).  Indeed, Foucault spent a large part of 
his typical Paris working day in the biblioteque national working only with documents.  He 
argued wirkliche historie (real history) “shortens its vision to those things nearest to it” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.133), meaning that the people whose narrative and actions some research 
(such as Government inquiries) seek to explain may be too close to the issue to give accurate 
account. 
3.4.1 Data selection 
Wynn and Williams (2012), advise researchers to refrain from giving a comprehensive 
description of the structural parts and contextual influences comprising a specific research 
project, instead focusing on those parts which are most relevant for the given research 
objectives. This informed the selection of data. Evidence was collected for the full project 
mainly from Government reports, parliamentary transcripts, national archives and via freedom 
of information requests.  As the research questions emerged from the narrowing down of a 
scope that was originally wider and indeed more socially constructivist in outlook, a 
comprehensive set of whole lifecycle project data was established.  As the inadequacies of a 
social constructivist approach alone, emerged with the requirement to gain greater depth 
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ontologically7, the data was allocated to project stages. The main question to be answered using 
the over-arching critical realist approach this study adopted, relates to period 1999 to 2004; the 
ideation period.  The key Government data sources for analysis towards answering the main 
research questions (1 to 4); 1] How do cultural, structural and agential mechanisms enable and 
constrain the legitimation of public reforms? 2] By what emergent powers do Government 
reform ideas prevail over alternatives? are listed in Table 1.   
Four government texts were selected for the critical hermeneutic analysis, embedded witin the 
overarching morphogenetic sequence analysis.  These texts are cited by the government’s 
Research Policy Unit as the official background8 to the FiReControl project and were referred 
to as sources of reform evidence throughout the social interactions that took place during the 
ideation stage (c.f. Chapter 4). Later in this study I refer to the Pathfinder Report which would 
have represented a research study undertaken in the fire service which the government chose 
not to publish after the Independent Review of the Fire Service was published. This report was 
not chosen for hermeneutic analysis as it was not published as a document.  The government’s 
omission of the Pathfinder raw data from its ‘evidence’ does form part of the discussion in 
Chapter 5. 
There were numerous other supplementary sources used for this question as the methods will 
illuminate.  Other data sources included excerpts from parliamentary debates, media interviews 
and newspaper articles.  Key document data that informed the discussion around the third and 
fourth research questions; 3] How can causal mechanisms of legitimacy influence the scope of 
reforms? 4] How do government evaluations account for such influences in delivering lessons 
learned after implementation failure? are also listed in Table 1.    
  
                                                 
7 This ontological shift led to method choice to use two frameworks of understanding (morphogenetic approach and critical 
hermeneutics), to access different layers of reality.  This is explored fully in Chapter 5. 
8 FiReControl and the regionalisation of the Fire Service.  House of Commons Research Briefing: SN/SC/3766 
Last updated: 14 July 2010 Author: Oliver Bennett 
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1] How do cultural, structural and agential mechanisms enable and constrain the 
legitimation of public reforms? 2] By what emergent powers do Government reform ideas 
prevail over alternatives? 
Title Date Pub/pages Source Author 
The Future of Fire and Rescue Service 
Control Rooms in England and Wales 
April 2000  
220 pages 
Home Office Mott McDonald 
(no named author) 
The Future of the Fire Service: reducing 
risk, saving lives; Independent review 
of the Fire Service 
December 
2002  
175 pages 
Office of 
the Deputy Prime 
Minister 
Sir George Bain 
Our Fire and Rescue Service White 
Paper 
June 2003 
80 pages 
Office of the 
Deputy Prime 
Minister 
DPM John 
Prescott 
The Future of Fire and Rescue Service 
Control Rooms in England and Wales 
(update) 
2003 
192 pages 
Department of 
Communities and 
Local Government  
Mott McDonald 
(no named author) 
 3] How can causal mechanisms of legitimacy influence the scope of reforms?  
Delivery FiReControl Project: Full business case June 2007  
40 pages 
 
Department of 
Communities and 
Local Government 
DCLG  
(no named author) 
 4] How do government evaluations account for such influences in delivering lessons learned after 
implementation failure? 
Ex-post 
Evaluation 
Failure of the FiReControl Project September 
2011 
53 pages 
The Stationery 
Office HC1397 
Parliamentary 
Accounts 
Committee 
 
Table 1.  Key text data sources for the study.  Supplementary sources are cited and listed in the 
bibliography. 
3.4.2 Data analysis approach: A two-stage framework  
A framework for analysis was based on two approaches.  One approach was aimed at the 
empirical level using critical hermeneutic methods to explore hidden meaning as a causal 
mechanism which influenced ‘the event’ (the unit of analysis, i.e. the build up to the project 
termed the ideation and approval stage).  The other, over-arching analysis, as is the character 
of critical realist approaches, takes place at the abstract level, and follows Archer’s (1995), 
morphogenetic approach, exploring deeply the situated context and social interactions between 
the selected time period 2000 to 2004, to reveal further underlying causal mechanisms. The 
research advocates both analysis techniques to understand the multiple causal mechanisms at 
play in legitimating a course of action.  Vandenberg (2009), advocates the suitability of 
hermeneutic methods within critical realism.  These frameworks will now be introduced 
conceptually and their methods will be discussed in detail thereafter. 
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3.5 Data analysis methods 
3.5.1 First (empirical/event level) framework of understanding: Critical hermeneutic 
analysis 
Hermeneutics unearths the symbolic meaning of communication, going beneath the surface of 
the text to the symbol; “any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning 
designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative”, 
(Ricoeur, 1980, p.245). Critical hermeneutic interpretation unveils hidden meanings that serve 
the interest of the socially and politically powerful, (ibid.). 
 
Critical hermeneutics is most suitable to the analysis of this study as it relates to organisational 
practices and institutions, economic and social structures, culture and cultural artefacts (Prasad, 
2002a). Critical hermeneutics provides the detailed rich picture from which to begin searching 
for underlying structures.  Public sector reform programmes are political and since politics is 
talk and talk is action in politics (Pollitt, 2001), revealing hidden meaning in texts that capture 
the contemporary political discourse, tells the partial story but is only an (obvious) starting 
point.  Delving deeper for underlying structures, which are less accessible can reveal more, 
hence the use of both hermeneutic and critical realist approaches. Hermeneutics differs from 
the ‘focusing in’ effect of phenomenology favouring instead the ‘focusing out’, deepening and 
widening effect that embraces symbolic meanings that is common to all the those who share a 
common language (Vandenberg, 2009).  Hermeneutics is compatible with critical realism as 
“Man is an animal suspended in webs of meaning” (ibid p.7). 
 
The first precept of hermeneutic analysis is that understanding can be viewed as an interpretive 
cycling between layers or perspectives.  This is known as the hermeneutic circle (Heidegger, 
1962; Gadamer, 1975), where one seeks first to understand small sections of knowledge (a 
text/text-analogue), then to understand each one further in relation to the whole (as it is 
understood by the researcher) of which it is part (its historical and cultural context). 
Understanding is achieved when there is a consistency between the whole and all its component 
parts and vice versa. Or, as stated by Myers (1994, p. 191); “This hermeneutic process continues 
until the apparent absurdities, contradictions and oppositions in the organisation no longer 
appears strange, but make sense”.  
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The second methodological precept is the hermeneutic horizon (Gadamer, 1975), which, just 
as the part is embedded in a specific cultural context, so too is the person seeking to interpret 
that text.  The researcher will have their own historic-cultural context and the process of being 
critical will be from the interpreter’s horizon as it circles through deeper understanding of the 
texts to their contexts.  The circling of differences in horizons, results in a fusion of horizons 
(Gadamer, 1975).  At this stage, the integration of the horizon of the text with that of the 
interpreter offers a fresh perspective that might not otherwise have been possible (Prasad, 
2002). Fundamental to Gadamerian hermeneutics is the rejection of authorial intention which 
asserts that we dismiss the text-author’s original motive in producing the text and instead focus 
on the text in its entirety, beyond its author’s intended, overt meaning.  Thus we are interested 
in the meaning which is hidden, its ideological elements, language, bias, authenticity (Philips 
and Brown, 1993; Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000; Prasad, 2002).  It is this moment of critique 
which provides a ‘critical unveiling’ (Philips and Brown, 1993) of the ideological meanings of 
the text and how such devices can influence decisions and actions.  Such critique can reveal the 
manner in which certain groups try to position their sectional interests as broader social goals 
(Prasad, 2002).    
 
The critical hermeneutic analysis is based on Prasad’s (2002), four-stage process, which is 
briefly introduced below and which is expanded upon as the analysis unfolds. 
Stage 1: Choosing and initial reading of the texts 
The first stage begins with choosing the texts and undertaking the initial read to understand the 
apparent meaning of the texts and to identify themes for deeper exploration in subsequent stages 
of the analysis. This stage can use content or thematic analysis techniques to explore the 
language used. The four key Government texts selected are:  
1. The Future of Fire and Rescue Service Control Rooms in England and Wales (2000) 
2. Independent Review of the Fire Service (2002) 
3. Our Fire and Rescue Service White Paper (2003) 
4. The Future of Fire and Rescue Service Control Rooms in England and Wales (2003 
update) 
Stage 2: The contexts  
This stage rebuilds the context in which the texts were situated.  The industrial, political, 
organisational, environmental and cultural context of the period under study (pre-2000-20004) 
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is developed. For example, in 1997, the new Labour Government were elected after 18 years 
of Conservative administrations and by 1999, the fire service were voting for industrial action 
over pay.  In 2001, terrorism in the West moved to another level after the events of 9/11 and 
Britain entered into the conflict in Iraq. 
Stage 3: The hermeneutic circle, closing the hermeneutic circle and fusing horizons   
With the contexts established and texts initially read for their apparent meanings and thematic 
references, the researcher enters into the hermeneutic circle, cycling between stages, texts or 
text analogues and the various contexts in which they were produced. In so doing, the objective 
is to understand “the parts ...in relation to the whole and the whole from the inner harmony of 
its parts” (Palmer, 1969, p.77).  For example, what contexts may have influenced the authors 
in relation to ideas about modernising public sector or keeping communities safe? This stage 
involves numerous other sources of secondary information from press releases, news articles, 
parliamentary debate as well as academic literature written at the time. 
Stage 4: Conceptual bridge 
The final stage in the hermeneutic cycle presents a conceptual bridge, where a richer 
explanation is developed between the texts and the contexts, or a rhetorical counterpoint 
(Gadamer, 1989), as horizons are fused.  This stage aims to reveal new connections to the 
meanings the Government and their agencies sought to produce in their defence of the 
FiReControl reform project. 
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3.5.2 Second (overarching) framework for explanation: Morphogenetic approach 
3.5.2.1 Operationalising morphogenetic theory 
In Chapter 2, the concept of analytic dualism (Archer, 1995), social theory and morphogenetic 
cycles were introduced and discussed as a guiding framework for the research.  Analytic 
dualism is possible owing to the temporality of structure and agency phased over different tracts 
of time (Archer, 1995, p.183). Temporality distinguishes and enables understanding of the 
morphogenetic cycles of structural conditioning, which ontologically assume that structure 
predates actions that transform it (Archer, 1995).  The principles of temporal separability and 
analytical dualism for structure and agency underpin two basic theorems of the morphogenetic 
approach (Archer, 1995, p. 157): 
 
 Structure predates activities, which transform it. Agents’ interactions can only shape 
or transform the social system in which they find themselves; they do not produce 
the system, as it already exists, having emerged from past interactions of agents. 
 Structural elaboration post-dates the action sequences, which gave rise to it. 
 
In this study, analytic dualism is operationalised using the ‘morphogenetic approach’ (Archer, 
1995). The morphogenetic approach enables researchers to tease out the relationship between 
structures, cultures and agency and the outcomes, by making explicit the mechanisms that 
connect situated actions and systemic outcomes (Nijhia and Merali, 2013). The morphogenetic 
approach can capture how agency emerges (or is lost), as it transforms through interactions 
over time, and can help in the quest for understanding the failure of the FiReControl project 
In the morphogenetic approach, the emergence of agency (through socio-cultural conditioning 
and interactions) is captured for analytic purposes in a three-part morphogenetic sequence. 
Morphogenesis occurs in endless cycles consisting of structural or cultural conditioning 
(predating any actions) → social/cultural interaction between parts and people → 
structural/cultural elaboration (change). Morphostasis occurs in the same cycle, however, the 
outcome either results in no change to structures or cultures, but the reproduction of them 
(Archer, 1995, see Figure 6 and 7 for structural and cultural examples of the cycle). To examine 
a morphogenetic sequence it is necessary to understand that the starting point is situated 
historically and is always conditioned by history: “for we are all born into and can only live 
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embedded in an ideations (and structural) context that is not of our making” (Archer, 1996, 
p.xxv). The three-part sequence is summarised below:  
1. T1 corresponds to prior conditioning by the existing configuration of parts and people 
in social reality.  The national structures and culture of the fire service, its leadership 
and management and positioning within the public sector. 
2. T2 to T3 represents the interactions of situated individuals and groups and the mediating 
action of their agency in response to the structural and cultural contexts and pre-
conditioning (Nijhai and Mereli, 2013). The arrival of new politics and politicians with 
New Labour, attempts to modernise the public sector, industrial disputes, conflicts of 
interest of key individuals with powers to enable or constrain actions of groups. 
3. At T4, the resulting agential interaction may lead to morphogenesis (changes to the 
structural or cultural system) or morphostasis (staying the same). Resulting changes to 
the fire service. 
The sequence shows that during the process of structural conditioning, structures in existence 
at a given point in time (T1) are assumed to precede the action of agency insofar that agents 
either transform or reproduce pre-existing structures.  During social interactions, agents do not 
construct new structures but from another point in time (T2) to a subsequent point in time (T3), 
the interplay and between structures and agency results in morphogenesis (transformation of 
structures), or morphostasis (reproduction of structures). The outcome of the interaction is 
observed at T4.  
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3.5.2.2 Social structure 
Structure provides agents (as individuals and groups), with interests and these relate to the 
social roles or positions that they occupy. SI (social interaction) represented by T2 to T3 is 
structurally conditioned but agents’ emergent volitional properties mean that actions are “never 
structurally determined” (Archer, 1995, p. 90). 
 
Structural (SS) conditioning 
T1 
Social interaction (SI) 
T2      T3 
Structural elaboration (morphogenesis) 
Structural reproduction (morphostasis) T4 
Figure 6. Social structure and the morphogenetic-morphostatic sequence (based on Archer, 
1995, p.157) 
The interests resulting from pre-existing structures provide reasons for actions.  These reasons 
may or may not generate consistent or even logical responses aimed at change or entrenchment.  
Such actions can be explained, but not predicted, and deliberate attempts to maintain or reform 
structures are unlikely to meet individual or group expectations. Indeed, the outcome of 
structural elaboration is generally “unintended” (Archer, 1995, p. 91). 
The four elements of the structural system (ibid, p.168-9) applied to this study are:  
“i) There are internal and necessary relations within and between social structures (SS).” Local 
councils employ local fire service personnel, union membership is high and the FBU plays a 
lead role in the management and operations of the service, funding and operational standards 
are set by central Government. 
“ii) Causal influences are exerted by social structure(s) (SS) on social interaction (SI).” 
Government, fire service and union institutions influence agents internal and external to the 
structures; the public have expectations of public services; media involvement can influence 
how social interactions are perceived. 
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“iii) There are causal relationships between groups and individuals at the level of social 
interaction (SI).” How did unions influence members’ actions, how did ministers influence 
employers’ actions? How were other groups influential to these interactions? 
“Social interaction (SI) elaborates upon the composition of social structure(s) (SS) by 
modifying current internal and necessary structural relationships and introducing new ones 
where morphogenesis is concerned. Alternatively, social interaction (SI) reproduces existing 
internal and necessary structural relations when morphostasis applies.” What changes to the 
situation logics between the groups of this study resulted eventually in structural changes in 
the fire service?  Did the process by which this came about influence the design and scope of 
the reform project? 
3.5.2.3 Cultural structure 
The morphogenetic-morphostatic sequence for cultural structure (defined as the cultural system 
or CS) and agential socio-cultural (S-C) interaction mirrors that of the structural system. Archer 
(1995), describes the CS/S-C interplay in a similar propositional model (below) that mirrors its 
SS/SI model. 
Cultural (CS) conditioning 
T1 
Socio-cultural interaction (S-C) 
T2      T3 
Cultural (CS) elaboration (morphogenesis) 
Cultural (CS) reproduction (morphostasis) T4 
Figure 7. Cultural structure (CS) and the morphogenetic-morphostatic sequence, (Based on 
Archer, 1995, p.193)  
The outcome of this approach is a three-stage morphogenetic cycle that covers structure, culture 
and agency. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the cycle for analysing structure and culture.  How they 
emerge, intertwine and redefine (Horrocks, 2009), is the overarching focus of the research 
process at this stage.  The morphogenetic approach provides the framework to outline key 
structural and cultural properties and powers that predate the start of the decision to reform the 
fire service. These properties and powers also created the situational logics for the different 
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forms of strategic action and modes of interaction that occurred during the unit of analysis 
before the FiReControl project commenced in 2005. Archer’s (1995), approach is aimed at 
examining the social interaction responsible for the elaboration or change in structures. 
The four elements of the CS/S-C interaction (Archer, 1995, p.169) applied to this study are: 
“i) There are internal and necessary logical relationships between components of the Cultural 
System (CS)”. What ideas were held and which belief systems prevailed between unions, 
ministers, fire service personnel? 
“ii) Causal influences are exerted by the Cultural System (CS) on Socio- Cultural interaction 
(the S-C level)” Are decisions and actions between the groups and individuals influenced by 
those ideas and beliefs? 
“iii) There are causal relationships between groups and individuals at the Socio-Cultural (S-C) 
level”. Continuous interactions between the Government, the FBU and employers, challenged 
ideas and beliefs, creating tensions with varying consequences.  
“iv) There is elaboration of the Cultural System (CS) due to Socio-Cultural Interaction (S-C) 
modifying current logical relationships and introducing new ones, where morphogenesis is 
concerned. Alternatively, Socio-Cultural Interaction (S-C) reproduces existing internal and 
necessary cultural relationships when morphostasis applies.” Would the structural reforms that 
led to the FiReControl project to regionalise the fire service disrupt cultural systems to allow 
new ideas and beliefs to prosper? 
3.5.2.4 Agents and agency 
Agency can also undergo a similar three-stage transformation through morphogenesis from 
person to agent and then to actor as changes to authority and access to power shifts through 
interactions (Archer, 1995; Willmott, 2000).  This can result in a double morhogenesis of 
agency as agents transform the social system in which they act and by the process, they also 
undergo transformation.   
3.5.2.5 Situational logics 
This study is about Government reform projects.  Since all methods for promoting change or 
protecting stability depend of the use of resources, then their distribution is of the greatest 
importance (Archer, 1995). Depending on their position in the social system, different sections 
of society have vested interests and associated opportunity costs and strategies; some will 
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welcome change, others will protect the status quo (Nijhia and Merali, 2013; Bourdieu, 1986). 
Situational logics predispose agents towards specific courses of action for the promotion of 
vested interests, by supplying reasons that are either favourable or unfavourable to the situation 
(Archer, 1995).  This results in agents pursuing change or defending extant arrangements 
because of the objective vested interests deposited in them (Willmott, 2000).  The situational 
logic will depend on the nature of the emergent properties that result from social or socio-
cultural interactions (Nijhia and Merali, 2013).    
Tendencies towards reproducing or transforming cultures or structures are distributed quite 
differently amongst groups because of large variations in numbers who stand to gain or lose in 
terms of their vested interests (Archer, 1995).  Emergent relations (from prior social and socio-
cultural interactions) can be of four different kinds (ibid).  First, they may be necessary and 
internally related to each other (as a school is to the education system (Willmott, 2000), or 
contingently related (like Governments and free markets (Archer, 1995)).  Secondly, at T1 of 
any given morphogenetic cycle, relations between stakeholder groups/institutions exist from 
prior social interactions that can be complementary, where culturally or structurally, the 
dominant stakeholders have a considerable amount in common (help each other’s operations), 
or as contradictory, where they do not (ibid). Systemic level compatibilities or incompatibilities 
are not immediately apparent to agents but are reflected in day-to-day practical situations 
(Nijhia and Merali, 2013).  Therefore second order institutional level relationships are manifest; 
necessary complementarities; necessary incompatibilities; contingent compatibilities and 
contingent incompatibilities (Archer, 1995), and situational logics arising from those relations 
will predispose groups to certain courses of action for the promotion of their vested interests. 
Necessary complementarities exist when relations are internal and necessary and are of a 
complementary nature between two systemic structures like local Government and fire service.  
This will predispose agents to act in a mutually reinforcing way, adopting a defensive strategy 
of protection of existing state of affairs, keeping the status quo and protecting vested interests.  
Necessary incompatibilities are reflected when internally linked structures do not get along 
easily but cannot separate from each other.  They therefore have to compromise to survive and 
overcome the difficulties.  
87 
 
Contingent complementarities arise when contingent relations arise that are highly compatible 
with the interests of some components and predispose agents to adopt a strategy of opportunism 
to make the most of what is available.   
Finally, contingent incompatibilities arise when two structures have no reason to compromise, 
where nothing is to be gained by it and this leads to competition and agents involved are inclined 
towards a strategy of elimination of the opponent (Archer, 1995; Nijhia and Merali, 2013). 
Table 2 summaries the various typologies that Archer’s morphogenetic theory creates. This 
table will be used to structure the data analysis in Chapter 4.  
 Contradictions Complementarities 
 Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
Situational logic correction elimination protection opportunism 
CEPS of:  
Cultural system 
Socio-cultural 
interaction 
syncretism pluralism systematisation specialisation 
unification cleavage reproduction sectionalism 
SEPs of: 
Structural system 
Social interaction 
 
compromise competition integration differentiation 
containment polarisation solidarity diversification 
Table 2. Summary of structural morphogenesis/morphostasis (adapted from Archer, 1995, 
p.303); CEP: cultural emergent properties; SEP: structural emergent properties. 
The table shows that, depending on the nature of the emergent properties of prior interactions 
(compatible, incompatible, necessary or contingent), there are four situational logics that will 
predispose agents towards specific courses of action (Nijhia and Merali, 2013). They are the 
situational logics of correction, elimination, protection or opportunism. For both structure and 
cultures, the systemic level (the top line for each in italics), shows the full range of 
developments which can be generated if the respective situational logics are all successfully 
followed (Archer, 1995).These in turn motivate different forms of strategic action by 
predisposing different sections of the population to see their interests served by modes of 
interaction with other groups which are most conducive to securing the systemic status quo 
desired by them (Willmott, 2000). 
Thus, agents with greatest power to act (corporate agents), who have vested interests culturally 
or structurally, have a corresponding ideal at the interaction level (social or socio-cultural), that 
is likely to secure their specific desire. To achieve this ideal various forms of structural or 
cultural power will be deployed to preclude deviant developments (Archer, 1995).  These 
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preferred social states are presented on the bottom line for both structure and culture in Table 
2. 
For example, at T1 in any given cycle, two institutions may have long-established, necessary 
and internal linkages (like the fire service and the Government).  Taken-for-granted behaviours 
and routines would result in congruence at the systemic level.  Thus, necessary 
complementarities in organisational relations, where everyone has something to lose by change 
may lead to a situational logics of protection.  If successfully followed, the situational logic 
would result in the systematisation (strengthening of relations among the various parts of the 
system), as cultures are reproduced. At the structural level the emergent properties of social 
interactions promoting solidarity result in the continued integration of structures. Therefore, 
“insofar as a form of situational logic is strategically carried through, it represents the 
generative mechanism of either morphogenesis or morphostasis” (Archer, 1995, p.217) 
Identifying the cultural and structural emergent properties9 (CEPs and SEPs, (Archer 1995)) of 
the interplay of the structural and cultural spheres of the study and the situational logic they 
create, are important means of analysis in the first stage of the morphogenetic process. 
Categorising emergent properties and the situational logic they create, enables the researcher 
to assess the probability of a group’s capacity to preserve its position as in maintaining the 
status quo, morphostasis or its likelihood to cause conflict and change, as in morphogenesis 
(Greener, 2005). 
3.5.2.6 Retroduction 
To acknowledge the stratified nature of reality, the analytical process must move beyond the 
inductive and deductive to the causal-explanatory mode of theorisation (Bhaskar, 1989). 
Retroduction  is the term given to this mode of inference which seeks to identify the structure 
or mechanism underlying the concrete object; which if it were to exist and act in the postulated 
way would account for the phenomenon in question (ibid). Retroduction means “moving 
backwards” (Easton, 2010, p.122), and that is what the process involves. It asks, “What must 
be true in order to make this event possible?” and it is the crux of critical realist analysis (ibid).  
                                                 
9 As introduced in Section 3.5.2.1 the social interactions (S-I) of agents relating to material resources give rise to structural 
emergent properties (SEPs).  The interactions of agents relating to ideas or beliefs in the cultural system (socio-cultural 
interactions or S-Cs), generate cultural emergent properties (CEPs) 
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In the context of legitimating reform ideas, this study explores what conditions must be like in 
order for reform policies lacking support to gain legitimacy and approval in UK Government? 
Retroductive inference techniques represent the fundamental departure in critical realism 
(Bhaskar, 1989; Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011).  Whereas induction, abduction and deduction 
are concerned with movements at the level of events from the particular to the general and vice 
versa, retroduction involves moving from a conception of some phenomenon of interest to a 
conception of a different kind of thing (power, mechanism) that could have generated the given 
phenomenon (Lawson, 1997). The goal then is explanation through the identification and 
verification of a set of mechanisms that are theorized to have generated the phenomena under 
study (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011).   
3.5.2.7 The morphogenetic cycle for this study 
This study explores the build up to a major fire service reform project (FiReControl).  The 
morphogenetic cycle is annotated in Figure 8 below, to describe the sequence in relation to the 
unit of analysis of this study. 
Pre-existing structures  
(prior outcomes of previous cycles)   
  (Pre 1999) 
                       T1           
           (Structural/cultural                          Structural reproduction (morphostasis) T4 
            conditioning) 
 
T2            (2000-2004)               T3                                                            (2004) 
(Social/socio-cultural interaction)   
            
                              Structural elaboration (morphogenesis) T4  
      
Figure 8. The morphogenetic transformation cycle of change (Archer, 1995, p.376), adapted 
with dates for this study. 
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Period T1 corresponds to prior conditioning by the pre-existing arrangement of components in 
social reality and the first step in the cycle will be to develop an account of how the powers of 
the “parts” condition the projects of the “people” (Archer, 1995, p.201). So in stage one of the 
morphogenetic cycle the structural and ideational influences that were present in the 
organisational system (remnants of Thatcherism, New Labour Government agenda, public 
sector and fire service institutions, national and international environments in which they 
existed during the unit of analysis), are explored before considering how these interact with 
human agency in stage two (T2 to T3), as the various events unfolded.  The result of those 
interactions are discussed in stage three and the emergent change that led to structural 
elaboration by time (T4), and the regionalisation reform policy that resulted in FiReControl.  
  
During analysis, the time periods are identified empirically from an historical account of events 
from around 1999 and up to 2004. T1, the structural, cultural and agential conditions at the start 
of the unit of analysis (predating 1999), are analysed using a range of secondary sources 
(historical accounts of the political environment as well as secondary and primary documents).  
In relation to structure and culture, this enables the study to be situated within a larger context 
of national and institutional structures and ideas around the new Labour Government and public 
sector reform as well as the particular conditions that applied within the fire service at T1. 
Specific attention is given to the data to develop an understanding of the constraints and the 
enablements of structure, culture and agency within the context.  
 
The intermediate period, T2 to T3 (years 2000 to 2003/4), is the main focus of the analysis since 
it is here that the reform policy was legitimated that led to the FiReControl project.  This period 
corresponds to the mediating action of agency through social interaction and an analysis similar 
to that at T1 is conducted at the points T2 to T3. Here, agential interactions are examined within the 
context of structural, cultural conditions to establish how ideas are formed and how agents 
negotiated their different perspectives in terms of governance, the public sector, its modernisation 
and the need and the nature of fire service reform. 
 
3.5.2.8 Section summary 
This section has introduced the two frameworks of understanding for the research that aims to 
understand more about the failure of the FiReControl reform project. The first analysis works 
at the empirical level, capturing the contextual interactions that led to the commissioning of the 
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key documents that ‘informed’ the FiReControl reform project.  A critical hermeneutic analysis 
of these documents illuminates hidden meaning and influence with texts. The method gives an 
historical account of the period and reveals the changing discourse on the imperatives for 
reform, as dictated by the Government as different contexts developed over the time period.  
To explore the emergent powers that exist at the other levels of reality (beyond the empirical), 
the deeper critical realist framework of analysis (operationalised by the morphogenetic 
approach), was used. The morphogenetic approach was introduced as a method that facilitates 
analytic dualism to analyse these concepts effectively and to avoid conflation of one with 
another in the search for causation.  Archer’s (1995), morphogenetic perspective asserts that 
cultural, structural and agential elements have to be “teased out over time to examine their 
interactions for mechanisms which explain structural and cultural stability or change”, (ibid, p. 
248).  It is the results of these interactions infiltrating into structures and cultures that are passed 
on to subsequent generations of people as new conditioning influences upon them. Whilst this 
enables us to understand (at least conceptually), the remodelling of structure and culture, it is 
equally important to follow the same sequence by which agency brings about social and cultural 
transformation and thus systematic transforming of social agency itself (Archer, 1995; 2009).  
This is called the 'double morphogenesis'; agency leading to structural and cultural elaboration, 
but itself being elaborated in the process (Archer, 1995; 1996).  
This study seeks to understand how the pre-existing/conditioning and complex interactions of 
cultural, structural and agential components combine to create situation-dependent mechanisms 
with emergent powers.  For example, what were the existing conditions into which a new 
Labour Government tried to introduce change to the fire service?  How did traditional structures 
and cultures respond?  Which actors had influence on decisions and actions, and who did not? 
Specifically, (from the methods) the study asks; 
1. Did cultural, structural and agential mechanisms enable and constrain the 
legitimation of the FiReControl reform project?  
2. By what emergent powers did the Government reform ideas prevail over 
alternatives? 
3. Did these emergent powers influence the scope of the FiReControl project? 
 
Both models guide the data analysis and theorisation process but the separate stages need not 
follow each other in a strictly chronological order and can in fact be combined where necessary 
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(Prasad, 2002; Archer, 1995). Thus the final stage of the critical hermeneutic approach 
(bridging concepts stage), is merged with the conclusions drawn from the morphogenetic 
approach. The empirical analysis takes place in the concrete world, where texts are analysed 
for hidden meaning. As the research progresses through to the second framework of 
understanding using the critical realist guidelines, the analysis enters the abstract world where 
studying situated and complex interactions should help to illuminate alternative explanations. 
The final part of the process is to return to the concrete world to bring together the causal 
mechanisms which were revealed through both frameworks, with a new explanation for the 
phenomena in question. This return to the concrete world forms the discussion in Chapter 5. 
The methods provide a broader and deeper contextual analysis compared to typical Government 
methods which are bounded by the project itself as demonstrated schematically in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. Schematic demonstrating the broader and deeper inquiry of the methods compared to 
traditional Government methods.   
 
3.6 Managing the data analysis: Nvivo 10 
NVivo is qualitative data analysis software with tools that helps researchers store, code, 
categorise and analyse large amounts of qualitative data in a more manageable and organised 
manner. It allows for the uploading and storing of data from text, audio and video sources. The 
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software was used during the literature review and the data analysis section, particularly where 
a hermeneutic approach to searching for hidden meaning was required, as well as for 
categorising data in each time-slice (T1 to T4).  To facilitate these activities, NVivo allows texts 
(including audio and video) to be ‘read in’ and key words or phrases or sections to be coded 
into Nodes.  Nodes may have sub nodes and can be dynamically re-grouped as the analysis gets 
more detailed and the data more voluminous.  Searches and reports enable easy review and 
assimilation of nodes and relationships between nodes.   
3.7 Theory generation and generalisability 
Regarding generalizability, the knowledge claims of single case study research are often 
challenged, questioning the ability of the researcher’s to accurately explain a complex situation 
and to be representative of the focal phenomenon (Easton, 2009).  However, Yin (2009), asserts 
that case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes.  Ultimately, research evaluation must address issues of 
representativeness and generalizability (Klecun et al., 2014), however, critical realist 
generalization is not based on uncovering universal laws; instead, it relies on identifying an 
underlying essence of things (i.e., generative mechanisms, structures, and the relations between 
them), (Danermark, et al., 2002). Critical realists believe knowledge is fallible and always 
mediated (Bhaskar, 1978) and that there is no clear window into the inner life of an individual. 
“Any gaze is always filtered through the lenses of language, gender, social class, race, and 
ethnicity. There are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the worlds 
of the observer and the observed” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 12).  Limited generalizability is 
considered possible through critical realist research by accumulating knowledge over time (e.g., 
from different case studies).  This case study does not represent a sample.  Its goal was to 
expand theories about projects and not to “enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” 
(Yin, 1989, p.21). 
In this study, generalisability is not a research goal because, it is not compatible with a critical 
realist ontology. The benefits of in-depth single case studies have been discussed, which 
advocates the notion that a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case 
studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without 
exemplars is an ineffective one (Flyvberg, 2006). However, the findings from this single case 
study can achieve several forms of generalisation which will be discussed in the final chapter 
in relation to the contribution this research makes to knowledge. 
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3.8 Ensuring quality of the research findings 
Unlike the positivist and interpretivist approaches, the critical research approach is driven by 
explicit ethical and value positions. In addition to quality criteria such as authenticity, 
plausibility and criticality, critical research is valued as a catalyst for change. The overall 
quality of the research and its findings may be partially established if a systematic and 
defensible research approach, including congruent method choices has been clearly 
communicated.  The next section will discuss research quality criteria in relation to its 
philosophical underpinnings of critical realism and the choice of the single case study. 
Every attempt was made to approach the data analysis critically and to triangulate ideas by 
reading and re-reading the data from a range of sources. Efforts were made to remain reflexive 
during the entire process of the research, and explicit within the analysis. Emerging findings 
and their interpretations were presented to, and discussed with supervisors, peers and research 
colleagues at each stage of the analysis process. Discussions and feedback supported researcher 
reflexivity and confirmed trustworthiness and credibility of the findings. 
3.8.1 Critical realist criteria 
Because a paradigm is a worldview spanning ontology, epistemology and methodology, the 
quality of research conducted within a paradigm has to be judged by its own paradigm terms 
(Healy and Perry, 2000).  For critical realist research these criteria are:  
 
 Objectivity 
 Ontological appropriateness 
 Reflexivity 
 Explanation 
 Triangulation 
 
3.8.2 Objectivity 
It is important to distinguish two different senses of objectivity. Objectivity in the sense of 
value-freedom is not necessary for objectivity in the sense of truth-seeking or telling (Sayer, 
2000). It is important for critical realist research to establish three things:  
 
1] Epistemological objectivity.  The criteria of ‘ontological appropriateness’ was put forward 
by Healy and Perry (2000), as a useful starting point with which to evaluate critical realist 
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research.  That the critical realist must confirm that they are dealing with the world of realism, 
with complex social phenomena involving reflective people, what Popper (1980), calls ‘world 
three’ (and not worlds one and two as in positivism and social constructivism respectively) may 
seem fundamentally basic. Acknowledging the balance of relevance to structure and agency is 
key to this concept, there being no primacy of one over the other. 
 
2] Objectivity of the researcher and 3) recognition of the value-ladenness of objectivity. This 
entails the researcher reflexively recognising the value-ladenness of research.  Contrary to 
social constructivism in which the researcher is immersed through shared knowledge, the 
critical realist remains value aware, (Healy and Perry, 2000), cognisant of the fact that a realists 
perception opens up a window into reality through which that picture of reality can be 
triangulated with other perceptions about a single reality (Healy and Perry, 2000).  This is why 
critical realist research relies on multiple sources of data and where possible peer researcher 
interpretations. 
  
In relation to the first two issues, Bhaskar termed the phrase, “epistemic fallacy” referring to 
Western philosophical traditions that have mistakenly reduced the question of, what is, to the 
question of, what we can know.  Thus epistemological objectivity requires that the researcher 
does not fall foul of this conflation, confusing ‘what we think is’ (epistemology) with ‘what is’ 
(ontology).  The research must acknowledge both the given world (in critical realism this is the 
Real level of reality, where things exist regardless of us experiencing them, as opposed to the 
Event or Experience levels of a stratified reality),  and the subjects’ beliefs about them (Bhaskar, 
1978; Sayer, 2000; Archer, 1995). 
 
3.8.3 Researcher reflexivity 
Researcher reﬂexivity involves honesty and openness about how, where and by whom the data 
were collected and acknowledges the researcher as a participant in and of the research process 
(Ryan and Golden, 2006). Reflexivity is an awareness of the researcher's contribution to the 
construction of meanings throughout the research process, acknowledging that objectivity from 
one's subject matter while conducting research is impossible. Since critical realism does not 
deal with measurable cause and effect relations, but rather with interpreting underlying causal 
tendencies (Bhaskar, 1978), interpretations may be particularly open to researcher bias or to 
the subjective nature of knowledge.  Thus the intention of reflexivity is to enhance the 
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credibility and rigour of the research process as well as make transparent the positionality of 
the research (DeSouza, 2004), Critical realism requires awareness and transcendence of biased 
beliefs through a commitment to reflexivity as well as to caution and scepticism to minimise 
bias. 
Reflexive research takes account of this researcher involvement (Anderson, 2008) by 
identifying it through the process. This study acknowledges the value-ladeness of the 
researcher’s experience and perspective (15 years working at fire services, including six years 
working on FiReControl and other Government reform projects), and the contribution these 
made to the selection of data for analysis, to stipulating the morphogenetic cycle timeframe, 
and to the construction of meanings attached to social interactions.  The contribution therefore 
makes no claim to generalizable knowledge creation but it does claims to add to our knowledge 
of reform project failure something which was not perhaps known before. 
3.8.4 Explanation 
Explanation is a fundamental aim of critical realism in seeking answers to the question about 
what caused events to happen. There are differing schools of thought even amongst critical 
realist researchers regarding explanation and generalising.  Sayer (1992), argues that 
explanations from generalisation are only acceptable in the absence of knowledge of causal 
powers, whereas, Danermark et al. (2002), assert that any explanation involving generalising 
claims must recognise causal mechanisms. Explanation and prediction are confident claims of 
the nomothetic epistemological stance of positivism, implying that there exist regularities or 
law-like generalisations in material or social settings such that if two events occur in sequence 
regularly then one is said to explain the other (Easton, 2010).  However, despite a taken-for-
granted acceptance of positivism’s capacity to explain, the reductive simplicity is problematic 
in that “constant conjunction of elements or variables is not a causal explanation nor indeed an 
explanation of any kind. It is simply an atheoretical statement about the world. It doesn't answer 
the question why?” (ibid, p.118).  
 
The need to open the black box of constant conjunction that connects one state to another 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1998), to reveal why and through what process an outcome was 
brought about, has led to the search for social mechanisms (Pajunen, 2008), to explain more 
about organisational outcomes. Critical realism offers what may be considered deeper 
explanation potential. Easton (2010, p.122), describes a basic explanation we might develop 
through critical realist case research; “Objects (a salesperson) having structures (knowledge 
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and personality traits, etc.) and necessarily possessing causal powers (to persuade a buyer, who 
is another object) and liabilities (to be rejected by technical buyers, to get tired towards the end 
of the day) will, under speciﬁc condition c1 (the buyer has a need for the product and the 
offering is suitable) result in an event e1 (a sale), or alternatively under speciﬁc condition c2 
(the buyer has a need for the product but the offering is not suitable) will result in an event e2 
(no sale)”. Whilst admitting the challenges faced in generating such formal explanations in the 
complex world of organisations, the process does offer a logical framework to guide case 
researchers. The aim of critical realism is to provide the best-fit theory and this is achieved 
through working with competing explanations, acknowledging the necessity to consider 
different interpretations of the data (Easton, 2010).   
3.8.5 Triangulation 
Advocating the critical realist epistemological principles of mediated knowledge, un-
observability, and the possibility of multiple mechanisms, researchers must try to approach the 
underlying reality from multiple viewpoints in order to overcome perceptual limitations (Wynn 
and Williams, 2012). The process entails the combination of at least two or more 
methodological approaches, theoretical perspectives, data sources, investigators, or data 
analysis methods with the intention of decreasing, or at least counterbalancing the deficiency 
of a single strategy (ibid). This study uses multiple sources of data and two analysis methods 
which enable a degree of triangulation (Yin, 1994).  
3.8.6 Ethical considerations 
The research process was subject to the research policies and ethical clearance guidelines of 
the University of Liverpool and was awarded full ethical clearance. 
Researching major project failures will inevitably have ethical implications for participants.  
Virtually every empirical inquiry of issues relevant to applied business ethics involves asking 
questions that are sensitive, embarrassing, threatening, stigmatizing, or incriminating (Dalton 
and Metzger, 1992).  As such, gaining access to obtain interview data can be difficult, possibly 
influencing the numbers and diversity of willing respondents, which in itself can lead to bias.  
Once access is granted responses to interviews may be further influenced both by the subject’s 
view of what the researcher wants to hear, by a reluctance to talk about sensitive ethical issues 
and by imperfect recall (Harris, 2001). Furthermore, when retrospectively collecting data 
through interviews, individuals can offer ego-defensive explanations that attribute success to 
their own disposition and failure to external forces can be at play (Miller and Ross, 1975).  
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There are several explanations for this. Miller (1975), suggests people offer descriptions 
designed to maximise public esteem. The rationalisation that takes place in the minds of the 
actors and agents involved in failed events leads to the construction of multiple realities. There 
can be limitations with such research (Wagner et al., 2010; Soeffner, 1997), particularly when 
trying to look back at events that contributed to major project failures.  Weick (1995), argues 
that sense making is also a retrospective process.  Consequently, the study relies on documented 
evidence that was largely in the public domain and as such the ethical implications were 
minimal.   
FiReControl was a high profile Government project failure.  The Public Accounts Committee 
blamed individuals and organisations for failing to do their jobs effectively and concluded it to 
be “one of the worst cases of project failure that the Committee has seen in many years” 
(Hodge, 2011). Accessing and obtaining unbiased reviews would have been problematic, 
particularly as the research began in 2012, almost three years after it was cancelled by the new 
Coalition Government in 2010), and key individuals had moved onto new projects in different 
Government departments.  Not only was interviewee bias negated by the sole use of documents, 
but the ‘researcher effect’10 was also controlled for.  Having spent several years working on the 
FiReControl project, information gained through interviews may well have suffered from this 
effect. On the other hand, it is vital to acknowledge the subjective bias the researcher brings to 
the study, since  sociological analysis is always from someone's point of view, and is therefore 
partisan (Becker, 1967). Thus, qualitative research begins with an acknowledgement of the gap 
between an object of study and the way we represent it and this has been stated in Section  3.8.2: 
Objectivity. 
  
                                                 
10 The researcher effect or the ‘Hawthorne effect’ refers to the tendency of people being observed in a research context to 
behave differently from the way they would otherwise. It takes its name from the factory of Western Electric where during 
behavioural research studies, production increased but not as a consequence of actual changes in working conditions 
introduced by the plant’s management.  Behaviour changed because researchers demonstrated a manifest interest in the 
workers (McCarney et al., 2007). 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
4.0 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 describes the process of achieving a deeper understanding of how contested reforms 
still manage to gain support and approval to be implemented as projects.  The methodology 
advocates a social realist approach underpinned by critical realist philosophy.  As the 
conceptual framework in Chapter 2 established, the current methods by which failed UK public 
projects are evaluated and from which learning is determined for future projects, largely focus 
on agents and the delivery stages of the project.   
 
Towards achieving the aim of acknowledging ontologically a stratified reality with emergent 
nature (c.f. Bhaskar, 1978; Archer, 1995; Nijhia and Merali, 2013), Chapter 3 proposes 
combining two data analysis methods (the morphogenetic approach and critical hermeneutics) 
within the critical realist framework of understanding and explaining the data. The critical 
hermeneutic method provides a subjective empirical analysis of the key reform texts to 
illuminate the influences of underlying meaning mechanisms in the stages of policy-making, 
resource negotiations and project approval. The critical hermeneutic analyses are embedded 
within the overarching ontological framework using the morphogenetic sequence method.  In 
accordance with the importance of temporal analytical separation, the morphogenetic cycle in 
this research is described in three time sequences.  T1 representing prior conditioning, T2 to T3 
representing the mediating action of agency through socio-cultural interactions, with emergent 
outcomes represented by T4 (structural/cultural change).  Combined, these two methods 
represent the critical realist approach, which involves a “thinking” rather than an 
“experiencing” perspective in the search for underlying mechanisms (c.f. Archer, 1995; 
Danermark, 2002; Fleetwood, 1999), that can influence the conception of projects.  
 
In this chapter, the results of the data analysis are presented in three sections representing T1, 
T2-T3 and T4. The data sources were collected and analysed in a cyclical fashion.  Information 
was read, re-read, analysed and re-analysed many times, as the process revealed ideas and 
patterns throughout the specific time-period identified for the study.   
Establishing the time period for data analysis started with a conceptualisation of fire service 
reform as the concrete social object emergent from the different underlying strata.  The 
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‘FiReControl’ project was explicable, though not necessarily a predictable outcome of those 
interactions between T2 and T3. The emergent outcome is represented at T4. 
Working backwards from T4 and following Archer’s (1995), principles of emergence required 
the analysis to focus on the process of interactions between agents within the organisational 
structures.  From these structures, the properties and powers of their groups (political parties, 
unions, fire service and independent consultants) arose. Being emergent, the reform (at T4) was 
not conceived of as a social activity independent from the politics occurring within the 
organisational structures of Government and the fire service (T2-T3). However, this did not 
imply that it was possible to predict through a reductionist process of analysis the outcome of 
the fire service in response to the organisational demands of its employers in the midst of the 
political, social and environmental changes that were taking place under the Blair 
administrations (T2-T3).  Working back and forth, the explication process required moving 
between the abstract and the concrete to analyses social and socio-cultural interactions against 
the conditioning influences of pre-existing structures and cultures, identified at T1. 
There was no definitive coding method by which the data was collected, computed or analysed 
as the cycling between parts and people and between the concrete evidence and abstract 
thinking, requires the researcher to move in and out of the data to explore causal links to 
underlying mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1975: Archer, 1995). Embedded within the T2-T3 stage of 
the morphogenetic sequence data analysis are the four hermeneutic data analyses of the key 
Government reform texts.   
Figure 10 demonstrates the temporal sequence, against which the findings are described in this 
chapter. 
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Figure10. Three-part temporal sequence for the study 
4.1 Overview of the case study 
In Chapter 3, the nature of the case study research was discussed.  In summary, this is an 
intensive case study of a specific unit of analysis relating to the build-up of the FiReControl 
fire service reform project. All case studies require initial descriptions (Yin, 2009).  The 
description is fundamental to critical realist research so that we may contextualize the space in 
which the casual mechanisms exert their effects (Danermark, et al. 2002).  The description stage 
provides the basis for abstracting the complexity that surrounds the phenomenon of interest to 
start to understand the complex social, political and environmental aspects of this particular 
public sector reform policy (ibid). 
4.1.1 The Case ~ FiReControl  
The FiReControl Project (2005-2010) was part of the UK Labour Government’s Resilience 
Programme, which aimed to improve the resilience, efﬁciency and technology of the Fire and 
Rescue Service by replacing 46 local control rooms with a network of nine, purpose-built, 
regional control centres using a national computer system and infrastructure to handle calls, 
mobilise equipment and manage incidents. The project commenced in 2004 and was scheduled 
to be complete by October 2009. In 2007, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) contracted European Air and Defence Systems (EADS) (now Cassidian) 
to design, develop and install the computer system underpinning the project. The project was 
subject to a number of delays and costs escalated over its lifetime. DCLG cancelled the project 
in December 2010 after concluding that it could not be delivered to an acceptable timeframe. 
At the point the decision was made, DCLG estimated it had spent £469 million on the project 
and calculated that completion would take the total cost of the project to £635 million, more 
T
1 Pre-existing 
structures/cultures from 
previous interactions and 
morphogenetic cycles with 
conditioning influences 
(pre 1999)
T
2
: 
T
3
 Socio-cultural interactions 
between agents, from 
whose mediated actions, 
emergent powers are 
generated resulting in 
situational logics, 
predisposing agents to 
decisions and actions.  
(2000-2004)
T
4 Outcomes of interactions 
resulting in 
structural/cultural changes 
(morphogenesis) or 
structural/cultural 
reproduction 
(morphostasis)
(2004 onwards)
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than ﬁve times the original estimate of £120 million (National Audit Office, 2011). The 
FiReControl project ‘failure’ was heavily publicised and criticised as “one of the worst cases 
of project failure the committee has seen in many years” (Hodge, 2011, Public Accounts 
Committee, p.3).  The findings from the two key Government evaluation reports  (PAC and 
NAO) contributed to prejudices and preconceptions about this DCLG project that have become 
firmly established in the major public sector projects’ community.  
4.1.2 The aims of the project 
FiReControl was part of Labour’s Resilience Programme and was considered to be a mission 
critical Government project (DCLG, 2007). The project involved the decommissioning of 46 
existing fire service control centres, responsible for handling emergency and other calls and for 
despatching appropriate resources in response, and the construction of nine regional control 
centres (RCCs).  These would form part of the Critical National Infrastructure11.  RCCs were 
to be equipped with a single command and control system infrastructure providing voice and 
data unified communications across English Fire and Rescue services.  The project also 
involved the transition of existing or recruitment of new control room staff, with new terms and 
conditions to work at the regional centres as well as the introduction of new business processes 
to reflect the change from local to regional control operating. The overall project was funded 
by DCLG.  The RCCs would operate outside of traditional fire service organisational structures.  
They would operate as companies limited by guarantee and once live, service delivery and 
payment for the RCCs would lie with local Government bodies.  
DCLG’s first Gateway report for FiReControl (ODPM, 2004), part of the process to examine 
programmes and projects at key decision points in their lifecycle to ensure suitability to 
proceed, stated that the project aims were to: 
 Provide regional control centres that deliver a cost-effective service, that operates to 
relevant standards, but is responsive to local needs 
 Support the Fire and Rescue Service modernisation agenda in full 
 Ensure the highest appropriate levels of security, resilience and service integrity 
                                                 
11 The UK's critical national infrastructure is defined by the Government as: “Those critical elements of infrastructure 
(namely assets, facilities, systems, networks or processes and the essential workers that operate and facilitate them), the loss 
or compromise of which could result in: a) major detrimental impact on essential services or significant loss of life or 
casualties and/or b) significant impact on national security. http://www.cpni.gov.uk.  Accessed 02/02/2016 
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 Work closely with the other emergency services to plan and manage the joint response 
to major incidents 
 Enhance the safety of the Fire and Rescue Service and of the public 
 Provide technology infrastructure and systems that meet the best available 
 Deliver the right information at the right time to support effective decision making 
 Encourage retention and development of staff 
 Encourage diversity in the workforce 
 Provide a pleasant, effective working environment that is designed to meet best practice 
and satisfy ergonomic and environmental guidelines. 
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4.2 Findings from a morphogenetic approach to the data 
4.2.0 Introduction 
The morphogenetic sequence provides an analytic history of emergence through three phases, 
developed through socio-cultural conditioning, socio-cultural interaction and socio-cultural 
elaboration/stasis.   The sequence provides an historical account of the process by which the 
fire service institution underwent structural and cultural change as Government reform was 
idealised and then approved.   
Section 3.5.2.5 introduced the concept of situational logics and outcomes in relation to socio-
cultural interactions. Archer (1995), provided a summary of the sorts of logics that can arise 
depending on the emergent properties of various interactions in the social world (Table 2).  This 
table will be used repeatedly throughout Chapter 4 to demonstrate how situational logics change 
in relation to shifting emergent outcomes of social and socio-cultural interactions as per the 
morphogenetic approach. Shading will indicate the new situation logic arising as organisational 
relations change 
 Contradictions Complementarities 
 Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
Situational logic correction elimination protection opportunism 
CEPS of:  
Cultural system 
Socio-cultural 
interaction 
syncretism pluralism systematisation specialisation 
unification cleavage reproduction sectionalism 
SEPs of: 
Structural system 
Social interaction 
 
compromise competition integration differentiation 
containment polarisation solidarity diversification 
Table 2. Summary of structural morphogenesis/morphostasis (adapted from Archer, 1995, 
p.303); CEP: cultural emergent properties; SEP: structural emergent properties. 
The analysis describes the three-part sequential schema of Socio-Cultural Conditioning or [T1], 
Socio-Cultural Interaction [T2-T3] and Socio-Cultural Elaboration/Stasis [T4].  
[T1] corresponds to prior conditioning by the pre-existing arrangement of components in 
social reality and the first step in the cycle is to develop an account of how the parts, both 
structural and ideational, influence the projects of the “people” (Archer, 1995, p.201).  
[T2 to T3] corresponds to stage two representing the socio-cultural interactions of the parts 
with human agency. 
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[T4] represents the third stage, where the results of those interactions are presented by 
socio-Cultural Elaboration/Stasis (morphogenesis or morphostasis of cultures, structures 
or of agency). 
 
Specifying T1 - T4 timeframes: 
T1 refers to the period prior to 2001, T4 is placed after FiReControl is approved and T2 - T3 
occupies the intervening time. 
The findings explore structural, cultural and agential changes. The implementation of 
FiReControl was an outcome of social interactions preceding 2005 when the delivery project 
was approved.  If successful, as a major reform, it would have been structurally elaborative 
(Archer, 1995), insofar as it would have transformed the structures of the fire service from 
taking a 999 call to despatching and managing the emergency incident (a fundamental process 
of the fire service), using nationally available resources.  Structural elaboration would be 
represented by the modification of the pre-existing established relations between the 
Government and the fire service institutions.  Even though organisational structures from 
before elaboration would remain after it, it is the complex and situated interplay of structures 
and the agential relations that are changed.  Therefore, the decision to regionalise control rooms, 
as the outcome T4 of the morphogenetic cycle is contextually situated back in T1. Through 
interactions between T2 and T3 contradictory structural relations ensued.  It is these relations, 
known by their effects on specific entities that will be explored using the morphogenetic 
approach with analytic dualism, and retroductive analysis techniques (Section 3.5.2.6).  Figure 
11 depicts the relevant texts and events against the selected timeline for the research
106 
 
4.2.1 Timeline of relevant events within the temporal sequence T1 to T4 (Figure 11) 
Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05
1999 Local Gov Act
Best Value
Future of Control Rooms
Mott MacDonald, 2000
FiReControl 
Reform Project 
begins
Pay Dispute & Industrial Action
Army provide fire cover
Apr-01
ODPM created,
led by
John Prescott
Nov-01
Terrorist attacks in US
Jun-99
Modernising Government 
White Paper
May-97
New Labour wins Election
Tony Blair introduces 
Third Way politics
Apr-00
Cabinet Office Report criticises 
government's regional policies
Aug-98
John Prescott creates 8 Regional 
Development Agencies
Apr-03
Army sent to 
Iraq War
Independent 
Review Fire Service
2002
Nov-02
John Prescott intervenes 
Ordering Indep. 
Review of Fire Service
Social & socio-cultural interactions
Future of Control Rooms 
Mott MacDonald 
2003 Update
Our Fire & Rescue 
White Paper, 2003
Fire Service Act 2004
T1
Pre-existing 
conditions
T2
T4
Consequences 
& outcomes
T3
 Black diamonds 
indicate the three 
phases of the 
morphogenetic 
sequence 
 
 Texts which are 
analysed using 
critical 
hermeneutics, 
within the 
morphogenetic 
approach  are 
coloured red 
 
 Other events will 
be referenced in 
the analysis 
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4.3 Prior structural and cultural conditioning [T1]:  
situational logics of late 1990s 
4.3.0 Introduction 
The following sections describe the English fire service context in terms of the conditioning 
structures and institutions representing the time T1 (pre 1999).  Describing the relevant 
components within the unit of analysis is the “concrete” stage of a critical realist study and is 
the empirical and actual layers of reality where we experience events.  Institutions are defined 
as systems of coordinating rules and conventions, which are both habits that are embodied by, 
as well as practices that are external to agents (Fleetwood, 2008).  Structures in relation to 
Archer’s cultural and social structures describe internally emergent constraining and enabling 
‘lattice-works’ (ibid, p. 20), of interest bearing relations.  
4.3.1 New Labour …a new red dawn or a new blue hubris12? 
At T1, the long tenure of the Conservative party from 1979 to 1997 was drawing to an end. This 
period had seen the steady introduction of new managerial techniques, latterly known as 
Thatcherism. Thatcherism describes the conviction politics, economic, social policy, and 
political style of the British Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher, who was leader of the 
Conservative party from 1975 to 1990. It has also been used to describe the beliefs of the British 
Government while Thatcher was Prime Minister between May 1979 and November 1990, and 
beyond into the Governments of John Major and Tony Blair (Stoker, 2003).  The 
implementation of such social policies (themselves the results of previous morphogenetic 
cycles prior to this unit of study), had resulted in significant structural changes to those of the 
state-dominated post war years.  A significant change saw the introduction of competition 
through quasi markets, seen to be fundamental to enhancing efficiency and quality in the public 
sector.  Education and health were the first major public services to experience competition, 
devolved management and performance management.  Extensive changes took place under the 
Conservative Government’s Education Reform Act (1988) and the NHS Community Care Act 
                                                 
12 Hubris, commonly associated with a loss of contact with reality and an overestimation of one's own competence, 
accomplishments or capabilities has been linked to a number of Prime Ministers who may have developed a personality 
disorder known as Hubris syndrome while in power. Researchers at St George’s, University of London have discovered that 
this personality change was reflected in both Blair’s and Thatcher’s use of language. http://www.nicosia.sgul.ac.September 
2013.  Accessed 11/03/15 
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(1989), which saw wide-spread introduction of new management techniques and competition 
within schools and hospitals (Pollitt, 2001, Willmott, 2000).  The Education Reform Act 
(1988), introduced significant changes, including the National Curriculum, delegated spending 
and management powers for schools, competition in the provision of support services, 
introduction of grant-maintained schools and changes to further and higher education.  The 
NHS reform, set out in the Working for Patients (1989) White Paper, led to the NHS and 
Community Care Act (1990), and introduced market-style mechanisms into the NHS.  Under 
the purchaser-provider separation and general practitioner (GP) fundholding, GPs were 
allocated budgets and they were free to spend as they saw fit to meet their patients’ needs (Scott-
Samuel et al, 2014).   
The changes resulting from the acts were contested by the then opposition Labour party, who 
saw the reforms as damaging to the wider social objectives of education and undermining to 
NHS teamwork and cooperation. For example, Shadow Health Secretary, Robin Cook, 
representing the views of the Opposition in 1991 challenged the efficacy of managerialism and 
internal markets resulting from the Conservative reforms that would enable the State-opting 
out for Hospital Trusts and the contracting out of supports services such as cleaning and 
catering; 
“Will the Secretary of State publish the report on trusts from Coopers and Lybrand, 
which found that only 12 of the 57 trusts had plans with which there were no financial 
difficulties? If that is true, was it not totally irresponsible of the right hon. Gentleman to 
go ahead with all 57 trusts? How did he keep a straight face when he told the House on 
4 December that, in deciding which hospitals should opt out, the key criterion was 
financial viability? 
Will the right hon. Gentleman also explain how Guy's can be so much in debt and yet can 
afford to pay its chief executive the highest salary in the entire NHS? Is he aware that, in 
the past year, Guy's has advertised 44 new management posts at a total cost of £1·3 
million—one quarter of its deficit? Will he explain how it can be value for money to hire 
more managers on bigger salaries to run a reduced service? 
Finally, after this weekend, does not the Secretary of State realise that leaving hospitals 
to sink or swim in the marketplace is regarded by the public as a wholly unacceptable 
way of running their health service?” (HC Deb 29 April, 1991 col 582W). 
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When Labour came to office in 1997, it inherited the new structures and processes that followed 
from the reforms and the firmly installed managerialism that had developed during 
Conservative administrations, and particularly under Thatcherism (Cutler and Waine, 2000). 
However, once in Government, the health and education reforms of the previous Conservative 
Governments that had once been contested went on to prosper under Labour.  In contrast to the 
views expressed by Labour’s Shadow Health secretary at the height of the reforms, the new 
leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair, favoured the development of the reforms, in the same 
direction.  Blair later wrote about this in his autobiography; 
 
“On health and education . . . while the Conservative reforms may have been badly 
implemented and badly explained, their essential direction was one that was in fact 
nothing to do with being ‘Conservative’ but to do with the modern world. These reforms 
were all about trying to introduce systems where the money spent was linked to 
performance and where the service user was in the driving seat” (Blair, 2010, p.262) 
 
This would be an indication of the new ideology of the new Labour Party leadership that had 
won the 1997 UK general election with a landslide victory, ending 18 years of Conservative 
Governments.  With 419 seats, compared to the 165 taken by the Conservative party, Labour’s 
win was the largest the party had ever taken. Tony Blair, at 43 was the youngest British Prime 
Minister that century and in his introduction to the 1997 manifesto, he argued that ‘In each area 
of policy a new and distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that differs both from the 
solutions of the old left and those of the Conservative right’ (Blair, 1997).  New Labour would 
come to represent a significant departure from the old Labour party, which had traditionally 
opposed everything the Conservatives stood for.  Labour’s new way of governing would be 
called the “Third Way”. The following table offers a succinct summary of the political 
philosophies of Tony Blair’s New Labour party and their Third Way. 
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Dimension Old Left Third Way New Right 
Approach Leveller Investor Deregulator 
Outcome Equality Inclusion Inequality 
Citizenship Rights Both Responsibilities 
Mixed economy of welfare State Public/private civil society Private 
Mode Command and control Co-operation/partnership Competition 
Accountability Central 
state/upwards/national 
Both? Market/ 
downwards/local 
Social expenditure High Pragmatic Low 
 
Table 3. Dimensions of the Third Way, (Powell, 2000, p.42) 
 
Table 3 describes what Blair’s Labour would stand for; collaboration, inclusivity and 
partnerships, where the sense of community would be seen “as the hangover cure to the 
excesses of Conservative individualism” (Driver and Martell, 1997, p.27). New Labour 
advocated social cohesion over the market culture of self-interest, and a dynamic market 
economy, where both the community and the individual would benefit from business and 
individual opportunity. Blair’s concept of communitarianism was the solution to the problems 
of Thatcherism; returning the country to its moral duties and obligations to one and each other.  
It was also a solution to and a departure from the failings of Old Labour, which relied so heavily 
on the state.  New Labour talked of reinventing Government through collective action in the 
community (ibid). 
 
The context of this new form of politics and its policy implications is important towards 
achieving a key objective of this research, which is to understand underlying mechanisms in 
the creation and approval of reform ideas.  New Labour’s Third Way advocated alternatives to 
state provision and Government control, promoting wealth creation by being fiscally prudent, 
matching rights with responsibilities and fostering a culture of duty within strong communities, 
(Driver and Martell 2000). Exploring the structural and cultural context of Blair’s Third Way 
politics, in terms of values and approaches to policy making, and challenges to the social world 
with which the political movement interacted, forms part of the analysis of social realist 
thinking.  This will now be explored further as part of the pre-existing T1 context that 
conditioned interactions later in the cycle. 
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4.3.2 Modernising Britain, the third way 
The Third Way was communicated in an array of policy initiatives and reforms encapsulated 
in the Modernising Government (1999) report, and demonstrated by schemes such as the Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP) scheme. PPP built on the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) of John 
Major’s 1992 Conservative Government and was aimed at encouraging public–private 
partnerships to reduce public sector borrowing in the building of public infrastructure, such as 
schools, hospitals and roads.  Under Tony Blair, the PPP scheme shifted the emphasis to the 
achievement of ‘value for money’, mainly through allocation of risk. Other key Third Way 
initiatives included the Best Value Quality Services programme.  The Best Value programme 
intended to improve local services in terms of cost and quality and promote continuous 
improvement having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (LGA, 
1999, Section 3[1]).  Within the early years of the first administration (1997 to 2001) under 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, New Labour’s agenda for reforming the public sector was well 
under way; the 1997 Department for Education’s Excellence in Schools policy laid down the 
Government’s educational reform priorities, promoting pupil attainment standards over school 
structures, as well as policies of intervention to overcome under performance.  
Healthcare reforms were also in progress under the first Blair administration, such as the 
creation of the new telephone support service, NHS Direct (1998), and healthcare regulator, 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence in 1999.  The first New Labour administration (1997-
2001) imposed extensive NHS organisational reforms that were set out in the 1999 Health Bill.  
The reforms established primary care groups, abolished the Conservative policy of GP 
fundholding and retained Conservative market-based policies of the purchaser-provider split.  
The bill also introduced service performance ratings and new targets to reduce NHS waiting 
lists. By 2000, Labour’s 10-year modernisation programme of investment and reform ‘The 
NHS Plan’ was published outlining strategies for more staff, more beds, more hospitals to 
provide improved access to care, and a new model for financing it;  the Private Finance 
Initiative.  Under New Labour, there was extensive hospital building using the PFI model; of 
88 major NHS investment schemes between 1997 and 2006, 67 were built under PFI (NHS 
Confederation, 2008)  
The key strategy to achieve reform was the concept of modernization, which served as a 
‘leitmotiv’ for New Labour (Pyper, 2003, p.494). Central to Blair’s modernisation was the 
rhetoric of renewal through collaboration, partnership and inclusion (Ahmad and Broussine, 
2003).  New Labour promoted the concept of evidence-based policy-making to end the 
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ideological-based decision making they claimed previous Governments had used (Sanderson, 
2003).  The zeitgeist of those years was public-private partnership schemes that promoted the 
involvement of private sector capital and operating methods in the delivery of the public 
services. During the previous Conservative Government, many Labour Members of Parliament 
(MP), in opposition, had fervently condemned the Conservative’s Private Finance Initiative, 
(itself an example of morphogenesis) as public sector privatisation.  Debating industry 
privatisation in the Commons in 1995 (before Labour won the General Election in 1997), 
Harriet Harman MP (then the Shadow Health Secretary), said that the PFI was: 
 
 "..a raft for a sort of ramp for privatising" (HC Deb, 30 Nov 1995, c1431). 
 
In the same debate, Margaret Becket MP (then Deputy Leader of the Labour Party) said:  
 
"Market testing represents creeping privatisation. As does the Private Finance 
Initiative."  (HC Deb, 30 Nov 1995, c1431). 
 
Interestingly, and indicative of the impending ideological schisms that would come to represent 
New Labour once in power, Tony Blair, as Leader of the Opposition said that day: 
 
"We would get public and private finance working together in transport, in housing, in 
health and education" (HC Deb, 30 Nov 1995, c1431). 
 
By the second term in office (2001-2005), the Blair administration was thoroughly committed 
to PFI as a cornerstone of their public services’ modernisation programme, promoting the UK’s 
competitiveness (HM Treasury, 2000).   The Prime Minister claimed that his second term 
mission was to deliver the biggest reform programme in public services for half a century 
(Blair, 2001b), and PFI was the mechanism of choice.   Under the PFI, private service providers 
raise the necessary finance to fund capital projects that they come to own and which, they either 
rent back or service charge the public sector partner.  Contradicting the previous criticisms of 
PFI made by senior Labour MPs in opposition by the leader of the New Labour party, PFI was 
now applauded as the Third Way of public provision built on partnership (Blair, 1998). 
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4.3.3 Final days of corporatism 
If the Third Way was to build on previous Government’s reform policies to modernise Britain’s 
public sector services with private sector involvement, some last bastions of post war thinking 
would need to be challenged.  The logic of corporatism had evolved across the British state 
sector since the end of World War 2 (Hughes and Tuohy, 1999).  Corporatism can be defined 
as an entire socio-economic system, or in its more restrictive usage, as a particular form of 
interest group politics (Bondi, 1987), whereby public service policy decisions consist of 
tripartite negotiations between Government, heads of industry, and trade union leaders. In this 
study, corporatism refers to interest group politics, in which the interests of powerful business 
and trade unions contribute to the policy process (c.f. Dearlove and Saunders, 1984; Mercer, 
1984), by virtue of the privileged access to politicians and administrators that such groups 
possess.  Privileged access in this sense is secured through formal arrangements for 
representation within political structures (Bondi, 1987).   At T1, the tripartite corporatist system 
that prevailed in the fire sector consisted of the Fire Brigade’s Union (FBU), the local 
Government employers and the Home Office.  
At T1 (pre 2000), the institutional structures of the UK fire sector consisted of 50 'Fire 
Authorities' made up of 16 county councils, 6 joint Fire and Civil Defence Authorities (set up 
under the 1985 Local Government Act in the former metropolitan authority areas), the London 
Fire and Emergency Planning Authority and 24 other combined authorities in England, 3 in 
Wales, 8 in Scotland and 1 in Northern Ireland.  Table 4 shows the organisations that made up 
the fire service institution as it was around the time of T1. 
 
The Secretary of State 
Responsible for Government policy and strategic direction for the fire 
service; fire service funding. 
 
 
 
Fire Authorities 
There were 50 fire authorities in UK, responsible to the Secretary of 
State. They were the formal employers of the fire brigades. They were 
responsible for: funding; budget setting; staffing; policy; direction on 
initiatives; decisions on the standard of the cover. 
 
Fire Brigades (later 
known as Fire & Rescue 
Services) 
There were 50 fire brigades responsible for organising and overseeing 
the delivery of the service. 
 
Fire Stations 
 
There were 595 whole-time fire stations; 874 retained stations (i.e. 
based on a part-time force); 115 day crewing; and 49 control rooms. 
Their role was to deliver the service. 
 
 
HM Fire Service 
Inspectorate 
Its role was to provide advice to Ministers, fire brigades, local 
authorities, and business. Responsible for inspecting activities of fire 
brigades. 
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Table 4. Fire Service Organisation in England and Wales at T1 (Bain, 2002) 
 
At T1, the fire service was under the central Government control of the Home Office.  
Nationally the fire service occupied a position at the edge of local Government and whilst there 
had been previous central Government attempts to modernise it (Audit Commission, 1995; 
ODPM Community Fire Safety Task Force, 1997), the change initiatives were without any 
material incentive to individual brigades and as such there had been little progress (Matheson 
et al, 2011).  In morphogenetic terms, pre-dating 1999, the fire service sat within systems of 
(but relatively untouched by) structural and cultural relations in which state public sector 
management principles had been evolving during the previous decade under Thatcherism.  
Despite significant public management reforms to the corporatist organisations of the education 
sector (c.f. Education Act 1979, 1980) and the health sector (c.f. Griffiths Report 1983, Project 
2000), during the Conservative administrations, the enduring corporatist structure of the fire 
service that favoured industrial relations and joint consensus, had remained largely protected 
from the Thatcher era.  This was due to the fire service being a “relatively low cost to the public 
purse, the high level of sympathy for workers doing a dangerous job and a pay formula that 
removed overt conflict” (Fitzgerald, 2005, p.648).   
Fire service corporatism at T1 is defined in both structural and process terms.  Structurally it 
reflected solidarity in Archer’s terminology; an industrial relations model advocating trade 
unions and joint negotiating bodies, and process-wise, agreed procedures, consensus and joint 
interests were prominent (Fitzgerald, 2005). A fundamental aspect of corporatist relations is 
that they are power-dependent (ibid), where all parties, “enjoy some measure of autonomy, 
although within a set of constraints” (Cawson, 1985, p.7).   
All parties had vested interests to protect.  Day-to-day, fire brigades had only indirect relations 
with central Government (Home Office), taking direction via a layer of so-called insiders 
(Fitzgerald, 2005).  The insiders were like-minded, seconded ex-fire service personnel of Her 
Majesty’s Fire Service Inspectorate (HMFSI) and the Central Fire Brigades Advisory 
Committee (CFBAC).  The bargaining power of the FBU meant they had significant managerial 
authority in directing the organisation in terms of delivering, developing or changing strategy. 
Corporatist cultures and structures meant the FBU had a very influential presence.   At T1, the 
FBU had a strongly collectivist and professionally oriented nature (Baigent, 2001; Seifert, 
2011), linked to the heavy demands of the job in relation to teamwork and loyalty (Redman and 
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Snape, 2005).  Such a collectivist work ethic fostered high levels of loyalty and discipline 
towards the FBU and at this T1 juncture, union membership was high; 86% in 1997 among 
uniformed staff (ibid).  The left wing leadership of the FBU under Andy Gilchrist and 
previously FBU General Secretary Ken Cameron, endorsed FBU rule book, rule number 3 (1) 
“ to be an industrial union for firefighters with the first objective to organise all uniformed 
employers into one union” (Redman and Snape, 2005, p.29). 
At T1 the fire service was a largely male institution and firefighters created an informal 
hierarchy through both the watch system and the generational system by which older 
firefighters pass down to younger firefighters their knowledge about the 
skills/qualities/attributes necessary for firefighting (Baigent, 2001). Baigent (2001), a 
firefighter turned academic considered the fire service institutionally conservative, sexist, racist 
and homophobic.  In 1999, Her Majesty’s Fire Service Inspectorate (HMFSI), conducted a 
thematic review into diversity, finding the fire service to be predominantly white, heterosexual, 
able-bodied and pseudo/para-military from the post-war recruitment connections with the 
Royal Navy (HMFSI, 1999).  The HMFSI were “strongly of the opinion that substantial change 
is necessary in the management and culture of the service to achieve an environment where 
equality and fairness can be integrated into its whole operation and organisation” (ibid, p. 55).  
Coupled with single tier entry, where everyone in the fire service joins as a fire fighter, the 
dominant culture had maintained the socio-economic and ethnic profile of new recruits and had 
contributed to the reproduction of attitudes and behaviours (HMFSI, 1999).  In morphogenetic 
terms, the institutional configuration was one of necessary complementarity (highlighted) in 
Table 2), where fire service organisations and their linkages enjoyed a complementary nature 
between systemic structures, mutually reinforcing one another (Archer, 1995). 
 Contradictions Complementarities 
 Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
Situational logic 
 
correction elimination protection Opportunism 
CEPS of:  
Cultural system 
Socio-cultural 
interaction 
syncretism pluralism systematisation specialisation 
unification cleavage reproduction Sectionalism 
SEPs of: 
Structural system 
Social interaction 
 
compromise competition integration differentiation 
containment polarisation solidarity diversification 
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Table 2. Summary of structural morphogenesis/morphostasis (adapted from Archer, 1995, 
p.303); CEP: cultural emergent properties; SEP: structural emergent properties. 
Such comfortable arrangements between like-minded members of the organisation perpetuated 
corporatist structures.  This led to social interactions that promoted solidarity in protecting the 
status quo. The closed nature of the system not only protected the profile of recruits (thereby 
excluding minority groups, as identified in the Home Office 1999 thematic review), but also 
produced Chief Fire Officers that had been brought through the same ‘closed’ system (Couch, 
2002). Despite the findings that would support radical change to cultures, at T1, structures such 
as HMFSI were considered “bodies of compromise rather than change, offering advice on the 
well-being of the service rather than models for radical overhaul of structures and service 
provision” (Fitzgerald, 2005, p.649). Whereas the bulk of the report considered the complexity 
of the environment, and the pressures on leadership that affected change potential, the 
recommendations to solve the problems focused on the development of future Chief Officers 
only (ibid). 
At T1, structures and cultures of the institution of the fire service were firmly embedded and 
the period was characterised by inertia.  The relatively harmonious relationship between the 
FBU, the local Fire Authority employers, and the management that had existed for some time, 
had led to a high degree of system integration where the institutions mutually reinforced each 
other’s status quo and in so doing protected their vested interests. The vested interests of the 
FBU in particular promoted a form of institutional integration that reinforced the Union’s 
hegemony in that tripartite arrangement. During the 1990s, the two-tier system of management 
operated initially at Brigade level where the FBU agreed strategy with the Chief Fire Officer 
and where most financial and organisational issues were sorted out with employer and Union 
representatives prior to full Fire Authority meetings.  The meetings were simply to ‘rubber 
stamp’ decisions made by the tripartite management group (Bach et al, 2005, p.651). 
Introducing structural changes to management would therefore not maintain the vested interests 
of the FBU concerning managerial authority and bargaining power. The emergent properties of 
this complementary configuration of structures, cultures and agents between the decision-
making tripartite were “sui generis”13 fostering negative feedback loops that would discourage 
                                                 
13 Sui generis (Archer 1995), as in a normative framework existing independently of and irreducible to individual social 
actors 
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any attempts at change. In such an arrangement, everyone gained and all had something to lose 
by disruption, as will play out over the morphogenetic sequence represented in this analysis.  
An example of the problems faced by ‘new’ ideas and management styles entering this 
protectionist matrix of compatible and interdependent institutions, was the train of events that 
occurred in 2000.  When Chief Fire Officer of Merseyside Fire Service, Malcom Saunders 
attempted to modernise the workforce through diversity in recruitment, he suggested appointing 
non-uniformed staff to senior management posts.  He also wanted to attract more women and 
people from ethnic minorities into the fire service.  Saunders was one of the ‘new generation’ 
of chief fire officers, whose appointment was not managed by the FBU and members of the 
Fire Authority.  From 1999, prospective CFOs had to complete a Command Training Course, 
selection for which was heavily influenced by the Home Office (Fitzgerald, 2005). The new 
CFO recruitment process brought a wider professional skill set beyond incident management, 
such as commercial and political acumen. The endeavour of CFO Saunders to change the 
profile of managers in the service may indicate the alignment of a different type of CFO with 
Government agendas attempting to disturb the taken-for-granted routines that were embedded 
in the fire service. 
CFO Saunders’ reform plans were rejected by the FBU and led to widespread strike action in 
2000 as reported in national media (Wainwright, 2001).  Saunders was quoted in a national 
newspaper report (Bunyan, 2001), as saying; “The union has a radical Left-wing leadership 
which seems determined to prevent the modernisation of the service. But they have got to get 
into the 21st century. We are not talking about political correctness, just common sense”. After 
a long and bitter battle including highly publicised accusations of personal misconduct, which 
Saunders counter claimed were defamatory and evident of bullying vendettas, he subsequently 
took sick leave and did not return to the service (Wainwright, 2001).  
Recalling Archer’s situational logics (Table 2), which predispose agents towards specific 
courses of action for the promotion of their interests (Archer 1995, p.216), the relations between 
fire brigades and their fire local councillor employers (the Fire Authority), were both necessary 
and complementary. The enduring systemic structures and integrated cultures that existed 
throughout the fire service during T1 resulted in considerable protection and stagnation.  The 
mediatory mechanisms which emerged from those parts and people emanated from the way in 
which the internal, necessary and complementary relations of the FBU, the employers and the 
old management systematically shaped agential situations.  In so doing, traditional actions 
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protected against loss of vested interests, whilst innovative action (such as the Saunders 
example above), threatened these interests both individually and collectively.  Socio-cultural 
interactions were therefore reproduced by limiting new ideas leading to a systematisation of 
the cultural system.  The resulting enduring nature of the tripartite arrangement (FBU, local 
councillor employers and senior management), possessed sufficient authority to manage or 
even remove threats to their vested interests.  Could this have been the case in relation to CFO 
Saunders at Merseyside Fire Service in 2000?  Overall outcomes of the situational logics led to 
a persistent lack of innovation across the fire service resulting in morphostasis, reproduction of 
those very systems.  Transforming them (through Labour’s early attempts to modernise), would 
threaten the loss of vested interests of the dominant group, the FBU and the senior management.  
Hence, attempts at modernisation of the fire service during the 1990s struggled to effect change.   
4.3.4 Early attempts to modernise fire brigades 
Conservative Governments did not undermine corporatist brigade structures and cultures but 
Margaret Thatcher’s introduction of New Public Management (NPM) principles in the 1980s 
put fire service structures under pressure, and this did begin to challenge attitudes (Fitzgerald 
2005).  Drawing on private sector management techniques (Hood, 1991), the austere financial 
arrangements of NPM accompanied by business led managerialism, focused attention on costs 
and performance management,  markets and competition (Farnham and Horton, 1996).  
The period since Labour came to office in 1997 saw public services’ reform at the top of the 
political agenda. However, significant challenge faced the implementation of those first term 
manifesto promises, not least because of commitments to adhere to the previous Conservative 
Government's spending plans (Bach et al. 2005). During the first administration of New Labour, 
fire service modernisation was set within the Local Government Modernisation Agenda and its 
key components, the Local Government Acts of 1999 and 2000. Thus, in Archer’s (1995), 
terminology, when the Local Government Act was passed in 1999, pre-existing relations of 
necessary complementarities (c.f. Table 1) and a conjunction of both structural and cultural 
morphostasis had resulted in the situation logics of protection causing structural integration and 
ideational systematization (strengthening of pre-existing relations among the parts (Archer, 
1995).  Relations between the tripartite arrangement of leadership (local Government 
employers, the FBU and fire service management), had developed over time as cycles had 
reproduced cultures and structures that served to fulfil their vested interests.  These logics 
119 
 
ensured the corporatist cultures and “semi-Taylorist”14 (Fitzgerald, 2005, p.651), structures 
remained intact. Whether the 1999 Act could affect structural and or cultural conditioning, 
enough to effect change in the fire service institutions is an important part of the morphogenetic 
sequence. 
Early attempts by Labour to penetrate the prevailing protectionist logics included the changing 
of terminology to move away from the militaristic style ‘brigade’ that had originated from a 
high level of recruitment from the armed services (Baigent, 2001).  In his ‘Independent Review 
of the Fire Service (which will be hermeneutically analysed in Section 4.10), the main author, 
Professor George Bain (2002), described these militaristic structures and cultures as 
anachronistic, culturally immobile and unrepresentative of the communities that they served. 
Of the many themes that Government-style modernisation would address, creating modern 
working arrangements, engagement with local communities and adopting a more preventive 
focus were key (Matheson et al, 2011), and the period saw the start of the rebranding from the 
militaristic ‘brigade’ to ‘service’.  The general shift in terminology was emblematic of New 
Labour’s modernisation process. Labour’s 1999 Local Government Act included the Best 
Value regime for local authorities in England and Wales.  Best Value was originally presented 
as a release from the Conservative’s that forced councils to submit selected services to 
compulsory competitive tendering.  Unlike forcing competitive tendering for services 
economies, the Best Value initiative required local authorities, including fire authorities, to 
undertake Best Value reviews of their public service provision and to publish Best Value 
performance plans for their improvement. Best Value aimed to secure continuous 
improvements in public service delivery by the most economic, efficient and effective means 
available. The Government set out four defining elements of Best Value for local authorities 
(DETR, 1998) 15: 
1. To secure economic, efficient and effective services continuously (the ‘3 Es’). 
2. Conduct service reviews within which the authority must demonstrate that in the 
fulfilment of their duties under Best Value they have: compared their service provision 
                                                 
14 Taylorism refers to a production efficiency methodology that breaks every action, job, or task into small and simple 
segments.  Its aim is to improve efficiency in labour production.  Its enduring nature in the fire service meant chains of staff 
were involved in procedures which protected roles and responsibilities to levels that countered efficiency. 
15 DETR was the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions.  This became Department for Local 
Government and the Regions (DTLR) in 2001 and in 2002 transport moved to its own department and the remaining 
responsibilities of the DTLR became the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), which in 2005 became Department 
for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). 
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with that of other private and public providers; consulted with local business and 
community; considered competition in provision; and challenged the reasons for, and 
methods of, provision (the ‘4 Cs’). 
3. Audit and measure performance, with the broad expectation that, year-on-year, costs 
would reduce and quality would increase. Performance would be monitored locally 
through Best Value Performance Reviews (BVPRs), partly through adherence to locally 
and statutorily determined Best Value performance indicators (BVPIs), and 
disseminated annually through Performance Plans (BVPPs). 
4. Consequences of under-performance: Government intervention in cases of Best Value 
failure, and reward in cases of success. 
Best Value policies and directives were intended to foster innovation and responsiveness and 
thereby promote continuous improvements in local service standards (DETR, 1998). The Best 
Value regime placed on local authorities a new duty to ‘make arrangements to secure 
continuous improvement in the way functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (DETR, 1998: para. 3.1). Under Best Value, councils 
and other statutory bodies such as police and fire authorities were required to develop a 
corporate strategy against which success can be measured; construct a programme of 
fundamental performance reviews; undertake performance reviews to examine the purpose of 
every function and the most effective means of procuring services; publish annual performance 
plans setting out strategies and targets for improvement and criteria for monitoring progress 
(Martin, 2002).  
Soon after its implementation in the fire sector, the statutory framework was seen as centralising 
and standardising in its measurement and control of performance.  Best Value introduced in a 
new system of external regulation intended to constrain the behaviour and performance of local 
authorities, principally through performance indicators, audit and inspection. The cost of 
delivering Best Value was unclear in relation to the service improvements it might actually 
deliver (Boyne 2000). Notwithstanding its inherent contradictions, the 1999 Local Government 
Act was designed to deliver service improvements across the public sector to the logic of the 
market, through centrally imposed performance indicators, monitoring and audit via the Best 
Value regime.  It was the start of the quasi-marketisation of the public sector – towards 
efficiency (Ironside and Seifert, 2004).  However, what was entrenched within the fire service 
cultural system that predated the 1999 Act defined how it impinged upon agents of the fire 
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service and its unions.  Those entrenched cultures would therefore mediate their responses in 
return to the Act and to subsequent directives in the Government’s drive to modernise the fire 
service. As well as FBU resistance and limited number of fire services submitting Best Value 
Reviews, the Chief Fire Officer’s Association shared their concerns in their Best Value Policy 
Document (COA, 2001): 
“It should be evident from this document that the Fire Officers' Association is not 
resistant to modernisation and change but we believe that it should be firmly based on 
evidence that effectiveness and value for public money can be improved. We are 
concerned that Government and its agencies might not always practice what they preach, 
and unless there is a clear demonstration of their commitment, Best Value is destined to 
fail. Confidence in the political process might be engendered were a long-term view of 
improvement (i.e. beyond the next electoral cycle) to be shown by political leaders. We 
also hold concerns over conflicting messages on who should determine the nature of the 
public services. On one hand we are told that our communities should dictate the balance 
between cost and quality, whilst on the other, Government imposes budgets and 
performance targets”.  
4.3.5 Best Value in control rooms?  Ask the experts! 
In respect of achieving Best Value in the fire service, the Home Office placed specific 
requirements on fire authorities to carry out reviews of defined activities in the first three years 
of their Best Value programme.  In the first financial year (2000 to 2001), the functions of 
communications (emergency communications such as wide area radio) and control rooms were 
to be reviewed with the intention of making changes to achieve improvements in operating 
efficiency. 
4.3.6 Control rooms at T1 
At T1, a typical fire ‘brigade’ control room would respond to emergency calls from the public 
within the geographical boundaries served by the organisation. Control room staffing would 
follow the same system as that of operational fire crews in stations, e.g. a four days on / four 
days off routine creating an eight day ‘tour of duty’ cycle. Four different watches operated the 
shift system: red, white, blue and green. The system ensured control room (and fire cover) was 
maintained 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year. If calls were received from outside the 
boundary, the incident would be passed to the relevant neighbouring brigade, usually via 
telephone or fax.  If for any reason, a control room became unable to respond to emergency 
122 
 
calls, for example, due to a  major telephony outage or threats to building safety, 999 calls 
would be diverted to another brigade based on disaster recovery arrangements with telephone 
providers and inter-brigade agreements of ‘mutual assistance’.  
Control rooms also dealt with many non-emergency inquiries and undertook numerous 
administrative tasks such as managing day-to-day fire station staffing/absences and 
coordinating issues with fire engine or equipment availability Control room operators receiving 
999 calls would begin the incident management process by creating an incident log.  By asking 
a series of questions, the incident would be assessed, coded and geographically located.  This 
would enable the incident to be matched to the nearest fire station resource.  The resource would 
be mobilised using telephone lines that would leave the control room and arrive at the 
designated fire station where a series of electronic triggers would alert the crews to the fire.  
Control staff would maintain communication with the crew using vehicle based radios and 
would continue to update the incident log until they were advised by the officer in charge to 
close the log.   
Control staff would also be responsible for engaging other agencies if an incident required 
support, for example, police and ambulance services.  By the late 1990s, the process was 
computerised however, each brigade had its own software systems and leased its own wide area 
network for radio communications (Merseyside Fire Service Control Room Manager, 2011). 
At the same time as fire authorities were reviewing control rooms and emergency 
communications for Best Value, the Home Office also commissioned the management 
consultants Mott MacDonald to undertake a Best Value review of control rooms in England 
and Wales. The following section delivers the key findings of a critical hermeneutic analysis 
of the report that followed the review. 
Text 1: Future of Fire Service Control Rooms and Communications in 
England & Wales, 2000. 
4.4 Findings of a critical hermeneutic analysis; the efficiency imperative  
For ease of reading, only page references are used in this section.  All page references unless 
otherwise cited relate to the first-analysed text (The Future of Fire Service Control Rooms and 
Communications in England and Wales, Mott McDonald, 2000).  This is the first of the three 
definitive reports used by the Labour Government as evidence to legislate for control room 
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reforms to the fire service in 2004.  Mott MacDonald were awarded the contract for the study 
on 6 December 1999 and their report was published April 2000. The report recommended the 
rationalisation of 47 control rooms to 21. The report recommended that “fire authorities work 
together to eliminate control rooms such that none handles less than 20,000 per year” (p.123). 
This is one of four critical hermeneutic analyses embedded within the overall analytic 
framework of the morphogenetic sequence (T1-T4).  Each follows the four stage approach 
(Prasad, 2002, c.f. Chapter 3); reading the text, laying out the context, closing the hermeneutic 
circle and forming the conceptual bridge to understanding.  The contexts for the texts have 
therefore already been laid out in the description of T1 and subsequent texts analysed against 
the machinations of interactions between T2 and T3 are also considered as background to the 
interpretations. The following findings (for Text#1), result from reading and circling between 
the text and the T1 contexts as different layers of understanding begin to emerge (Prasad’s 
stages 2 and 3).   The conceptual bridge to understanding (stage 4), shall be incorporated in the 
Discussion, Chapter 5. 
The 2000 Mott McDonald document is one of three successive Government-sponsored texts 
about reforming the fire service during Blair’s second Labour administration. The analysis 
shows how language was used to theorise how reform changes ought to be constructed. An 
early indication of this can be seen in Page 1 of the report where the Government’s brief was 
interpreted by the management consultants and mirrored back using the political language of 
the day.  This would set the tone for the report throughout. 
The terms of reference taken from the original consultants’ brief and contract (p.1), were: 
 To provide authoritative advice for fire authorities and fire brigades on how best to meet 
their future mobile communications and control requirements 
 To assess relative costs, benefits and risks available options for the provision of control 
rooms and mobile communications 
 To identify criteria that should determine the choice of future mobile communications 
systems  
 To advise how options should be implemented and to provide a timetable for doing this 
 To provide practical assistance to fire brigades implementing the change 
 To report to ministers by 31st March 2000. 
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Introducing the scope of the report that would deliver the findings of the work undertaken to 
deliver the brief (above), the management consultants immediately introduce the political 
policy language of Best Value and in doing so give salience to its merits without further 
justification.  The scope of the report would: 
 Identify the functions carried out by fire brigade control rooms in England and Wales 
 Identify potential options for providing Best Value in the provision of fire control rooms 
 Compare the options identified 
 Provide advice for fire authorities on how best to achieve Best Value control room 
solutions, 
 Identify potential barriers to implementation and recommend how these may be 
overcome 
 Consider the implications for future fire service radio systems 
 Develop an outline plan for implementing the report’s recommendations (p.1). 
 
The subtle jump from the Government brief (to help fire brigades best meet their future mobile 
and control requirements), to the consultants’ claim that the report would provide advice on 
how best to achieve Best Value in control room solutions implies the latter is the solution to the 
former.  Introduced in the 1999 Local Government Act, by the time of the report (April 2000), 
the espoused political value of the Best Value regime has been absorbed by the management 
consultants and becomes their objective in meeting the brief to find the best way for fire 
brigades to meet their future needs. “As a result of the Best Value initiative, there will be 
increasing pressure on the emergency services to improve their operating efficiency” (p.8).  
Ideologically, this first report about reforming control rooms reveals the emerging discourse of 
New Labour’s early agenda for modernising the public sector.  By linking Best Value to 
operating efficiency and then to meeting the future needs of control rooms, the management 
consultants are able to direct attention to the political conception of Best Value and efficiency, 
whilst concealing the fact that crucially,  the review did not establish inefficiencies in control 
rooms. Key themes emerge in the report from which thematic references can be identified for 
the analysis (Prasad, 2002).  They are based on themes of Best Value, efficiency and 
collaboration.  
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4.4.1 Constructing the requirement 
The report lacks any preamble to its purpose.  It moves straight into Terms of Reference and 
Scope (listed above) and provides a short précis of a series of historical Government reports 
that have made recommendations to improve various aspects the UK fire service.  Any 
references to control rooms contained in the historical reviews (technology, operations and 
staffing), are extracted to support the report’s aims, giving an impression that the current review 
builds from previous attempts to improve control rooms.  However, amidst the 50 year potted 
history, only two reports specifically mention control room rationalisation.  The first, 
Mobilising Fire Service Resources (1992), refers to procuring control room software solutions 
for managing resources at incidents.  Based on information technology, the 1992 report 
suggests regional procurement of solutions would be more efficient. The second ‘In the Line 
of Fire’ is a management handbook (1995).  It identifies opportunities for increasing value for 
money that might be achieved through inter-brigade collaboration.  Fundamentally, the need 
for control room operational change per se, is not evidenced in these historic reviews; in fact 
the report admits that previous reports have only “touched on fire service control rooms” (p.7).  
Nevertheless, the report goes on to say, “in spite of the substantial series of past reports and 
investigations into the fire service, there are still significant drivers for further change” (p.7), 
as if the previous reports were specifically about control rooms. Notwithstanding this paucity 
of relevant control room investigation, the report suggests that  
“Despite the fact that reforms have been recommended for at least a decade, there has 
been no significant change in the basic configuration of the fire service control rooms for 
at least a decade.  This suggests that the methods used to promote change in the past 
have not been strong enough” (p.2). 
The Introduction thereby creates the idea that previous attempts to reform control rooms had 
been ignored.  Though unsubstantiated (see above), this helps the management consultants to 
develop the notion there is a control room problem that still needs solving.  The report implies 
the problem (though undefined) now needs resolving.  However, what the report promotes as 
new imperatives to reform essentially boil down to the new Government policies; Best Value, 
joined up Government and regional governance (p.7-8), as opposed to any operational 
dysfunction, per se. 
Though it is typical that Government policies should drive reforms, the critical hermeneutic 
perspective highlights the report’s lack of information to fully describe the control room 
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problem that the management consultants are ‘helping’ to resolve in light of new Government 
policy. The following table summarises the chapter where we might learn of the actual problem, 
by understanding the things that are driving the need for change.  However, as can be seen from 
the summary table, the drivers relate to what were in fact New Labour’s latest Government 
policies.  In reality, technology drivers could be achieved with improved procurement and 
drivers relating to Police and Ambulance were without substance.   
Drivers for Change Summary of driver 
 
2.1 Government policy 
[2.1.1] Best Value initiative; [2.1.2] Joined up Government; [2.1.3] Possible 
changes to local Government boundaries; [2.1.4] Experience from five recent 
major incidents, (“All of these incidents involved the three main emergency 
authorities.  It may be the case that operational benefits could have been achieved 
if these incidents were dealt with by a single joint Emergency Control Room.  
However, such benefits may also be achieved through the use of appropriate 
technology and a change in procedures” (p.10) 
 
2.2 Technology 
[2.2.1] The need to implement new digital radio systems for fire-fighter 
communications (this is different to control room resource management systems) 
and the need to consider more efficient procurement of said technology; [2.2.2] 
The need to consider new ways of working in light of new technology, suggesting 
non-emergency calls could be managed through call centres to reduce calls into 
the emergency control room handling only 999s. 
 
2.3 Fire-specific 
 [2.3.1] Home Office Policy (to encourage joint working within and with other 
organisations); [2.1.2] Regionalisation “We [Mott MacDonald] have been told 
that the Home Office does not have any plans to regionalise the fire service.  It 
does however believe that whilst the fire service is organised, provided and 
funded locally, there are some decisions about the provision of the fire service 
that are best made regionally or nationally” (p.11) 
 
2.4 Police 
States that police are organised locally but have some aspects managed nationally 
(e.g. National Criminal Intelligence Service) and “No plans to regionalise the 
police service have been announced although some senior officers have 
advocated rationalisation of the existing 43 forces into a smaller number or larger 
forces” (p.11) 
 
2.5 Ambulance 
“The department of health appear to be content to let amalgamation of ambulance 
trusts to be driven at least in part by commercial pressures” (p.11) 
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Table 5 Drivers for change (based on Chapter 2. of ‘The future of fire service control rooms 
and communications in England and Wales’, Mott MacDonald, 2000) 
The point of exploring this issue, is that had previous attempts to reform control rooms been 
ignored (as the management consultants suggested from the outset, see earlier), unresolved 
problems would have prevailed in fire control rooms.  The problems may have related to control 
room operational inefficiency or to public safety and ineffective 999-call management, or to 
fire fighter safety in despatching to emergency incidents, for example. No such ‘drivers’ for 
change are mentioned. What is provided is a political agenda to reform control rooms to meet 
new Government policy requirements. Whilst this may not be unusual, the findings of the text 
analysis did not reveal any other reasons to reform other than those relating to Government 
initiatives.  This will be explored further in the Discussion chapter but closing the hermeneutic 
circles reveals evidence of how this was achieved. 
4.4.2 No significant changes to fire service in last decade? 
Suggesting there had been ‘no significant change’ in fire service organisations for over a decade 
(p.2), set against the zeitgeist of Blair’s New Labour policy for modernising Britain, the 
apparent institutional resistance helps create the sense that the Mott MacDonald review was 
needed to move things on.  However, in the absence of defining the meaning of the word 
‘significant’, the report contradicts itself by highlighting a number of change projects (cases of 
potential shared service plans or active projects between fire and other emergency services), as 
part of the evidence to help shape future control rooms.  These clearly evidence changes that 
were at least in serious planning stages in response to previous Government policies.  The 
Discussion chapter will expand on this finding but in response to previous Government reviews 
that had not focused specifically on control rooms, evidence did exist that at least 17 fire 
services were considering or planning organisational collaborations, in efforts to improve 
efficiencies. If this ‘evidence’ was not significant in relation to sector changes, per se, why was 
it considered significant in the data collection stage to count as evidence for scoping 
recommendations for a national solution? 
In its aim to arrive at a national solution (as opposed to the active locally/regionally managed 
solutions that were in various stages of development), the report goes on to discuss the high 
level options for (national) change and the associated issues for each.    Further contradictions 
are revealed early on in the report.  The management consultants briefly admit the paradox of 
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meeting the Government’s brief to find a national solution, whilst striving to achieve Best Value 
in control rooms.   
“One potential problem with the Best Value legislation, however, is that it applies to 
individual fire authorities, rather than to the fire service nationally.  In this respect, it 
could be interpreted as being at variance with the Terms of Reference of this study” (p.8) 
Yet, as if it is sufficient just to refer to it in the Introduction, the fundamental contradiction 
between these aims are never referred to again nor the obvious flaw in the process because of 
the incongruity.  Despite the fact it would prove difficult to develop a national solution to 
deliver a locally managed policy (as Best Value was intended to be), Mott MacDonald continue 
to define the future of fire control room options, making the assumption that to achieve Best 
Value, there can only be four configurations for the future of fire service control rooms.   
“The options for the future of fire service control rooms fall into the following categories: 
Fire-fire control room amalgamation; joint/shared services control rooms; several 
brigades sharing a common  control room and two or more emergency services sharing 
a common control room” (p.91). 
The hermeneutic circle of interpretation here again enables the text to be considered in the 
wider political context of New Labour’s ‘modernising Britain’ discourse that was discussed in 
Section 4.3.2, relating to joined up working, collaboration and removing boundaries between 
organisations. 
The imperatives for reform are described using New Labour discourse (e.g. shared services, 
joined up working).  This infers that the solution to achieve future efficiency in control rooms 
would be to implement New Labour policies (thereby underpinning the relationship between 
political rhetoric and reform, which will be explored in Chapter 5).  
4.4.3 Quality evidence? 
Of course, the last point is not explicit in the report.  Instead, the authors describe a 
comprehensive data collection method, which gives the impression that a solution, which was 
hitherto unknown, could be found from the review. Yet, in light of the Government’s brief, that 
the management consultants would provide “authoritative advice” (p.S-1), for the future of 
control rooms in England and Wales, the quality of the data to inform that advice is less than 
adequate.  In fact, the authors admit this at the very start of the report, when discussing the tight 
timescales set by the Home Office (three months to review all fire, police and ambulance 
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control rooms across England and Wales as well as a study of international control room 
examples);  
“..evidence had to be gathered very quickly” (p.2)  
And this;  
“precluded many potentially fruitful approaches, including in particular, any gathering 
of evidence at first hand from control room models outside the UK” (p.2).   
The timescales meant;  
“..there were limited opportunities to verify evidence collected….some areas of statistical 
data that could not be verified but were critical to the potential conclusions” (p.2). 
The management consultants explain how they substituted for these shortcomings by 
assembling their own “Expert Panel comprising senior personnel from each emergency service 
and other experts in the field” (p.2).  The expert panel would review the outputs of the study 
and check the “soundness of the analytical process and validity of conclusions” (p.2).  The 
expert panel consisted of five people; one police commander, one chief fire officer, one 
ambulance trust chief executive, the Chief Executive of the British Association of Public 
Communication Officers (BAPCO), and a police project manager.  Although Mott MacDonald 
label the five as experts, their credentials in relation to assuring soundness of the analytical 
process and validity of conclusions are not evidenced. Perhaps feeling this was inadequate, the 
report offers the following; 
“The consultants could not fail to be impressed by the dedication and knowledge of all 
contributors to the study” (p.2). Here the authors are drawing our attention to the ‘experts’ 
personal rather than professional attributes, emotively suggesting they worked tirelessly on our 
behalf, carrying the “burden of listening to arguments..” and “correcting mis-interpretation of 
the evidence” (p.3).  The latter statement suggests the process was scientific and helps to create 
the perception of research rigour, which in reality falls short in genuine research terms.  It is 
from there, (a paragraph), without further reference to this obvious limitation to the data and 
the subsequent recommendations, that the expert panel substitution process was deemed 
sufficient.  The ‘experts’ essentially negated the need for actual data collection and verification 
to the level that would be appropriate for such an influential Government review into the future 
requirements of control rooms.   
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The report goes on to provide three chapters of ‘data’; Chapter 3, “Current Emergency Control 
Room Arrangements” describes details of existing arrangements in police, fire and ambulance 
control rooms. Chapter 4, “UK Case Studies” details seven case studies of emergency service 
organisations in various stages of exploring or implementing changes through control room 
rationalisation. Chapter 5, “International Experiences” describes five collaborative control 
room arrangements in other countries.  Recalling that the report was due in such a tight 
timescale that the authors said they had to collect evidence quickly and that precluded many 
potential fruitful approaches, including first-hand information gathering (p.2), the actual 
evidence that was collected was based on the three chapters outlined above (a summary of 
control rooms, seven UK cases of possible collaborations and five international control room 
collaborations).  If these were the key sources of evidence, the following findings reveal the 
shortfalls. 
4.4.4 UK evidence 
Table 7 provides a summary of the UK case studies of organisations working on collaboration 
projects.  At the time of the report, only the Welsh and Warwickshire changes had actually 
happened and these were due to locally managed governance (boundary) changes as opposed 
to fire service reforms.  The other five cases were all in the planning stages.  Each case was 
unique in its configuration; some were considering tri-service arrangements of police, fire and 
ambulance, others were between fire services.  Some were hosting others and some were 
sharing sites.  None was considering joint technology or ways of working. It is difficult to 
understand how any conclusions can be drawn, let alone generalised to future 
recommendations.   
Collaborating organisations Configuration Government Scheme 
Cleveland police, fire, ambulance 
services 
Share a building but not 
equipment or operations 
‘Invest to Save’16  pilot project 
(started 1999) 
Gloucestershire police, fire, 
ambulance services 
Share a building but not 
equipment or operations 
‘Invest to Save’  pilot project 
(started 2000) 
                                                 
16 The Invest to Save Budget was introduced by the Government in 1999 to encourage partnership and cross-boundary 
working by Government departments; it was subsequently extended to local authorities and the NHS, National Archives; 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk.  Accessed 12/01/15 
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Wiltshire police, fire, ambulance 
services 
Share a building and consider joint 
equipment or operations at later 
stage 
‘Invest to save’ pilot project 
(started 2000) 
North West Regional Control task 
group (fire) 
5 NW counties (3 of which large 
urban conurbations, including 2 
metropolitan brigades) exploring 
possible reorganisation to achieve 
Best Value looking at 5 
configuration options 
‘Best Value’ initiative 
(started 1999) 
 
West Midlands Regional Initiative 
(fire) 
Feasibility of regional initiative 
across 5 brigades  
‘Invest to Save’ initiative 
(started 1999) 
Brigade mergers in Wales 
(fire) 
Previous merging of 8 authorities 
into 3 new entities (South, Mid & 
West and North wales Fire 
Services 
Reorganisation completed in 1996 
under local Government changes 
Warwickshire fire/ambulance 
initiative 
Fire service hosts ambulance 
control room/HQ onsite 
1997 changes made based on 
locally managed decisions 
 
Table 6. Summary of collaboration projects considered in the report. 
4.4.5 International evidence 
Data for international case studies of control rooms that had reformed to work with other same 
or different emergency services, was taken from published documentation or websites and in 
two of the five case studies telephone conversations were included with the Chief Fire Officers.  
However, based only on this table-top exercise, the report assumes the authority to provide “an 
assessment of lessons to be learned from international experiences” (p.2).  Such conclusions 
can at best, be based only on the personal opinions of the management consultants and the five 
members of the ‘expert panel’ and the telephone conversations with one Chief Inspector 
(Toronto case study of shared emergency control room) and a Coordinator for International 
Relations (Netherlands case study of shared emergency services organisation).  Limited 
numbers of geographically, demographically and culturally disparate case studies of 
collaboration (Vancouver/ Canada; Chicago/USA, Victoria/Australia; Drenth/Netherlands and 
Sweden), concluded that everywhere is different; “control room arrangements implemented 
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are strongly influenced by local circumstances and requirements” (p.89) and resistance to 
organisational changes is proportional to the extent of the change;  
“Mistakes have been made where changes from the ‘status quo’ have been drastic (e.g. 
the private build, own, operate). There is evidence of less insurmountable problems 
where an incremental approach to change is adopted.” (p.90).  
What stands out in the report are the conclusions the authors have drawn in relation to Barriers 
to Implementation (p.89), in these cases of various collaborations.  Based on what can only be 
the telephone calls to a police inspector and an international relations manager (since the rest 
of the evidence was taken from published documents and there is no reference to academic 
research), the report states  
“There is strong evidence of significant barriers to implementation in instances where 
control room functionality is combined. In general the most stubborn barriers are posed 
by cultural, organisational and ownership issues…” (p.89).  
The report goes on to say: 
“Labour relations (e.g. Paramedic Union involvement in Vancouver) have also presented 
significant barriers” (p.90), and, “Some ‘human issue’ barriers that have had to be 
overcome include: parochial self-interest; self-preservation of an identity; lack of desire 
to work with outsiders; stoical resistance to change; uncertainty, defensiveness and 
increased perception of threat” (p.90). 
Closing the hermeneutic circle of interpretation in relation to how the authors selected 
‘evidence’ for inclusion in the report, suggests they were reflecting the political mood around 
the time of this report.  At T1, FBU membership was high; 87% of uniformed staff (Redman 
and Snape, 2006), and the tripartite arrangement which gave Union leaders significant say in 
organisational change was embedded practice.  The authors use strongly negative language to 
reveal only certain issues, whilst concealing (through omission) other issues or any counter 
perspectives from other stakeholders (since only two names are provided as live participants in 
the International case study reviews), and in doing so, reflect the mood of their New Labour 
commissioners. Labour’s stand on unions had been made firmly back in 1995, when Tony Blair 
as newly elected Party Leader said in his inaugural speech to the Labour Conference; 
“We don’t want bosses versus workers, those are things of the past” (Blair, 1995).   
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Based on this limited ‘data’, we are presented with a chapter that discusses the high level 
options and issues for national reform.  The chapter offers the various configurations that could 
work and provides an assessment of the options.  From a hermeneutic perspective, the chapter 
mirrors the language of (and reflects), Blair’s New Labour politics, where modernisation, 
joined up Government, partnership and efficiency gains were key concepts (Fairclough, 2000).  
“Barriers to implementation and restrictions on the potential for future joint/shared 
arrangements however encouraged a compromised approach in which optimum 
efficiency and economy was balanced by a realistic and achievable goal” (p.S-1); 
“This would secure and maximise the realisable efficiency gains whilst enabling fire 
brigades to work effectively together” (p.S-4). 
The language of New Labour was clearly demonstrated in the 1999 Local Government Act that 
had, for example, emphasised the need for inter-organisational collaboration at a strategic level, 
working closely with other local agencies to develop overarching community strategies.  Best 
Value, which was enshrined in the LGA advocated internal joining up at a strategic level and 
external integration at an operational level (DETR, 1999). 
4.4.6 Effective cost modelling? 
If the data collection was inadequate from which to draw conclusions for a national solution, 
the Cost Model chapter also fell short in robust arguments to support it. The chapter begins 
with the line; “The business case cost model has been designed in order to enable an informed 
financial decision to be made on the future of fire brigade control rooms” (p.116).  However, 
the cost model uses the Erlang-C17 model for calculating call centre headcount.  Its application 
to call centres is expressed within the first few lines of the chapter, which explicitly links 
emergency control room reforms to call centre models of work.  Interpreting this against the 
work trends in the period T1, the ‘call centre’ organisation had been growing in number 
throughout the 1990s due mainly to their widespread adoption across the finance sector, with 
60% of banks offering 24 hour call centre services by 1994 (Bain and Taylor, 2002). In call 
centres, customer and other telephone calls are handled in high volume using various 
information and communication technologies. In the context of the report written early 2000, 
call centres had diffused widely throughout the economy and were becoming the new 
                                                 
17 Erlang-C Model is a mathematical model commonly applied to predict queuing system behaviour in call centre 
applications (Robbins et al., 2010). 
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organisational model.  Successes by the innovative First Direct (banking) and Direct Line 
(insurance) operations, established in 1989 and 1988 respectively as well as modern, customer-
focused services offered by high profile companies like British Airways and British Telecom 
(Russell, 2008) were furthering their popularity. However, with rapidly growing numbers of 
call centres, the impact of conditions on workers were also beginning to emerge.  The 
paradoxical objectives of transacting the maximum number of calls with the lowest staffing 
ratios, while aspiring to deliver customer satisfaction that retains and attracts new customers 
was beginning to be associated with significant working welfare issues (ibid).  The focus on 
mass call processing that forces the shortening of job cycles and intensifies work processes 
(Bain and Taylor, 2000), was causing concerns.   
In the Mott MacDonald report, the nature of emergency call handling had been described in 
detail across the three services.  The report had described the very different systems in operation 
in police, fire and ambulance control rooms, with different routines.  The unpredictability of 
emergency requirements (nature and state of an incident as well as caller disposition for 
example) compounds- the complexity of emergency control room work.  However, whilst the 
report failed to justify the use of the generic call centre Erlang-C tool to model emergency 
control rooms, the authors nevertheless arrive at an optimal configuration that they say will 
achieve greatest efficiency, or in their words Best Value. Using the tool to plot a graph that 
“demonstrates how savings increase as the threshold rises and the number of control rooms 
decrease” (p.117), gives a very simple and apparently compelling picture for rationalisation, 
accompanied by confident claims: 
“The key issues that flow form the model are; 
 There is clear efficiency gain as control rooms deal with larger numbers of incidents 
 Annual cost savings of over £10 million are achievable 
 Clear and unambiguous targets can be developed from the model to measure a 
Brigade’s performance once a benchmark is set 
Greater economies of scale can be expected in any calculation that divides a bigger number by 
smaller numbers.  However, modelling one industry with tools from another did not account 
for any of the fire-specific complexity that existed. The findings suggest the use of such a tool 
may have been linked to New Labour’s intentions for modernising work forces with cheaper 
more flexible options as opposed to calculating accurate costs. 
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In justifying the claim that the maximum efficiency gains would be made if control rooms 
increase in size from 10,000 to 20,000 incidents per year (in relation to cost per 999 call) the 
range between the largest and the smallest control room was given as £20-30 and £40-50.  
Importantly, the cost modelling left out London from this range due to its unique size and remit, 
separately identifying their cost per incident at £15 per call.  This assumption would change in 
the Mott MacDonald 2003 update report, 2.5 years later, rendering the range huge and more 
unequal.  This change would support a different conclusion that will be described later in the 
third hermeneutic text analysis. 
4.4.7 Summary of hermeneutic analysis text #1 
The intention of this analysis was to interpret the text in relation to its context at increasingly 
higher levels to establish greater understanding of the original document (Prasad, 2002), and to 
explore “crucial dimensions of power, and specifically ideological deformation of language 
use” (Kinsella, 2006, p. 7). The hermeneutic analysis of the first of two fundamentally 
important management consultant reports, illuminated the ease with which Mott MacDonald 
constructed notions of a requirement for reform, efficiency and the idea of their expertise in 
conducting the review to deliver authoritative advice.  Expertise was deemed sufficient, and 
the review and its report proceeded without the views of any fire service staff in relation to 
meeting their future needs.  Mott McDonald were able to admit to the pressure of, but not be 
hindered by political timescales that prevented the collection of sufficient data to support 
reforms.  This demonstrates the ease with which management consultants, hired by 
Government ministers under their own political time pressures, are seemingly able to mitigate 
the otherwise significant limitation of data quality by labelling a group of five disparate public 
sector staff an ‘expert panel’.  The findings also highlighted the adoption of New Labour 
discourse (joined-up, collaboration, best value), in describing solutions to achieving greater 
efficiency, yet the report lacks the necessary evidence trail to underpin such claims.  The report 
fails to define efficiency, inefficiency, or the political concepts that would provide resolutions, 
such as Best Value.  Yet, despite these shortcomings the report is able to recommend a national 
solution to rationalise the number of control rooms from 49 to 21 that would best meet the 
future needs of the fire service in England and Wales. 
4.5 FBU throws down the gauntlet: the 2002 40% pay claim 
The process of collective bargaining, then characteristic of the fire service’s nationally indexed 
pay formulae, had provided significant benefits to its members.  The scheme had generally led 
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to automatic, formulaic increases and management-union negotiated conditions of service 
(Corby, 2003). However, by the beginning of the new decade the benefits of the pay scheme 
began to break down due to its rigid procedures high rates of inflation. There was cause for 
concern as firefighter pay had started to fall behind other skilled worker rates and this started 
to unsettle unions (Ironside and Seifert 2005). During the latter part of the decade preceding 
T1, industrial relations had been deteriorating.  This took the form of local fire brigade disputes 
(Berkshire 1999; Derbyshire 1995/6; Essex 1997/1998; Merseyside 1995, 2001).  Disputes 
came in response to growing tensions around pay and conditions.  By the late 1990s “disquiet 
was being vociferously expressed by rank and file delegates at FBU conferences” (Serfiet and 
Sibley, 2011, p.337). Following the election of the second Blair Government in 2001, the FBU 
leadership was ready to build a new pay claim and at their 2002 conference debated an 
emergency resolution; 
“The fire service national pay formula [has become] less effective at delivering a 
reasonable living wage to those who render a vital emergency service to our 
communities.  Simultaneously the jobs of firefighters and emergency control staff have 
become increasingly complex and skilled and this should be reflected in their wages” 
(FBU, 2002, p.97)”  
By 2002, New Labour was settling into its second Government administration and the 
modernisation agenda in one form or another was taking shape across public sector institutions, 
such as education and health. The 1997 Excellence in Schools White Paper (DfE, 1997), had 
legislated for changes in terms pupil attainment and school performance standards that were 
now in place and operating. Healthcare reforms such as NHS Direct (1998), and healthcare 
regulator, National Institute for Clinical Excellence (1999), were by now, embedded in 
organisational structures and processes. Such reforms were changing roles, structures and pay 
levels in those sectors.  For example, Prime Minister Blair was beginning to signal for above-
inflation pay rises for all nurses, with the biggest increases for those at the top of their profession 
(Blair 2002).  In August 2002, the Government announced that teachers' pay would, for the first 
time be linked to test results or pupils' behaviour (The Guardian, 2002). It is around this time, 
(of national discussions and developments in other public sector roles and salary structures and 
the effects of attempts to modernise through Best Value), that strains between the FBU and the 
local authority employers begin to emerge in relation to pay.  In Archer’s (1995), terms, a 
disjunction was developing within the strong tripartite arrangement and tension was brewing.  
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4.6 Divergent interests 
At the end of the structural conditioning phase (T1), there begins a departure in the nature of 
relations between the FBU, the local authority employers and the fire service management.  In 
morphogenetic terms, organisational relations that had been necessary, interdependent and 
complementary, and where everyone’s vested interests were being served to a greater (or at 
least acceptable) extent, were changing; interests were diverging.  What was changing?  
4.7 A brief history of the Labour Party 
The Labour Party was created in 1900.  It was formed collaboratively by working people, trade 
unionists and socialists.  The party website states that Labour Party is united by the goal of 
changing the British Parliament to represent the interests of everybody, not just the affluent 
(Labour Party, n.d.).  Labour was the party of the working classes and for the next one hundred 
years the Labour-union alliance would serve to be mutually beneficial to its key stakeholders; 
unions and their working members provided mass membership, finance and organisation to the 
party and in return were assured of working-class political representation and advocacy of 
working-class and trade union interests (Davies, 1996).  
As the century progressed, the extensive increases in public services in post war Britain that 
had enabled working class people to enjoy some voice through their trade unions in the 
direction of state policy had as a result, enabled the unions to grow powerful.  However, a sea 
change occurred (itself the result of morphogenesis) in the aftermath of Labour's fourth 
successive general election defeat in 1993 when  Tony Blair was elected as leader of the Labour 
Party in 1994 (Harmer, 2014).  It was at this juncture that changes to the traditional Labour 
Party rhetoric, internal party organisation and policies became evident. The ideological drift 
was manifest in Labour’s 1997 General Election victory speech at which Blair’s ‘fairness not 
favours’ line demonstrated the tone of their winning manifesto that contained few commitments 
to union-related issues, typically stalwart Labour material (Fairclough, 2000). During the 1996 
Labour Party conference in Blackpool, Tony Blair claimed he had turned Labour into a party 
that was ‘pro-business and pro-enterprise’ (Blair, 96). Blair’s ‘Third Way’ philosophy of New 
Labour, New Britain and the associated rhetoric of modernisation and change, had been 
inspired not only by US President Clinton’s new democrats (Section  4.3.2), but philosophically 
by sociologist Anthony Giddens (Neocleous, 1996).  Giddens (1998), argued that a series of 
social revolutions, including globalisation, individualisation and de-traditionalisation, had 
transformed matters in ways that meant traditional right and left approaches to Government 
were now inappropriate. After the 1997 victory, Blair’s and Clinton’s Governments 
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collaborated to organise the Third Way conference at New York University where both leaders 
spoke (Jaenicke, 2000). Blair’s influences are evident in his speech at the conference.  For 
example; 
“The Third Way is not an attempt to split the difference between right and left. It is about 
traditional values in a changed world. And it draws vitality from uniting the two great 
streams of left-of-centre thought - democratic socialism and liberalism - whose divorce 
this century did so much to weaken progressive politics across the West. Liberals asserted 
the primacy of individual liberty in the market economy; social democrats promoted 
social justice with the state as its main agent. There is no necessary conflict between the 
two, accepting as we now do that state power is one means to achieve our goals, but not 
the only one and emphatically not an end in itself”. (Blair, 1997 in Coates and Lawler, 
2000) 
The Blair Government was shifting its ideological position towards a pro-business image, 
abandoning policies grounded in old Labour ideologies in line with other global social democrat 
leaders of the post-Soviet Union era, such as George Clinton and Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder 
(Schafer and Walker, 2006). 
To reach wider audiences effectively, the new democratic leaders of Blair’s Labour Party 
courted the media and in so doing became effectively autonomous from the trade unions and 
political activist base of their parties (Seifert & Sibley, 2011). Though the FBU saw itself as a 
fundamental part of the backbone of the Labour Party, advocating the rights of workers, the 
Blair Government had totally reassessed the role of the labour movement in state governance 
(Crouch and Streeck 2006).  
Blair as leader of the New Labour party was now publically distancing himself from the unions 
and was instead pursuing a new democratic, pro-business image. The seeds of divergence from 
old union allegiances is captured in excerpts from two BBC televised interviews from the 1997 
British General Election, Jeremy Paxman (JP) and Peter Sissons (PS) question Tony Blair (TB):  
(JP) “Do you still consider yourself a socialist?” 
(TB) “I do in the sense of the values; I don’t share the idea that socialism’s about 
some fixed economic prescription”.  
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(PS) “If Labour wins on Thursday it’s a fourth victory for Margaret Thatcher, she 
said she’d bury socialism, you’ve completed that for her, you left all the principal 
landmarks she created in place”.  
(TB) “No I wouldn’t agree with that at all. What I think is sensible however is that the 
Labour Party wants to take the country forward and it is New Labour and we don’t 
want battles over public versus private sector, bosses versus workers, those are things 
of the past.” (Bull, 2000). 
4.8 Summary and morphogenetic perspective at T1 
T1 represents the structural and cultural conditioning that results from prior to social and socio-
cultural interaction. At this time, the New Labour party was bedding in with its new Third Way 
values and politics, representing a significant departure from traditional Labour thinking and 
practices and reflecting the conditioning of previous administrations and the diffusion of new 
democratic politics that had been spreading in parts of Europe and in America.  The fire service, 
on the other hand, had been conditioned by years of morphostasis, where the vested interests 
of existing institutions had been protected and reproduced for decades.  The coming together 
of the New Labour Government and the old fire service institution, to undergo structural reform 
policies (as first attempted by the Best Value initiative), resulted in divergent interests and 
asymmetrical relations.  In morphogenetic terms. The consequences of these asymmetrical 
relations derived from unequal power emerging between the FBU and the New Labour Party 
ideology.  The FBU held power from previous cycles but Labour was the new party; their power 
to change structures and cultures using only policy initiatives was not strong enough. 
As the FBU were calling for pay increases and equity, the Government were promoting New 
Labour thinking that lacked the traditional allegiance with left-wing politics of the FBU.  The 
New Labour Government were instead calling for improved performativity and efficiency 
through their modernisation agenda. Disjunction developed as the contest began between the 
new Government’s mantras of modernisation, Best Value and efficiency, and the traditional 
structures and cultures of the fire service.    
In Archer’s (1995), morphogenetic terms (see shaded columns in Table 2 below), the situational 
logics, once necessary and compatible, resulting in protectionism, were now shifting.  Relations 
between the local Government employers (taking directives from central Government) and the 
fire service (represented by the FBU) remained necessary but were becoming incompatible.  
The resulting situational logics were now calling for change, for correction of the necessary 
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complementarities within the fire service structural system.  The institutionally dominant FBU 
were confronted by the emergence of competitive contradictions as New Labour posed cultural 
alternatives in relation to their ideas of Best Value and efficiency that would challenge the 
routinized behaviours in the fire service.   
 Contradictions Complementarities 
 Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
Situational logic 
 
correction elimination protection opportunism 
CEPS of:  
Cultural system 
Socio-cultural 
interaction 
syncretism pluralism systematisation specialisation 
unification cleavage reproduction sectionalism 
SEPs of: 
Structural system 
Social interaction 
 
compromise competition integration differentiation 
containment polarisation solidarity diversification 
Table 2 summary of structural morphogenesis/morphostasis (adapted from Archer, 1995, 
p.303); CEP: cultural emergent properties; SEP: structural emergent properties. 
Whilst major structural change was not occurring at T1 under the Best Value initiative, signs of 
compromise were apparent as fire services complied with new regulations to implement Best 
Value performance indicators. Whilst the new situational logic of correction stemming from 
the contradictions of New Labour and old fire service, was not delivering service-wide cultural 
reform, cultural syncretism was evident in the socio-cultural interactions between the fire 
service and the Best Value process. Syncretism occurs when an organisation (e.g. the fire 
service) sinks its differences, and to some extent displays unification with the aspects of change 
(Archer, 1995).  This was the case in the fire service response to Best Value and joined-up 
working, as, for example, the various Best Value collaboration projects began feasibility studies 
(c.f Table 6, Section 4.4.4; Summary of fire service collaboration projects).  However, Best 
Value auditors were finding evidence that changes were superficial.  This excerpt is taken from 
a Scottish audit report published in December, 2001, three years after Best Value was 
introduced to local Governments; 
“About half the councils and two fifths of audited services had a good number of the 
elements for effective performance management in place….However, a third of councils 
and almost half of services were still some way behind”…. 
“First there must be clear recognition that Best Value requires a culture change. There 
must be clear active and sustained leadership from senior managers and elected members 
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to ensure that Best Value is fully integrated.  Best value must be promoted as a way of 
working to improve services rather than an end in itself” (Audit Commission, 2001, 
p.33). 
At T1, the new policy changes associated with performance and doing more for less, also 
brought the frustrations of the rumbling pay issues to the surface.  The FBU’s 40% pay claim 
in 2002 marks the point at which interests began to diverge between the fire service and the 
Government.  Notwithstanding the element of subjectivity in selection of ‘evidence’ for the 
research, the structural and cultural conditioning that was shaping the situations at T1 may not 
have determined but certainly predisposed people to take up certain courses of action (Archer, 
1995).    
In the next section, the effects of those structural conditioning forces described in the period 
designated T1, will be revealed through a description of interactions.  In this morphogenetic 
sequence, these interactions ultimately led to organisational elaboration at T4.  The interactions 
between the structures and cultures (parts), and the people, would result in further shifts of 
situational logics (between T2 and T3), until significant structural changes resulted.  The power 
by which this was effected will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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4.9 T2 – T3 Socio-Cultural Interaction:  
situational logics 2000 to 2003 
4.9.0 Introduction 
The research asks if our usual source of understanding the failure of FiReControl (PAC), was 
sufficient or if there are alternative places to look for causal mechanisms that may contribute 
to the failure, such as cultural, structural and/or agential influences.  Thus far, the analysis of 
early attempts to reform the fire service has centred on the Best Value modernisation efforts of 
the New Labour Government following the Local Government Act (1999).  However, the fire 
service did not undergo any notable cultural or structural morphogenesis. The Labour 
Government's 1999 Act and its Best Value regime, though statutory did not instigate significant 
changes to structure nor to culture. Not only was the FBU dominant in its power to protect its 
vested interests but the Government and the Home Office did not individually, or collectively, 
provide a coherent strategy to attain the holy grail of efficiency through Best Value. Indeed, 
the tendency to portray Best Value as a decisive strategy for change was misleading as was 
found in the analysis of the 2000 Mott MacDonald Report at T1.  The link between Best Value 
and the achievement of ‘efficiency’ was not made clear by the Government, nor was the 
evidence trail for the claims that the former would deliver the latter.   
4.9.1 Reinventing ‘the Department’; reinventing John Prescott? 
The Home Office had been responsible for the ministerial conditioning of the UK fire service 
at the end of T1.  In 2001, the fire service moved into a new ministry, the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM).  The influence of the ODPM would eventually contribute to the 
structural morphogenesis of the fire service. 
 
The ODPM had a complicated and relatively short life.  It was formed as part of the Home 
Office in 2001 and reformed to become the Department of Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG), in 2006.  Yet by standards of other offices it was a significant element of the New 
Labour Government.  Previously known as the Department of the Environment when Labour 
came to power in 1997, it was merged with the transport department to form the huge 
Department for Transport, Environment and the Regions (DETR). Then, in 2001, the DETR 
lost its environment team to a newly merged ministry with agriculture, and became the equally 
huge Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, under Stephen Byers. In 
the aftermath of the resignation of Stephen Byers, following controversies relating to Railtrack 
(The Guardian, 28 May, 2002), and the Potters Bar rail crash (The Telegraph, 13th May, 2002), 
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a new Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), was created and headed by the Deputy 
Prime Minister John Prescott.  The ODPM assumed responsibility for local Government, 
including fire brigades, the regions, housing and planning, with transport moved into a separate 
department. The size of the ODPM was considerable in comparison to other departments, 
employing more than 6,000 staff with a budget of around £50 billion.  The ODPM’s mission 
was to create "Sustainable Communities". In the period relating to the unit of analysis (1999 to 
2004), the National Archives (2006), show the ODPM’s critical programmes for that remit 
were:  
 Improving regional arrangements to maximise the effectiveness of planning and 
investment  
 Supporting robust local Government finance; securing a strategic role for local 
Government  
 Delivering the Thames Gateway programme as a cross-Government project  
 Modernisation of the Fire and Rescue Service.   
 
The National Archives (2006), also show the Fire and Resilience Directorate as a sub-
department in the ODPM, tasked with the modernisation of the fire and rescue service through 
three key projects;  
 FiReControl: to regionalise the fire service command and control function (the case for 
this research),  
 FireLink: to deliver a national voice and data system that would join up hitherto 
independent and disparate fire service radio communications,  
 New Dimensions: to deploy equipment, training and standardised procedures to deal 
with terrorist attacks and major environmental disasters. 
 
4.9.2 Prescott’s vision: decentralism, regional governance 
As well as the modernisation of the fire service programme, another of the ODPM’s critical 
programmes was of causal import to the research case; ‘Improving regional arrangements to 
maximise the effectiveness of planning and investment at this level’. This programme was a 
fundamental link to the eventual FiReControl reform project.  The motivation for regionalism 
reflects the traditional Labour Party commitment to the concept of redistributing wealth via 
‘centralism’ (where economic planning is reshaped through central control as a means of 
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redistribution or equalisation (Labour Party website.).  Regionalisation is considered by Labour 
Governments as a “technocratically efficient means to that end”, (Sandford, 2005, p.109).  
 
John Prescott’s work on regional Government went way back before he headed up the regional 
agenda at the ODPM.  In 1982, under the old Labour leadership of Neil Kinnock, the then 
Shadow Secretary of State for Transport, John Prescott MP, published the Alternative Regional 
Strategies and in 1994 he set up the Regional Policy Commission to develop regional policy. 
Later on under Tony Blair’s leadership, Prescott authored elements of New Labour’s 1997 
General Election Manifesto, which pledged to introduce directly elected regional Governments.  
In a DETR press release in 1997, Prescott suggested the economic benefits of regional 
Government in regions that had suffered “huge disadvantages over the years”.  Prescott asserted 
that it was “absolutely vital that we give the regions the tools to do the job themselves”. Prescott 
promised policy would be driven by “five key priorities -integration, de-centralisation, 
regeneration, partnership and sustainability” and assured the regions that the Blair Government 
would “not be dictating rigid prescriptive formulae from the centre. Innovation and flexibility 
will be encouraged at all times” (DETR, 1997, pp. 1-2).  
Prescott’s perspective on regionalism differed politically to the original manifesto view for 
regionalism put forward in 1997 by Jack Straw who had focused on the democratic benefits of 
regional Government.  When Labour won in 1997, Prescott’s version was more popular 
amongst Labour’s senior ministers and in 1998, eight Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 
were born of his mega ministry, the Department of Transport and the Regions (Harrison, 2006). 
Giving Prescott freedom to develop the RDAs has been portrayed as a “sop to English 
regionalism, to make up for the Government’s unwillingness to progress with elected 
assemblies” (Sandford, 2005, p.109). It was suggested that Blair and Brown saw Prescott’s 
RDAs as “innovations in their overall political economic strategy” (Harrison, 2006, p.14), 
whilst Prescott viewed them as a fundamental element of a grand governance plan. Though 
regional assemblies had been promised in Labour’s 1997 election manifesto, despite Prescott’s 
ardent advocacy and commitment, they were continually subject to lack of support throughout 
the party ranks and the regions. By 2000, a report by the Cabinet Office, called ‘Reaching Out’, 
heavily criticised the Government’s regional policy when it suggested better co-ordination was 
needed between ministers and within Whitehall to make policy for the regions work.  It said: 
"The clear evidence from those on the ground is that there are too many Government initiatives, 
145 
 
causing confusion; not enough co-ordination; and too much time spent on negotiating the 
system, rather than delivering." (Cabinet Office 2000, p.4). 
Prescott responded by announcing a new Regional Co-ordination Unit to oversee the delivery 
of Government departments' initiatives across England. Blair did little to defend the failings, 
instead writing in the Introduction to the ‘Reaching Out’ report, said that it 
"..shows that too many good projects are having to waste time negotiating their way 
through complex systems of unnecessary red tape. The report recommends a stronger 
role for Government offices in the regions in pulling together the different arms of central 
Government; new arrangements in Whitehall; and new mechanisms to streamline the 
variety of different funding streams, initiatives and arrangements. The Government has 
accepted these conclusions. Our aim is now to implement those proposals in ways which 
can support departments in delivering their key objectives, and which will improve the 
coherence of national departmental policies delivered locally." (Blair, 2000, p.4)  
 
In the next election manifesto in 2001 and Labour was again promoting regionalism, claiming 
that some Government functions were best tackled at the regional level and it remained a 
commitment for the party to achieve this.   
 
“Some functions are best tackled at the regional level.  Economic development is the core 
of regional policy today.  In our first term, we have created RDAs to drive economic 
development….We are committed, as RDAs take on more power, to enhance the scrutiny 
functions of regional chambers”.   
The manifesto suggested some regions would be satisfied with enhanced scrutiny functions but 
in others.. “there may be a stronger sense of regional identity and a desire for a regional 
political voice” (Labour Party Manifesto, 2001). 
Regionalisation and elected assemblies were never really presented as high profile policies, 
instead being merely discussed through policy documents and proposals very much in the 
shadows of the ‘big’ New Labour election issues, such as public sector reform (Sandford 2005, 
p.104). The devolution that had occurred in Scotland and Wales in the early part of Labour’s 
first term in office had heralded a new era for England’s regional Government agenda, the 
beliefs surrounding how Government is structured in New Labour’s Third Way approach 
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ultimately would influence the success of regional Government and the desire by some 
powerful agents to make something fit into the regional vacuum created.   
John Prescott was, and remained until his retirement in 2010 (c.f. Prescott, 2008), a staunch 
advocate of regionalism and regional governance.  Despite his advocacy of regional 
Government, in the end, regional assemblies failed to be realised after the crushing defeat of 
the idea at a referendum in the North East in 2004.  The Yes campaign (to implement a regional 
assembly), was supported by the region's Labour political establishment, but it was defeated by 
a campaign that concentrated on the perceived wastefulness of a regional tier of Government 
reported to cost £25 million a year to run which was covered by national press (Johnston, 2004). 
In the wake of the defeat the policy was abandoned and the ODPM sought instead to pursue 
alternative decentralisation strategies, such as new governance for neighbourhoods and 
revitalization of local Government (Sandford, 2005, p.66). 
Despite its failure to implement regional assemblies, the structures, cultures and agency of the 
ODPM and Prescott between T2 and T3 would feature heavily in the morphogenesis of the fire 
service at T4. The next section continues the analysis from September 11th 2001 when a single 
event would not only alter the western psyche but would bring firefighting sharply into national 
focus. 
4.9.3 Firefighting in the global spotlight; the terrorist attacks of 9/11  
On September 11, 2001  (9/11), a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks were carried out 
in the United States on buildings in New York City and Washington, D.C. Four passenger 
airliners were hijacked by the Islamic terrorist group al-Quaeda and flown into the North and 
South towers of the World Trade Centre and into a Pentagon building. The New York Times 
reported that the attacks killed over 2,750 people and caused at least $10 billion in property and 
infrastructure damage (Dunlap, 2008). 414 of the dead were emergency workers in New York 
City who responded to the attack and of these, 341 were firefighters and two were paramedics 
from the New York City Fire Department (Grady and Revkin, 2002).  
The attacks had a profound global impact and changed public expectation of emergency service 
response capability.  In the UK, the event significantly affected thinking around how the 
emergency services would respond to catastrophic, multiple and sustained incidents on a scale 
now envisaged after 9/11. The 9/11 attacks made the scale and scope of multiple and 
simultaneous terrorism a reality and introduced a new concept of being permanently prepared 
147 
 
for sustained response to unprecedented and unanticipated occurrences (Mott. MacDonald, 
2003, p.8). A direct UK Government response to 9/11 was the Civil Contingencies Capabilities 
Programme.  Specifically for the fire service, the New Dimension programme issued specialist 
equipment, procedures and support mechanisms to all UK fire and rescue services to improve 
resilience and preparedness to civil contingencies and large-scale catastrophic incidents.  
4.9.4 Pay talks break down; all-out strike, deadlock.. 
By 2002, with a new post 9/11 heightened state of emergency, the relatively new ODPM with 
its vast political remit, was dealing with matters ranging from local Government reform, 
English devolution and transport policies, to overhauling the 1948 Civil Defence Act.  On-
going updates to the 1948 Act, which became the Draft Civil Contingencies Bill (passed in 
2003 and finally the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004), aimed to ensure first responders such as 
fire and police could cope in the event of domestic threats to services (as seen in the fuel 
protests, mass flooding of 2000, and the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001) and 
terrorist attacks. In light of 9/11, the meaning of emergency was re-defined with clause (c); 
(1)In this Part “emergency” means— 
(a) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in the United 
Kingdom or in a Part or region, 
(b) an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of the United 
Kingdom or of a Part or region, or 
(c) war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United 
Kingdom. (Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 c 36) 
By May, 2002, the on-going dispute between the fire brigades’ local authority employers and 
the FBU that had led to the 40% pay claim (discussed at T1). The FBU wanted a modernised 
reward package for its members based on notions of equality and recompense for skills 
upgrading which related both to the changing nature of the job and increased productivity 
(Seifert and Sibley, 2011).  A confidential report obtained by the Guardian newspaper reported 
that fire authority leaders had already proposed a 16.1% rise in July to avoid damaging strikes, 
but ministers refused to fund the deal (Maguire and Wintour, 2002). By late summer, industrial 
relations were at an all-time low.  The new terrorist threat and talk of troop deployment to Iraq, 
heightened tensions around the FBU’s threat of all-out national strike action as the contingency 
plans required the army and Green Goddess vehicles as fire cover. 
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This stage in the ‘story’ of this case represents an important juncture. In brief, the events 
surrounding 9/11 and the timing of the FBU pay dispute, highlighted the tensions between the 
FBU, the fire service and its employers, due to power changes that will be discussed more fully 
in Chapter 5.  In the aftermath of 9/11, Blair began to talk of a ‘war on terror’ and the rhetoric 
served to highlight a new crisis of national security. Speaking at The Lord Mayors banquet 
(2001), Blair had said: 
“The war against terrorism is not just a police action to root out the networks and those 
who protect them, although it is certainly that. It needs to be a series of political actions 
designed to remove the conditions under which such acts of evil can flourish and be 
tolerated. The dragon's teeth are planted in the fertile soil of wrongs unrighted, of 
disputes left to fester for years or even decades, of failed states, of poverty and 
deprivation” 
And.. 
“Above all, I know the British people recognise the link between what happens in the 
outside world and what happens on our own streets in Britain. The 11th September was 
an attack on us all. Defeating those responsible is essential to our security; to economic 
confidence, so badly hit by terrorism; to the stability of our society, from the reduction of 
external threats down to the drugs trade - 90% of the heroin in Britain originating in 
Afghanistan (Blair, 2001). 
The links between national security and the fire service had never been so apparent.  The death 
toll of fire fighters after the terrorist attacks exposed the vulnerability of emergency workers 
and civilians.  The growing pay crisis in the UK fire service would now present a hugely 
significant political element for the Blair Government.  The symbolism of the confrontation 
between the Labour Party and the FBU, was not only challenging the long established legacy 
of the Labour-union alliance (Pyper, 2003), but challenging the capacity of Blair’s new party.  
New Labour was in the global spotlight as the key ally for the US to address the significant 
issue of national security.  
4.9.5 Morphogenetic perspective 
From a morphogenetic perspective, at this stage, (mid-way between T2 and T3- 2001/2), the 
start of another a shift in organisational relations occurs as a test of power between New Labour 
and FBU begins.   
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Around 2000, Government attempts to reform the fire service with the Best Value initiative had 
disrupted prevailing protectionist logics of previous cycles where necessary and 
complementary relations had reproduced structures and cultures for decades.  However, at the 
end of T1, beginning of T2, though necessary, organisational relations (between fire service and 
Government), became incompatible (necessary incompatibilities. At the social-interaction 
level, the fire service contained its actions and complied with the correction logic (around Best 
Value changes), but significant structural or cultural change did not follow, as was found at T1. 
However, by 2001, as the 40% pay claim continued to be met with derision and rejection (see 
Section 4.6), interests were diverging and nation-wide fire service strikes were getting under 
way.  Moreover, in response to 9/11, Britain and the US had sent troops to Iraq and the army 
was being stretched to provide cover for the fire service.  Relations were strained, showing 
signs of becoming in morphogenetic terms, contingent contradictions (see Table 2 below).  
Neither the FBU nor the Government appeared willing to compromise.  
 Contradictions Complementarities 
 Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
Situational logic 
 
correction elimination protection opportunism 
CEPS of:  
Cultural system 
Socio-cultural 
interaction 
syncretism pluralism systematisation specialisation 
unification cleavage reproduction sectionalism 
SEPs of: 
Structural system 
Social interaction 
 
compromise competition integration differentiation 
containment polarisation solidarity diversification 
 
Table 2 summary of structural morphogenesis/morphostasis (adapted from Archer, 1995, 
p.303); CEP: cultural emergent properties; SEP: structural emergent properties. 
The shading in Table 2 indicates the oscillation between situational logics that appeared to 
occur in this phase (T2 to T3), as the Government involved itself in the dispute.  During the 
morphogenetic sequence time frame (1999 to 2004), responsibility for negotiating firefighters’ 
pay lay with the local Government employers.  Before the Government interjected, the 
employers met regularly with the FBU18,19 to discuss a settlement between the original 40% 
pay claim of 28th May and 2nd September 2002. That initial period of negotiation ended with 
                                                 
18 Fire talks continue 04 November 2002. www.fbu.org.ukAccessed 07/12/15 
19Firefighters threaten first national strike in 25 years 16 May 2002.  
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/may/16/localgovfinance.localGovernment Accessed 07/12/2015 
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an offer of 4% and unsurprisingly the FBU executive subsequently rejected the offer on 2nd 
September20.  In morphogenetic terms, that date is important because here, social interactions 
between the FBU and Government appeared to be following strategies of containment.  After 
pay talks broke down, the emergent properties of the relations that ensued following these 
unyielding interactions, John Prescott intervened.  He announced the establishment of an 
independent review of the fire service, alleging it to be on behalf of the fire service employers.  
This suggested new situational logics of compromise.  The apparent intention was to assist local 
employers in their decision making to arrive at a pay settlement.  Discussing the issue in the 
House of Commons October 22, 2002, John Prescott said; 
“On 2 September, the employers offered the FBU a 4 per cent. increase, plus an 
agreement to establish a new formula that would link increases in firefighters' pay to 
increases in the economy in general. The employers also invited the FBU to join them in 
asking for an independent review to be established. They also gave an undertaking that 
any increase in pay agreed by the review would be backdated to the 7 November pay 
settlement date. By any standards that was a reasonable offer. Nonetheless, the FBU 
rejected it. 
It became clear that there was no prospect of a solution being found through the normal 
negotiating process. The employers made it clear that the negotiations had broken down, 
and requested a Government review. In those circumstances, the House will recognise 
that the Government could not stand aside. Fire disputes are different from most disputes. 
People's lives are put at risk and the Government have a responsibility to secure people's 
safety. So we acted quickly and decisively. 
On 5 September, just three days after negotiations broke down—and after 
consultations—we set up an independent review” (Prescott, 2002). 
The ODPM issued the following press release, 5th September 2002 
FIRE SERVICE MINISTER ANNOUNCES INDEPENDENT REVIEW ON THE FIRE 
SERVICE 
                                                 
20 “FBU reject employers pay offer”, letter to FBU members, Mick Shaw, Executive Council Member for 
London Fire Brigades' Union, 12th September, 2002.  Accessed 05/07/2015 
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The Fire Service Minister, Nick Raynsford, announced today that the Government is 
launching an independent review of the Fire Service. The review will be conducted by 
Professor Sir George Bain.  
Nick Raynsford said:  
“We all greatly value the contribution that Fire Service staff make to public safety. They 
are rightly held in high regard for their professionalism and dedication. This independent 
review will be an excellent opportunity to consider the issues facing the Fire Service, 
including pay. I am delighted to say that Professor Sir George Bain has agreed to conduct 
the review. This review provides an alternative to what would be unnecessary and deeply 
damaging industrial action. There is no time to lose and I hope that the review will start 
and report its findings as soon as possible, allowing for the necessary consultation and 
consideration of what are some difficult and complex issues. All parties will be given the 
opportunity to submit evidence and to participate in the review” (ODPM, 2002). 
The Independent Review of the Fire Service (IRFS), and the subsequent report, would mark an 
important turning point in the process that resulted in the FiReControl reform project to 
regionalise the fire service.  The IRFS report (2002), became one of the most important 
documents in the modernisation of the fire service (Matheson et. al, 2011), and is the subject 
of the second critical hermeneutic analysis for this study.  (The findings will be discussed next 
in Section 4.10). 
Whilst the move to commission the IRFS not only bought Labour time, it would also ensure 
the interests of Blair’s vision for modernisation were protected. The timing of the 
announcement of the review (5th September), made within 48 hours of talks ending on the 3rd, 
suggested it had been a premeditated decision to seize the pay opportunity to further the reform 
objectives.   
The FBU refused to take part in the review, rejecting the report as trotting out a ‘tired, old 
agenda’ and of being part of a ‘derisory and insulting’ offer (BBC News, 2002). Instead, the 
FBU balloted its members in October 2002 and as was reported in The Telegraph, 87%  voted 
in favour of industrial action (Laville and Brogan, 2002), giving the fire service the facility to 
threaten strike action, to encourage the employers to demand more central resources to raise 
wages and the level of services to the public. On the eve of the first 48 hour strike 12th 
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November, Mick Shaw, Executive Council Member for London FBU wrote to all Union 
members about rejecting the 12% pay offer and the subsequent action.  He said: 
“The blame for the breakdown of talks and for the second national strike in the history 
of the UK Fire Service rests fairly and squarely with the Government, our employers and 
Sir George Bain. If they have calculated that our members do not have the stomach for a 
determined fight, they have badly miscalculated. We will walk out together at 6pm 
tomorrow and will not call off action until we have achieved professional pay for 
professional Firefighters and Emergency Fire Control Staff” (Shaw, 2002). 
Following the first 48 hour strike on November 12th 2002, pay talks resumed.  Further evidence 
of compromise and containment are demonstrated by the FBU, as their leader Andy Gilchrist, 
delayed a second strike in favour of continued negotiations. By 5am on the morning of 22 
November, the FBU executive had voted to accept a deal including a 16% pay rise offered by 
the employers. Notwithstanding the original 40% claim of May 2002, and the independent 
reports commissioned by the FBU (Cap Gemini, Ernst and Young, 2002), which indicated a 
rise of 21% was needed to level the playing field before account was taken of increased activity 
and skills, the new offer of 16%, “would have been strongly recommended by the FBU 
leadership to its members” (Seifert and Sibley, 2011, p.336). On the 22nd November, the 
Secretary of the Fire Brigades’ National Employers, Charles Nolda, wrote to fire authority 
executives and the Members of the Employer’s side (Fire Brigades’ National Employers, 
2002); 
For the record; 
1. The first offer made to the Employers yesterday to the FBU is attached as Appendix 1. It 
was rejected by the FBU. 
2. The draft agreement prepared overnight to the joint secretaries is attached as Appendix 
It was endorsed by the FBU, but not by the Employers following a last minute request 
from Government sources that the Employers should not endorse the draft until Ministers 
had considered it.  This is a new procedure of which we had been given no prior notice. 
3. The statement made by the Employers early this morning is attached as Appendix 3. 
That statement read; 
Appendix 3 
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STATEMENT BY THE FIRE SERVICE EMPLOYERS 
The Employers believe that the draft agreement prepared overnight is the best way 
forward. 
In view however of the circumstances in which we find ourselves, we suggest that the 
Employers and the Fire Brigades Union seek an urgent meeting with the Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
The deal between the employers and the FBU would have averted the strike. The ODPM 
intervened again even though pay was a local Government issue and despite Labour’s claims 
towards decentralism and its intervention in the dispute by commissioning the IRFS.  Upon 
reaching agreement with the FBU, the employers were asked to refer any decision to the Deputy 
Prime Minister’s Office (see above).  After the long negotiations the Employers called the 
ODPM at around 05.30 on the 22nd November.  They were advised that the Deputy Prime 
Minister wanted to see all of details of the proposed deal before going any further. The FBU 
Executive gave the Deputy Prime Minister until 7.30am later that morning to review the deal 
(Morris and Waugh, 2002).  Neither John Prescott, nor his officials were able to read the 
agreement before the 9am deadline for the start of the strike.  Therefore, at 7.28am the FBU 
announced that the strike was on, and blamed the Government for wrecking the deal. The strike 
went ahead.   
Speaking on Sky News on the 22nd November, Fire Service Minister Nick Raynsford said: 
"I am afraid what happened last night was a very sad muddle. Yesterday evening about 
six o'clock the employers released a document which set out this proposal of achieving 
pay and modernisation. We have always said that pay and modernisation had to go hand 
in hand, because any increase of pay above 4% had to be covered by savings and 
modernisation.” 
"We had first sight of this revised document, which was substantially different from what 
the employers had released yesterday evening, at around half past six this morning. 
"No responsible Government could possibly write a blank cheque for several hundred 
millions of pounds without the prospect of modernisation.” (Raynsford, 2002). 
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Speaking on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme 22nd November, 2002, John Prescott put the 
blame firmly at the door of the FBU and the employers. Prescott suggested there was no time 
to analyse the document to ensure it addressed all the modernisation questions raised in the 
IRFS. He also raised the issue over funding the deal, stating that any increase in salaries of the 
fire brigade, should be funded through modernisation - not extra cash from central Government 
funds (Prescott, 2002). 
Speaking at the Trade Union Congress (TUC), Organise Conference, November 23rd, 2002, 
TUC General Secretary John Monks appeared to lay blame back with the Government; 
"Brendan Barber and I helped the FBU and the employers construct a draft pay and 
modernisation agreement. The pay levels were almost precisely those set out by the 
Deputy Prime Minister in his statement to the House of Commons on Thursday.  The 
modernisation proposals were based around a commitment to reach agreement by the 
FBU with a right of each party to submit outstanding modernisation issues to 
independent, binding adjudication……In my view, this was a robust and practical 
approach. The employers liked it and we assumed that the Government did too. …….This 
was then shattered by the Deputy Prime Minister’s decision that he could not sanction 
the deal without knowing the savings to be made from modernisation. The employers did 
not therefore make the offer and the strike started” (Monks, 2002). 
Thus, politics was to play a huge role in the pay dispute despite its local Government-managed 
pay structures.  Blair’s New Britain manifesto had been built on concepts of efficiency and 
modern public services and the national pay dispute was now testing the new party on the issue 
of modernisation.  Despite ‘Third Way’ claims of devolution and decentralisation (Giddens, 
2013), senior Government ministers had intervened repeatedly in the dispute making the issue 
high profile and political.  Situational logics of correction resulting in compromise at the 
structural level and actions that attempted to contain the situation had thus far been holding 
vested interests but it was at the cost of reaching a resolution. The Government’s apparent 
compromise of asking the employers to wait for the outcome of the IRFS to help with 
understanding pay and roles, effectively promoted the vested interests of the employers and the 
Labour executive.  The most obvious interest being that once the review was completed the 
Government was committed to intervene again to achieve its dual policy of restricting pay 
increases to the firefighters to what it considered an acceptable level (as opposed to the 
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Employers), while securing a raft of modernising measures (Blair styled), as the price for future 
pay increases. 
 
From the morphogenetic perspective, this juncture in the cycle reveals a decline in the hitherto 
mutuality of the tripartite arrangement and dominant bargaining power of the FBU.  Whilst 
there had been oscillations between the FBU and the Government competing and appearing to 
compromise with each other (agreeing to talk, calling off strikes, calling for the IRFS), by 
November 2002 after the talks broke down, what was emerging from the social and socio-
cultural interactions were intractable differences.  These intractable differences led to 
polarization along the different lines of vested interests of the two power bases (FBU, 
Government).  The effects of holding theories or beliefs which stand in particular logical 
relationships to other theories or beliefs, places their holders in different ideational positions 
(Archer, 1995, p.229).  The emergent properties of these new situational logics resulted now in 
cultural pluralism at the systemic level (shaded columns in Table 2 below), where the FBU had 
to choose to either come down on the side of Government and acquiesce to reforms in exchange 
for a lower pay increase, or to resist/challenge the changes and hold out for better pay deal. 
This contest would continue to play out bitterly from November 2002 to June 2003 (T2-T3). 
 Contradictions Complementarities 
 Necessary Contingent Necessary Contingent 
Situational logic 
 
correction elimination protection opportunism 
CEPS of:  
Cultural system 
Socio-cultural 
interaction 
syncretism pluralism systematisation specialisation 
unification cleavage reproduction sectionalism 
SEPs of: 
Structural system 
Social interaction 
 
compromise competition integration differentiation 
containment polarisation solidarity diversification 
 
Table 2. Summary of structural morphogenesis/morphostasis (adapted from Archer, 1995, 
p.303); CEP: cultural emergent properties; SEP: structural emergent properties. 
These developments led to competitive conflicts of ideas which promoted deeper cleavage 
between the Government, the local employers and within the fire service.  The resulting 
situational logic of elimination developed as the FBU and the Labour executive competed to 
protect their vested interests.  The power struggle appeared to be more than a result of their 
polarised views of modernisation; this was now a test of institutional legitimacy. The IRFS had 
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not only completed without the participation and input from the key stakeholders (the fire 
service), it was very quickly promoted by the Government as the definitive model for reform. 
The report of the IRFS is the second of the four texts to be analysed using critical hermeneutic 
methods. 
Text 2: “Independent Review of the Fire Service, 2002” 
4.10 Findings of a critical hermeneutic analysis; the structural reform imperative 
By December 2002, after a short review of the fire sector to assist with settling the on-going 
pay dispute and lasting less than six weeks, Professor George Bain and his co-authors, 
completed the IRFS.  They concluded that the whole service was in need of radical reform and 
it was now an urgent matter of community safety.  The opening paragraph of the Foreword to 
the IRFS reports said: 
“"The Fire Service needs to be changed from top to bottom and every aspect of its work 
reformed to bring it into line with best practice at the start of the twenty-first century." 
(Bain et al. 2002, p.3) 
 
For the critical hermeneutic analysis, thematic references are used as anchors for re-reading the 
report and entering the hermeneutic circle in efforts to reveal hidden meaning. In reading texts 
to understand their manifest meaning, the report was read and re-read against prevailing 
contexts (as outlined from T1 onwards), using three thematic anchors of ‘independent’ (in terms 
of the review), ‘efficiency’ and ‘modernisation’. These reveal political undertones that non 
critical readers may find to be unimportant (Prasad, 2002).  The three themes were chosen 
owing to the emphasis that was placed on the review’s independence (as will be discussed 
within this analysis), and due to the reoccurring narrative of the Blair Government to modernise 
public sector to achieve efficiency. The following section demonstrates how these themes were 
used to support the overall conclusion of the IRFS report. 
 
The decision to commission the independent review as an action taken by the Government is 
also worthy of critical hermeneutic analysis as well as the text itself. Freedom of Information 
requests (see Appendix 1), to establish a greater understanding of the origins of commission, 
including what criteria were applied in selecting the 'expert' and if others were considered and 
rejected.  Therefore, the exact origins of the Government review remain unclear (Rowe and 
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McAllister 2006), beyond the declaration made in Parliament by John Prescott (outlined 
earlier). 
The questions related to the IRFS origins are fundamental in the search for how the reforms 
were legitimated.  Was the IRFS a benevolent deed of Government to help the fire service 
employers understand how they could settle the pay claim?  Was it a Government device to 
legitimate an ideological way forward for New Labour’s modernisation agenda?  Answers to 
these probes will be discussed in the next section. 
 
For ease of reading only page numbers will be used in this section, since all refer to the single 
text under hermeneutic analysis here (Independent Review of the Fire Service, 2002), unless 
otherwise referenced. 
4.10.1 Origins; who really asked for it?  
In the Foreword to the report, Bain indicates the Government’s passive role in the initiation of 
the review, suggesting they responded to a request from the local Government employers for 
help;  
“The proposal for a review was put forward by the Fire Service employers in the course 
of discussions at the negotiating body for Fire Service pay, the National Joint Council 
for Local Authorities’ Fire Brigades. The Government decided that such a review would 
be helpful” (p.1). 
Government consultants Mott MacDonald in their 2003 Update Report into Control Rooms, 
(the fourth text to be analysed in Section 4.19), also referred to the IRFS as an ‘initiation’ by 
the Government “in response to a proposal by fire service employers, to consider the issues 
facing the service and to assist in discussions regarding fire service pay” (Mott MacDonald, 
2003, p.4). Notable here is the sympathetic language, such as ‘proposal’, ‘consider’, 
‘discussion’,  firmly attributing the rationale of the Government commission to a benevolent 
gesture in response to calls from the local authority employers of the fire service.  However, 
other commentators had different perspectives, referring to the IRFS as a review ordered 
directly by Government in response to the strike threat (Seifert, 2002), suggesting it was 
strategic and commissioned for political reasons to alter a course of action.  In a press release, 
the FBU labelled the review a meaningless distraction (FBU, 2002).  
4.10.2 How independent? 
The true origins of the IRFS are questionable, as is its independence. The ability for the review 
to be independent can be challenged from a number of directions on a number of levels.  Yet it 
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was the very concept of labelling it ‘Independent’ and the frequency with which the IRFS 
authors and commissioners promoted the independence of the hired ‘experts’ as well as their 
inquiry methods, which fundamentally served to objectively position its conclusions from the 
views of the Government.  This would help to portray the ODPM as uninvolved and nonpartisan 
in shaping the subsequent reforms that were recommended by the review. There are 34 
references to the independence of the review in the first and final chapters of the final report 
(both chapters totalling 15 pages), such as; 
“We have carried out our work independently and objectively” (p.i) 
“The review is independent of all parties and will consider all of the issues facing the 
Fire Service including modernisation and pay” (p.130) 
“The Review is completely independent of Government. Its purpose is to review 
objectively the situation within the Fire Service and to make recommendations 
accordingly. Evidence will not be published by the Review and hearings will be held in 
private” (p.131). 
 
With regards to the independence of the review, despite the regular use of the word throughout 
the report, there are challenges to its ability to be independent in light of the predominant 
industrial relations, the threat of strikes and the fundamental significance of the absence of key 
stakeholder representation, namely the FBU.  The FBU had refused to participate in the IRFS 
on the grounds of the review’s validity as discussed in an interview on BBC Radio 4’s On the 
Record programme, 20th October, 2002 between John Humphreys, Nick Raynsford and Andy 
Gilchrist: 
 
HUMPHREYS: Mr Gilchrist, why not wait for the review to report? 
ANDY GILCHRIST: Well, the review is not actually a review into pay at all. It's a very 
wide ranging review and we question seriously the independence of it. 
HUMPHREYS: Sir George Bain is an eminently independent man. Everybody believes 
that.  
GILCHRIST: Our issue is not about the eminence of Sir George Bain.  The fact is, this is 
not an independent inquiry.  The Prime Minister, indeed the Deputy Prime Minister, have 
backed  up the fact that even if Sir George Bain were to find that we were right  in 
claiming forty per cent, that in fact he would not be allowed to award  that. 
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HUMPHREYS: Nonetheless, you'd have  a stronger moral case for taking action wouldn't 
you, if you had an independent  review saying yes, they ought to get forty per cent, that 
would be a pretty  powerful argument for you, wouldn't it? 
GILCHRIST: Well there is no such thing at the moment as an independent review of pay.  
What there is, is a rather farcical wide-ranging review into the Fire Service. 
 
Raising the issue in the House of Commons on 22nd October, 2002, John Prescott said: 
 
“The Bain review will be the way this argument over firefighters' pay will be settled. The 
TUC is serving on the review, along with an employer's representative. Unfortunately the 
FBU won't even cooperate with the inquiry, the FBU won't even work with the review to 
get the firefighters higher pay through the review of the existing criteria which presently 
governs their pay. 
I think that is wrong, I think it is short-sighted and I believe the general public cannot 
understand it.” (HC Deb, 22 October 2002, c125)  
 
The length of time in which the review was to be completed (six weeks with interim reporting 
within four weeks), was exceedingly short compared to other public sector structural or pay 
reviews of a similar national scope. For example, Thomas Winsor was appointed on 1st October 
2010 to conduct an independent review of police officer and staff remuneration and conditions.  
Volume 1 of the report was published 18 months later in March 2012 (Winsor, 2012).   An 
independent review of the UK postal services sector was commissioned 19 December 2007 and 
that report was published 12 months later on 12th December, 2008 (Hopper, 2008).  The matter 
of only weeks for completing the IRFS, makes the position of the review’s authors less than 
clear in terms of their genuine independence in reviewing the fire service conditions of service.  
Was it to help settle the pay dispute, or quite plausibly, was their role to assist the Government 
in buying time, as competing situational logics began to threaten their vested interests . 
Whichever it was, the interruption to the industrial dispute process that the IRFS represented 
and its timing, undoubtedly compromised the fire service employers from taking any further 
action to resolve the pay dispute until its publication. 
 
Adding to the contentions around the independence of the review, selection of its members was 
also unclear. In the course of this research, two Freedom of Information requests (Appendix 1), 
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were refused in requesting information on how members of the review were chosen.  The 
review itself states,    
“Membership of the Review was put together with the co-operation of the Government, 
the employers’ organisations and fire authorities in England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, as well as the General Secretary of the TUC” (p.i). 
If three months seemed short for an independent review of a national public sector service and 
its 47 institutions, the actual duration of the research process was even shorter. Bain had stated 
“This report is the result of a three-month review which we have carried out into the UK Fire 
Service” (p.i). The review was launched on 20th September 2002 and whilst a final report 
publication date was indicated as Christmas 2002, a detailed position report, containing the 
majority of the recommendations was submitted to John Prescott on 11th November, 2002.   
According to the cover letter to DMPM by Bain, with which the position paper was submitted 
he said,  
“In light of the discussions currently underway between the Fire Brigade employers and 
unions, we thought it would be helpful for us to indicate to you, and through you to them, 
the general thrust of some of our findings (Bain, 2002a).  
The position paper outlined the review authors’ views on what needed to be done to deliver a 
modern fire service, indicating that the review was itself completed and views were finalised 
for dissemination within six weeks. 
4.10.3 How valid? 
The team’s ability to conduct a sector-wide review in such a short timescale is attributed by 
Bain to its reliance on secondary data from previous reports undertaken by other agencies.  Bain 
advised that collecting fresh evidence was constrained by the short deadline set by the ODPM 
and industrial action, limiting access to fire service staff;  
“We had as our starting point the long list of reports and reviews of all or parts of the 
Fire Service which have been produced over the last twenty-five years. These identified 
many of the issues and questions that this Review would need to tackle. They even 
identified many of the answers. Although this review was conducted very quickly, we were 
able to reach some firm conclusions because of the strong body of earlier work supported 
by the evidence we received, most of it displaying a uniform view of the urgent need for 
change” (p.1). 
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The convincing portrayal of 25 years’ worth of previous data as authoritative and definitive, 
able to stand the test of time, conceals both the on-going changes in the sector that had been 
taking place for several years prior to the IRFS and the questionable validity of  25 year old 
data.  Bain downplayed the lack of FBU member/firefighter involvement;  
“The union’s stance also inhibited some face-to-face contact with firefighters during our 
visits. But it did not deter more than ninety firefighters” (p.1).  
However, 90 participants (their ranks not indicated), represented only 0.15% of the possible 
59000 national operational staff at the time in England alone, who could have taken part. 
Bain’s reliance on previous Government-commissioned reports did not stretch to the more 
contemporary report commissioned by the FBU to establish proposals for modernisation (A 
Modern Fire Service: The True Challenge, Cap Gemini, Ernst & Young, 2002).  Bain’s failure 
to reference that report in any way throughout his review process was surprising.  The report 
was discussed in Parliament to support not only the pay claim (The 2002 Labour Research 
Report into the Operation of the Pay Formula and the 2002 Hastings Research Report into the 
Role of the Modern Firefighter), but also to support a "productivity deal" which would pay for 
it.  
4.10.4 Whose language? 
Though written by a senior academic, the IRFS report employs the language of Government, 
endorsing the business language of New Labour on many occasions. For example, the opening 
chapter of the final report says:  
 
“We believe that the service we describe will be able to meet current and future 
challenges flexibly; to offer challenging and well-rewarded work to a wide range of staff; 
and to respond to the need for continuous improvements in performance whether 
through working with others or spreading good practice. But the merits of our vision will 
count for nothing if what we propose is not put into practice.” (p.2, emphasis added)  
 
This language is remarkably similar in context with the dominant politics of the Blair 
Government and its modernisation agenda.  However, in generalising the concept of reform 
and modernisation to the wider public sector, the report fails to focus on the fundamental issues 
of the fire service, about which specifically, the review was commissioned (pay). For example, 
the regular use of the term 'modern'; the report makes no effort to agree a starting point for its 
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definition in the context of the IRFS, or to indicate consultation of the idea that there is only 
one way to modernise.  At the time, Blair’s view of modernisation leaned towards privatisation 
or at least to manage public services like private service with customers, rather than what the 
fire service was/is; a public service with users and potential users.  
 
Similarly, for concepts such as best practice and methods of funding, the report does not 
indicate agreed consensus of these ‘givens’ upon which the report was founded.  Bain’s use of 
Blair’s Government language and the undeclared assumptions and definitions upon which his 
review was based, arguably undermines its independence, regardless of the regular references 
he makes. 
Whilst the use of Government language sets an authoritative tone, Bain also employs emotive 
rhetoric, which establishes the benevolent tone needed to connect persuasively to readers and 
the wider public. The emotive rhetoric begins in the opening lines of the report leaving readers 
with a sense of dismay about the state of the fire service:  
“Localised responses to emergencies are working well, but it is a sad fact that too many 
people in this country die in fires and the number of fires is currently increasing each 
year. This cannot be right. Urgent action is required to make things better”. (p.iii, 
emphasis added).   
Not only does this contradict the terms of reference for the review (to understand structures and 
roles to help settle the pay dispute), it also conceals the considerable work that was on-going 
in relation to discussions about modernisation before the pay dispute.   
Opening the document with references to failure and loss of life and the unacceptability of 
doing nothing, whilst omitting evidence that would counter such claims appears divisive.  
Government statistics for that year actually indicated decreasing fire deaths as well as evidence 
of ongoing modernisation since previous Government interventions. This paragraph from the 
ODPM’s (2002) Fire Statistics report attests to this; 
“In 2002, there were 562 deaths from fires in the United Kingdom compared with 606 in 
2001 and 613 in 2000. The latest figure is the lowest number recorded since 1961. By the 
1970s, the number of people dying in fires had reached about 1,000 per year. Since 1979 
there has been a general long-term fall in the total number of fire related deaths”. (para 
1.13).  
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Furthermore, if the fire service had remained unchanged for decades the comments made in 
Parliament five years earlier by (the then opposition), Jack Straw MP in a discussion on cuts to 
the service and the loss of a firefighter on duty in Wales, would also conflict with Bain’s views;  
“I beg to move, that this House congratulates the Fire Service on its exemplary record 
as one of the most consistently high-performing services in local Government; is appalled 
by the uncertainty over the future of the world-renowned Fire Service College; and 
deeply regrets the lack of any clear strategy by Her Majesty's Government properly to 
sustain and to develop the service. As our motion spells out, the fire service in Great 
Britain is one of the most consistently high-performing services in local 
Government". That is a direct quotation from the Audit Commission in its comment on 
the 1994–95 performance indicators for local Government, which were published last 
month” (HC Deb, 08 May 1996 Vol 277 cc296-342). 
 
What Bain’s approach achieves in using commanding language to highlight the inadequacy of 
the fire service, is to position the review as independent, benevolent and authoritative. It implies 
the IRFS process can rescue the fire service, which is much loved and respected by all, but has 
fallen into the wrong hands.  It implies that the review itself can move it on and can finally 
“make things better” (p.iii).   
We are reminded of the rescue ‘mission’ in the closing paragraphs of the Foreword, after which 
the authors give their signatures, giving the impression of their personal pledge; 
“The important message is for everyone to recognise both the need for change and the 
gains from doing so. Staying where we are is not an option, and we believe that reform 
will bring greater gains for everyone. We hope that when you have read our report, you 
will agree. We leave you with the words of one of the members of the Fire Service who 
met us during one of our visits. Her message, quite simply, was ‘don’t let us down this 
time’.” (p. i) 
In summing up the introductory section to the report, Bain repeats a key phrase and infers that 
before the review, no changes at all had happened across the service for decades and without 
it, none were going to.  
“Staying where we are is not an option, and we believe that reform will bring greater 
gains for everyone. We hope that when you have read our report, you will agree” (p. ii).  
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Bain’s rhetoric of lament conceals the fact that reforming the fire service had been on the 
agenda long before the IRFS.  Changes were happening and the need for structural reform had 
been agreed.  Reform had been the subject of continuous debate in relation to pay and 
conditions that preceded the review, refom was also the subject of modernisation proposals by 
other independent consultants hired by CFOA and the FBU and a fire service consultation 
exercise before the 2001 General Election, for which a draft was produced, but never published. 
It had been drafted following full consultation with Fire Service stakeholders including the 
Employer Organisations, Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association and the FBU. On 
19th November 2002, Andy Gilchrist sent to John Prescott a position statement along with the 
contents of the draft White Paper.  It detailed the framework of the modernising Government 
programme.  It also contained what the stakeholders who took part had believed to be the true 
modernisation of the Fire Service and a reform agenda that would take the Service forward. 
Gilchrist said: 
“The Fire Brigades Union has launched its own views on the modernisation of the fire 
service to drag it into the 21st century. Its proposals are in line with the Government’s 
last stated aims contained in a draft proposed but never published in 2001. As I have 
stated many times, the FBU would have no difficulty discussing a significant increase in 
pay in conjunction with an open and progressive discussion on modernisation, the 
framework of which it believes is contained in the attached document. It is our sincere 
wish to avoid future strike action, and the FBU believes that a genuine commitment to a 
deal with pay linked to modernisation as set out in the attached document could be the 
basis for achieving this.”(Gilchrist, 2002) 
The introductory paragraph of the draft read; 
"The Fire Service is one of the most consistently high-performing services in local 
Government. This ‘succeeding’ service is highly effective in its work of responding to fire 
and other emergencies and widely admired by the public. Certainly the Audit Commission 
Performance Indicators for 1999-2000 published in January 2001 fully bear it out. At the 
same time, the role of the fire service has begun to change, essentially from a reactive to 
a proactive one; and the next few years will see a major transformation in the way fire 
brigades deliver services to the public." (Un-published, n.d). 
And; 
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"The fire service has already made considerable progress towards modernisation" (ibid). 
Comparing Bain’s (2002), opening themes to the IRFS (fire deaths, the need for urgent action, 
and doing nothing not being an option) with those of the draft, the contrast is stark, yet it would 
be the IRFS that would shape the reforms that entered legislation a year later.  The evidence of 
the draft indicates that the need to modernise the fire service was not disputed. The IRFS 
conceals this truth with rhetoric of the fire service doing nothing and of failure.  In fact, what 
was actually in question between the stakeholders was the definition of modernisation.  The 
FBU’s veto on participating in the IRFS enabled Bain to discard any other of their contributions 
outside of the review process, including the unpublished draft White Paper and the FBU’s 
modernisation proposals (Cap Gemini, Ernst and Young, 2002).    
Exclusion of any contributions from the FBU and the sole use of reports by Government 
consultants, hired decades earlier (for example, Mott MacDonald), throws into question the 
true level of independence of the review process. 
4.10.5 A new sense of urgency 
The report introduces and sets the tone with the concept of urgency very early on page one of 
the Executive Summary; “Urgent action is required to make things better”.  Although the 
‘urgent’ dimension relates largely to risk management, fire cover, and diversity, it would be 
this the new sense of urgency that appears in the narrative of the Government’s follow-up White 
Paper (Our Fire and Rescue Service, 2003), that amongst other structural changes, legislates 
for control room restructuring through regionalisation via the FiReControl project.  Ironically, 
the IRFS explicitly cautioned against regionalisation of control rooms; (“we do not, however, 
favour a major re-organisation”, p.iv).  The introduction of the ‘urgent reform’ narrative in the 
IRFS allowed the subsequent 2003 White Paper to imply he concept of urgency for the 
regionalisation of control rooms, despite the questionable evidence trail.  
This unjustified, and hitherto unmentioned sense of urgency also shows itself to have travelled 
across time and departments when textual excerpts are analysed in future Government level 
meetings in relation to the rush to get the FiReControl project to get off the ground in 2005. 
The latter sense of urgency links the reforms to imminent terror attacks (which would emerge 
in future Government reform documents as the national security imperative, discussed in 
Section 4.11). However, Bain’s introduction of the sense of urgency was associated with 
addressing inadequate risk management and unacceptable numbers of domestic house fire 
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deaths (notwithstanding the downward trajectory of these statistics that his report had 
concealed). 
Discussing numbers of death from fire, Bain had stated;  
“This cannot be right. Urgent action is required to make things better” (p.iii), and “The 
leadership must recognise that urgent action is required” (p.v). 
 
The tone of much of the language in the review indicates an authority of the authors, which was 
not qualified in the report.  In light of the minimal new evidence, limited access to stakeholder 
views, the political environment and compromised conditions of delivery and completion of 
the review, the assumed authority of Bain and his colleagues in making the claims, indicates a 
skill or experience level which are well beyond the competence of the authors. All these 
limitations aside, the report nevertheless advised the following and this would pave the wave 
for reform, New Labour-style; 
“There needs to be a new policy-making body, led by Ministers in the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister. This needs to set a framework, making clear what the Government 
requires from the Fire Service; the ways in which the Service should be modernised”, 
(p.iii). 
 
4.10.6 Bain on regionalism 
Recalling the debates around Labour values, New Labour and the concept of devolved power 
from the Centre (c.f Section 4.9.2), the 2001 Labour Manifesto stated; 
“Some functions are best tackled at the regional level.  Economic development is the core 
of regional policy today” (Blair, 2001). 
This is an important statement in its similarity to comments made in the IRFS, again without 
the evidence one might have expected from an academic undertaking a national public service 
review.  It is another example of Bain’s use of political language, mimicking the Government’s 
perspectives as opposed to objective and evidenced findings.   
“There are cogent arguments in favour of moving the Fire Service onto a regional 
structure. New responsibilities are emerging, such as the need to deal with major terrorist 
incidents. These are best handled above brigade level” (p.iv) 
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Despite Bain’s considerably authoritative, emotive language and his sense of urgency in calling 
for immediate, radical and Government-controlled reforms in almost every other aspect of the 
English fire service, a pivotal issue is that the IRFS report dedicates less than a page to the idea 
of rationalisation of control rooms.  Whilst acknowledging the debates that had taken place on 
this political agenda (see last quote), despite the modernisation imperative expressed 
throughout the report, in respect of regional control rooms, Bain is succinct, concluding;  
We do not, however, favour a major re-organisation …; the Fire Service will already 
have a major programme of change to handle” (p. iv). 
4.10.7 Empowering Government 
The terms of reference of the IRFS did not cover changes to governance.  Participation in the 
review by ministers and fire service agencies such as the inspectorate, are not mentioned in the 
list of individuals or parties consulted.  However, Bain assumes a taken-for-granted authority 
in recommending considerable changes to governance that are required if the reforms are to be 
implemented and these changes indicate significant increases in ministerial power over the fire 
service. Likewise there are bold statements for which no references are given to support;  
“At the same time, most of the principal parties in the current arrangements – 
Government, local authorities, inspectorates, professional bodies, unions, and CFBAC – 
believe that the responsibility for this lack of progress lies elsewhere” (p.46)  
This is not evidenced and the following statement is vague yet accusatory; “The existing 
machinery is clearly not working” (p.46).  Again,  and without underpinning analysis or 
evidence to support;  “The most appropriate means to translate policy into action is the 
framework for local Government set by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM)” 
(p.46). 
Importantly, this language further evidences how the ‘independent’ review mirrored 
Government opinion.  It seemed to be part of the negotiating process rather than independent 
from it; a view that was shared by Dr Dennett, an independent fire consultant. Giving evidence 
to the ODPM Committee’s inquiry (4 November 2003, QQ 118-120) he went further in his 
criticism of the Bain review: 
“I think it [the Bain Review] is significantly flawed because it did not collect the evidence 
available to it…I think it is a political report; I think it errs on the side of Government 
and looks at the solution to the problem, if you like, rather than the problem. There is so 
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much in it, for example, that is unsubstantiated about recruitment, about bullying and 
about the general standards of fire cover, and there is nothing in the report that I have 
seen that is supportive of those conclusions”  
4.11 The unfolding story 
Despite the many limitations with the nature of the IRFS that a hermeneutic reading has 
illuminated, what it subsequently set in motion was a programme of radical changes. What is 
important to this case is the impact of the IRFS and the power of its recommendations, 
especially the new authority to be transferred the ODPM to widen its legislative control over 
the fire service.  Of fundamental relevance to the FiReControl project are the recommendations 
it made in relation to regionalisation i.e. - not to do it.  The 2003 House of Commons ODPM 
Select Committee 4th Report reiterated Bain’s recommendation regarding control room 
rationalisation, advocating greater collaboration between fire brigades on cross-cutting issues 
such as civil resilience but not major reorganisation.  Despite both, the review itself and the 
Select Committee agreement recommending not to reform control rooms, and notwithstanding 
the Government’s frequent reference to the unquestionable authority of the Bain report in 
justifying its far-reaching reforms, the clear recommendations not to reorganise control rooms 
would from here on be concealed.  Without further inquiry, reforming the fire control room 
function through regionalisation entered Government narrative and would from here be 
discussed as if Bain had recommended it.  Thus, in Prescott’s follow up White Paper, 30 June 
2003, ‘Our Fire and Rescue Service’ his personal vision for regionalisation would become a 
prominent element of fire service reform as well as a step towards the flagging policy for 
regional governance.  
The hermeneutic analysis of the IRFS report looked beneath the surface of this second 
important document.  The review was apparently commissioned to help employers understand 
how to settle the pay dispute, but it became a powerful tool to legitimate the Government’s 
vision for reform over any evidence-based alternatives. 
Returning to the timeframe of the morphogenetic sequence (T2 to T3), in which the IRFS took 
place, Government rhetoric was painting a picture of the dispute as a struggle for and against 
progress and modernisation along the lines of the Government wanting it and the FBU wanting 
to remain unchanged.  In a Prime Ministerial press conference about the fire dispute (25th 
November 2002), responding to questions from journalists, Blair was asked if he had ever used 
the word Scargillism (a term used to describe militant strike action after Arthur Scargill, the 
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President of the National Union of Mineworkers 1992 to 2002) .  The Telegraph published 
Tony Blair’s responses in an article the next day, 26th November, 2002 (Jones, 2002); 
"What I have said is that industrial militancy to pursue political ends, which I guess is 
what people would think of as Scargillism, is not on. 
I hope and believe the firefighters are not trying to do that. We have got to be very clear 
about that. Those days are over." 
This is a strike they can't win, it would not be a defeat for the Government; it would be a 
defeat for the country."  
 
The media coverage of the pay dispute played a soignificant role in the pay dispute. Under New 
Labour, Tony Blair had doubled the number of special advisers to 81 at a cost of £4.4m to the 
public purse, compared with £1.8m in 1997 (BBC News online 2002).  The role of a special 
adviser was to advise ministers on media communications, 26 worked directly for the prime 
minister.   In 2002, newspaper leaders, writers and columnists would be briefed by Philip 
Bassett who ran No 10's strategic communications unit. Interviews with union members 
revealed they believed the national press was generally hostile towards their case, and the 
tabloid ‘Sun’ newspaper was considered as one of the worst offenders (O’Neill, 2007). 
 
“Examples of headlines from the Sun in this period, which coincided with the run-up to 
the Iraq War, include, “Fire strike a ‘gift for terrorists’” (13 November 2002) and “Fire 
union chiefs are Saddam Stooges” (14 November 2002). Other Sun headlines read 
“Wrecker in chief” (14 November 2002); “Beat the Bully” (21 November 2002); “Crews 
‘stuck in the past’” (26 November 2002).  The Times referred to the “Winter of 
Discontent”(12 and 13 November 2002,) the name given to a period in the 1970s when 
many unions in the UK were on strike, and the “hard left” (13 November 2002), while 
the Express referred to union “dinosaurs” and “our lives put on the line” (13 November 
2002), as well as headlines such as “Killed by the fire strike” (15 November 2002)” 
(O’Neill, 2007, p. 15). 
Labour’s media-managed rhetoric had unintended consequences.  Rather than cast the FBU in 
a ‘Luddite’ light as they had hoped for, it actually united the wider trade union movement 
behind the FBU.  When Labour publically denigrated the union’s rejection of the IRFS and its 
apparent aims to arrive at a pay settlement, many other unions publicly voiced their support for 
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the FBU.  An article in the Guardian published the following statements indicating union 
support for the FBU pay claim; 
Derek Simpson, Amicus: “The only people who have introduced politics are those 
elements of new Labour who revile trade unions” 
Bill Morris, TGWU: Believes a new Labour “sabotage squad” deliberately scuppered a 
negotiated deal 
Mick Rix, Aslef: Accuses Downing Street of seeking a confrontation to deter others 
Dave Prentis, Unison: “'If the Government wants a long dispute it can have one” 
Mark Serwotka, PCS: Says ministers using public funds to take on trade unions 
 Even Beverley Malone, general secretary of the Royal College of Nursing, itself a non-
striking union showed public support urging the FBU and employers to resume 
negotiations said; "We respect the right of our colleagues to push their issues forward in 
the way that they feel they need to," she said. "I would call it warm support." (Maguire, 
2002) 
4.12 The effects of ‘Two Jags Prezza’: the failure of agency 
The threat of Blair’s entire public sector modernisation project would be compromised by the 
FBU securing a significant pay increase on a ‘no-strings’ basis.  To counter this risk, the general 
management of the dispute was centralised to the ODPM, headed by John Prescott.  Prescott’s 
role was to prevent the dispute from moving beyond the control of the Government (Dinan et 
al, 2006), or maybe, to prevent the local authority employers from agreeing to deals that did 
not suit the Government? 
 
John Prescott had courted controversy during his tenure at the ODPM.  Originally, the media 
referred to Prescott almost affectionately as "Prezza" but as various misfortunes befell him the 
nicknames became more detrimental to his Labour roots and particularly to his credibility.  The 
names would impact on his integrity and his political agency during the period T2 to T3.  Names 
such as “Two Jags"21 (Prescott owned a jaguar, and had the use of another as his official 
                                                 
21 "'Two Jags' Prescott in parking row". BBC News (BBC). 27 July 2001. Retrieved 23 February 2014 
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ministerial car); then "Two Jabs"22 (following his retaliation against a protest farmer in 2001); 
and "Two Shacks"23 (referring to his former country house). The nicknames would serve to 
undermine Prescott’s credibility as a grass roots union man, the profile upon which his political 
character had been built prior to Labour’s election in 1997. The morphogenetic perspective of 
the changes to Prescott’s credibility during the fire dispute will be an important issues discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
 
The highly political move by Blair to appoint Prescott to manage the fire dispute as it escalated 
in November 2002 back-fired at the beginning. Prescott’s new media image portrayed him not 
as a union man, but a man of luxury cars enjoying the accommodations of high office.  Prescott 
was now considered by many to be a contradiction to his union roots (Pyper, 2003). He failed 
to stop the second strike in 2002 and was fast losing credibility.  Avoiding further personal 
confrontation at this stage, he became less visible.  The Guardian reported the Government 
explaining Prescott’s diminished presence was down to him spending time with the local 
authorities to “work through some of the issues in respect of costings” (Guardian, 2002). 
4.13 Toning down the rhetoric: building New Labour’s agency 
The temporary absence of Prescott can be seen as a strategic media move by the Labour party 
to appear to back off, whilst controlling the reputational damage to Prescott and the party as 
the FBU showed strength in numbers.  In an attempt to keep relations working, the Government 
appear at this stage to be in a state of compromise as they deployed what seemed like 
containment strategies. For example, in a clearly political attempt to indicate the party’s 
allegiance with the union movement, senior, old school-Labour, pro-union MPs Ian McCartney 
(Minister of State at the Department for Work and Pensions) and Adam Ingram (Minister of 
State at the Ministry of Defence) were engaged in the fire dispute. Some were sceptical of the 
move to bring in obvious unionist MPs.  In respect of Ian McCartney, a former minister told 
the Guardian (Maguire and White, 2002): "Every now and then it suits the Government to have 
someone with a regional accent putting their case". The article suggested Ian McCartney had 
said his role was a modest one; "I'm not involved in the fire dispute, I'm not there to negotiate, 
John Prescott is responsible.  But I am very much involved in developing relations with the 
trades unions.” (Maguire and White, 2002) 
                                                 
22 "Prescott punches protester". On This Day (BBC). 16 May 2001. Retrieved 11 March 2015 
23 “Two Shacks' Prescott". The Guardian .1 Weaver, Matthew, June 2006. Retrieved 11 March 2015. 
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Whether they helped the negotiations is not clear but their media-managed presence gave the 
perception Government was trying its best to contain the problem and resolve the dispute.  An 
article in The Telegraph, 30th November, said; 
 
The increasingly sour relationship between the Government and the FBU was also 
signalled last night when Adam Ingram, the Armed Forces minister, demanded that an 
FBU official apologise for claiming that the Army was not coping with fighting fires 
during the strike. 
His demand came after Dave Patten, an FBU national officer, said he wanted to "destroy 
this myth" that the 19,000 servicemen and women were coping with a service carried out 
by 55,000 fire-fighters. 
"The Army is not coping well at all," Mr Patten told BBC News 24. "The Army are not 
providing a fire service, they are merely providing first aid cover." 
In a strongly-worded statement Mr Ingram said last night: "All servicemen and women 
engaged in firefighting duties did not join up to do this work, but as ever they have 
performed magnificently and I will not have them attacked and undermined by people 
like Mr Patten, who is not fit to lace their boots." 
 
However, evidence of New Labour’s growing power was emerging when, after pay talks broke 
down further at the end of 2002, despite the numerous Labour MPs who were variously drafted 
into the talks, (e.g. John Prescott, Nick Raynsford, John Reid, Peter Hain, Gordon Brown, Chris 
Leslie, Margaret Beckett, Tony Blair, Ian McCartney (Maguire and White, 2002), John Prescott 
was returned to centre stage to lead again the Government’s management of the dispute.  
Seemingly, politically stronger, Prescott had called the local fire authority employers to talks, 
authoritatively directing them to adhere to the recommendations from the IRFS, which he later 
repeated in the House of Commons (HC Deb 26 November 2002 vol 395 cc165-85). 
“Secondly, any pay rise in addition to the 4 per cent already on the table must be paid 
for by modernisation. That is the clear message that I have given in every meeting I have 
held with the employers and the FBU since the early summer. It is the same message that 
has been repeated by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and members of the Government 
ever since this dispute started” And; 
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“The way forward is for the employers and the union to sit down and discuss how quickly 
the service can be modernised, how much can be saved, and when the firefighters will get 
their extra pay. What is absolutely clear, however, is that this fire service strike will have 
no influence on that process. The Government are not willing to abandon the clear 
principles that I have set out in the face of industrial action.” 
 
In terms of New Labour’s growing strength in the dispute, the obvious toning down of the 
rhetoric and shuffling to the fore of union-friendly ministers to front discontented unions, 
coupled with timely reappearances of the more senior hard-line ministers, “epitomised its adroit 
approach in this context” (Pyper 2003, p.504).   
 
Prescott returned wielding the might of Parliament, threatening new legislative powers to 
impose a pay and reform package if the dispute was not resolved by Easter 2003. Speaking in 
Parliament January 28 2003, Prescott said; 
 
"As a matter of priority, I will introduce legislation in the public interest to take new 
powers of direction over the Fire Service. These powers will, it is to be hoped, bring a 
new and much-needed sense of reality into future negotiations. 
I will discuss through the usual channels, including the devolved Administrations, the 
best way forward to introduce this legislation. I will draw on provisions in the Fire 
Service Act 1947, which were repealed in 1959. Those provisions allowed the Secretary 
of State to specify the pay, terms and conditions of the Fire Service. In addition, we will 
propose powers to direct the Fire Service on its objectives and its use of facilities and 
assets. 
Legislation in itself will not end the dispute, but it is prudent to take these powers to use 
if necessary to help reach an agreement.” (HC Deb 28 January 2003 vol 643 cc1013-26) 
The Government’s threat of legislation to take control of the dispute, despite an earlier pay 
agreement between the FBU and the employers, evidences the Government’s use of its ultimate 
power in legislation.   The party had used every measure available to it to protect its vested 
interests and had developed powerful agency along the way.  The same cannot be said of the 
FBU, once dominant and effective in achieving their corporatist agenda.  Powerful at the start 
of the pay claim and overwhelmingly successful in harnessing the support of 87% of members 
174 
 
to strike, FBU authority appears to wane as the analysis moves through the period T2 to T3.  
Their demise was not because of a weaker or less appropriate pay/modernisation agenda but 
may have been due to playing less tactically and having less capability in harnessing the 
powerful effects of rhetoric and strategic use of media.   
Since the eve of the 22 November 2002, when the FBU dropped its claim for a 40% rise in 
favour of 16% and later accepting that it would be paid over two years and in return for some 
reform of the fire service, the agency of the FBU begins to diminish.  Though contentious and 
challenging to the Government, the FBU leader Andy Gilchrist maintains his loyalty to the 
party, despite New Labour’s approach to the fire service. Even at the most bitter height of the 
dispute, Gilchrist writing in The Guardian, was still advocating his union’s continued allegiance 
to Labour;  
"My call on Saturday was simply to work within the constitution of Labour to reclaim 
the party for socialist values and pro-working class policies: to work for greater 
equality and fairer rewards, for full employment and jobs paying decent wages, for 
progressive taxation to fund better public services" (Gilchrist, 2002) 
Tony Blair in stark contrast had publically rejected the union movement even before he was 
successful in the 1997 General Election.  Asked if he, like PM Thatcher had said she would, 
bury socialism, he said:  
“No I wouldn’t agree with that at all. What I think is sensible however is that the 
Labour Party wants to take the country forward and it is New Labour and we don’t 
want battles over public versus private sector, bosses versus workers, those are things 
of the past.” (Blair, 1997, quoted in Bull, 2000, p.187). 
After five years in Government, Blair was still not a union-sympathiser.  He continued to 
publically repudiate the FBU and in November 2002, accused their pay claims of potentially 
wrecking the economy and referring to Union leaders as ‘Scargillites’ (after the militant leader 
of the National Union of Miners, Arthur Scargill, who had ordered miners out on strike without 
a ballot in 1986) (Monks, 2002). 
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4.14 The ODPM and the success of agency, 2003 
Moving on through the timeframe between T2 and T3, by spring 2003, the pay dispute was still 
unresolved. Figure 12 presents a summary of the key events of January to April 2003 in relation 
to the pay dispute24 following the publication of the all-important IRFS. 
 
Figure 12. Summary of key events of pay dispute January to April 2003. 
4.15 Tenuous links to reform 
Since its December 2002 publication, the recommendations of the IRFS were used by the 
Government to represent the definitive framework for modernisation if any pay rise was to be 
approved. The FBU continued to reject the offers having first lodged the claim for 40% increase 
back in May 2002 and being on the brink of accepting 16% with originally the agreed 
modernisation measures (developed with all stakeholders), back in November before the IRFS 
was commissioned.  Figure 12 shows that in April 2003, a 16% offer was rejected by the FBU 
as the increases were to be spread over two years and included all of the IRFS recommendations 
for modernisation.  By May, John Prescott was advising Parliament to legislate for change and 
for increased powers to impose pay levels in the fire service.  On May 8th 2003, Prescott 
addressed the House of Commons; 
                                                 
24 Timeline: “Firefighters' pay dispute” http://www.theguardian.com/firefighters/subsection/0,12536,839787,00.html.  
Retrieved 07/07/14 
January 2003
No agreement 
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Fire Service Bill
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FBU pledges not to 
set any new strike 
dates after first talks 
between all sides
at ACAS.
March 2003
Employers make a 
16 per cent ‘final 
offer’, which is 
rejected by the FBU
and more strike 
dates are set. But a 
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off at the last minute 
as talks continue
April 2003
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“I beg to move, that the Bill be now read a Second time. 
It is with some reluctance that I find myself here today. This is a Bill that I would have 
preferred not to introduce, but after 12 months of negotiations and three separate pay 
offers, the fire dispute has reached deadlock. Legislation is therefore necessary in the 
public interest and to protect public safety. Reform of the public services is one of this 
Government's key priorities. In recent months, we have pressed ahead with the 
modernisation of the fire service, the repeal of section 19 of the Fire Service Act 1947, 
the introduction of a new system of fire cover based on actual risk, and a new White 
Paper that will be published shortly. 
The Bill now before the House draws on the arbitration powers originally set out in the 
Fire Service Act 1947 but repealed in 1959. It will enable me—in England, but not 
Scotland—to make an order to do two things: first, under clause 1(1)(a), and subject to 
the negative resolution procedure, to set or modify the pay and conditions of service of 
fire brigade members; and secondly, under clause 1(1)(b), to give specific or general 
directions to the fire authorities about the use or disposal of property or facilities. Those 
combined powers will enable me to secure a pay and modernisation deal for the fire 
service if no agreement is reached through the normal process of industrial negotiations, 
and only after full consultation with the parties. That is the situation that we find 
ourselves in today.” (HC Deb, 8 May 2003, c856) 
In June 2003, based on what the Government considered the only way to modernise (i,e, 
findings from the IRFS), the ODPM published its White Paper, ‘Our Fire and Rescue Service’, 
which presented its intentions to reform the fire service.  Discussing its publication with the 
House of Commons, Prescott was keen to stress the contents of the paper were totally in line 
with recommendations from Bain’s IRFS (Prescott, HC Debates 30 June 2003 cc 21-24) 
This is important to remember since it would be here that an important departure is made 
between the evidence (labelled as such by the Government) and the policy that ensued. 
White Papers are documents produced by the Government setting out details of future policy 
on a particular subject and usually the basis for a Bill to be put before Parliament. Bain and his 
co-authors had spent only six weeks gathering evidence before recommending urgent, radical, 
structural reform remarkably similar to Blair’s New Britain vision for public service 
modernisation.  On the strength of Bain’s ‘independent and expert evidence’, John Prescott’ 
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subsequent White Paper  set out the policies that would achieve Bain’s urgent, radical, 
structural reforms, with one notable exception; the addition of the concept of regionalisation.   
Prescott was able to use the White Paper process as a vehicle to re-energise his preference for 
regional governance on the back of the IRFS.  He was able to do this with no further evaluation 
for his policy.  The following section provides a critical hermeneutic analysis of the third of the 
key reform texts, again with the intention of revealing hidden meaning that helped to further 
the objectives of the Government. 
Text 3: “Our Fire and Rescue Service, 2003” 
4.16 Findings of a critical hermeneutic analysis; the national security imperative 
For ease of reading only page numbers will be used in this section, since all refer to the single 
text under hermeneutic analysis here (Our Fire and Rescue Service White Paper, 2003), unless 
otherwise referenced. 
4.16.1 Setting a different tone  
Earlier that year, Professor Bain had said in his Foreword to the IRFS,  
“While it may be an unachievable aspiration that no one should die from fire in the future, 
we believe there is plenty of scope to drive down fatalities, injuries, loss of property and 
damage to the environment to negligible levels” (Bain et. al 2002, p.ii).   
Importantly, Bain chooses to highlight fire deaths and injuries in his mood-setting Foreword 
and makes no mention of terrorism.  Six months later and apparently in direct response to the 
IRFS, the White Paper, which would indicate the Government’s policy and proposals for 
legislation to reform the fire service, opened with themes of terrorism. The document went on 
to mention terrorism 27 times.  In the first paragraph, it is stated that the fire service is; 
“..now developing a wider role. That role involves tackling new threats which we are 
now facing, including terrorism, and threats such as flooding and other environmental 
disasters” (p. xx).   
This is one of many examples whereby the Government chooses language to omit, conceal or 
reveal facts to suit the report.  For example, the idea of ‘new threats’ suggests the fire service 
had not faced any before.  However, the document makes no mention of the prior decades of 
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IRA mainland terrorism for example, or the major flooding incidents the fire service had always 
managed, along with other agencies. 
In seeking to interpret more via the hermeneutic circle of re-reading the parts, relating them to 
the contextual ‘whole’ (Gadamer, 1975), it becomes possible to establish the relevance of 
language and the use of content, which the authors chose to reveal and that which was concealed 
to achieve certain ends (New Labour-style modernisation). Against the backdrop of the 
ODPM’s regional Government agenda, through hermeneutic analysis, a considerable shift in 
emphasis from Bain’s structural reforms to the ODPMs political agenda for regional 
Government emerges.  This is coupled with the equally shifting imperatives for reform, from 
economic (April, 2000 when Mott MacDonald first reviewed best value options for control 
rooms), to the structural reform imperative (December 2002, Bain’s IRFS), to a national 
security imperative, (June 2003, ODPM’s White Paper).  By the time the 2003 White Paper is 
published fire service reform must be achieved by regional coordination.  How did the 
Government deliver this perspective?  
The White Paper opens with a benevolent tone, set by John Prescott in the familiar and warm, 
personally signed and photographed Foreword.  This would contrast sharply with the 
accusatory and authoritative tone in later sections of the document, related to the areas of 
contention at that time; namely, regionalisation, modernisation and unions.  Prescott’s 
benevolent manner suggests respect for a much-loved service; 
“We pay tribute to the bravery of individual fire-fighters in the face of multiple 
hazards” (p.15). 
“This does not mean that we want to dictate from the centre matters, which should 
be left to local discretion” (p.30). 
“We would not expect to tell fire and rescue authorities how to run their service. 
But there will be some areas where, from time to time, the Government does need 
to set parameters about how things should be done” (p.30). 
 
Prescott’s claim to be responding to the IRFS is nevertheless contradicted very early in the 
report when he introduces a non-IRFS reference; 
“We will now set national objectives for the fire and rescue service outlining what we 
expect it to achieve. We believe that a regional perspective is more appropriate for fire 
authorities. We will establish, as soon as is practicable, regional fire and rescue 
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authorities in those regions that choose to have elected regional assemblies. Elsewhere 
we want to see regional management” (p.7). 
 
By mid-2003 regional governance (c.f Section 4.9.2), was becoming a politically moribund 
policy. However, the ‘Our Fire and Rescue Service’ White Paper sees it return to the ODPM 
agenda.  Prescott’s ‘regional perspective’ was promoted to the forefront of the White Paper 
from the outset, when he suggests that the regional approach is now more appropriate for fire 
authorities. The ODPM, referenced Bain’s IRFS report 41 times in 80 pages, suggesting it was 
an authoritative and independent review, yet it did not recommended the key policy which was 
now driving the White Paper.  Without any further consultation or research, major regional 
restructuring of the fire service had found its way into the legislative process that begins the so-
called tool of participatory democracy (Doerr, 1971), the White Paper.  
 
Specific attention to control rooms’ regionalisation entered the narrative of the White Paper in 
Chapter 3.  This is where the important link was made between Bain’s IRFS structural reform 
recommendations, which excluded control rooms, to Prescott’s regional policy agenda. 
Recalling that Bain had mirrored the language of Blair’s 2001 Labour Manifesto in which he 
vaguely said: 
 
“Some functions are best tackled at the regional level.  Economic development is the 
core of regional policy today” (Blair, 2001). 
Bain had also vaguely talked on some functions in the IRFS; 
“These are some functions best handled above brigade level” (Bain et.al, 2002, p.iv). 
Prescott again vaguely continues with the theme that some matters are best decided at regional 
level (see below).  However, all three documents (2001 Labour Party Manifesto, IRFS and the 
White Paper) fail to actually list the functions or matters best decided at regional level, or the 
evidence to support the claim. The White Paper said it would set national standards, adding the 
nebulous line about leaving matters to regional management levels.  However, as regional 
management levels did not actually exist, was this benevolently worded statement a veiled 
directive from the ODPM? 
“The Government will set national objectives for the fire and rescue service, although 
we will not dictate matters that are best decided at regional or local level. The current 
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structural arrangements of the service are in need of reform. Many functions are 
currently not carried out in a cost-effective way. For example, the cost of local-level 
control room cover can be as high as £168 per incident handled, compared to £18 per 
incident in London” (p.27) 
In making the tenuous link, the ODPM fails to elucidate on how ‘matters that are best decided 
at regional or local level’ would be determined.  Despite the evidence trail, the ‘matter’ of 
control room regionalisation was about to be determined by the ODPM, having not been part 
of Bain’s terms of reference. Advocating regional policy by linking the reports in this way gives 
false evidence to the  claims,  without reference to any evidence based modelling that "larger 
units are required to run the new fire and rescue service" (p.32).  Now referring directly to 
regionalisation, the White Paper states the Government’s proposals to create Regional 
Management Boards where regional assemblies were not established, and provocatively 
warned that  
"..if these arrangements do not deliver modernisation quickly, we will use our powers to 
require combinations of fire authorities, in order to establish regional fire and rescue 
authorities" (p. 33).  
 
The tone is markedly less benevolent and demonstrates the growing agency of the Government 
in the midst of the on-going pay dispute. 
In contrast to Bain’s frustrated, paternal critique of the fire service, which had lamented the 
lack of take-up of initiatives from previous reports and the unacceptable domestic fire risk that 
existed in the community, the White Paper gives examples of change that was happening in the 
fire service.  For example, the report talks of initiatives to improve community fire safety 
resulting directly from previous policy and reports, featuring mini case studies at Kent and 
Surrey Fire Services for example. Like Bain, however, the White Paper selectively revealed 
examples of where and how unions and fire staff had obstructed progress towards 
modernisation whilst omitting cases where their involvement had enabled progress. For 
example in the major fire service policy changes introduced by the Civil Contingencies Act and 
the New Dimensions and Search and Rescue initiatives.  
“These programmes have been designed nationally through close co-operation between 
central Government and fire authority representatives, and they will be delivered on the 
ground by means of close working with stakeholders in their communities” (p.24).   
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In fact, not only had unions not impeded such reforms but such reforms had already started to 
change the face of the fire service and firefighting since 2001 after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
For example, since 2001 and the build-up to the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act, fire services 
undertook to make considerable changes towards being in a continued state of preparedness to 
respond to major incidents or threats.  Since 9/11, under the New Dimensions programme, fire 
services introduced wide-scale changes to training and standardised procedures to deal with 
terrorist attacks and major environmental disasters. These important changes being made across 
the fire service were omitted by the Bain review six months earlier and would also be omitted 
in the subsequent consultant report into the future of control rooms, both of which portended 
to conditions of inertia and reluctance to modernise.   
Like Bain, the White Paper criticises the ability of the fire service to be able to respond to major 
incidents in light of 9/11. It is interesting to note that despite the  White Paper allegedly 
responding directly to the findings of the IRFS, Bain would mention terrorism and regional 
solutions to terrorism only three and 28 times respectively.  The White Paper, however, created 
a new focus on these topics, making increased reference to terrorism (17 times) and regional 
solutions to terrorism (97 times). In addition, vague and unsubstantiated statements inferred 
that local fire services were reluctant to partake in major incidents; 
“Many of the service’s new functions, particularly in relation to responding to terrorism, 
cannot be carried out properly at local level” (p.15) 
“Even where central Government has had a clear idea of what it wanted the service to 
do – such as taking on more responsibility for responding to the threats of increased 
terrorism or of biochemical contamination – it has had no way of ensuring that 
authorities would play their part” (p.29) 
Again, both reports omit any reference to the more frequently occurring major incidents (than 
incidents of the 9/11 scale) that the fire services had responded to for decades (e.g. Lockerbie25, 
Kings Cross26 and Bradford City football stadium27 disasters and the 55 IRA terrorist attacks 
                                                 
25 21 December 1988, the wreckage of Pan Am Flight 103 crashed after a terrorist bomb on board detonated, killing 270. 
26 18 November 1987, a fire at King's Cross St. Pancras tube station, killed 31 people and injured 100 people 
27 11 May 1985, a fire at Bradford City killed 56 and injured at least 265 
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between 1971 and 200028). Nevertheless, the general theme of the White Paper is that the fire 
service was not best-fit for its purpose, and lay the blame with the service for its inadequacies.   
 
By the time of the White Paper , the National Coordination Centre had also been established in 
direct response to 9/11, the New Dimensions (anti-terrorist equipment, training and operating 
procedures) initiative was well under way in the fire service and the 2003 counter terrorism 
budget £330m29.  Thus, much was already available to enhance responses to potential major 
terrorist or weather incidents.  However, the White Paper’s rhetoric continued to describe fire 
service shortfall in this respect as if the public would be in danger because of fire service 
structures and cultures. Ironically, since 9/11, the Ministry of Defence had been strategizing on 
dealing with terror threats, national security and preparedness (HC 465-I, 1st July 2004), and 
the fire service did not feature in any of their reports as being responsible for national security, 
despite the rhetoric of the White Paper and the IRFS. 
4.16.2 The royal ‘we’ 
What is useful to appreciate in the search for hidden meaning is the continuous reference the 
White Paper makes to ‘we’.  This is a taken-for-granted approach in Government documents 
which suggests a collective opinion, yet the ‘we’ are not identified, nor is their authority, nor 
any evidence to substantiate ‘their’ new expectations. 
 “We expect democratic fire and rescue authorities, which will increasingly take a 
regional perspective, to take key strategic decisions about how the service operates 
within their area, based on expert professional advice and following consultation with 
their local communities” (p.7); 
“We believe that a regional perspective is more appropriate for fire authorities (p.7); 
 “Elsewhere we want to see regional management boards for those parts of the service 
that are best managed regionally” (p.8).   
 
 
                                                 
 
29 “Budget at a glance” BBC News 9th April 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/2932263.stm.  Retrieved 
09/107/2015 
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4.16.3 Fudging the figures to suit the ideology 
The White Paper makes the statement;  
“Too many small authorities are struggling to provide a cost-effective service. That can 
make achieving economies of scale difficult: for example, the cost of fire control rooms 
handling a fire incident can be anything between £18 and £168” (p.7).   
In its 2000 report Mott MacDonald had suggested that in a typical rural brigade control room 
the staff cost of handling an incident would be about £50, compared with £18 for the London 
Fire Brigade, which has one large control room for the whole of the London area. The White 
Paper, however, used the higher figure of £168 per incident but concealed the fact that it related 
to the tiny and uniquely sized fire service on the Isle of Wight.  Instead, it persuasively revealed 
a hugely disparate cost of service delivery, as if there were numerous (“too many”) of such 
brigades.  This information would be more accurate and useful if the ‘extreme’ organisations 
such as the tiny island brigade and the huge metropolitan brigade had been excluded from the 
range for what they are, statistical outliers. Then the costs per incident would vary considerably 
less and give a more accurate indication of scale up or down potential.  The paramount 
significance of both the method and the use of the statement is that originally cost and the 
economic imperative was the main driver for regionalisation, an imperative that would be 
replaced with another (modernisation) and another (national security), later in the debates as 
time revealed the implausibility of the calculations and the cost benefits. 
4.16.4 Exaggerated claims 
The White Paper is replete with hyperbole, giving no evidence or reference for claims such as 
(with emphasis added);  
“The changes we set out in this will benefit everyone. Communities will be safer. The 
service will be opened up to more members of those communities. The public will receive 
better value for money from its investment in the fire and rescue service” (p.11)  
And; 
“The events of 11 September 2001 have given further new impetus to the need to 
rationalise the way in which the fire service resources are used. Further work since then 
supports the case for moving towards regional-scale fire control rooms. They would 
make possible more effective responses to local, regional or national incidents of any 
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scale and complexity, as part of a longer-term strategy for moving towards more joint 
and shared control rooms with the other emergency services (p. 29).   
In fact, none of the 9/11 findings indicated fewer control rooms would have improved the way 
incidents had been managed during the disaster.  The McKinsey Report into 9/11 had identified 
that one of the key issues contributing to emergency workers not leaving the building before it 
collapsed, was incident-ground radio communications not control room incident management 
(McKinsey, 2002).  Control rooms have between 2 and 20 operators on at any one time.  A 
room of 100 control room operators would not have been enough for the unprecedented scale 
of the 9/11 disaster.  Such links are misleading and potentially emotive.  Moreover, the 
comment ‘further work’ since the 2000 report by Mott MacDonald is also unsubstantiated.  
However, what is clear is that by the time the White Paper was written in June 2003, regardless 
of the outcome of further Government reviews (that would be commissioned later that year to 
find optimal solutions for rationalisation), the regional configuration choice for reform was 
already decided. 
4.16.5 Agreement for the regional perspective  
So urgent was Prescott to regionalise the fire service, he was unable to wait for democratic 
agreement for regional assemblies.  He appeared to be forcing the fire service to regionalise 
management and parts of its services, regardless of regional assemblies;   
“Local fire authorities will therefore be required to establish, before 1 April 2004, robust 
regional management arrangements with members from existing fire authorities” (p.33). 
Prescott’s assured tone almost negates the need for actual evidence;  
“The regional level is acknowledged to be the right operational level for many functions, 
in particular securing the safety of the community in the event of terrorist attack or 
other major emergencies. Regional operations will yield management efficiency savings 
and will ensure management at the right level and of the right quality to deliver the 
outcomes we seek in terms of lives saved, and less property and environmental 
damage”(p.32, emphasis added). 
By using the formal and taken-for-granted White Paper process, the Government can gain 
legitimacy for proposals before legislating for them.  Prescott, without waiting for the results 
of any wider national referendum was setting out his intentions to regionalise the fire service 
whilst seemingly democratically inviting the fire service to begin the process themselves.  
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However, it was clear that negotiation was not on the agenda.  In relation to creating regional 
management boards to start the regionalisation process, Prescott wrote (emphasis added); 
“We hope that such voluntary arrangements will succeed. But if these arrangements do 
not deliver modernisation quickly, we will use our powers to require combinations of fire 
authorities, in order to establish regional fire and rescue authorities. We will be 
strengthening these powers in the forthcoming fire legislation in order to ensure that 
such combinations can be achieved more quickly than at present and to allow the 
Secretary of State to nominate some of the members of the regional combination 
authorities”(p. 33). 
Prescott was clearly wielding his powers to force regionalism in the fire service.  Yet earlier in 
2002, his ODPM colleague, the Regions Minister Nick Raynsford, had been less dictatorial.  
Speaking at the Annual Conference of the Campaign for the English Regions, he gave details 
of the considerably more democratic mechanism by which the Government would assess the 
national appetite for regional governance. He said: 
 “We will seek the views of the people in all eight regions before taking a decision. We 
will explicitly seek the views of the regional chamber, local authorities, MPs and other 
key stakeholders” (Raynsford, 2002). 
It is interesting to note that after the White Paper was published, the 2003 ODPM Select 
Committee discussing the fire service had asked Bain about the concerns that the fire service 
had over proposed large regional control centres, he replied;  
“Well, there has been quite a bit of work done on this. First of all, there is obviously a 
question of how large, etc., and I am not competent to get into that” (Bain, 2003, in 
ODPM Select Committee Third Report Session 2002-3: The Fire Service, HC 43-1 (CM 
6154), p.33).  
Not competent to discuss control room size, yet, Prescott had privileged Bain’s views in 
radically reforming the fire service, including regionalising control rooms.  It is this key 
juncture, where the audit trail for one of New Labour’s tenets of public sector reform 
modernisation, ‘evidence-based policy-making’, breaks down significantly between the IRFS, 
the White Paper and the subsequent policy outcome, the FiReControl project. 
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Prescott used Bain’s estimated savings figures from the IRFS to underpin his argument for the 
economic gains of regionalism;  
“Such a regional approach will ensure that service improvement and also greater 
savings are achieved from regional fire control rooms, from reducing waste in other 
areas–for example, procurement, training and vehicle maintenance–as well as from 
rationalising management effort. The Independent Review of the Fire Service estimated 
that savings of the order of £42 million over the first three years could be achieved in 
these areas alone.” (p.33).  
He fails to show how the regional approach would improve public safety, surely the raison 
d’etre of the fire service.  Again, no evidence was provided to substantiate how a regional 
approach would achieve the following claim; 
“In due course, as elected regional assemblies are established, there will also be savings 
from regionalisation in terms of reducing the bureaucratic overhead as the number of 
authorities is reduced. These savings would be over and above those identified by the 
Independent Review, and so can be recycled into increased fire-prevention measures.” 
(p.33) 
Prescott’s claims concealed the equally-possible outcome that overheads could increase as an 
additional level of bureaucracy was added to the fire service.  The previous extracts demonstrate 
how the Government used language devices to reveal what supported their views whilst 
concealing that which did not.  Despite the blatant selectivity, ‘Our Fire and Rescue Service 
White Paper was another of the key texts that was used to ‘evidence’ the reform.  The narrative 
will now return to the morphogenetic cycle. 
4.17 The seeds of Prescott’s folly30? 
Through spring 2003, two key milestones in the fire dispute were reached; 
 May, 2003: Fire Service Bill begins its progress through Parliament 
                                                 
30 “Prescott’s folly” (Daily Mail, 10th May 2002), was first seen as a newspaper headline in relation to Prescott’s ailing 
regional policy.  It would continue to be used in association with the FiReControl Project from its inception right up until 
2013 (“John Prescott's fire centre 'folly' still costing taxpayers millions”, Independent, Andrew Grice, 23 July 2013) 
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 June 2003: Agreement finally reached on the 16 per cent pay increase, with 
firefighters voting three-to-one in favour. Firefighters receive 4% rise immediately 
followed by 7% in November and remaining 5% by July 2004 – taking the basic 
salary to £25,000. Deal includes modernisation of the fire service and consultation 
about changes. 
At this stage, it is important to return to the wider remit of the ODPM and Prescott’s regional 
Government agenda (c.f. Section 4.9.2).  Following the publication of his 2002 White Paper; 
‘Your Region, Your Choice’, Prescott’s ideological passion for decentralism through 
regionalism continued at best to be challenged, and at worst neglected, across the country and 
even by his own party.  An Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), report ‘Monitoring 
the English Regions’ in May 2002 gives an insight into how Prescott’s regional agenda was 
being received at the time.  Responding to his White Paper ‘Your Region, Your Choice’, the 
ESRC authors said; 
“For some the White Paper may have raised as many questions as it answered.” 
“Did it prepare the ground for a constitutional step forward or signal a dangerous leap 
into the unknown?” 
“For John Prescott and a Government which took some convincing of the case for 
English devolution….” (Tomaney and Hetherington, 2002, p.1) 
The ESRC report provided a summary of the reactions towards the regional governance White 
Paper from the Conservative party, who were concerned that regional assemblies would take 
power from local Government, leading to the abolition of county councils.  Labour MPs 
representing their constituencies also expressed concerns.  For example, Malcom Moss (NE 
Cambridgeshire) dismissed the White Paper as a ‘sop to the Deputy Prime Minister and the 
north east’ (Westminster Hall Debates, 2002, Col 280) and raised issues about the cost to local 
Government reorganisation, set up costs for assemblies and the conflict between Government 
designated regions and historic counties. The Telegraph published comments from the British 
Chambers of Commerce who said regional assemblies would increase bureaucracy and cost the 
taxpayer £1.4 Bn. (Johnston, 2002). Despite this public and wide-spread malaise towards his 
2002 White Paper on regionalism, Prescott nevertheless continued to promote the policy in his 
2003 White Paper on the fire service (Our Fire and Rescue Service).   
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In the White Paper, Prescott’s continual cross-referencing to the IRFS (54 times in 70 pages), 
had helped create a sense that Bain was advocating regionalisation.  His next move was to re-
commission Government consultants, Mott MacDonald to revisit and ‘update’ their 2000 
control room review (The Future of Control Rooms in England and Wales, 2000), that had 
concluded regionalisation was unachievable, instead recommending small control rooms below 
a 20,000 incidents per year threshold merge with larger control rooms.   
The recommendations of the original Mott MacDonald Future of Control Rooms in England 
and Wales (2000), report did not support Prescott’s regional vision either.  Is it surprising then 
that Prescott commissioned an update just two and a half years on. Prescott justified the update 
commission on the grounds of needing to account for “the changed operational environment” 
(Mott MacDonald, 2003, p.S-1). Findings of a hermeneutic analysis of this fourth important 
text will be provided in (Section 4.19). 
The move to commission an update to the control room review was swift and timely.  By spring 
2003, the previously high profile pay dispute was being managed out of the public eye as the 
Iraq war loomed higher in newspaper headlines.  The ongoing pay dispute was ‘competing’ 
with headlines of terror and of war in the Middle East since late 2002.  The Sun newspaper for 
example ran these headlines; “Fire strike a ‘gift for terrorists’” (13 November 2002) and “Fire 
union chiefs are Saddam Stooges” (14 November 2002). A common thread running through 
the firefighters’ dispute was a “mobilisation of bias” (Dinan et.al, 2006, p.310), whereby the 
FBU was always vulnerable to being portrayed as a narrow, sectional interest, with its concerns 
about pay and conditions of service. The result was that the public image and strength of 
message from the FBU weakened and a new situation logic was beginning to develop.   
4.18 Morphogenetic perspective 
The Government had used a variety of containment strategies, designed to insulate the general 
public from too much familiarity; the effective exercise of power, where Government had the 
position and the resources to control the diffusion of information. For example, the Government 
had misrepresented the FBU’s lack of participation in Bain’s IRFS as a reluctance to change 
despite the Union’s rational challenge to the credibility and timing of the review, as well the 
fact they too had commissioned independent consultants to research proposals for reform.  The 
FBU proposals failed to feature in any of the reform debates. In its written evidence to the 
ODPM Select Committee inquiry the Fire Service (12 July 2006, HC 872-I), which was 
assembled after the first year of FiReControl project;   
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1.(a)4  
 “Two Government commissioned reports from consultants Mott MacDonald the first of 
which (The Future of Fire Service Control Rooms and Communications in England and 
Wales, April 2000) recommended a reduction from 49 controls to 21, the second (The 
Future of Fire & Rescue Service Control Rooms in England and Wales 2003) which 
recommended 9 new regional controls in England, one new control to serve London. The 
union produced a detailed response to both reports, the most relevant now being "Out of 
Control", published by the FBU in May 2004.” 
1.(a)5  
    “We have our own proposals for the creation of a UK-wide network of "Resilience 
Controls" which we supply as Annexe 2 prior its official public launch on 25 January.” 
The White Paper and the inclusion or exclusion of details and evidence from other sources 
(such as the IRFS and the FBU’s input), had been used by the ODPM to exercise greater power 
to control the social visibility of contradictions.  From late 2002, the Government press office 
had been publicising their version of objective truth in the absence of any input from the fire 
service itself.  The Government was claiming constitutional legitimacy, as the guardian of the 
national interests in regard to public sector pay settlements and the need to modernise public 
services (Dinan at.al, 2006), and they used the Government process (White Papers, 
commissions), to control this.  
 
As well as revealing Government management consultants’ recommendations whilst 
concealing alternative management consultants’ proposals commissioned by the FBU (Cap 
Gemini Ernst & Young, 2002), the Labour Executive had been taking other opportunities to 
use political rhetoric and weighted language to publicise that which supported their vision, and 
to ignore that which did not.  For example, on 24th November 2002, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Gordon Brown had used his political position to further Labour’s version of events 
during his address speech to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 2002 Annual 
Conference in Manchester.  He discussed the fire service pay dispute, and warned that there 
must be no going back to “the bad old inflationary days of the mid-1970s” (Brown, 2002). In 
direct response, the CBI Director General, Digby Jones, publically backed the Government, 
responding the next day in the Guardian.  He said the pay dispute situation was lamentable and 
bad for British investment, saying "I don't think the Government has mishandled it at all. It 
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understands that it is governing for the whole nation. It is important that it stands firm” 
(Guardian, n.a, 2002).  
 
On other occasions, such as 25th November, 2002, the Prime Minister in a televised statement 
to BBC News said he was not prepared to ‘risk the economy’ to appease the firefighters. 
Prescott used his position in a stage-managed, televised visit to the temporary control rooms 
set up by the Army during the fire strike.  Prescott applauded publically the Army’s efforts in 
providing fire cover, especially in the midst of the looming Iraq war.  The combined effect of 
this negative publicity further diminished public support for the FBU.   
 
The continued use of strategies to reveal or conceal the full picture as well as effective 
containment strategies that were deployed from late 2002, including the White Paper, led to the 
Labour Government gaining ground in the pay dispute.  Following the publication of the White 
Paper, Prescott re-hired Mott MacDonald to review rationalising control rooms.  In June 2003 
the recommendations of their report, the fourth key reform text, were published. The following 
sections provide excerpts of the final critical hermeneutic analysis of text four.  
 
Text 4: “The future of control rooms in England and Wales” 2003 update. 
4.19 Findings of a critical hermeneutic analysis; the regionalisation imperative  
A Freedom of Information request to establish how and at what cost the management 
consultants, Mott MacDonald were commissioned for both reports (2000 and 2003), was 
rejected by DCLG.  (Appendix 1).  A request for further assistance via Lord Heseltine’s office 
following his ‘No Stone Unturned’ 2014 report into project failure was also rejected (Appendix 
2). 
For ease of reading only page numbers will be used in this section, since all refer to the single 
text under hermeneutic analysis here (The Future of Control Rooms and Communications in 
England and Wales, 2003 Update), unless otherwise referenced. 
The Mott MacDonald 2003 update report is structured to present a review of the original 2000 
scope (Text #1), against a new landscape, which the report calls the ‘Changed Environment’. 
This changed environment covers issues and events such as Labour’s Best Value initiative, the 
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9/11 terrorist attacks, the outcome of the IRFS and changes in modern technology in public 
service. The themes for the changed environment were defined by the Government. 
Contextualising the reform proposals against other organisations, the update report discusses 
The Ambulance Service, The Police Service and Multi-Service Initiatives in a section called 
‘Current Arrangements’, and also features a small range of case studies, four UK and five 
international, in a section called ‘International and UK Case Studies’.  
The report then provides a section on Options Analysis, which concludes;  
“The results of comprehensive analysis and cost modelling implicate that rationalisation 
of fire and rescue service control rooms by means of ‘Vertical Integration’ (Fire-Fire) to 
a regional configuration is the optimum solution for fire and rescue service control rooms 
in England with a single control room in Wales” (p.51).  
This is followed by a detailed section on the Vertical Integration option, which explores three 
amalgamation configurations; supra regional (47 control rooms amalgamate to three control 
rooms; regional (47 to nine), or sub-regional, (47 to 18).  The penultimate section of the review 
discusses the national strategy required for the selected solution and recommends;  
“the Government initiate a national strategy to reduce the number of fire and rescue 
service control rooms by means of Fire-Fire amalgamation to form regional controls 
which match the Government Offices of the Regions” (p.51).   
The final section; Implementation Plan, sets out the basic plan for implementing Mott’s 
recommended solution. 
 
4.19.1 A fait accompli? 
The purpose of the report was to;  
“..update the original, with current evidence, information and analysis to inform a 
national strategy for securing optimum efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of the 
UK fire and rescue service” (p.2), and that “This report is intended to support future 
policy decisions” (p.2).   
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It is therefore clear that the report will inform a ‘national strategy’ for rationalisation.  This 
driver now appears in the report despite no prior consultation and for what is was worth, Bain’s 
personal opinion to avoid major reorganisation.  
 
4.19.2 Quality evidence? 
At the beginning of the report (p.5), we are reassured of the high quality sources informing the 
review; 
“The conclusions made in this report are based on the results of extensive analysis of 
fact, data and other evidence available to the review team”,  
And of the teams’ apparent objectivity, assuring readers that the views;  
“.. do not reflect the opinion of individuals”. 
 
Yet like the IRFS, the report is forced to reveal the significant limitations on data gathering due 
to the on-going industrial dispute and the tight timescales imposed by the Government on the 
review team; 
“Restrictions on access to information and personnel resulting from ongoing discussions 
between fire and rescue service employers and staff …. have limited the ability of the 
review team to complete an exhaustive investigation of UK fire and rescue service control 
room arrangements”.  
It goes on..  
“..in addition, limitations on time and the associated practicalities of international site 
visits confined the team to the study of a limited range of control room models” (p.5).   
Despite significant compromises in data gathering, the update claims extensive analysis of fact, 
data and other evidence. 
 
4.19.3 A changed environment; by whose definition? 
The Government decided what would constitute the changed environment in specifying it to 
commission the consultants.  The Terms of Reference for the Mott MacDonald report were;  
“To review the Mott MacDonald Report, ‘The Future of Fire Service Control Rooms and 
Communications in England and Wales’ (April 2000), to verify, amend and update the 
recommendations and proposed implementation plan for the rationalisation of fire 
service control rooms in light of the changed operational environment” (p.S-1). 
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Ironically, despite operational, political, global and technology changes to the environment 
(defined by the Government), that justified the need for an update, no mention was made of the 
changed domestic environment affecting the day-to-day delivery of the fire service.  For 
example, rising youth unemployment, ageing housing stock, or the higher numbers of 
immigrants whose communities were difficult to penetrate with fire safety initiatives (Arson 
Control Forum, 2004, Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service Annual Report, 2003). Had the 
changing domestic environment featured, this may have indicated the need for greater resources 
on the ground as had been concluded in the Government’s Pathfinder research, which the 
Government had chosen in the end not to publish as a report in 2003, the year of the IRFS. 
Challenging the Government’s decision to not publish the Pathfinder findings, this early day 
motion was raised in Parliament (EDM 543 Firefighters’ pay negotiations, 2002-03) with 35 of 
the 43 who signed the motion being from the Labour Party. 
 Date tabled: 20.01.2003 
 Primary sponsor: Wood, Mike Roy 
 Sponsors:  
That this House calls on the ODPM to publish the Pathfinder report into the British Fire 
Service, given that it has already been leaked to Channel 4 news, so that all sides involved 
in firefighters' pay negotiations, conditions and working practices have access to all 
current thinking on these issues, particularly those conclusions which contradict the 
findings of the Bain Inquiry; believes it is unwise for present negotiations to continue 
based solely on the findings of Bain given the level of contradiction which exists; and 
expresses grave concern that any deal which is reached relying on Bain's findings alone 
could cause substantial and lasting damage to the British Fire Service and relations 
between firefighters and their employers. 
The Pathfinder research had looked at 11 brigades over three years.  The inquiry concluded that 
in response to changing domestic needs, the fire service needed more resources and spending 
on brigades in large cities needed a 50% increase in the number of fire engines and firefighters. 
These findings contradicted Bain’s IRFS report, which had talked of reducing the number of 
resources. 
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In summing up the chapter; The Changed Environment, Mott MacDonald persuade us to 
consider a new perspective on rationalisation in light of important changes to;  
 
“The operational, political, economic and technical environment of the fire and rescue 
service”(p.6).   
However, in reality, each of these Government-selected factors was also Government defined 
and driven.  Bain had imposed the operational changes to modernise the service as 
commissioned by the ODPM under the auspices of helping to address pay and conditions.  The 
report does not elaborate on the actual political environment.  As described, the pay dispute had 
pitted a powerful union against a new political party and the political environment that ensued 
was now being ‘managed’ by the operational modernisation programme Bain’s IRFS had 
triggered.  The argument for addressing a global political environment related to 9/11 and the 
validity of this has been discussed. The economic drivers were also Government driven; Blair’s 
modernisation agenda.  The report addresses technology changes by referencing the radio 
technology that was being rolled out to all emergency services in a separate project called 
Firelink.  Again, the radio technology argument (to introduce a single radio communications 
platform for all emergency services to be able to interoperate), does not clearly support the 
drive to urgently rationalise fire control rooms, since this had not been a requirement when the 
same technology was implemented across the ambulance and police services. 
The ‘changed environment’ of Best Value, 9/11, the Firelink project, the IRFS and the 
modernising of public service were delivery, were in fact political policies, about which  Mott 
MacDonald were able to conclude; 
“There is increasing pressure (no source of which is provided) on the fire and rescue 
service to adapt and adopt new ways of working. Current organisational arrangements 
constrain the ability of the fire and rescue service to operate effectively (no examples of 
failure given) and to develop its capability to protect the nation from the new level of 
threat that the emergency services must now plan for. Change is necessary” (p.19). 
The inclusion ‘protecting the nation’ is an important addition to the 2003 rhetoric for 
modernisation, which becomes associated with the search for an optimum rationalisation 
solution from here on.  Hitherto, apart from the loose link to the 9/11 McKinsey Report (2002), 
which had predominantly listed inadequate communications and lack of interoperability (issues 
to be partly addressed through Firelink, the radio project), fire services were not tasked with 
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national security.  If this was now a driver for change favouring the regional approach, the 
choice of regional locations would become absurdly contradictory in the project of achieving 
national security.  Whilst the unit of analysis for this study does not cover the requirements 
specification of the FiReControl project that ensued in 2005, it is interesting to note the rhetoric 
of national security in relation to the fact that all nine regional control centres were eventually 
built next to major motorways. The centres were co-located on large retail or industrial estates 
and were constructed of aluminium and glass.  All of these specifications would undermine the 
resilience of a centre tasked with national security. 
Deeper exploration to reveal how language may conceal meaning (Prasad, 2002), within the 
section called ‘Options Analysis’, suggests a similar intention to direct attention to issues and 
ideas that fit with the dominant political ideologies of that period, whilst diverting attention 
away from facts which may have supported alternative lines of thinking.  This section is 
arguably one of the most important in its ‘analysis’ of the ‘evidence and data’ from which the 
consultants could now claim to have calculated the optimum and definitive modernisation 
solution.  Within two years from the previous report there are no longer any grey areas between 
solutions, yet it is difficult to follow the evidence trail that would lead Mott MacDonald to draw 
such conclusions. 
Thematic references/entry points of Best Value, efficiency and resilience were used to read the 
updated Mott MacDonald (2003) report.  Entering the hermeneutic circle and cycling between 
the text and the political context reveals how language is used to both direct and re-direct 
attention to and away from key issues. 
4.19.4 Resistance to change or flawed policy? 
Mott MacDonald’s (2003) report highlights the inadequacy of the fire sector for failing to 
exploit the Government’s Best Value policy to make changes towards achieving efficiency 
following the Local Government Act (1999) as recommended in their first report, in 2000. Yet, 
the report also appears to blame not just the fire sector for challenging the Best Value principals 
and being protectionist but suggests the Best Value policy itself is flawed;  
“Many of the Best Value Reviews of Control and Communications fail to address the 
issue of externalisation in earnest. There are varying interpretations as to what this 
means and many have compared their service with private, commercial agencies with 
whom the requirements of service delivery are incongruent. Few brigades look to other 
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brigades as a possible source of externalisation, which is a significant flaw in their 
approach” (p.7).  
Mott McDonald advised;  
“Best Value is not suited to the development of a local service to meet national needs and 
the experience of the fire brigades in completing their BVRs has shown that, contrary to 
initial expectations, it is not capable of supporting a national strategy to secure efficiency 
and effectiveness. The lack of central accountability to challenge BVRs and enforce the 
implementation of initiatives to meet Best Value meant that the production of BVRs was 
little more than academic in nature.”(p6)  
This begs the question, was the patchy implementation of Best Value due to protectionism, 
which had led Bain to condemn the structures as obstructive to change, or did the fire service 
fail to embrace those changes due to the inadequacy of the policy?  
4.19.5 Creating confusion with 9/11 rhetoric 
“The attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) on September 11th 2001 fundamentally 
changed the ways in which the UK emergency services operate and the scale, scope and 
public expectation of their response capability” (p.8), 
The rhetoric of a ‘greater public expectation’ is not substantiated; how was this established?  
More concerning is that Mott MacDonald use what can only be described as 9/11rhetoric to 
support the control room rationalisation proposals of the UK Government, without due 
consideration to the actual detail. The report fails to hone in on the important facts of the 9/11 
inquiries, such as the McKinsey Report (2002), which identified lessons learned and 
recommendations in the wake of the disaster.  The objective of the 9/11 reports was to 
recommend changes to improve preparedness for large-scale incidents.  In a Government 
review by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency, (2002), that summarised nine of 
the key 9/11 reports, the three most prevalent themes for improving community responses to 
terrorism and other catastrophic events were given as: 
 
1. Command and Control. The need for a pre-planned command structure that 
establishes security at the site, effectively tracks personnel, and utilizes an incident 
command system (ICS) in order to establish stability and consistency in operations. 
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2. Communications. The need for interoperable communication equipment and standards 
on the local, State, and Federal levels to allow first responders to communicate 
effectively with one another. 
3. Training and Exercises. The need for first responder training in preparedness, response 
operations, and interoperable equipment across agencies. 
 
Mott’s remit to recommend a solution to best rationalise control rooms, can only loosely be 
connected to the first theme; Command and Control.31 None of these themes lays culpability 
with control room operators and rooms per se.  In the report from the US Federal Management 
Agency (2002), the Command and Control recommendation related to the multiple incident 
command management structures of different fire departments, which did not interoperate 
easily at that scale of incident.  Difficulties were also faced by poor radio communications at 
the fire ground of the attacks and the subsequent confusion that arose in locating and deploying 
personal.   The report suggests that on the day, these issues were further affected by the timing 
of the shift changes coinciding with the disaster leading to many firefighters and officers being 
available and despatching themselves voluntarily.  Though generally related in terms of 
incident management, the specific 9/11 lessons are distinctly different issues to Mott 
MacDonald’s claims that the existing number of English control rooms would be a barrier to 
the National Coordination Centre’s ability to coordinate fire services, if faced with a similar 
incident and that fewer control rooms would resolve this problem.  The links are both 
unsubstantiated and tenuous. Responding to this section of the Mott MacDonald report, the 
FBU welcomed wider civil contingencies planning and a National Co-ordination Centre to 
facilitate movement and support for a large number of resources.  However, the FBU 
challenged the idea that its operation would be undermined by local emergency fire service 
controls’ organisational arrangements and operational protocols, stating in their ‘Out of 
Control’ (2003) response to the Mott MacDonald report;  
 
“The organisational arrangements and operational protocols of the Fire and Rescue 
Service are driven by Fire-fighter’s requirements at incidents and not issues relating to 
Emergency Fire Service Controls. Emergency Fire Service Controls would expect the 
national co-ordination centre to deliver national direction and as such would respond in 
                                                 
31 The 1988 NATO definition: Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
[individual] over assigned [resources] in the accomplishment of a [common goal], www.nato.int accessed 27/04/15 
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their usual professional manner. Emergency Fire Controls are not a barrier to 
implementation of national strategies and guidance. They are part and parcel of the 
system that delivers them” (FBU, 2003, p.9).  
As with the previous Government reports (IRFS, Our Fire and Rescue Service White Paper), 
Mott MacDonald also failed to acknowledge the reality that the fire service frequently attended 
and managed successfully, large-scale incidents, including terrorism, albeit not on the 
unprecedented scale of 9/11. Mott MacDonald listed the new Government initiatives for 
dealing with large-scale incidents, such as the Civil Contingencies Programme, the New 
Dimensions Programme and the National Co-ordination Centre (NCC), which had been 
developed to provide strategic direction to the emergency services in the event of a major 
incident. However, in rhetorical fashion and in the absence of any sourced evidence, the report 
creates a sense that control rooms would struggle to work with these new coordinating agencies. 
The following statement illustrates this point; 
“Current divergence between the size and operational capacity of fire controls has led 
to differences in levels of staff training and experience. Such is likely to introduce 
significant resource problems between small and large brigades, undermining their 
ability to provide a collective and cohesive response to New Dimension incidents in which 
resources from multiple brigades may be required” (p.9). 
The report diverts attention towards Government perspectives by totally omitting the fact the 
fire service had a long history of dealing with large scale incidents, including terrorism and 
were already working with the new agencies by June 2003 when the report was published.  In 
responding to this omission the FBU said;  
“All Emergency Fire Controls have been fully versed and trained in the response to New 
Dimension mass decontamination incidents. They have been fully briefed in the role and 
use of New Dimension equipment and the procedures and protocols and support 
required. The Fire and Rescue Service takes very seriously its expanding role and as such 
is constantly reviewing, changing and adapting procedures and Emergency Fire Controls 
are critical in this process”( FBU, 2003, p.10).  
Linking 9/11 findings with unsubstantiated statements reflects the methods used in the report 
to divert attention and conceal facts.  The following statement under the heading 
‘Interoperability’; 
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“A further consequence of September 11th 2001 and the subsequent requirements of New 
Dimension is the need for enhanced interoperability within the fire and rescue service 
and with other emergency services in the context of communications”, (p.10).  
 links a 9/11 issue relating to poor interoperability to the size of control rooms; a link which 
was not made in any of the 9/11 reports.  Nevertheless, Mott MacDonald claim; 
 “Larger control rooms would interface with and be more easily managed by the National 
Co-ordination Centre in the event of a major incident” (p.10). 
This assumption infers that a larger control room, with arguably fewer overall control staff 
numbers on duty for the wider region (using the staffing economy of scale and economic 
arguments of previous reports), would somehow deliver interoperability, a key issue in 9/11.   
The report cites Bain’s IRFS (2002), which advised as a matter of priority that the Government 
should establish a strategic level, high capability co-ordination infrastructure to deal with the 
New Dimension work. Yet, that was the role of the newly established National Coordination 
Centre (NCC).  That the NCC was created to provide such a national function is played down 
in the Mott MacDonald report but in a statement that is unsupported by evidence it claims; 
 “The current 49 control rooms present a barrier to this centre” (p.9) 
And rhetorically infers obstructive behaviour; 
 “There is currently no statutory responsibility on fire brigades to operate collaboratively 
or in a common operational environment” (p.9) 
Such statements serve to divert our attention away from facts, such as the relative rarity of 
large-scale incidents, which the dedicated NCC was established to coordinate, and the lack of 
any examples where local fire services had obstructed collaboration at large scale incidents.  
Moreover, whilst there were (are) no statutory obligations to collaborate, equally there is no 
evidence offered which says in such events fire services did not cooperate.  The NCC (now 
called the FRSNCC32) coordinates and deploys national resilience resources (housed and 
utilised by local fire services) to large-scale incidents.  
  
                                                 
32 FRSNCC (Fire and Rescue Service National Coordination Centre) is part of the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA) 
National Resilience remit. 
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4.19.6 Options analysis; a changed environment but same model criteria  
 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
Supra-Regional 
Controls 
The amalgamation of fire and rescue control rooms in England and Wales to create 
three supra-regional controls 
Regional 
Controls 
The amalgamation of fire and rescue control rooms in England and Wales to create a 
regional arrangements in accordance with the Government Offices for the Regions 
Sub-regional 
Controls 
The amalgamation of fire and rescue control rooms in England and Wales on the basis 
of a 30,000 call threshold.  This would result in 18 sub-regional controls. 
 
Table 7. Options available in amalgamating fire-with-fire service organisations (Mott 
MacDonald, 2003) 
The 2003 update report was intended to advise Government on the best way to meet the future 
requirements of control rooms.  The options available under the preferred fire-with-fire (vertical 
integration, as opposed to fire-with-police etc. as in horizontal integration), are described in 
Table 7.  Mott MacDonald’s analysis of options was based on four criteria:  
 Requirements; ability to meet the requirements of the changed environment   
 Experiential; lessons learned from outcomes of various control arrangements  
 Qualitative; service delivery impact, organisational development impact, barriers to 
implementation and other associated issues and opportunities 
 Cost; possible savings that would be available. 
Of particular interest and import to the final selection of an option (for the future of control 
rooms) was the language used in discussing the qualitative criteria for each solution.  
Qualitative criteria was based on the three dimensional model that had been introduced in the 
original 2000 report, as below.  In the 2003 update report, Mott said: 
“This model has been adopted for the purpose of this report and used as a means of 
determining which option(s) are most appropriate in today’s environment.” (p.2) 
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Figure 13. Model to measure Qualitative Criteria, (p.2) 
The model was instrumental in helping Mott MacDonald make recommendations in their 2000 
report seeking efficiency that had led to recommendations for small control rooms join with 
larger ones for optimal efficiency gains. It is not possible to determine if this was the best model 
to inform that recommendation.  However, in light of a ‘changed environment’ (including 
national security post 9/11, that was highlighted as a new imperative), was the model to measure 
efficiency suited to measuring qualitative criteria to inform a new decision? 
The ‘Options Analysis’ chapter of the report is of considerable importance, given the impact of 
the change its conclusions ‘informed’, yet the language used by the authors is both inconsistent 
and biased in describing negative and positive features.  Issues that similarly affect all three 
solutions are variously described with considerably different language that underplays, 
overplays, or omits impact and in so doing directs the focus of the reader. For example, moving 
from local control room arrangements to regional, which would in effect mean merging five 
organisations into one centre, is a complex challenge and one likely to result in job losses and 
managerial conflict. Likewise, this is also true of merging a greater or fewer number of control 
rooms into one organisation as in supra-regional or sub-regional options. However, the choice 
of more positive language to express such issues when associated with the regional solution is 
evident.  For example, where the job losses, managerial conflict and need for legislation to 
implement the reform are all considered more manageable or expressed more positively.  The 
report describes the barriers for implementation in relation to job losses at each option.  The 
estimated job losses for a regional option were 572 (p.43).  Mott MacDonald said of this 
number; 
“Some resistance likely as a result of anticipated job losses and changes in staff 
conditions, such as location. May be mitigated by improved working conditions and 
redeployment.” (p.43)  
Service delivery benefits 
Organisational development 
Efficiency gains 
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For the supra-regional (3 control rooms), the job loss was estimated as 625 (p.42).  Based on 
some threshold of tolerance, which it seems the consultants have introduced but not shared with 
the reader, Mott MacDonald said of this option;   
“Barriers to implementation would be onerous since they would likely result in extensive 
job losses and require existing staff to significantly change working location.” (p.42)  
 When describing barriers to implementation in relation to job losses at the sub-regional option 
(reducing to 18 control rooms, which was closer to Mott MacDonald’s original 2000 
recommendations), they said there may be; 
“Some staff resistance due to anticipated job losses although likely not as significant as 
other options.” (p.43).  
However, interestingly now, in 2003 Mott MacDonald now expressed concern about this last 
option because, now it seemed;  
”Management arrangements between brigades may be difficult to deliver” (p.43). 
The evidence to underpin the barriers to implementation claims is not provided in any detail. 
We are to assume that the consultants gained this data from their second review; though they 
stated clearly, this was significantly restricted due to the industrial dispute and in fact, they 
spoke to just 90 operational staff.  In a single metropolitan service alone there are on average 
1200 operational staff and small county services average 400 (Corby, 2003), therefore across 
47 organisations, the number of operational staff consulted from which to gauge views from 
that perspective is limited.   There is no mention of how the consultants arrived at the conclusion 
that 625 job losses would be considered extensive and obstructive to implementation but 570 
or 365 (solutions 1 and 2 respectively), would not. Similarly, claims that resulted in the 
differentiation of the solutions, such as “management based on a local structure may be a 
source of contention” (p.41,) helps to rule out the sub-regional solution.  This was the preferred 
solution of the Mott MacDonald 2000 report, yet there is no mention that management based 
on a regional solution. Table 8 presents a section of the language used throughout the 
‘Qualitative Analysis’ of the three solutions against the three dimensional model of criteria 
measured.  Comment boxes are used to highlight inconsistencies and language choices which 
direct or redirect our attention and in so doing emphasise or minimise meaning for the reader. 
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CRITERIA 
Service Delivery 
Impact Positive: 
Service Delivery 
Impact Negative: 
Organisation development 
Positive: 
Organisation development 
Negatives: 
Barriers to 
Implementation 
 
S1: SUPRA-
REGIONAL 
(3 Control 
Centres) 
Improved ability to deal 
with large-scale 
incidents and manage 
cross border operations. 
Significant increase in 
workload; Reduced 
resilience. Feelings of 
detachment 
Potential to rationalise 
practices on a national scale 
Potential management 
difficulties/national 
management structure, 
would take time/limit career 
progression 
Barriers to implementation 
would be onerous since 
they would likely result in 
extensive job losses (625)  
 
S2: 
REGIONAL  
(9 Control 
Centres) 
Provide a regional 
response capability and 
improved cross-border 
operations whilst 
maintaining a local 
focus.  
Differences between 
brigades would remain – 
but this could be 
overcome 
 
Rationalisation and adoption 
of best practice on a 
regional scale. •  enhanced 
career opportunities and job 
satisfaction  
Would require 
central/national direction 
with appropriate legislative 
power to implement. •  
 
Resistance likely as a 
result of anticipated job 
losses (570)  
 
S3: SUB-
REGIONAL 
(18 Control 
Centres) 
Joint arrangement is 
possible with other 
emergency services.  
Least disruptive of all 
vertical models and 
therefore offers the least 
resistance to 
implementation 
Less able to provide 
regional/national 
response capability. 
Maintains opportunity for 
future of Shared or Joint 
arrangements with other 
services. •  
Maintains strong links 
between brigades and 
control. 
May maintain some 
differences between 
brigades. Less able to 
provide a regional/national 
response capability. • 
Management based on a 
local structure, may be 
source of contention 
between brigades. 
Some staff resistance due 
to anticipated job losses 
although likely not as 
significant as other options 
(365).  
 
Table 8. Options Analysis: Qualitative Criteria
Can be said for all 
solutions just to a differing 
degree 
Can be said for all 
solutions just to a differing 
degree but language 
emphasises S2 option as 
better 
Workload increase for all solutions 
if in failover mode, especially also 
true for S2: regional solution, a 
whole region’s worth of calls is also 
significant workload in failover 
mode. 
 
Now expressed 
neutrally as a 
resolution, in S1 
it was negative 
rhetoric ‘feelings 
of detachment’ 
 
Surmised 
possibilities using 
negative rhetoric.  
Yet, these issues 
are considered 
positive 
possibilities in the 
S2 option.  
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4.19.7 Options analysis: the ideology of cost 
In choosing the optimum solution by which to reduce control rooms in the strategy to 
rationalise fire services, the next important analysis consideration was cost and the savings that 
would be made available through the various options.  Unfortunately, as with the IRFS and 
other chapters of the update, the report advises (p.45); 
“The political situation has meant that all the information we would have ideally wanted 
was not available to us, however, we have obtained ‘sufficient evidence’ from other 
sources to ensure the conclusions reached are robust” 
However, in what is arguably one of the most vital elements of solution evaluation in reforming 
national emergency services, there are no references to identify exactly which sources did 
inform the cost modelling exercise. Despite the criticality of this section, we are again reminded 
of the limitations of the data gathering exercise.  
The cost modelling for the various solutions is largely based on the ratio of incident numbers 
to staffing as control room scenarios are scaled up through the various amalgamation scenarios.  
Complexities that would undoubtedly be characteristic of such reforms, such as impact on 
capital charges or payment profiles are deliberately excluded from the model; 
“..due to the array of uncertainties surrounding timetables for implementation”(p.124).   
However, those same uncertainties surrounding timetables for staffing reductions would almost 
definitely apply yet costs associated with phasing such reductions are not addressed when costs 
for staffing are calculated.   
This Mott MacDonald 2003 report was commissioned to account for the Government’s version 
of a ‘changed environment’, which was to include the significant operational changes that had 
resulted from the Government-commissioned IRFS of 2002.  These changes included control 
room and firefighter staff responding to a wider range of incidents, such as rescue and other 
special incidents under the New Dimensions initiative.   
However, and crucially, the source of the incident data used to inform the cost model, the 
Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), was dated 2000/2001. There 
are several problems here.  CIPFA provides of public sector services and resources statistics 
based on retrospective annual data provided by fire services to the Government.  Therefore, 
data of 2000/2001 data represents the previous year.  The data is the key component for 
modelling costs.  However, modelling the cost of the solutions for Mott MacDonald’s 2003 
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report, based on activity data that was in effect more than four years old.  This report was 
supposed to be addressing the changed environment from that original 2000 report, making the 
cost model both inadequate and indeed inaccurate.  However, the language used in the report 
omits the relevance of this fundamental data issue; 
“The data and methodology used in this model reflects that used previously to ensure 
consistency in approach”, (p124) 
Instead, the language conveys a sense of robust and principled research methods, which 
ultimately conceals relevant information that may affect the final costs and thus the option 
chosen. 
The use of passive language, such as ‘does not appear’ not only relieves the authors of 
responsibility, but infers objectivity.  It is as if the data now speaks for itself; 
“The analysis shows that the costs associated with establishing and continuing to operate 
a reduced number (but larger in size) of control rooms is less than the costs of 
maintaining and upgrading control rooms in the existing arrangement. Combining this 
with staff savings resulting from increasing economies of scale the analysis concludes 
that amalgamating control rooms to either ‘Supra’ or ‘Regional’ level is likely to result 
in the freeing up of major capital and revenue funds within the fire service over the 10 
year period and beyond. From a financial perspective to continue with existing 
arrangements does not appear to be an option that can be justified” (p. 49); 
With little evidence to link the paragraphs the report strongly concludes the optimal solution 
for the future of control rooms to manage any incidents of any scale or complexity is the 
regional solution; 
“Overall, the results of the analyses strongly demonstrate that a regional approach is 
the optimum solution for the future of fire and rescue service control rooms in England 
and Wales. This would secure and maximise the realisable efficiency gains, whilst 
enabling fire and rescue services to work effectively together to provide a local, regional 
or national response to incidents of any scale and complexity” (p.49). 
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4.19.8 All roads point to the regions; but only the GORs!33 
The penultimate section of the report; ‘A National Approach’ indicates Mott MacDonald’s 
compelling support for a national strategy by which to reform the fire service using the 
Government regions’ configuration, which their analyses had concluded optimal.  Despite the 
questionable sources of the fundamentally important statistical data, as well as the  model used 
to calculate costs and the consultants own numerous references to shortfalls in accessing data 
and participants, their report concludes (emphasis added);  
“The results of comprehensive analysis and cost modelling implicate that rationalisation 
of fire and rescue service control rooms by means of ‘Vertical Integration’ (Fire-Fire) 
to a regional configuration is the optimum solution for fire and rescue service control 
rooms in England with a single control room in Wales. This is considered to be the most 
appropriate way forward to secure maximum gain along each of the three axes 
identified in the analysis model whilst mitigating barriers to implementation and risk to 
operations” (p.49).  
“The most appropriate configuration for fire and rescue control regions is considered to 
be in accordance with the Government Offices for the Regions Aligning fire service 
control rooms to the Government Regions will help overcome issues associated with 
funding, ownership and accountability whilst securing significant cost saving” (p.50). 
On the basis of minimal factual evidence and financial modelling that omitted to cost in the 
‘changed environment’ that had apparently necessitated the update to the report, without 
quantifying any of the frequently proposed benefits, a solution to site new control rooms in the 
Government offices for the regions (GORs had been established across England in 1994), was 
justified.   
 
The report further justifies the regional centres by subtly referring to newly perceived barriers 
about ownership and accountability of new control rooms, urging readers to accept that the use 
of non-brigade sites would overcome perceived managerial issues that may ensue because of 
amalgamation.  Mott perceived managerial issues as likely to occur in all but a Government 
office regional solution, citing this isolated example as justification;  
                                                 
33 Nine Government offices for the regions (GORs) were established across England in 1994. 
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“In the case of South Wales, the building of a brand new facility as opposed to locating 
the new control within one of the existing brigade controls, was seen as a significant 
advantage since it marked the initiation of a new organisation rather than being 
perceived as an extension of an existing one” (p.54).   
No source reference is provided for this opinion. Meanwhile, in the wider political 
environment, in a departure from the persuasive and unchallenged language used in the Mott 
MacDonald reports, the concept of regional Government was evidently still not prospering 
during the same period.   
“Despite 90% overall opposition to the policy, and 75% from business, John Prescott 
transferred county councils' housing planning powers to (unelected) regional bodies”. 
(The Telegraph, 19.7.02).  
“New Labour's mania for uprooting local Government hit trouble after 15 out of 22 
referendums rejected "continental" elected mayors, at a cost of £2.5m and turnouts 
averaging 30%” (The Times, 19.7.02).  
In response to the Mott MacDonald 2003 report, the Minister for Local Government, Regional 
Governance and Fire, Nick Raynsford said (emphasis added); 
“The Government is persuaded by the conclusions of the study and proposes to 
establish regional control rooms in England, including the one already established in 
London, working closely with Fire and Rescue Authorities through their Regional 
Management Boards. We have written to the Practitioners Forum asking for their views 
on our proposed approach” (HC Deb 11th December 2003, c97WS). 
After a long and drawn out journey through industrial disputes, industry reviews and public 
battles between union leaders and politicians, the decision for regional control rooms was now 
concluded by the Fire Minister. 
4. 20 Summary and morphogenetic perspective of T2-T3 
At the end of T3, what had begun as a new Government’s attempts to increase efficiency and 
modernise working practices in a corporatist, routinised fire service, using the Best Value 
initiative (Local Government Act, 1999), had ended four years later after bitter conflict and 
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polarisation of views.  Early socio-cultural interactions at T2 had been infused by New 
Labour’s ideas on pubic management, emerging from the new democratic movement. The 
situational logic of the new Government, called for correction from the necessary 
contradictions stemming from the comfortable tripartite arrangement that had developed 
between employers, managers and the FBU. In this arrangement, vested interests had been 
protected for decades, resulting in reproduction of the structural and cultural systems and a 
resistance to externally imposed change.  The newly established Office of the Deputy Prime 
under the leadership of John Prescott MP, undertook to impose such changes which were based 
on the new democratic politics of Prime Minister, Tony Blair.  However, up to 2000, no 
significant cultural or structural changes took place beyond a form of compromise.   Fire 
services responded to Best Value, submitting statistics and service reviews back to the ODPM 
as required (Audit Commission, 2000), but there had been no dramatic changes through inter-
organisational collaborations as recommended (Mott MacDonald, 2000).  
Based on growing disquiet around the country in relation to fire service pay, in May 2002, the 
Fire Brigade Union, representing a large number of employers, delivered a 40% pay claim to 
its local Government employers. The conditioning effects of T1 had positioned the FBU as the 
dominant group in relation to the new Government group, whose agents were still developing 
new roles within their new departments.   However, despite relative dominance, the FBU 
leadership entered into a period of compromise, accommodating negotiations with employers 
and accepting the considerably lower 16% pay offer (July, 2002) that would eventually be 
withdrawn as the Government intervened (November, 2002).  As battle lines were drawn, the 
situational logic of elimination developed predisposing the FBU to polarise and compete.  The 
union harnessed the support of its members for all out strike action, weakening the Government 
as competing factions of old Labour (traditionally in support of the trades unions) clashed with 
the ideas of New Labour MPs, expounding neo-liberalist views on public sector management.    
Individually, Tony Blair and John Prescott vied for authority in their respective domains as the 
FBU called for industrial action and the army were despatched to provide fire cover for the 
first time in twenty years. Not only was Blair’s modernisation agenda being challenged but, 
following the events of 9/11, and involving the UK in Iraq, controversially, Blair had also 
agreed to send Army troops to fight.  Meanwhile, on another political agenda, John Prescott 
was working hard to persuade the country that decentralism through regional assemblies was 
the way forward for Government.  Throughout the later stages of T2 to T3, in a series of media 
managed communications and effective deployment of rhetoric, the Labour executive began to 
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build legitimacy for their goals.  Intervening in local Government business by commissioning 
an independent review of the fire service on the eve of national strikes, despite significant 
research limitations, not only delayed decision making but developed a powerful tool for the 
Government to use in the battle to modernise Blair’s way.  Removing Prescott from the dispute 
at a crucial moment when the Government were losing ground and deploying union-friendly 
MPs to hold the fort may also be viewed as delay tactics, whilst other avenues were developed.  
When Prescott re-emerged with the White Paper, threatening to increase Government powers 
of legislation to end the dispute, the shifting situational logics between correction and 
elimination resulted in oscillating interactions at the structural level to maintain vested 
interests.  Ordering an update of the Mott MacDonald report, which had originally concluded 
regionalisation to be unachievable, served the ODPM well.  By 2003 Mott MacDonald were 
able to fully support the new Government narrative of regionalisation and national security. 
  
210 
 
4.21 T4 Socio-Cultural Elaboration: 2004 onwards 
4.21.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to demarcate the final phase of the morphogenetic sequence.  
This stage offers explanatory power because it manifests what is to be explained of relations 
and power, which are both irreducible to but temporally anchored amidst the levels of reality 
(Archer, 1995).  The relations and power outcomes of previously conditioned socio cultural 
interactions, result in either elaboration or stasis that in turn provides the temporal starting-
point of a new conditioning sequence (ibid). The cycle described in this study is morphogenetic 
(as opposed to morphostatic); changes to structures and to cultures (structural and cultural 
elaborations), occurred, though not in exact tandem, as will be discussed in this section. Socio-
cultural interactions between T2 and T3 were governed by a “cleavage of intractable 
differences” (Nihija and Merali, 2013, p.895) between the FBU and New Labour. Discord 
between emerging agents within a new Government and the leadership of the longstanding 
institutions of the fire service and the FBU led to changes in agency.  The mediating effects of 
these varying levels of agency are described between T2 and T4 and the outcomes in terms of 
structural and cultural transformation will now be discussed.  How agency was itself 
transformed throughout the interactions, enabling or constraining the power of various actors 
or groups to act will be discussed in the Chapter 5. 
 
The cycle began at T1, designated as prior to 1999, where we find conditioning influences of 
pre-existing structures and cultures of the time.  The effects of agential interactions delineated 
in this study as T2:1999 to T3:2004, gave rise to structural and cultural elaboration at T4, post 
2004.  The structural and cultural elaborations and the power by which change was effected 
were facilitated by agency.  However, agents in return were also affected, resulting in the 
double morphogenesis of agency; agents were both influential to and influenced by the 
interactions.  The cycle is summarised pictorially in Figure 14 below and in more detail in 
Table 9. 
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Figure 14. The morphogenetic cycle for the study, in brief and in pictures 
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Pre 1999 
Structural conditioning 
 Fire service corporatism 
 Collective bargaining 
 All vested interests served 
 Peripheral disquiet about pay issues at 
local brigades 
 Early days of Blair’s New Labour, new 
democratic politics and new public sector 
management policies 
 1999 Local Gov. Act 
 Mott MacDonald Best Value review 
advocates New Labour’s economic 
imperative for modernisation in control 
rooms, recommends collaboration of small 
brigades with big ones. 
 Fire service response: containment, 
service engages with Best Value 
minimally, little structural change  
 Interests begin to diverge   
                                 
 
 
T1  
 
2000 to 2004 
Social interactions 
 New breed of Chief Fire Offices with 
managerialist behaviours, 
 Peripheral pay issue now a national dispute 
 New Labour v FBU ideological clash, situational 
logics of  competition as both consider 
alternatives: 
 Bain Review recommends radical modernisation 
similar to Blair’s agenda, before any pay increase 
 FBU votes for strike action 
 Army provides fire cover 
 9/11, Iraq war,  
 ODPM publishes White Paper mirroring Bain 
Report proposing radical reforms and introduces 
a new imperative for modernisation using 9/11 
links; national security. 
 White Paper introduces fire service 
regionalisation, now stated as critical key 
change, despite lack of evidence or support for it 
in previous reports 
 Prescott and regionalisation agenda 
 
T2                                                      T3 
2004 onwards 
Structural elaboration 
 2004 Fire Service Act 
 Legislates for radical restructuring of 
the fire service, includes clauses to 
combine fire authorities into regions. 
 Mott MacDonald re-hired to ‘update’ 
their previous recommendations for 
finding efficiency in control rooms of 
England due to ‘a changed 
environment’ post 9/11.  They endorse 
structural reforms via regionalisation. 
FiReControl project is approved within 
the year. 
Cultural elaboration 
 The Act legislates for changes to duty 
systems, recruitment, diversity (the 
areas that had remained unchanged for 
decades, reproducing corporatist 
behaviours and cultures).  It imposed 
new performance targets and 
measurements that required new 
managerial processes to operate; 
cultural ways begin to change 
 
 T4 
Table 9. Pre-existing conditions at T1, interactions at T2 to T3, consequences and outcomes at T4
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4.21.2 The Fire Service Act, 2004 
The structural elaboration of the fire service came in the form of the 2004 Fire Service Act and 
its subsequent legislation in the Fire Service Bill, 2004.  Notwithstanding the conflicts and 
industrial dispute between 2002 and early 2003 and despite some challenge in mid-November 
2003 over the Fire Services Bill, in which 41 Labour MPs voted against it, when the Act was 
finally passed it went almost entirely unreported in the media, (Cowley and Stuart, 2004). 
Caroline Spelman MP in a House of Commons (2005) speech on regionalisation, said this; 
“The very manner in which the regionalisation of emergency services was slipped out in 
the press over the summer recess shows just how sheepish the Government is about this 
announcement. I am sure colleagues on both sides of the House will, like me, have 
received lots of letters from people rightly concerned about the implications of this latest 
experiment in restructuring. In fact looking at the number of colleagues who have signed 
EDM 229, at least 219 of them agree with these concerns. Without any statement having 
been made to the House on these changes I have had to rely on press reports and it seems 
that the number of fire control rooms are being cut from 46 to 9,”(HC Deb 12 October, 
2005). 
4.21.3 Structural changes 
Structurally, the 2004 Fire Service Act introduced a raft of changes to working practices such 
as overtime, duty systems and part-time working.  It abolished organisations such as the Central 
Fire Brigade’s Advisory Council and shifted responsibilities to other agencies the Government 
had established under its modernisation agenda, such as the Practitioners Forum and the 
Business and Community Safety Forum. The Act removed restrictions that previously 
prevented Government from intervening in pay disputes.  It gave Government substantially 
increased control over the fire service.  The Government were empowered to direct the fire 
service over its strategic objectives, as well as the use of its assets such as fire stations, where 
they should be, if they should close, and in increasing or reducing the number of fire-fighters. 
The fire minister or secretary of state was given powers to impose pay and conditions in line 
with Home Office control over the police service. Part of the managerialist consolidation of 
the 2004 Fire Service Act, were the changes introduced with the audit/inspection frameworks 
that reflected the new public management themes of Blair’s modernised public service. 
What is important to this study is the search for causal mechanisms that contributed to the 
failure of the fire service reform project called FiReControl.  The intention was to look beyond 
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traditional spheres of inquiry.  The timeframe here designated as T1 to T4 is that other place.  
The 2004 Fire Service Act was the T4 outcome of the complex social interactions (T2 to T3), 
that took place between 2000 and 2004, mediated by pre-existing conditions at T1.  In relation 
to the intention of this inquiry, what is important about the Act is not only the structural and 
cultural changes it imposed or brought about, it is the appearance of clauses that enshrined in 
law the configuration of reform, for which there had been no supporting evidence in any of the 
reviews that had preceded the Act (Prescott’s ‘Our Fire and Rescue’ White Paper, Professor 
Bain’s IRFS, and the two Future of Control Room reports by Mott MacDonald). Despite the 
fact neither of the government documents advocated regionalisation, Part 1 of the Act (entitled 
Fire and Rescue Authorities) legislated for the following (emphasis added); 
 “Section 2 Power to create combined fire and rescue authorities 
 Section 3 Creation of combined fire and rescue authorities: supplementary  
1. Section 4 Combined authorities under the Fire Service Act 1947 
These sections give power to create combined fire and rescue authorities, supplementary, 
and combined authorities. The existing power in the Fire Service Act 1947 to create 
combined fire authorities is being re-enacted in a modified form to facilitate the 
establishment of combined fire and rescue authorities for reasons of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness or for areas that correspond to the English regions.” (Fire Service 
Act, 2004) 
Such structural elaboration was underpinned by Prescott’s regional governance agenda as well 
as Blair’s ideas for ‘New Britain’ and public services, made clear in his 1997 Leader’s Speech 
when Labour had won the General Election. Those ideas, themselves elaborations of previous 
public sector management philosophies of the Thatcher administrations, were used both to 
construct and to legitimate the 2004 Act and were contradictions of Blair’s neo-liberalist 
preference for decentralised Government and previous Conservative ideologies that favoured 
centralism (Willmott, 2000).  New Labour’s apparent desire to devolve control from the centre 
conflicted with ideas to combine local authorities and performance manage them through audit 
and inspection, from the centre.  It was from this confusion that the control room reform project, 
FiReControl evolved.  The reform sought to impose a centralist, single national control room 
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structure, delivered via the English Government regions.  The strapline logo34 for the 
FiReControl project reinforced this rhetorical concept. 
 
4.21.4 Cultural changes 
Cultural elaboration followed the structural changes that resulted from the 2004 Act, which 
was the outcome of the social interactions between T2 and T3.  Recalling T1, there had been 
little impact on fire service culture following the 1999 Local Government Act.  The fire service 
was steeped in corporatism, where routine behaviours had been reproduced for decades and the 
situation logic was to protect vested interests.  Despite Labour’s early attempts to modernise, 
the Audit Commission in 2000 found that fire authorities were not implementing the Best Value 
initiative as well as expected.  In many cases there was lack of understanding of key 
performance indicators, and of the process changes required to bring about efficiency (Audit 
Commission, 2000).  In relation to control rooms, the Best Value initiative had become a 
superficial departmental activity to meet minimum requirements of performance, as opposed 
to any significant tool for modernisation and inter-organisational collaboration (Audit 
Commission, 1995, 2000; Mott MacDonald 2000). The Independent Review of the Fire Service 
(2002), had labelled the fire service as anachronistic, culturally immobile and unrepresentative 
of the communities it served.  
However, five years later the Fire Service Act of 2004 would effect cultural change, in the form 
of the New Labour’s style of public management, a fusion of neo liberal and conservative 
philosophies (c.f. Chapter 2), which would achieve performance improvement through 
strategic regulation, audit and inspection.  The 2004 Fire Service Act removed restrictions that 
previously prevented Government from intervening in pay disputes.  It gave Government 
substantially increased control over the fire service.  Central control was increased by a national 
framework that placed a number of fire service activities on a statutory footing, such as 
attending to road traffic accidents, dealing with flooding, responding to terrorist attacks.  These 
were already part of fire service activities but under the Act, they would be measured nationally 
and fire services would be accountable to Government.  Community fire safety was made 
                                                 
34 Department for Communities and Local Government 
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statutory and the Act would legislate for partnership working, community outreach and 
diversity. The Act required fire authorities to produce an Integrated Risk Management Plan, 
including targets and objectives for reducing risks, balancing prevention and intervention and 
determining response standards and resource allocation. These new ways of working, many of 
which were structural changes would transform the legacy culture that was based around the 
old duty system, around the fire station, responding to fires when they occurred.  It would 
transform working practices and extend the reach and interactions of the fire service through 
community engagement and fire prevention activities.  This would eventually shift established 
station-centric, insular cultural behaviours of firefighters who remained together on stations, 
between fires and often for prolonged periods, where many of the cultural traditions were 
reinforced (Fitzgerald, 2005).   
4.21.5 Agential changes 
The morphogenesis of agency (Archer, 1995) resulting in Labour’s increased authority and 
power to act in this arena was the outcome of the socio-cultural interactions between T2 and 
T3.  This thesis argues that the differently conditioned agential activity ultimately led to the 
ODPM legislating for its version of modernisation and from this came the FiReControl project 
to regionalise 49 control rooms into nine super centres serving John Prescott’s regions.  This 
was despite the possibility that there was equally valid evidence from the FBU proposed 
reforms (Cap Gemini, Ernst and Young, 2002; Pathfinder results, 2002), challenging the ability 
of a regional policy to achieve the efficiency upon which the IRFS and previous reviews were 
originally predicated. By the time of the 2004 Act, the imperative for fire service control room 
reform had changed from economic efficiency 1999/2000, to modernisation in 2003, and then 
to national security later that year, as the events of 9/11 became part of the rhetoric for reform.  
What was introduced to (and what was concealed from) the debates about control rooms and 
major incident management post 9/11, contributed to the Government gaining legitimacy for 
its control room reform ideas over any other alternatives. 
Legitimation of the combined authorities, regionalisation ideas and structures through 
legislation, promoting the expertise of Government consultants, whilst ignoring that of other 
consultants, evidences a more powerful use of agency, which will be explored in Chapter 6.  
Reservations for regionalising the fire service had been expressed from all key areas including 
academics and consultants, as well as the management and unions of the fire service itself as 
has been illuminated throughout this chapter. A failure to involve the fire service in its own 
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industry review or to heed advice from critics makes the dichotomy between decentralism and 
centralism a socio-cultural contradiction which was evident in the FiReControl project aims.    
Mott MacDonald had originally recommended smaller control rooms merging with larger ones 
to ensure success.  Bain’s IRFS had only recommended co-operation between brigades (and 
this was his opinion not one of his terms of reference).  Bain had not recommended 
reorganisation as a regional structure.  Giving evidence at the ODPM Select Committee, on 
discussing the Fire Service, the Association of Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers 
(CACFOA), had also challenged the Government’s clarity on regionalisation; 
 
“The lack of focus and detail around the timing of any future regionalisation, and the 
weight placed on ‘encouraging’ voluntary arrangements merely ads to the confusion. It 
has a particular impact on County Council Fire Authorities who already enjoy the benefit 
of economies of scale for many of their support activities. It is clear that collaboration 
across larger areas than the current boundaries of fire authorities is needed to unlock 
the benefits of modernisation. It is also a question of the capacity and resources to deliver 
change, and it is apparent that smaller authorities simply do not have the capacity to 
deliver. The regional issue, thus, merits further scrutiny, and clarity about Government 
expectations”35 (HC 1168-II 2002-03, Ev74) 
 
At the same ODPM Select Committee, the FBU expressed; 
“The FBU agrees that the Service should share resources when it makes sense to do so. 
However, pooling resources should not be at the expense of diminishing levels of service, 
or delivery at the point of need. The proposals to move towards a regional Service need 
further consideration. The Union is minded to agree that in the event of regional elected 
assemblies, it would make sense, both in terms of delivery and democracy, for regional 
fire and rescue authorities to be established. However, as even the states, even in the 
best-case scenario, the first regional assemblies are not expected to be in place for 
several years. The Paper also states that local fire authorities will need to establish 
regional management boards with members from existing fire authorities before 1 April 
2004. The preparedness of the Service to respond to such a demand has to be questioned. 
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The Government should not rush ahead with reform before the proper structures are put 
in place” (HC 1168-II 2002-03, Ev90). 
 
In a supreme exercise of agency to serve and protect its own interests, despite considerable 
challenge from various spheres (see above), Labour was not deterred from its direction of 
travel.  That direction was to consolidate Labour’s managerialist aims according to its 
preference for regional governance configurations with centralist control.  This had been 
foreseen back in 1997 with New Labour modernisation and regionalisation agendas, 
underpinned by private finance (PFI) methods of funding.  In terms of reforming the fire 
service, Labour was extending those managerialist aims based on Best Value, efficiency and 
modernisation imperatives to be more accountable and efficient (by Blair’s definitions),  and 
also based on national security and regionalism imperatives, as per their desire to achieve 
success in reforming this part of the public sector, come what may.  
This thesis argues that the decision to regionalise control rooms via the FiReControl project 
was legitimated by an act of corporate agency and not by a robust evidence-based policy 
making process.   
The development of Labour’s corporate agency, where one group shapes social outcomes to 
serve or protect its own vested interests will be discussed in Chapter 6 in response to the 
research question; 
 By what emergent powers do the Government reform ideas prevail over 
alternatives? 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
5.0 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the outcomes of the research with respect to the gaps 
identified in the extant literature on project failure and using the analytic framework of analytic 
dualism in relation to the search for legitimating mechanisms as defined by the theoretical 
framework (Chapter 2).  This allows the research questions to be answered and the overall 
study to be positioned in terms of its contribution to knowledge, both of which will be presented 
in the final Chapter 6.   
 
The findings demonstrate that both institutional and strategic legitimacy were powerfully at 
work before and between the time periods designated as T1 and T4, when the reform policy was 
idealised and finally approved for implementation. This chapter discusses the findings in 
relation to the morphogenetic sequence framework and explains the presence and effects of 
mechanisms of legitimacy, which were sui generis of the situated structures and cultures, and 
the people involved.  The objective of the study was to give new substance to explaining how 
the emergent properties of mechanisms, such as the institutionally conditioning influences and 
strategic devices, such as rhetoric, helped to legitimate decisions and specific courses of action.  
These decisions and courses of action would result in the legitimation of the Government’s 
preferred version of reform.   
The discussion begins by highlighting the gaps in the literature and the extant body of 
knowledge in the field of project failure, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
5.1 Gaps in our sources of understanding 
The overall aim of the research was to ascertain if alternative theoretical perspectives and 
evaluation methods can help us to understand more about why many public reform projects do 
not complete successfully or are considered failures.  Chapter 2 identified the limitations of 
extant sources of understanding failure in public projects.  Government evaluations, such as 
the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), inquiry, take place after the project is cancelled or is 
labelled a failure.  Like much of the project research (Meredith and Mantel, 2011; Scott-Young 
and Samson, 2008; Merrow, 2011), the Government PAC takes a foundationalist perspective 
where success and failure are generally considered objective states of reality (McConnell, 
2003). The foundationalist perspective tells us that projects fail for reasons to do with budget, 
time and or scope overruns (Meredith and Mantell, 2011; Merrow, 2011) or because of a failure 
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to adhere to project management standards (PMI, 2012) or because of future perfect 
strategizing (Clegg, et al, 2006; Atkin, 2012; Flyvbjerg et al, 2003), that results in over 
estimated future benefits and underestimated costs.  The theory of escalation of commitment 
(Fox and Staw, 1979), tells us that people continue to commit resources to failing courses of 
action (such as long term Government reform projects), for reasons that may be social 
(expectations of others), psychological (internalised views), project (original commitments) or 
organisational (hierarchical structures and influences), (Staw and Ross, 1987).  Controlling for 
these factors to help reduce their impact on people’s tendency to escalate commitment to failing 
projects demonstrates the emphasis on project agents as the main determinants of failure. 
 
Based on the extant literature, this study challenges three fundamental concepts in the field of 
public project failure that have become taken-for-granted and as such, this study argues, leave 
gaps in our understanding;  
 
1] That failure is an objective state of reality that is reached,  
2] Causes of failure can only be found within the boundary of the project itself, and  
3] That project-related people (agents) are usually to blame.   
 
5.1.1 Gap 1: Failure is an objective state of reality 
To address the first gap, an important concept underpinning this study was ontological; what 
exactly is failure?  Extending escalation of commitment research from a positivist to a more 
social constructionist perspective, Drummond (1996), suggested failure was a loss of support 
for the myths that are created about a project’s possibilities.  Myths can and will persist if there 
is sufficient political will to obscure reality.  If the myth becomes taken-for-granted, its 
possibility is sustained for as long as its legitimacy is maintained (Drummond, 1996).   
 
Therefore, this study premised its perspective of the failure of the FiReControl project as a loss 
of support, a loss of legitimacy.  The study rejected the idea that an objective state of failure 
was finally reached in 2010 as labelled by the Coalition Government and the PAC inquiry 
(PAC, 2011).   
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5.1.2 Gap 2: Causes of failure can only be found within the boundary of the 
project  
The Public Accounts Committee report, ‘The Failure of the FiReControl Project’ was published 
in 2011.  As is usual for the terms of reference of the PAC, the ex-post inquiry limited its 
investigation to the ‘failed project’. No consideration was given to anything beyond the 
boundaries of the project from its approval date (2004), to its apparent failed state at 
cancellation (December 2010).  
 
Naming no ministerial names, in criticising ‘the Department’ (the ODPM, later known as 
DCLG), the PAC report said;  
 
“The Department was keen to launch the FiReControl project. A Gateway Review by the 
Office of Government Commerce in April 2004 found that the project developed at an 
“extraordinarily fast pace.” The review concluded that the project was in poor condition 
overall and at significant risk of failing to deliver” (PAC, 2011, p.7). 
 
Yet, despite this critical comment that significant early risks were evident, due to the 
extraordinary fast pace at which the project developed, we learn nothing of the reasons why 
or what was happening before the project was initiated to influence this hasty approach. The 
project had been the outcome of an act of parliament that had arisen because of insufficient 
authority to quell the fire dispute.  The ODPM had overtly involved itself in the pay dispute in 
a way that was unprecedented and the IRFS had been commissioned, which significantly 
changed the course of events in favour of Government objectives as has been discussed.  
However, despite such significance, the PAC inquiry had started from the initiation of the 
FiReControl project and was bounded only by the delivery project. 
 
 As a point of departure from the taken-for-granted starting point of ‘day one in the Government 
project’, this research based its starting point significantly earlier than 2004 when FiReControl 
was approved. In seeking to address the previous knowledge gap (foundationalist view that 
failure is an objective state), the research sought to find out when and how legitimacy started 
for the project since it would be a loss of legitimacy that led to its demise in 2010.  To do this 
the analysis adopted a critical realist overarching philosophy that advocates a retroductive 
approach in contrast to the positivistic project research, to explore the underlying structures 
and mechanisms (complex interactions of cultures, structures and agents), which according to 
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the critical realist paradigm, are not directly accessible to sense experience (Blaikie, 2000).  
Retroduction is mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating mechanisms 
which are capable of producing them and it is these mechanisms that developed corporate 
agency in groups and helped them to build legitimacy for project. 
With the critical realist philosophy (choosing the social realist variant), the research used 
methods of critical hermeneutics and the morphogenetic approach to look beyond and deeper 
than the event (FiReControl), itself.  The methods facilitated analysis of data outside of the 
project boundaries to explore where and how legitimacy developed for the ideas leading up to 
2004, what sustained the development of those ideas and by what power ideas were 
consolidated into the FiReControl reform project. 
5.1.3 Gap 3: Project-related people (agents) are usually to blame.   
Unsurprisingly, what we learnt from the PAC report that sought causes of failure of the 
FiReControl project, was that project delivery agents were to blame.  Project directors, 
procurement and project managers were all found to be weak (PAC, 2011).  Using the 
philosophical approach to search for causal mechanisms not immediately accessible to the 
senses, embracing the equally influential causal powers of complex interplay of cultures, 
structures and agents, this study found causal mechanisms that were not just agential. 
5.2 Methods that find the little things 
To explore the origins of legitimating influences for FiReControl, social realism’s 
morphogenetic approach (Archer, 1995), provided the overarching analytic framework, based 
on the concept of analytic dualism.  Analytic dualism recognises that the entities of social life, 
the parts (structure and culture) and people, are "analytically separable" (Archer, 1996, p.xvi). 
The depth analysis of the morphogenetic approach was augmented by concrete analyses using 
critical hermeneutic methods, which advocate, simply, that the parts can only be understood in 
relation to the whole and the whole from the inner harmony of its parts (Palmer, 1969, p. 77), 
and that the parts, once integrated, define the whole.  The hermeneutic methods illuminate 
mechanisms operating at the event level that is the level of reality in critical realism that we 
‘experience’ such as the Government commissions or the management consultant exercises. 
Overall, the objective of these critical analysis methods was to account not just for the big 
things that detailed case analysis can reveal, but importantly, also for the little things.   
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As a phronetic study, the research aim was to ask the ‘little questions” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.133), 
to have patience and seriousness in the smallest things and to not overlook the minutiae.  For 
example, the study illuminated the relevance of the nick names given to John Prescott and the 
effects they had on his credibility and ultimately his agency.  It showed how Labour’s behind 
the scenes shuffling of MPs to present Ian McCartney and Andy Ingram, as pro-unionist MPs 
dealing with the dispute when Prescott was moved side-wards for a short while in November 
2002, was a one off strategic act.  Neither McCartney nor Ingram appeared to be involved or 
consulted again after the move failed to win over the FBU. Critical hermeneutic analyses 
revealed subtle changes to narrative between Government reports that introduced new 
imperatives for change, but which had huge impact on recommendations. Attention to the 
timing of the announcement of the IRFS indicated that it must have been discussed at length 
prior to the Government offering it to the employers as a way of ‘helping’ them to understand 
the pay settlement since the relatively esteemed panel were ready to begin the review almost 
immediately. This phronetic approach of attending to the little things advocates the idea that 
“all the problems of politics, of social organisation, and of education have been falsified 
through and through….because one learned to despise the ‘little’ things, which means the basic 
concerns of life itself” (Nietzsche, 1969, p.256, quoted from Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.133) 
 
The aim of these critical research methods was to illuminate more elements of a reform project 
than traditional post evaluation methods and in so doing to search for and reveal mechanisms 
that could be influencing the policy ideation stages of such projects. Eisner, (1991) describes 
being critical as an “art of saying useful things about complex and subtle objects and events so 
that others … can see and understand what they did not see and understand before" (p.3). 
Exposing and exploring failure from a different place and from a new perspective prompted 
the theoretical framework of legitimacy, both institutional and strategic. The analytic 
framework was used to separate out structures, cultures and agency, to explore their 
interactions and outputs over a given time cycle.  The objective was to explain how situated 
actions were both conditioned by, and through complex interactions, influential of, the process 
of acquiring or strategically deploying legitimacy, to achieve political ends.  
 
5.3 Revealing legitimacy through the morphogenetic approach 
In respect to the restructuring of the fire service, legislated by the 2004 Fire Service Act, the 
morphogenetic approach allowed historically situated social and cultural structures operating 
224 
 
upon and within the fire sector and the Government, to be distinguished.  The model enabled 
the mediating responses of agents to structural influences to be explored in response to internal 
change (Local Government Act, 1999, Best Value, Chief Fire Officer appointments, etc.), and 
external structural pressures (industrial action, media coverage, terrorist attacks of 9/11). The 
morphogenetic approach enabled an exploration of the emergent properties resulting from the 
mechanisms that were at play when complex interactions occurred between the situated 
structures, cultures and agents. These mechanisms are now discussed in relation to conceptual 
framework of legitimacy. 
5.3.1 Conditioning influences at T1   
5.3.1.1 Structural institutionalism 
Represented at T1, was the institutional legitimacy of the long-established practices of the fire 
service, with the dominant, managerial patronage of the FBU that had protected its vested 
interests and those of key stakeholders, such as the fire service management and the local fire 
authority employers, and had perpetuated corporatist ways.  In the pursuit of legitimacy, the 
fire service, like other public sector organisations, was embedded in the social interactions of 
the time, where unions held significant power and important social and material resources were 
exchanged.  This had resulted in individual fire brigades becoming increasingly isomorphic 
due to mimetic, coercive and normative pressures, (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  The 
embedded institutional logics had reproduced themselves for many years had successfully 
protected the status quo and essentially legitimated continued inertia.  At T1, fire service 
corporatist structures had survived beyond those of other, previously corporatist organisations, 
such as health, education and transport that had structurally transformed through successive 
Conservative Governments of the 1980s and early 1990s (c.f. Chapter 2). 
 
It was this structural institutionalism in the fire service that the New Labour executive faced in 
1997.  However, though the Labour Party was new and visibly different to previous British 
Governments, they too were institutionally conditioned.  Once in power, as will be argued in 
this chapter, new Governments pick up where old Governments have left off and the business 
of public sector reform continues. As was explored during the T2 to T3 stage, isolated 
manifestations of discontent had begun in various independent fire brigades.  Hitherto, the fire 
service in general had been below the major reform radar of previous Governments but through 
increasingly visible industrial disputes, the fire service was presenting resistence to Blair’s new 
political agenda for modernising Britain. Towards the aspirations of New Labour, the 
225 
 
attractiveness of a reform idea would contrast with the problems of the current reality in an 
age-old institution such as the fire service and given the nature of politics, the fidings support 
the idea that the ‘new’ politicians idealised new solutions (Brunsson, 1989; Jennings, 2012), 
and FiReControl was one of those solutions.   
 
However, given the evidence of failure in IT reforms of public services around the time of T1 
(for example, Child Support Agency, Magistrates Courts System, National Air Traffic System, 
c.f. Chapter 2), the early warning signs of potential failure for the fire service regionalisation 
reform in particular (as mentioned in both the Mott MacDonald report (2000) and the Bain 
report (2003), why was the reform solution still sought so enthusiastically? Perhaps reforms 
are facilitated by organizational forgetfulness, which "prevents the past from disturbing the 
future" (Brunsson, 1993, p. 41).  This notion would lead to a constant supply of ideas to solve 
those never-ending organisational problems and because of this, the process of reform becomes 
legitimated as institutionalized routine work of Governments. The New Labour Government 
continued along this path with its modernisation agenda to reform public services through 
rationalisation and technology based on a set of ideas that were not arrived at democratically 
but were reinforced through legitimacy. 
 
Despite attempts to reform the fire service during the early years of the new Labour 
Government through Best Value programmes, for example, little had penetrated into the pre-
existing structures and cultures.  Organisational change was superficial; surface level tensions 
developed within the fire organisations between the need for legitimacy and the need for 
efficiency (Meyer and Rowan 1977).  Collecting and submitting Best Value indicator data to 
central Government from an isolated statistics department, while at the same time solving their 
local problems of efficiency more individually across other departments (Audit Commission, 
2000), fire brigades effectively began to decouple their structures, (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), 
in order to appear legitimate and compliant to external auditors. This was achieved by 
maintaining a façade, which reflected the prevailing rationalized myths of a modernised 
organisation using Best Value procedures.  However, it was found that inside fire brigade 
structures, the actual state of the organisation tended to be different and more oriented towards 
the day-to-day tasks at hand (Audit Commission, 2000), which reflected that in reality there 
was little change to operations. Best Value was not effective at disrupting the deeper structures 
and cultures of the fire service.  This evidences the effects of institutional legitimacy, not just 
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in the old ways of the fire service, but also in the political system itself, regardless of the new 
party.   
 
The idea that organisations competing for power choose to exploit the legitimating effect of 
isomorphism was observed in several ways.  The style and public imagery of New Labour ‘the 
brand’, competing for power at the 1997 General Election was explored at T1.  From the 
morphogenetic perspective, all structural influences as emergent powers of culture and 
structures are “mediated to people by shaping the situations in which they find themselves” 
(Archer, 1995, p.196). So, whilst the circumstances confronted by the new Government were 
not of their making, particularly after 18 years under a distinctly different Government 
administration, they did affect what the contemporary politicians made of them and how they 
reconstituted themselves in the process. 
 
5.3.1.2 New Public Management 
Taking the first point, the public management policies were not of New Labour’s making. 
Rather they were an inherited set of bespoke structures, politically and (after almost two 
decades), culturally shaped by Margaret Thatcher’s conservative and  neo-liberal politics, 
which had also risen to dominance in the US under President Ronald Reagan.   As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, the effect of the US Democrats’ party landslide electoral losses to 
Republican Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, inspired a group of prominent Democrats (such as 
Bill Clinton), to make radical shifts to their policies and the ‘New Democrats’  were conceived.  
Their new political approach became known as the "Third Way" and by the mid-1990s the new 
democratic movement that was developing through the US, Australia and Germany and was 
giving rise to new political imagery and public management philosophies.  Through mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), NPM policies were spreading throughout the 
western world.  Tony Blair was advocating these same principles for Britain in his ‘New’ 
politics portfolio, as he promoted the ‘cool Britannia’ cultural movement of the 1990s (Turner, 
2013). The modern, new democratic, media-managed style and manner in which Blair led 
Labour into power in 1997, hitherto anathema in British politics, mirrored the US Democrat’s 
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US Presidential Election win the previous year, including chart-topping theme tunes along the 
campaign trail36.  
 
The contextual situations into which the Blair Government arrived, such as the public 
management philosophies of conservatism as well as those of the new democratic movement 
provided conditioning influences on the complex interactions that would follow. Advocating 
Archer’s (1995; 2003), theory of human agency, the structures and cultures into which the new 
Government arrived influenced but did not determine behaviours of the leadership as in 
Bourdieu’s (2005) concept of ‘habitus’37.  Habitus stresses the role of social conditioning in 
determining our behaviour and downplays the contribution of a person’s conscious 
deliberation.  Archer’s (1995; 2003) theory on human agency places greater stress on 
conscious, reflexive deliberation and the consequent choices that individuals make.  The 
research shows that on winning the 1997 general election and entering into prior constructed 
new public management traditions that were laid down through earlier morphogenetic cycles 
in Britain and abroad, Blair was both influenced by that which he confronted and thereafter, 
was reflexively and intentionally influential to it, over the course of his administrations.   
 
The economist Friedrich Hayek38 had influenced Margaret Thatcher.  The sociologist, Anthony 
Giddens39 provided the inspiration for Tony Blair’s politics. Initially conditioned by them, the 
agency of Blair’s administration shifted the institutional logics of Thatcher’s neo-liberalist 
NPM philosophy towards new democratic politics, yet the changes in public management as 
outlined by the Local Government Act continued along more or less the same lines of 
                                                 
36 In 1994 “Things can only get better” by D-Ream was used as the theme tune to Labour’s 1997 election campaign. 
37Habitus is neither a result of free will, nor determined by structures, but created by a kind of interplay between the two 
over time: dispositions that are both shaped by past events and structures, and that shape current practices and structures and 
also, importantly, that condition our very perceptions of these (Bourdieu 1984). In this sense habitus is created and 
reproduced unconsciously, ‘without any deliberate pursuit of coherence… without any conscious concentration’ (ibid, 
p.170). 
38 Friedrich von Hayek, the economist inspired the central values of Margaret Thatcher's neo-liberal politics based the notion 
of markets and competition between nations, regions, firms and between individuals. 
39 Anthony Giddens’ Third Way political philosophy promoted an ethical doctrine that views social democratic Governments 
as having achieved a viable ethical socialism by removing the unjust elements of capitalism by providing social welfare and 
other policies. 
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managerialism. Building on from the notion of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991), it is the replication of rhetoric, forms and practices across the world, in what 
Pollitt (2001), called convergence that “may have more to do with Government fashions, 
symbolism and the propagation of norms than with the grim dictates of the global economy or 
the functional necessity for increased efficiency” (Pollitt, 2001, p.934).  On the strength of 
continuous reproduction throughout the world, through forces of isomorphism, NPM has 
gained legitimacy.  Blair as an executive politician was conditioned by what he confronted 
once in power and set about to reform public services.  Though NPM as a framework of 
management policies has itself been elaborated through morphogenetic cycles, as new actors 
and cultural shifts have emerged, the structures and cultures of NPM continue to dominate 
Government philosophies for managing public services (Dunleavy, 2006).   
 
At T1 in the research, Labour had not long been in power and NPM-like reforms had not yet 
reached the fire service but as this research suggests, public services are in a constant state of 
reform, via Government-crafted NPM solutions for never-ending organisational problems.  In 
this study, the problems began as pay dispute and ended as national security problems.  Though 
there are new generations of politicians, NPM reform solutions continue to be the cyclical focus 
of Governments in the continual quest for the elusive thing called efficiency. This study argues 
that new morphogenetic cycles are starting and finishing all the time effecting elaboration or 
stasis (Archer, 1995), of public services depending on agential effects of conditioned 
politicians to greater or lesser degrees.  The T1 of these cycles and the conditioning influences 
agents find themselves facing will inevitably vary depending on the social interactions of 
previous cycles. In the next section the emergent properties of powerful mechanisms resulting 
from the social interactions that followed the T1 chosen for this study, are discussed. 
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5.3.2 Social interactions at T2 to T3 
5.3.2.1 Strategic legitimacy  
A limitation of a structural institutional approach is that it fails to acknowledge the 
phenomenological or conscious reflexive perspective, with language and meanings reflecting 
only social structure (Green and Li, 2011).  Archer (1996), considers this as committing the 
epistemic fallacy of conflating structures with agency and in so doing obscuring the connection 
of social action to meaning, as if structures alone constrained or enabled social action.  As 
critical realists would assert and as the findings demonstrated, actors are not dopes of structures 
or cultures (Garfinkel, 1967).   
 
Institutional sources of legitimacy alone, such as NPM, fail to explain adequately the process 
of institutional change.  In morphogenetic terms, and advocating analytic dualism (Archer, 
1996), we need to reintroduce the people to the equation. The study explored the effects upon 
people of the contradictions and complementarities in the cultural system, into which social 
agents (the Blair executive) arrived with ideas.  They were conditioned by the situations they 
found themselves in to varying degrees and subsequently, by how they held on to those ideas.  
As discussed, the findings suggested that at T1, upon the arrival of New Labour in power, agents 
in the fire organisations did not abandon their long standing beliefs and ideas, and neither, upon 
exposure to fire service institutions, did the new democratic executive of the Labour Party.   
 
Despite making little impact on structures and cultures of the fire service at the start of Labour’s 
first administration (1997 to 2001) through Best Value, New Labour continued to promote 
strongly their ideas of modernisation, based on new democratic ideologies that had and were 
taking shape around the Western world.  Holding on to ideas may be partly explained by 
institutionalism, insofar as actors deploying language strategically or engaging in rhetoric to 
produce myths or claims to knowledge.  This may be achieved by “providing convincing 
accounts, regulating impressions and images” (Alvesson, 1993, p.1011).  In so doing the 
members of these organisations construct perceptions of quality, value, expertise, reputation 
and share these myths within and across organisational boundaries, (ibid). It is the strategic 
deployment of language, embodied in rhetoric (Alvesson, 1993), and the concept of agency, 
which is now introduced to the discussion. 
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5.3.2.2 Shifting institutional logics with rhetoric 
Institutions are socially constructed through discourse, embodying sets of sanctions that make 
certain viewpoints dominant and thus make contradictory actions problematic (Alvesson, 
1993).  Institutional logics are systems of socially constructed cultural symbols and material 
practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which organizations provide meaning 
to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce experience (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 2008).  Therefore, discourse affects action (Fairclough, 2005).  New Labour’s 
discourse on modernising Britain was the socially constructed rhetoric of Blair (ibid, 2000; 
2005), and his new democratic-minded followers. Although it is interesting to note that the new 
institutional myths of New Labour had not fully propagated nor replaced entirely those of old 
Labour; far from it.  There were many traditional Labour party members who did not share 
Blair’s ideas for modernising the fire service.  However, through other structures and 
mechanisms that promoted party loyalty by treating conflicting views or actions as problems, 
those old Labour ideas were rarely voiced publicly (McAnulla, 2007).   
 
The FBU institution, as another socially constructed set of beliefs embodied its sanctions too; 
all management decisions went through the Union first (Seifert, 2011).  The fire service 
managers and the local authority employers were the less dominant elements of the tripartite 
arrangement that the union essentially controlled (Seifert, 2011; Redman, 2006).  Anything 
alternative to this was not accepted as was the case when the Chief Fire Officer at Merseyside 
Fire Service attempted to change recruitment traditions as discussed in Chapter 6.  The social 
interactions between T2 and T3 demonstrated that as the disputes began, the situational logics 
between the Government and the fire service, which contradicted and competed against each 
other, sought to deny the legitimacy of either group’s discourse.  However ultimately, the 
situational logics of one group would shift, as is the tendency for organisational change and 
progression (Archer, 1995).  Using Alvesson’s (1993) theories of rhetorical agency and 
rhetorical institutionalism, we can begin to understand Archer’s (1996) morphogenetic cycles 
in terms of the roles and effects of the parts and the people as they interact. 
 
This study attests that the shift in institutional logics that finally resulted in structural 
elaboration at T4, was brought about through the complex social interactions, the detail for 
which was played out in the previous chapter.  How the decisions and actions of one group 
over-powered those of the other, the FBU, were not unusual; they were the tools of politics, 
employed not just by politicians but also by the FBU in the battle to legitimate a course of 
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action and ensure the survival of the respective organisations as legitimate entities. Both of the 
key groups of agents (the FBU and New Labour) used such devices but ultimately New Labour 
used them to greater effect. Thus, shifts in the institutional logics were facilitated by strategic 
use of rhetoric, not by happenstance but because those holding the reins of power must deploy 
rhetoric (Krebs and Jackson, p.27) to harness resources for political gain.  Rhetoric in this sense 
includes all speech acts whether they are oral or written. Strategic rhetorical manoeuvre can 
prove critical to success in political contests even when one’s opponents have not internalized 
the promoted values (ibid). Organisations are “systems of persuasion” where organisational 
actors are agents or rhetors that deploy language strategically (Alvesson, 1993, p.1101) 
 
Political rhetoric can give salience to a situation, translating its exigencies into some 
provocative language and symbolism (Vatz, 1973), and creating myths (Drummond, 1996).  
For Alvesson (1993), it is the ambiguity that is inherent in social life, the complexity in which 
we find ourselves that forces actors to use rhetoric to construct the institutional myths in order 
to provide meaning and legitimacy to organisational practices and beliefs.  For New Labour, 
political beliefs were laid down previously through NPM principles, embedded within the 
structures and cultures of Governments that had gone before and through isomorphic 
convergence throughout new democratic parties around the world.  For example, there is no 
‘reality’ in the claims that many of the UK’s public sector projects are in our national interest; 
they are rhetorically constructed myths.  FiReControl was idealised as a critical, national 
project that would make communities safer, fire services more efficient and later on, it was said 
it would improve our national security in the face of terrorism. The Government claims that 
the High Speed 2 (HS2) project will bring prosperity to the North and redress the concept of 
London-centricity (where most of the country’s wealth is created and maintained around 
London and the South East).  Many of the failed NHS IT reform projects were promoted using 
myths about ‘delivering patient choice’.  Whilst all of these reforms each have their project-
specific rhetoric, all are predicated on socially constructed myths about increasing efficiency, 
whether through joined up working, faster systems or reduced waiting times.  There is no 
proven evidence that such deliverables (patient choice, national security, efficiency or 
prosperity for the North), can be achieved but ideologically actors as “agentic meaning-
makers” (Green and Li, 2011, p.1664) use such talk to tell stories that will secure resources, 
and thus begins the legitimisation of large-scale reform projects. Political beliefs, perceptions 
and expectations are overwhelmingly not based on observation or empirical evidence available 
to participants but rather “upon cuings amongst groups of people who jointly create the 
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meanings they will read into current and anticipated events” (Vatz, 1973, p.159).   
 
In the case of this study, the talk was the action (Pollitt, 2001) and the winning talk, based on 
the questionable evidence of Bain and Mott MacDonald, was rhetorically more powerful.  This 
powerful rhetoric gave salience to Labour’s myth of modernisation instead of any alternative 
viewpoints.  The analysis provides evidence that pre-existing institutional logics of NPM and 
‘what it is to’ be the Government in power, exerted conditioning influences on Labour actors 
during the late 1990s and this became manifest in their rhetoric, once in power.  Concomitantly, 
the emergent powers of that rhetorical agency served to legitimate ideas and courses of action 
in a continuous morphogenetic cycle of elaborating and bringing ideas to bear.  
 
The interplay of rhetoric from both Labour and the FBU provides power in explaining some of 
the outcomes of this case as per the unit of analysis.  Following social realist ontology, rhetoric 
is not epiphenomenal, without causal influence (Green and Li, 2011).  Nor, in this case, as 
constructivists would argue, was it simply a matter of political actors being rhetorically 
effective in successfully persuading the FBU of the correctness of their preferred modernisation 
configuration. Rather it was a combination of the interplay between pre-existing parts (cultures 
and structures), influencing the people who in turn influenced the parts in continuous cycles 
that either maintain or move things on in directions of travel, based on whom possesses the 
greater power.  Possessing greater power to act means possessing corporate agency. Corporate 
agents promote their own interests to define and redefine organisational goals; they “pack more 
punch in defining and redefining structural forms” (Archer, 1995, p. 191).  How the agency of 
competing interest groups (New Labour and Union executives) was transformed, will be 
discussed in detail in Section 6.2.1. 
 
5.3.2.3 Coercion 
It took several years before Labour’s ideas for regionalising and modernising the fire service 
gathered sufficient legitimacy (at T4).  A series of complex social interactions between T2 and 
T3, resulted in the gradual eroding of the Union dominance, evidenced by the FBU leadership 
indicating to the employers, they would agree to a reduced pay increase (16% from 40%, before 
the ODPM halted the process in November 2002).  This may be viewed as a loss of legitimacy 
of the FBU as the dominant group in the tripartite management arrangement that had prospered 
for so long.  Conversely, there is evidence of Labour’s greater skill at deploying rhetorical 
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devices to increase legitimacy for their ideas.  The Labour executive used the privilege of office 
and made better use of media opportunities, particularly as emotions ran high during the strikes.  
The FBU were on the receiving end of rhetorical coercion (Krebs and Jackson, 2007).  This 
occurs when the opponents (the FBU), have through contest, been talked into a corner, and 
compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject.  Evidence for successful execution 
of coercion appears when the ODPM’s rhetorical moves deprive the FBU of “materials out of 
which to craft a reply that falls within the bounds of what the public would accept”(ibid, p.36), 
such as when the FBU’s alternative proposals for modernisation were omitted from the IRFS 
and any other public debate. Whilst Labour may have deployed arguments in the hope that they 
could eventually persuade the FBU and the fire service in general (to modernise), their more 
immediate task was to leave their opponents, including the old Labour back benchers, without 
access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal to Blair’s agenda 
for New Britain.  This would be achieved by skilful framing of messages through what may be 
considered the parliamentary privileges of public and business communication channels (radio 
and TV interviews, stage appearances at business conferences) and control of powerful 
processes such as ‘independent reviews’ and Government commissions. 
 
5.3.2.4 Strategic manoeuvres legitimating Labour’s ‘New’ vision  
The evidence for political actors being conditioned by the existing discourse and structures of 
previous Governments, for example, in NPM policies, has been discussed; When Labour took 
office in 1997, after 18 years of the Conservatives, they picked up the familiar gauntlet of 
public sector reforms and efficiency that was becoming familiar to the expanding army of NPM 
followers spreading through Western world Governments (c.f. Pollitt, 2001).  This study shows 
how the emergent powers of those political agents, began to exert influence on the structures 
and cultures.  In so doing, the complex interplay between people and elaborated parts created 
new emergent powers, which in turn conditioned future interactions.  How this unfolded is 
captured in the keys texts (The Future of Control Rooms in England and Wales, 2000, 2003; 
Independent Review of the Fire Service, 2002; Our Fire and Rescue Service White Paper 
2003).  To the non-critical reader, these document the justification of the reforms in the taken-
for-granted manner such processes follow. However, on deeper hermeneutic analysis, adopting 
Ricoeur’s (1978), concept of suspicion, the texts evidence the powerful new concepts and 
language which had entered the political discourse in the matter of public sector management. 
 
234 
 
Despite the complexity of the fire service, through these texts we see how Labour (like previous 
Governments), and its management consultants, adopt the rational/instrumental perspective as 
an ideal and use highly abstract language in the process.  Fundamental detail, especially in the 
IRFS and the Mott MacDonald report that followed it, were conveniently and rationally 
ignored.  What academic researchers would consider highly limiting in data quality for 
example, the authors of the reports confidently justify as acceptable.  For example, the 
significant lack of stakeholder involvement in a sector-wide review was deemed acceptable in 
the IRFS and put down to the national strikes, as if they were coincidental.  That the review 
was commissioned in the very midst of the dispute, on the brink of strike action, was the detail 
that was rationally excused as unimportant.  Similarly, in the 2003 Mott MacDonald update 
review of emergency control rooms, justifying the use of call centre cost modelling and 
statistics that were five years out of date, on the grounds of providing consistency between 
reports is bewildering.  The apparent point of the reports was to support the notion that reforms 
would make operational efficiency savings in the future and the fire service was operating in a 
changed environment.  Yet the operational data was five years out of date but that detail did 
not provoke concern in the authors, nor the Government commissioners.  It is these examples, 
which support the suggestion that reforms become taken-for-granted ideas, where the detail is 
less critical, as opposed to evidence-based practices (Brunsson, 1993). The study suggests that 
the fire service reforms were not (or perhaps not just) about the increasing the role and power 
of managers in the fire service or the adoption of private sector management discourses and 
techniques to improve operating efficiency and manage performance.  The changes may have 
represented a deeper ideological process that would transform power relationships, culture, 
control and accountability (Clarke et al. 1994) in the quest for legitimating the new democratic 
politics of New Labour.  
 
The report of the IRFS, recommended the introduction of wide scale new public management 
policies of performance measurement and accountability.  The report suggested changes should 
be made in relation to working practices and that the service should be reorganised to be more 
in line with other public sector organisations, including wide-scale changes to: 
   
i. financial structures 
ii. Lines of accountability 
iii. Involvement of private sector (Bain, 2002, p.76) 
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The rhetoric of managerialism and the language of Blair’s agenda for modernisation were 
prominent throughout.  The political language that emerged was one which drew on a new 
democratic discourse, representing a shift from Conservative Party language of ‘competition’, 
which had been the emphasis in previous reforms, for example in the NHS. The use of political 
discourse in the IRFS was interesting because the main author was a senior academic.  Once 
published in text, and labelled by the Government as ‘Independent’, the Labour executive were 
able to use it to back up their arguments, as if, despite its major research limitations, the IRFS 
was the objective truth on how to reform the fire service.  Ironically, it was only considered an 
objective and independent review by the people who commissioned, scoped and funded it.  
Elsewhere it was challenged (c.f. Seifert, 2002; Birchall, 2004).  Nevertheless, with the 
privilege of Government channels to promote ideas, the IRFS took on a life of its own and its 
rhetoric gave salience to its own existence as the Labour executive reinforced its apparent 
independence and authority, despite its significant shortcomings in both departments.  
 
Thus the very process of commissioning the IRFS was a rhetorical move on the part of the 
Government. The Labour executive took every public opportunity to appear at high profile 
events, whilst the opposing FBU members were viewed via television scenes of angry strikers, 
freezing outside closed fire stations with burning braziers.  Labour politicians exploited the 
ministerial privilege to use public arenas, including senior business leaders conferences 
(Chancellor Gordon Brown at the CBI, 2002), to promote their ideas.  Labour used the IRFS 
as their justification, whilst castigating, or worse, concealing any alternative views.  The FBU 
did not have such privileged access to the same channels beyond traditional media coverage.  
Unlike the staged-managed appearances of the Labour executives, projecting professional 
modernisation imagery, the media coverage of the FBU generally showed them as old style, 
confrontational, unrefined packs of working class men not wanting to accept change, unwilling 
to be part of Blair’s polished, modern new vision for the public sector.  
 
As time progressed through T2 to T3, the Labour executive gained greater strength through 
clever moves and turns as outline in Chapter 6, the FBU bean to acquiesce to some of Labour’s 
organisational change demands despite not having been persuaded by the benefits (accepting a 
series of reduced pay level increases).  The FBU was now facing a crisis of its own legitimacy 
and the alternatives were to lose even more powers as a union (Prescott’s threat to change the 
law to give him greater powers, if pay dispute not settled), or continue to push, to harness the 
resistance of the members for longer.  Though only indicative of public opinion, support for 
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the firefighters appeared to be in decline as BBC polls showed the public’s change in attitude 
towards the striking fire fighters.  The following vote result was published on the BBC website 
(BBC News Wednesday, 13 November, 2002), that featured an on-going update for the fire 
dispute between 2002 and 2003; 
 
Do you back the firefighters' strike? 
 
Yes 
 4.07%  
 
No 
 95.93%  
 
64332 Votes Cast 
Results are indicative and may not reflect public opinion 
 
This would suggest that the public being swayed by the Government’s more powerful rhetoric, 
whilst the FBU was slowly conceding to it, as pay deals talked first of 40% then of 16%, and 
then a three-year staggered 11% (Bain, 2002).  The FBU members were frustrated with their 
own executive and it would be this that would contribute further to the FBU’s loss of strength 
in the battle.  As 2003 started, this shift might indicate that the actual motives or the sincerity 
of the FBU or the Labour executive were not particularly relevant at this stage.  What was 
happening as the situation logics moved beyond competition and headed towards compromise 
was less to do with convivial acceptance of Government’s ideas and more to do with the FBU 
cutting its losses, as ODPM ultimatums and power changes took place.  In the battle between 
the power groups possessing agency (which will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter), a stronger party had emerged and it was the greater agency with which Labour used 
strategic legitimacy, including rhetoric with coercive characteristics that resulted in their more 
successful exercise of power. 
 
Critical hermeneutics of the key texts revealed the rhetoric of the Blair ideology that 
underpinned the recommendations.  The methods helped to expose some of the taken-for-
granted assumptions of such Government exercises when valid and reliable evidence is scant.  
It demonstrates how the research process can be exploited when commissioners are in positions 
of power.  More importantly in terms of understanding reform policy, the hermeneutic inquiry 
revealed that while the philosophy of New Labour showed some key differences with those of 
conservatism (discourse of joined up collaboration as opposed to competition), their agenda to 
disregard democratic consensus and promote an anti-collectivist set of values continued in the 
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same vein.  This is important to the question which will be answered later in respect of ‘what 
can be done’ and who is best placed to decide the best course of action for multibillion pound 
reform projects in the public sector? 
Through critical hermeneutic analyses, the four main Government texts, which sought to 
evidence the Government’s decision-making process, emphasised the fact that social reality is 
historically constituted. The findings indicate how cultural messages concealed and revealed, 
how the ambiguity of meaning allowed a ‘group to represent itself while opening the door for 
distortion and domination’, (Roberge, 2011, p.5). Political or ideological exaggerations, 
fallacies, taken-for-granted flawed processes and contradictions were brought to the surface to 
reveal the values, norms and beliefs of the Blair executive.  Through a process of legitimation 
that proved more successful for the Government than other groups with ideas, (namely the 
FBU), it thus became more powerful to act.   
 
The critical hermeneutic process demonstrated how “action can be best understood as opposing 
performances driven by ideological-moral views.  As a method for understanding, its success 
depends on its ability to articulate a theory of meaning with one of action and experience as 
well as its capacity to renew our understanding of the problem of ideology” (Roberge, 2011, 
p.5). Analysis of the texts highlighted New Labour’s lack of sector-wide democratic 
negotiation and consultation in the development of its far-reaching reform policies, whilst 
giving the appearance of acting on the evidence of independent commissions.  The taken-for-
granted authorial and professional legitimacy and positivist research approaches, informed 
decision-making and enabled action in favour of Government objectives.  Despite not being 
fully evidence-based, the IRFS, and the all-important 2003 White Paper (Our Fire and Rescue 
Service) that followed it, conveyed the generalised perception that the Government’s actions 
were desirable, proper and appropriate “within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p.574). At the same time the narrative 
contextualised different perspectives so as to illuminate underlying issues and conflicts 
between, for example the transition from state to market-oriented policies and shifting 
paradigms of long-standing Labour-unions relations.   
 
5.3.2.5 The power of the Commission 
The decision to commission the IRFS had been the turning point in this story.  In and of itself, 
a Government’s choice to commission a review indicates both a willingness to commit 
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additional resources to a problem and a readiness to cede a certain level of control over the 
outcome (Hunter and Boswell, 2014).  Was the IRFS commissioned to contribute knowledge 
to inform Labour’s reform policy, as is the case for some industry reviews (Rowe and 
McAllister, 2006)?  If it was, the considerable number of limiting factors affecting the review 
would clearly have an impact on the quality of knowledge it would produce.  Hunter and 
Boswell (2014), argue that the value of commissions may lie as much in their symbolic 
functions, either to signal a Government is taking appropriate action or to substantiate a course 
of action with evidence, or to solve a problem.  The IRFS commission may have been set up 
to signal that the Government was taking the pay dispute seriously and was looking to help 
solve a problem.  However, in practice, the purpose may have been to redefine the problem.  
Given the factors governing the review, it was unlikely to produce recommendations that would 
cause the Government to adjust its policies on modernisation.  In fact the IRFS served both to 
legitimate the Government’s course of action to modernise the fire service as per Blair’s agenda 
and to buy time to try to delay the national strikes that the FBU had promised.  Blair, as an 
institutional entrepreneur (Mutch, 2007), operating as a change agent acting upon his own 
interests (DiMaggio and Powell, 1988; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), deployed his social 
skills as a method of agency to motivate cooperation in other actors and thus change or 
reproduce institutional orders (Fligstein, 1997).  The ability of the Labour executive to succeed 
in motivating the rational men of the IRFS team to cooperate with what may be termed 
‘Blairist’ modernisation concepts and to conclude them as the best solution after a very short 
industry-wide review that undemocratically excluded key view-points, demonstrates not just 
Blair’s institutional entrepreneurship qualities but also the greater agency he effects for his 
executive leadership team and beyond it.  
Using Hunter and Boswell’s (2014), indicators to establish the true function of a Government 
commission (that is, the commission’s composition, resources and time-frame, independence, 
dissemination and Government take-up), with regards to the IRFS, we can see that the 
fundamental reason for which it can only be considered to have been commissioned, was to 
provide legitimacy to Blair’s agenda for modernisation.  Assessment against the indicators 
indicates the IRFS was not commissioned to provide evidence to solve a problem or 
substantiate the policy, despite the claims it was.  The composition of the review team signalled 
its authority more than any problem-solving or substantiating function; the Chair, Professor 
Bain, was not only a distinguished academic, he was well known to the Labour party and its 
policy makers, having chaired the Low Pay Commission, (1997 to 2002), and presided over 
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the Manitoba New Democratic Party in mid-60s Canada.  His authority in the field lent weight 
to the process and much was made of his professional stature.  If the IRFS was really intended 
to solve a problem or to provide evidence for modernisation, the lack of involvement of the 
fire service profession and its unions, a reliance on legacy reports with legacy data and the 
exceptionally short timescales would not serve these purposes. As per the dissemination 
indicator in Hunter and Boswell’s (2014), categorising the function of commissions, the high 
profile launch and media coverage of the review signalled the Government’s greater interest in 
publicising its existence, composition and workings of the review, as a means of signalling its 
credibility.  The IRFS was less to do with adjusting policy as a result of any detailed evidential 
findings. 
5.3.2.6 Hiring ‘experts’ 
It is widely recognized that management consultants have been important players in the reforms 
of a number of countries, including the UK, the USA, New Zealand (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006).  Management consultants provide the ideas for which ministers and senior civil servants 
have such a strong appetite and they have also provided employment for a number of ex-senior 
civil servants, “who can contribute their 'local knowledge' and networks of contacts inside the 
Government machine” (Pollitt, 2001, p.942).  In Chapter 2, the role of management consultants 
was discussed in relation to explaining how mimetic isomorphism occurs as a result of the 
small pool of firms used by governments.  This small pool of ideas results in a few organisation 
models being used repeatedly and spreading throughout industries (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991). Moreover, as a result of re-using management consultants, the language of governments 
becomes the language of consultants, resulting in risk-averse governments re-hiring those same 
consultants because they speak the language of governments!  
 
Labour hired management consultants, Mott MacDonald, first in 2000 then later in 2003 in 
relation to reform configurations in control rooms.  Mott MacDonald were also the chosen 
management consultant for other DCLG fire-related reforms such as the Firelink national 
communications project which was delivered in parallel with FiReControl.  Hiring and re-
hiring tried and tested suppliers like this demonstrates the government’s superior effectiveness 
(compared to FBU’s hiring of equally expert management consultants, Cap Gemini), in 
building legitimacy for its actions by using its network of familiar agents to advocate their 
powerful rhetoric.  
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Management consultants have been identified as “key levers in the process of changing 
management practices in the public sector” (Hood, 1995), having significant influence within 
the transformation of the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).  Yet there is little evidence 
to indicate they offer value for money or even accurate expertise.  Taking the NHS as an 
example of where the public sector regularly engages consultants, in 2014 the cost rose to 
£640m per year, more than double the amount recorded in 2010 (Oliver, 2014).  NHS research 
organisation, The King’s Fund asserts that the effects of management consultants’ work are 
inconclusive and they remain unaccountable and can walk away from bad or damaging advice 
(ibid).  Reacting to this level of spending and accountability, the Health Select Committee in 
2014 promised to tackle the issue and clamp down on such activity (Una O’Brian, 2014). Yet 
still today in March 2016, the Nursing Times reported a continued increase in NHS spending 
on management consultants, now standing at £600m per year. 
Despite this considerable public sector spending, claims to expertise are sometimes more 
consequential than the knowledge itself and “being perceived as an expert is more crucial to 
being one” (Alvesson, 1993).  Hiring consultants from knowledge-intensive firms, such as Mott 
MacDonald,  not only serves to legitimate a course of action, helping agents to change the 
distribution of power within an organisation, it also reinforces claims over knowledge 
production,  perpetuated in cycles of using same consultants to speak the same language to 
ensure results.  This further evidences the more effective use of strategic legitimacy by the 
Government compared to the FBU in the quest to promote and implement Labour’s 
modernisation over any alternative solutions. 
5.3.2.7 The trump card: legislation 
The final strategic manoeuvre in the challenge to reform the fire service based on Blair’s 
modernisation agenda was the Fire Service Act, 2004.  The strategic use of legitimating devices 
between T2 and T3, such as political rhetoric (itself conditioned by institutionally legitimated 
beliefs of NPM), and through the process of commissioning reviews and management 
consultancies, the Government was ultimately able to use its position of power, with ease when 
harnessing the full legitimating might of the political process.  Just five months after the 
publication of the IRFS, the ODPM published the follow-up White Paper, which begins the 
process that sets into motion the exclusive privilege of a Government’s authority; an act of 
parliament.  In social realist terms, this may be seen as the ultimate exercise in corporate 
agency.  Its power confers legitimacy to the actions of the Government regardless of their 
credibility. Based on the Government texts analysed in this research, the political processes to 
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legislate for a raft of reforms progressed, despite a lack of credibility on many counts.  
Following a draft Fire Service Bill, the Fire Services Act came into effect on 1st October, 2004.  
Responding to the Act, the ODPM Select Committee reported on the Fire and Rescue Service 
in January 2004.  Even at that committee, the members cast doubt on some of the policies, 
particularly on the idea of regionalisation that had appeared in the White Paper (that was about 
to become legislation), despite no evidence trail. The Select Committee report found that the 
main grounds for the reform seemed to be cost, not operational effectiveness or national 
security.  The Committee reported that the Government had not made clear how the reforms 
would improve public safety or reduce bureaucratic overheads. It also cast doubt on whether 
the regionalisation should be imposed on local FSA. Many witnesses to the inquiry complained 
of a lack of clarity and openness in the Government‘s plans (ODPM Committee, 2004, HC 43 
2003-04). Nevertheless the Act was passed. 
 
Legislation serves to embody new institutional constraints, rules and norms so as to set new 
limits in a particular sphere.  There is a view that legislation along with other Government 
action is a product “supplied to well-organized interest groups that are struggling to maximize 
the incomes of their members, often at the expense of the less well-organized” (Shaviro, 1990, 
p.6). This study demonstrates how the Labour Party, once struggling to get its modernisation 
agenda accepted and embedded in the fire service became able, through a more successful 
series of legitimating actions at the expense of the less well-organised FBU, to use the 
legislative process to further its objectives. 
 
In the build-up to the 2004 Fire Service Act that would legislate for radical changes, 
dissatisfaction had grown from a tired public, an unsettled and weary fire service and a 
frustrated Government, in response to the bitter and unresolved dispute being played out 
between key protagonists of the ODPM and the FBU.  The research shows how ideas 
embodying the political benefits of responding to pay dispute malaise by reforming the fire 
service, gradually gained legitimacy.  The study illuminates that legitimacy for Blair’s reforms 
was gained not through an evidence base but through effective political manoeuvres.  
 
Legislation can have political goals (Shaviro, 1990). Discussing the legislative process in US 
Congress, for example, Shaviro (1990), describes the political goals as i) enhancing re-election 
chances, ii) prestige, and iii) ideology. In this study, maintaining good will amongst the 
electorate to ensure re-election required effective use of the media to portray Blair’s reform 
242 
 
ideas.  Initially public opinion fell more towards supporting the fire-fighters as was evidenced 
by the general support of other unions and opinion polls in late 2002.  In legitimating their own 
ideas, New Labour took every opportunity to fuel public fears around prolonged strike action, 
highlighting the threat of terrorism and the need to send army troops to war not to domestic 
fires in Green Goddesses.  The legitimacy-building goal of enhancing prestige for the New 
Labour ‘group’ speaks for itself.  Although New Labour may not have succeeded against the 
FBU without stage-managing communications to the public or to the media, even without their 
support, Labour as the Government were never powerless to advance their objectives. 
Governments can both adapt and introduce the legislation to meet requirements and use 
promises and threats relating to future behaviours to win broader support (Shaviro, 1990).   
 
In this case, the timing was important which is why the temporality of the morphogenetic 
sequence captures the flow of events that built legitimacy and led to the legislative outcome 
being accepted with little challenge.  Had that same legislation been considered necessary back 
at T1, when the take-up of Best Value across the fire service was minimal (Audit Commission, 
2000), the ease with which structural reform became enshrined in law would have been far less 
assured.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
6.0 Concluding   
The aim of the study was to use alternative methods and theoretical approaches to gain a more 
complex understanding of the factors influencing the ‘failure’ of reform projects than those 
revealed by the government evaluations from which we learn lessons.  The empirical case of 
FiReControl was used to illustrate the methods in order to answer four research questions that 
would provide the greater understanding sought by the study.   
1. How do cultural, structural and agential mechanisms enable and constrain the 
legitimation of public reforms?  
2. By what emergent powers do Government reform ideas prevail over alternatives? 
3. How can causal mechanisms of legitimacy influence the scope of reforms? 
4. How do government evaluations account for such antecedent influences in delivering 
lessons learned after implementation failure? 
The study concludes with contributions that can be made to the fields of reform projects, their 
management and evaluation and answers a fifth question to fulfil the phronetic aspirations of 
the study and to make a contribution to practice. 
5. What can be done to make a difference 
Chapter 1 introduced the research problem.  Chapter 2 presented the literature review 
highlighting the flat ontology of extant perspectives and methods used in areas of inquiry that 
view project failure as an objective state that exists and is caused only by people.  A link was 
made between the alternative concept of failure being a loss of legitimacy, and theories of 
institutional and strategic legitimacy. To address the ontological issue that failure is not an 
objective ‘truth’, the analytic framework of a stratified reality and analytic dualism was 
introduced.  From the literature gaps, legitimacy theories and analytic concepts, five guiding 
research questions were posed.  Chapter 3 discussed the methodology and described the 
methods used in the study to meet the research objectives. Two frameworks of understanding 
were used to understand more about the failure of the FiReControl reform project. The first 
framework used critical hermeneutics to understand the build-up to the project as it was 
documented in reports commissioned by Government. The method gave an historical account 
of the period and revealed the changing discourse on imperatives for reform as dictated by the 
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Government, as different contexts developed over the time period. The method revealed 
underlying NPM ideology, as well as a range of political imperatives such as efficiency, 
modernisation and national security, that helped to legitimate Labour’s domination of the 
reform agenda.  The hermeneutic analysis revealed how those with privilege (the Government 
and its ministries), have greater access to resources (management consultants, Government 
commissions, media), that allow them to promote ideologies and representations in a way that 
individuals without such privilege cannot (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1997).  
The second and overarching framework for analysis was Archer’s (1995), morphogenetic 
approach.  The method facilitates analytic dualism to analyse the component parts of the social 
world, culture, structure and agency effectively and to avoid conflation of one with another in 
the search for causation (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1978).  Temporality as a tenet of the 
morphogenetic approach forced the research to consider not only the timeframes involved in 
the descriptions of events but also the histories and nature of events therein described. 
Combined with analytic dualism and a theory of situational logics (Archer, 1995), the temporal 
element allowed structures (social or cultural), and agents (corporate or primary), to be 
analysed discretely and relationally (Lipscomb, 2009).  Although delivery of FiReControl was 
found to be inadequately managed (PAC, 2010; NAO, 2010), the methods of this study sought 
to reveal if there were causal mechanisms outside of the scope of Government evaluation 
methods, which contributed to inadequate reform ideas gaining legitimacy, resulting in an 
imprudent, poorly evidenced project that inevitably went on to ‘fail’.   
Chapter 4 presented the data analysis and findings of the three-part morphogenetic cycle chosen 
for the study, designated as T1, T2 to T3 and T4.  In this cycle the influences of cultures and 
structures and the mediating effects of agents were analysed and discussed in relation to the 
changing situation logics that emerged as social interactions ensued.   
Chapter 5 discussed the research findings in relation to the gaps identified in the literature and 
the theoretical framework of legitimacy theory. The chapter discussed how, using the 
morphogenetic approach, the influences of cultures, structures and agents can be teased out 
over a temporal sequence and analysed separately.  This revealed how causal mechanisms of 
legitimacy, both pre-existing and ones which developed dynamically (through social 
interactions), contributed to the legitimation of the FiReControl project.  The research 
questions will now be addressed specifically. 
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6.1 Research Question 1: How do cultural, structural and agential mechanisms enable 
and constrain the legitimation of public reforms? 
Looking in different places than the project itself and searching for alternative causes for its 
future demise, Research Question #1 asked how cultural, structural and agential mechanisms 
enabled and constrained the legitimation of the FiReControl project.  It is useful to define again 
that a mechanism in this sense is a causal structure that can trigger events (Bhaskar, 1998) and 
social mechanisms are "social processes having designated consequences for designated parts 
of the social structure" (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998, p.6).  From the mechanisms created 
by both the conditioning structures and cultures at T1, as well as complex social interactions 
between T2 and T3, outcomes emerged, whether intended or not (Archer, 1995).  
 
The task of Research Question #1, was to identify how the complex interplay of these 
mechanisms produce emergent causal properties that legitimated the FiReControl project.  The 
interplay of parts and people between T1 and T4, resulted in situated and context dependent 
mechanisms of NPM (i.e. Blair’s version), with causal properties of institutional legitimacy for 
New Labour’s actions.  Achieving the political goal of promoting Blair’s modernisation 
ideology contributed positively to enactment of the reforms.  Blair’s New Labour and 
Prescott’s personal ideologies for regional governance were both promoted in the 2004 Act. 
By 2004, Blair’s Labour party was firmly embedded after almost two successful terms in office 
and re-election in 2005 would be paramount.  During these years, new democratic-styled public 
sector reforms were progressing across Western governments as has been discussed.  The 
movement had both industry and intellectual appeal at a time when the excesses of 
conservatism had temporarily discredited alternatives (c.f. McAnulla, 2007; Schafer, 2006).  
 
The study found further causal mechanisms of rhetoric and coercion that resulted from the 
complex interplay of the contextual parts and situated people and groups of the social system 
(Labour and the FBU). Both groups contributed to the development of mechanisms that would 
legitimate their views.  However, overall, the emergent properties of Labour’s legitimating 
mechanisms proved more successful than those of the FBU due to the powerful agency they 
exercised over context dependent structures, such as political institutions, the political process 
and the media.  For example, government rhetoric in its various forms was reinforced by taken-
for-granted authoritative processes, such as the IRFS, management consultants, the White 
Paper and stage-managed communications with the public. All of these evidenced strategic 
legitimacy and it was deployed by Labour executives with greater aplomb than the FBU.  The 
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case for reform was built on Labour’s rhetoric; binding that rhetoric into legislation was not 
difficult.  The 2004 Fire Service Act was passed without contest from anyone whose voice 
could be counted. How this was achieved is the subject of the second research question. 
6.2 Research Question 2: By what emergent powers do Government reform ideas 
prevail over alternatives? 
6.2.1 Power shifts; the morphogenesis of agency 
The temporality of the morphogenetic approach enabled ‘visibility’ of where power resided at 
the start of the sequence, when the long-established authority of the FBU was able to resist 
changes imposed by the new Government.  The approach also showed how throughout T2 to 
T3, power oscillated between the competing groups.  Finally, it would reveal how, facilitated 
by emergent properties of legitimating mechanisms, the balance of power shifted. The shifts 
changed the situational logics enabling the Government to realise their ideological interests.  
How this happened will be now be discussed.  The focus of research methods that advocate the 
principal of analytic dualism is that neither cultures, nor structures nor agents have primacy in 
explaining the social world (Bhaskar, 1975; 1978; Archer, 1995; 1996; Mutch, 2010). Rather, 
it is the results of the interactions of pre-conditioned social agents that are passed up the 
structural and cultural systems, and on to subsequent generations as new conditioning 
influences (Archer, 1995). This helps explain structural and cultural remodelling.  However, it 
is important to recognise the same sequence by which agency is itself transformed by 
interactions and in return is transforming in the “double morphogenesis of agency” (Archer, 
1995, p.74). In this study, whilst morphogenesis of structures preceded that of cultures (as the 
Fire Service Act first legislated for structural reforms at T4 that would eventually disrupt and 
change cultural norms in a later timeframe outside of this one), it is within the cycle that agency 
was transformed (Figure 15). 
Socio-cultural conditioning of groups 
T1 
Group interactions 
T2      T3 
Group elaboration (morphogenesis) 
T4 
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Figure 15. The morphogenesis of Agency (Based on Archer, 1995, p.194)  
The concept of agency was introduced in Section 3.5.2.4, referring to the reflexive and 
purposeful actions of people and the choices they make in their daily lives (Barker, 2003), that 
reinforce existing structures and cultures or transform them (Archer, 1996).  Agency is dynamic 
and agents in different settings have different emergent properties (Horrocks, 2009). People 
can possess agency as individuals, as people with roles and positions, and as groups and 
collectivities who may be more or less powerful in decision-making situations (Archer, 1995). 
There are two types of agent, the corporate and the primary agent (Bourdieu, 1986; Archer, 
1995, 2009; Scott, 2001; List and Pettit, 2011). Corporate agents have the capacity to influence 
stability and change, whilst primary agents lack a say in structural or cultural modelling in 
either society or in a given institutional sector. In this study, the emergent powers of each of 
the two main groups, the Labour executive and the FBU leadership fluctuated and as such so 
did their agency. 
 
Through interest groups in decision-making arenas, corporate agents engage in strategic actions 
that effect outcomes (Willmott, 2000).  Their corporate agency enables self-declared goals 
within a pre-existing social context to be pursued, where these agents will shape and re-shape 
that context for all actors (Archer, 1995; 2000; 2003).  At T1 and part way through T2 to T3, the 
FBU were, in respect of pay and of structural and cultural ‘management’, the corporate agents 
in the arena of the fire service and had thus maintained this status quo throughout the previous 
decades (pre-T1).  Local authority employers and government ministers had been similarly 
situated but as taken-for-granted routines become accepted over time, they had been the 
primary agents with less say in matters of fire service management.  For some time this had 
suited all involved and had been reproduced as structural and cultural norms.  Though not 
immediate, since the Local Government Act 1999 and Best Value had little structural and 
cultural impact, New Labour policies began to challenge the domination of the FBU in the 
management tripartite, whose considerable vested interests had reproduced the protectionist 
situational logics.   
 
The transformation or morphogenesis of agency in this specific unit of analysis (morphogenetic 
cycle), started with the consolidation of new corporate actors who were committed to asserting 
their views and ways.  These were the new executives in a new Labour party; John Prescott, 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Early in the cycle, the FBU’s powerful positioning, beliefs and 
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pursuit of its long established vested interests, had impeded the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair 
and his early visions to modernise the public sector.  Whilst New Labour asserted Government 
authority, initially they were not able to emerge easily as corporate agents and therefore not in 
a position to shape and reshape the fire service context for their own ends (Archer, 1996; 
Mutch, 2010).  
At T1, the FBU was more established than New Labour, they were strong and defended their 
privileges as corporate agents.  They had, through many years acquired considerable bargaining 
power, which, as an emergent relational property, defines who can bring what kind of resources 
to bear in the struggle to promote vested interests when challenged (Archer, 1996). At T1, the 
FBU had the support of rational and trusted groups through the strength of the wider union 
movement and their public sector members, and a considerable and loyal membership of their 
own.  To become the corporate agents, whose strategic actions would enable their version of 
modernisation, New Labour would need to bring to bear the right resources to undermine the 
basis for domination that FBU held.  They would need to promote a strong and legitimate 
counter ideology to confront the entrenched vested interest group. Labour needed the capacity 
to influence stability and change. “For only those who are aware of what they want, can 
articulate it to themselves and others, and have organized in order to get it, can engage in 
concerted action to re-shape or retain the structural or cultural feature in question” (Archer, 
1995, p.258). The research has shown how, through a series of complex social interactions 
mediated by agents, conditioned by and influential to their experiences, the agency of the New 
Labour executive was transformed through powerful sources of legitimacy. 
New corporate agency “usually results from alliance formation, goal dilution and ideological 
accommodations from the interest groups who constitute it in order to become an effective 
force” (Archer, 1995, p.266). The powerful effects of political rhetoric have been discussed.  
The commissioning of the IRFS was an attempt to promote and endorse, through the 
legitimating power of the Government review process, a counter ideology to the FBU’s version.  
When Bain’s IRFS failed to settle the pay dispute, the subsequent threat to force changes using 
legislation was another push on the newer ideology. Despite many limitations to the credibility 
of the IRFS, the 2003 White Paper written in direct response to the review became the 
benchmark reference justifying the Government’s modernisation agenda.  The White Paper 
would also make emotive links to the new terrorist threat, since the 2001 World Trade Centre 
attacks, and the state of the nation’s security and preparedness entered the rhetoric for fire 
service reform.   
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Government changes to recruitment meant a new breed of Chief Fire Officers would be hired 
for their managerial and commercial acumen and not hand-picked from the ranks by the Union, 
as had been the tradition.  Changes to local Government under the Local Government Act 
(1999) and Blair’s increased engagement of external management consultants would form the 
new alliance required to acquire corporate agency.  As we progress through the temporal 
sequence of T2 to T3, through the long and bitter disputes, agency is transforming; the FBU 
were becoming the new primary agents in the battle to design the future of fire service 
structures and New Labour were becoming the corporate agents with greater power to shape 
the fire service in the manner of Blair’s modernisation agenda.  Towards the end of T3 and from 
T4 onwards, there is little further challenge for the radical changes that followed.   
Gradually the NPM agenda of New Labour would reform structures and erode the corporatist 
culture of the fire service and progressively disempower the incumbent corporate agents, the 
FBU.  During this time, Labour’s new alliance (required to ‘seize’ corporate agency), gained 
strength through social and cultural interactive twists and turns within the morphogenetic cycle.  
Employing numerous legitimacy-building devices, the counter ideology gained strength too, 
culminating in the powerful White Paper to communicate the Government’s way forward, and 
then the final act of power, the Fire Service Act itself.  The corporate agency of the FBU was 
now undone and they were relegated to the new primary agents; they had to respond to and 
take new options, or leave them and lose power in the future. 
The information purveyed by the new corporate agents was strategic.  Critical hermeneutic 
methods revealed considerable manipulations shaping and distorting details to advocate the 
Third Way ideology of the new, more powerful agents.  For example, the Government’s agency 
enabled their selective use of certain evidence to legitimate their policy, and concealment of 
other evidence that contradicted those policies.   
That the FBU became the new primary agents in this case study, has more to do with their 
inability to manipulate information and stage-manage media communications as well as the 
corporate agents did.  The FBU also hired independent consultants to scope organisational 
reforms that would improve efficiency across the fire service.  Those reform configuration 
alternatives, which had involved stakeholders from the sector, may have aligned better to 
successful implementation and to the fundamental objectives of the fire service than the 
ideological, economic and fiscal objectives of the Blair’s modernisation agenda.   
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The unobservable mechanisms of legitimacy in its strategic and less obvious institutional 
forms, contributed to the morphogenesis of agency for the Labour party.  This enabled their 
ideological goals to be achieved and constrained alternative courses of action.  Figure 16 offers 
a schematic representation, showing more visible sources of legitimacy above the red line as 
well as the less visible institutional sources, below the red dotted line.  
 
Figure 16. Schematic representation of agency building through mechanisms of legitimacy. 
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6.3 Research Question 3:  How can causal mechanisms of legitimacy influence the scope 
of reform projects? 
 
In the case of FiReControl, identifying and linking the causal mechanisms of legitimacy to the 
final reform project scope illustrates the influence of institutional legitimacy of NPM and the 
strategically deployed rhetoric that gains legitimacy through management consultant reports 
and the Government-commissioned reviews.  Blair’s ideology for a ‘new Britain’ was based 
on new democratic politics and his ideas for the state were based on NPM.  The rhetoric of 
partnerships, public-private finance and joined up Government were key tenets of Third Way 
public management politics (Coates and Lawler, 2000).  All were reflected in the FiReControl 
project scope. FiReControl would join up 46 local emergency control room organisational 
functions using a single IT system deployed at nine regional control centres.  Terms and 
conditions of staff working as uniformed fire service employees in existing control rooms 
would cease as the function transferred to the regional network.  The centres would operate as 
limited companies and staff (hired through selection), would be employed on private company 
contracts and new terms and conditions. The limited companies providing the 999 service 
contract, would partner the adjoining fire services.  Physically, the nine regional control centres 
would be constructed to protect against the new threats to national security (for example, 
terrorism and floods). The locations corresponded to the English regions identified for 
Prescott’s regional assemblies that had not succeeded.  Based on the historical account of social 
interactions re-told in Chapter 6, which revealed political agendas of Blair (public sector 
modernisation), and Prescott (regionalism), as well as Labour’s changing narrative of fire 
service reform imperatives (efficiency, modernisation and finally national security), it is 
possible to see the links to the final project scope.   
 
In view of the paucity of evidence established by the ‘experts’ (Mott MacDonald, 2000; 2003; 
Bain et al., 2003; ODPM, 2003), it suggests a good deal of the project scope was related to 
political aspirations of the New Labour ideology. For example in the final 2009 revision, the 
FiReControl Project scope included; 
 
 Design and construction of new control centres, in the regions, in accordance with 
national security requirements (DCLG, 2009, p.185).  
 
Regional restructuring and national security concepts were introduced to the narrative about 
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fire service reform in the Government’s 2003 ‘Our Fire and Rescue Service’ White Paper (Text 
3).  They had had not been considered  fire service reform imperatives in the 2002 Independent 
Review of the Fire Service published six months earlier (Text 2).    
 
 “Identification and selection of Regional Control Centre (RCC) locations” (DCLG, 
2009, p.185).   
 
 
The Regional Control Centres were constructed of aluminium and glass and many were built 
on retail parks at the side of arterial motorways or in the case of London, in built up urban 
areas. If their locations were selected based on national security requirements, shopping centres 
and motorways and glass would contradict the intentions for heightened security.  
 
 “Design of new regional and national organisation and management structures, 
including job descriptions” (ibid, p.185). 
 
This reflects the move towards privatising the emergency control room function of the fire 
service.  Existing control room staff who wished to move to a Regional Control Centre would 
be re-employed in the new limited companies on non-fire service terms and conditions or leave 
the service. The new employment contracts would place employees out of the fire service and 
therefore out of the FBU membership. 
 
 “Formulation of performance standards (service level agreements) between the RCCs 
and FRAs (ibid, p.186) 
 Establishing a Performance Standards framework to ensure appropriate standards are 
crystallised which enable network resilience. To (potentially) include some nationally 
set standards” (ibid, p.186). 
 
These elements of the project scope reflect NPM, clearly evidencing Labour’s aspirations for 
the institutionally legitimated concepts of managerialism and performativity in the public 
sector and Prescott’s regional agenda. 
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6.4 Research Question 4: How do government evaluations account for such antecedent 
influences in delivering lessons learned after implementation failure? 
 
The evaluation approach taken by a PAC inquiry begins with the assumption that a project has 
the capacity to achieve its objectives having passed through the Government gateways of 
approval before initiating and at key stages of implementation. From this foundation the PAC, 
in considering NAO auditor reports on project spending, undertake to interview a selection of 
‘witnesses’ to establish what went wrong when a project has been deemed to have failed.  It is 
clear from such an approach that a longitudinal perspective to explore the antecedents of the 
project and a multi-level view of the policy-making process is not in scope. This research does 
not set out to discredit the PAC process but suggests it is insufficient to learn lessons about 
‘failure’. Thus, in the case of FiReControl, PAC did not account for the causal mechanisms 
revealed by this study, nor did it challenge the un-evidenced link between the project scope 
and Labour’s political agenda. For example, had the PAC evaluated the government’s 
definition of ‘modernisation’ against the cultural backdrop of New Labour in relation to the 
rooted structural and cultural institution of the fire service (which despite Bain’s report had 
performed well in relation to saving lives and putting out fires), it may have been possible to 
expose the fact that the fre service and the FBU had also offered modernisation proposals in 
the form of consultant reports throughout the process.  This was concealed in what became the 
government’s main reform document (IRFS), as were the views of the fire service in general.  
Alternative reorganisation options were availale, and fundamentaly, the regionalisation option 
was contested, even by Bain and Mott MacDonald. Therefore, the conclusion; 
 The Department failed to secure the co-operation and support of local Fire and Rescue 
Services 
…may have been different had there been and democratic agreement on what modernisation 
was to look like beyond the ‘New Britain’ ideological version of Labour’s manifesto.  
 
The PAC report of the failure of FiReControl lists the other causes of failure as; 
 
 The Department failed to apply effective checks and balances from the start. 
 The Department’s management and oversight of the project was weak. 
 The Department failed to manage delivery of the IT system by the contractor. 
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 Despite the scale of failure and waste, no one in the Department has been held 
accountable. 
 
Each of the above demonstrates the narrow, project-bound view the PAC takes and the 
fundamentally conflationary conclusions it draws based on the foundational assumption that 
the project reached an objective state of failure in 2010.  On this assumption, and using 
functional frameworks of evaluation, they determine the agential ‘failings’ in financial, project 
and contractor management.   
 
This research does not challenge the reality of complex project management where it is highly 
probable that delivery agents can and do underperform.  However, the study refutes the notion 
that this is the end of the story in determining causal mechanisms that contribute to projects 
not completing or achieving intended aims.  Could the PAC have challenged and explored 
interpretations of taken-for-granted definitions of reform and looked more broadly beyond 
value for money reports and (potentially biased), witness retrospective accounts, the inadequate 
management they found may have also been considered emergent from deeper issues resulting 
from the legitimation of ideas, which had overlooked key facts in the ideations stages.  Ideas 
based on rhetoric and not evidence will prove difficult to implement.  
 
The final summary recommendations of the PAC report; 
 
 The Department must ensure that the further £84.8 million it now intends to spend to 
obtain the original objectives of the FiReControl project is not wasted. 
 The regional control centres remain empty and expensive to run (PAC, 2011, pp5-6). 
 
..suggests the foundational assumption that FiReControl could have delivered a successful 
solution, is still intact.  PAC essentially orders the government to continue spending to achieve 
the original project objectives.   
Audit and scrutiny bodies themselves can become subject to the institutionalism of public 
management frameworks and managerialism (Pollitt and Summa, 1997). The project-bound 
PAC inquiry, predicating its investigation on the foundational perspective that FiReControl 
‘failed’ in December 2010, over budget, under scope and over time, predictably summarised 
the project thus; 
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“This is one of the worst cases of project failure that the Committee has seen in many 
years. FiReControl was an ambitious project with the objectives of improving national 
resilience, efficiency and technology by replacing the control room functions of 46 local 
Fire and Rescue Services in England with a network of nine purpose-built regional 
control centres using a national computer system. The project was launched in 2004, but 
following a series of delays and difficulties, was terminated in December 2010 with none 
of the original objectives achieved and a minimum of £469 million being wasted” (PAC, 
2011, p. 3). 
 
As far as Government projects are concerned, the PAC report is one of the key sources of 
learning when projects do not complete.  The implications of the flat ontology adopted by PAC 
for learning lessons, in relation to the problematic of the projects paradox (Flyvbjerg, 2001), 
means we commit the epistemic fallacy (Bhaskar, 1978).  In other words by limiting our view 
and objectifying failure, we look for the same answers to the same problems.  Yet projects 
continue to ‘fail’ or lose legitimacy and get cancelled at considerable cost. 
 
What can be done to make a difference is the final research question which helps to make this 
study phronetic.  The question will be answered in relation to the practical contribution the 
research makes, at the end of the next section. 
 
6.5 Contributions to project management and evaluation 
The research contributes directly to the fields of reform projects in terms of their management 
and evaluation and in relation to our extant sources of understanding of reform project failure:   
 That failure is an objective state of reality that exists,  
 Causes of failure can only be found within the boundary of the project itself, and  
 That project-related people (agents) are usually to blame.   
6.5.1 Understanding the concept of failure  
The research makes a contribution to project management and evaluation theory by 
emphasising the importance of ontology in understanding reform project ‘failure’.  
The purpose of lessons learned is to enable Government action to continually be refined to 
reflect what best achieves objectives and promotes the public interest (H. M. Treasury, 2011). 
Exercising authority to achieve collective purposes is the dominant paradigm in policy research 
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(Sanderson, 2000).  The assumption here is that rational, clearly defined objectives indicate the 
capacity for effective achievement of goals.  From this position, it is expected that equally 
rational goal oriented evaluation will provide sufficient evidence on attribution and causality 
in failed projects. This view may not only be inaccurate but also misleading, potentially 
contributing to why the performance paradox (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003) 
remains a reoccurring feature of public reform projects. This research makes a contribution by 
provoking the received notion that positivist paradigms are adequate for evaluating complex 
reform projects when they are perceived to have reached an apparently objective state of 
failure, such as FiReControl did in 2010.  This study was based on an ontologically alternative 
interpretation of ‘failure’; a loss of legitimacy. 
The scoping of reform projects take place in the relatively unobservable realm of politics, in 
places not easily accessible to researchers and threads of political discourse to conceptualise or 
secure reforms can reach back over many years. The study demonstrated that by using a novel 
methodological approach to achieve greater ontological depth, as well as much broader inquiry 
scope, it is possible to ‘illuminate’ the less observable historic contexts at both the Government 
and organisational levels. In so doing, it becomes possible to more truly understand the 
legitimating mechanisms that are at play in public reform contexts.  The study demonstrated 
the role legitimacy plays in idealising, winning support for and shaping the scope of 
Government reform projects.  It found evidence for institutional legitimacy in the effects of 
NPM and for strategic legitimacy in the effects of rhetoric and Government office privileges 
such as commissions and the legislative process.  
The research contributes to the project failure debate by asserting that it is through these 
legitimating mechanisms that ideas and narratives, developed through and by institutionalised 
beliefs embodied in rhetoric, gain credence and give form to reform projects, often after many 
years of social and political interactions between stakeholder groups.  It is from these contexts, 
and the causal mechanisms therein, that organisational transformation ideas later emerge, 
which result in the events we can see as the delivery reform projects.  The research makes a 
contribution by challenging what we think and how we come to know of project failure and 
reveals instead a much richer picture as well as the diverse sources of causal mechanisms that 
can influence project outcomes.  
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6.5.2 Looking beyond the boundary of the ‘failed’ implementation project for 
causal mechanisms that contributed to its legitimation 
The research perspective sees the project delivery stage as an aspect of reforms and not the 
whole story. The study makes a further contribution to project management and evaluation 
theories by moving on the project-failure debate from resource-based, functional perspectives 
of delivery and evaluation stages.  The study demonstrates new sources of understanding can 
be found if we look beyond the event – i.e. the project delivery stages, to the ideation stages 
and the genesis of ideas and look not for causes of failure but for causal mechanisms that 
contributed to legitimation of those ideas.  
Through the adoption of critical realist approaches and social realist methods, the research 
demonstrates that Government projects as events and experiences in the domain of the actual 
and empirical do not just happen as the taken-for-granted routine activities, such as 
Government reviews, consultant reports and White Papers, suggest.  They do not follow a linear 
path from problem-identification, evidence gathering, policy-making and solution assessment 
and design, for example. As the delivery projects are events and experiences that occur in open 
systems, the research confirms there are a number of unobservable mechanisms in the domain 
of the real that endure from previous morphogentic cycles of structural, cultural and agential 
interactions. Therefore, the situated influences of structures or of cultures on the power of 
agency within and between groups, illuminates the antecedents of project implementation 
stages and opens up the field of inquiry to the genesis and legitimation of project ideas.  Here 
we can explore "deeply intertwined issues of power, politics, donor dependencies, institutional 
arrangements....and can open up that black box of accepted ways of doing things as an aid to 
deeper understanding (Walsham et al., 2007, p.324), so we might know more about how some 
ideas gain legitimacy over other ideas, from which projects emerge. 
If the boundary of inquiry for PAC or NAO evaluations is restricted to the project delivery 
stage and their assessment is only ever related to project controls and budget management 
criteria, underperformance will inevitably lead to the same conflated conclusions that these 
shortfalls are the causes of failure.  
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6.6 Contribution to Realist Social Theory 
6.6.1 Acknowledging the interplay of both ‘parts’ and ‘people’ in the history of 
emergence of reforms 
It was by looking outside of the taken-for-granted boundary of Government inquiry that the 
research methods enabled the separating out of the relevant parts and people, the interplay of 
which was instrumental to legitimating FiReControl. Due to the concept of temporality, it was 
possible to identify structures and cultures laid down by previous cycles (such as previous 
Government administrations), which have autonomy from agency and exert a causal influence 
upon it.  As was revealed in this case, the antecedents of failure of the FiReControl reform 
project could be traced back through the temporal sequence, to decisions and actions by agents 
who were both influenced by pre-existing structures (e.g. NPM) and cultures (e.g. previous 
Governments in power) and agentially-influential to them at their intersection of time (e.g. new 
democratic politics, modernisation agenda). This represents a contribution to realist social 
theory and to the morphogenetic sequence approach.  In particular the research identified the 
morphogenesis of agency between groups as corporate agency diminished in one group (FBU), 
and developed in another (Labour executive) over the unit of analysis in the T1 to T4 sequence. 
Labour’s corporate agency shaped the fire service reforms around Blair’s ideological vision for 
the public sector.  The research identified a significant lack of empirical evidence to support 
those reform policy ideals.  These findings contribute to the opinion that in reforms, 
Governments do not so much act in the general public interest, rather they deliberately create 
or redefine a public interest to protect particular, private interests (Kemp at al.,, O'Riordan, and 
Purdue, 1984), and use tools at their disposal, enabled by their corporate agency to endorse and 
further those interests.  
6.7 Contributions to Practice: What can be done to make a difference? 
Research Question 5 asked, what can be done to make a difference?  The study responds to 
Flyvbjerg’s (2001), call for social science to concern itself with society’s improvement and to 
enter into public dialogue and praxis (Schatzki, 2006).  In its aims to be phronetic research, the 
study was grounded in contextual knowledge and sought to be more “inclusive of values and 
groups that are legitimate and pertinent to the issues but who may have been marginalised by 
other more powerful groups had they not achieved a voice through phronetic research” 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2012, p.286). Accounting for boarder contextual knowledge and greater 
inclusivity of values and groups relevant to the antecedents of FiReControl, the research set 
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out to search for causal mechanisms that contributed to its failure beyond project delivery 
agents. 
A phronetic approach to understanding this case would be sceptical of the PAC methodology 
alone to provide definitive answers after FiReControl ‘failed’.  In the top-down process of PAC 
inquiries, theories of project management and evaluation precede the analysis, and it is these 
which are applied to the question of project failure.  Social and particularly political action are 
complex and require knowledge of context that is not accessible through theory alone 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2012).  The study acknowledged the value of context and sought to answer the 
four value-rational questions that stand at the core of social science (Schram, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 
2001; Flyvbjerg et al. 2012);  
1) So what?   
2) What can be done to make a difference?  
3) Who gains and who loses, and  
4) By which mechanisms of power? 
5) What can be done to make a difference? (Flyvbjerg, et al., 2012).  
These were not the research questions but they helped to shape them and underpinned the 
research aims to make a contribution to project management and evaluation theories.   
In relation to project failure, the first value-rational question asks;  
6.7.1 So what?   
Public project failure at the rate the UK is currently experiencing is not sustainable (Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, 2012).  Despite the Government’s added support and 
scrutiny agencies that have been established to oversee public projects (e.g. Major Projects 
Authority), the National Audit Office remains concerned about the potential failure of major 
public sector projects and has predictably warned of the need to improve project delivery. The 
latest NAO report highlights that a third of projects due to deliver in the next five years are 
rated as being in doubt or unachievable, if action is not taken to improve delivery (NAO, 2016). 
Not only do project failure rates continue to increase, agents tasked with understanding why 
continue to look in the same place; project delivery. The second value-rational question asks; 
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6.7.2 Who gains and who loses?  
What is situationally conditioned is the promotion or defence of vested interests that have been 
previously established in a prior socio-cultural context (Archer, 1996).  In the case of structural 
reform of the fire service, the situationally-conditioned New Labour leaders promoted ideas 
that reflected their vested interest in the new democratic movement and the NPM agenda it 
embraced.  Originally, at T1, these ideas and propositions stood, in relation to the traditions of 
the fire service, as contradictions to their vested interests, the emergent properties of which 
formed situational logics of protection.  When challenged through the Government directives 
and policies, the situation logics transformed relations towards competition.  The competition 
logics thus determined the particular courses of action and episodes of interaction (Mutch, 
2010), that ensued through the bitter disputes of 2001 to 2003.  The emergent properties of the 
various interactions between the Labour and the FBU fluctuated within the situated contexts.  
Sometimes the emergent properties were characterised by tension and other times by 
coherence.  On occasions the situational logics of compromise led to the FBU repeatedly 
calling off strike action and agreeing to the reduced pay offers.  The loyalty of the FBU leader 
towards the values of the Labour party contrasted with Labour leader’s attitudes towards the 
unions was a small but important piece of information in relation to the alternating compromise 
and contradictory relations that ensued.   
Answering the value question, Labour gained and the FBU lost and the national reform 
FiReControl project was included in a list of structural reforms.  Following the cancellation of 
the project five years later, after spending almost £500m of public funding, ultimately the fire 
service and the tax payer were the losers.  In 2011, when the Government conducted its routine 
PAC inquiry to find definitive causes for failure, delivery agents were blamed.  By then, the 
origins of ideas and the threads of their legitimacy were no longer observable in the realms of 
the event itself. The third value-rational question asks; 
6.7.3 By which mechanisms of power do they (the Government), gain? 
The lack of certainty or indeterminacy as to the outcomes of change in the morphogenetic sense 
is partly a consequence of what kinds of agency particular groups of people are able to exercise 
(primary agency, corporate agency or as individual social actors in particular roles (Lipscomb, 
2009). Early in the cycle, the FBU were the corporate agents, that is, the self-conscious interest 
group who had (morphogenetically speaking), through decades of integrated solidarity, 
organised themselves to undertake collective action in order to achieve a particular articulated 
demand or ideal (Archer, 1995). At T1, the FBU had their articulated goals of trade unionism 
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and worked collectively towards achieving them for the fire service. In relation to the FBU as 
the corporate agents, around 1999, New Labour were temporarily the primary agents.  Effecting 
structural change in the fire service had been easily resisted. The morphogenetic approach 
illuminated the social interaction between primary agents and corporate agents over the period 
designated between T2 and T3. In the process, Archer’s third category of human agency 
emerged – individual social actors who fill particular social roles, dialectically changing their 
personal identities and the social role as they do so (Archer, 1995). It was by this power through 
corporate agency that Government ideas were legitimated and ultimately prevailed over 
alternative ideas (as detailed in Section 6.2.1).  
 
6.7.4 What can be done to make a difference? 
Functionalist methods and Government lessons learned processes overlooked the ideological 
influences that instigated, framed and sustained legitimacy in the FiReControl project.  Yet it 
is these impacts that had considerable effect on seemingly rational actors escalating their 
commitment to the project and continuing to do so despite it appearing to be a failing course 
of action (ODPM Gateway Report, 2004).   
If we are to make a difference to reform project failure, social realism can help us to ask 
different questions of failure to explore how powerful groups such as politicians can “pack 
more punch in defining and redefining structural forms” (Archer, 1995, p. 191), and promote 
their own interests to define and redefine organisational goals, even when evidence is lacking.  
The nature of a networked Government, where a small group of large management consultancy 
firms are engaged to provide expertise, results in recommendations that serve to reinforce the 
rhetorical discourse of Government and legitimate ideas for reform.  With so many 
unsuccessful reforms, we should ask how much network learning (Knight and Pye, 2013), is 
taking place?  When the familiar process of the PAC report publication is complete, reform 
projects begin again using similar Government networks with similar ideological goals. Social 
realism can help us to know what is situationally conditioned in the promotion of ideological 
vested interests, what goals are sought by groups acting with agency and what situational logics 
will predispose them to act in certain ways (Archer, 1995), and to achieve their goals.  Coupled 
with a critical and phronetic approach to reveal more of the power and value issues (Flyvbjerg, 
2001), both frameworks enable researchers to develop more effective suggestions towards what 
can be done to make a difference.  
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The research argues that the taken-for-granted elevation of Government evaluations (PAC), as 
our primary means of learning from failed Government projects as being better than other 
methods, can both obscure the agendas and political motivations (conscious and unconscious) 
of reform project formation and approval, and of the failed project evaluations that follow. 
Despite continuous public sector reorganisations towards achieving efficiency, results from 
joined up collaborative endeavours are not always convincing, and the “continued appeal to 
policy-makers can appear to be an expression of faith, underpinned by an unquestioning 
acceptance of its apparent virtues” (Sullivan et al, 2013, p.123). By looking behind the 
processes and methods to challenge the taken-for-grantedness of NPM-style reforms and the 
privileged evidence from their evaluations, it may be possible to approach ‘truer’ lessons in 
understanding failure. To operationalise this contribution, decision-making processes that 
would legitimate both the shape of a proposed public sector reform and the decision outcome 
should be subject to truly democratic scrutiny, outside of Government spheres, where the 
ultimate authority does not lie with ministers, and the power to challenge is not singularly 
within their gift. 
 
6.8 Limitations to the research 
This study has three main limitations to address: the use of the single-case-study strategy, its 
dependence on secondary data and its interpretation of the morphogenetic approach.  Each will 
now be addressed. 
Overall justification for the single-case-study approach using document sources as empirical 
data is made by the research focus on the process of legitimating a Government reform, the 
research questions asked and the theories and methods used to answer them.  
6.8.1 Single case study approach 
As a single case study, the findings have limited generalizability. As has been discussed 
throughout the study, the research advocates that ‘failure’ of Government projects is not an 
exact state that ‘exists’.  Some projects are considered successful, despite budget and time 
overruns, and others can be completed on time and within scope and budget, yet are considered 
failures.  Notwithstanding the ontological challenge to the concept of project failure, as events, 
projects are temporarily situated and contextually driven.  In different empirical settings, a 
similar study of another large Government reform project may return different results. 
However, applying the findings to other reforms such as in the NHS or education sector or in 
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other ideologically framed schemes such as High Speed 2, it is likely to reveal evidence of 
corporate agency for legitimating and shaping the delivery projects. 
However, in stating its phronetic intentions at the outset, this research does not claim 
universality in its interpretation of events, but aspires to contribute to understanding beyond 
the taken-for-granted and conflated notions of project failure.  
6.8.2 Documentary data 
The research was based on a wide collection of publicly accessible documentary data, such as 
Government documents, parliamentary transcripts, published reports, situated academic 
research, media coverage and archival material. Reliance on only document sources may lead 
to bias through selection, which may undermine the reliability and the validity of the findings 
(Silverman, 2013). However, as detailed in Chapter 5, documentary evidence was deemed to 
be of greater value than primary sources due to the nature of the inquiry which was unlikely to 
achieve personal involvement from the key agents discussed.  Furthermore, the concrete 
(empirical), analysis method (critical hermeneutics), aimed to recreate a real-time context by 
analysing texts against their original contexts, where there were no ethical issues imposing on 
participants’ recollections years later.  Therefore, the data types are considered consistent with 
the objectives of the research and with the methods approach adopted. Furthermore, measures 
were taken to compensate for data weaknesses. Data was collected from multiple sources to 
triangulate findings and improve reliability.  
6.8.3 Interpreting critical realism and the morphogenetic approach 
The final limitation relates to the interpretation of the methodological approach.  Archer's 
(1995), morphogenetic methodology might be considered abstract especially as it provides 
little prescriptive direction to researchers.   Critical realist approaches are more about principles 
that guide than rules that regularise (Pawson et. al., 2005).  The case study is based on the 
judgements of the researcher.  In particular, the selected unit of analysis indicated a temporal 
sequence (T1 to T4), within which causal mechanisms were sought that give explanatory power 
to the thesis that there are other places to look when learning lessons after projects are 
considered failures.  As such, this research makes explicit the role of the researcher’s reflexivity 
throughout this process and this is explained further in Chapter 3, Section 8.3.  The study 
acknowledges that objectivity cannot be offered, but crucially objectivity is not intended in 
critical realism.  Instead, a window into reality through which that picture of reality can be 
triangulated with other perceptions (Healy and Perry, 2000), is the aim.  However, to minimise 
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researcher bias in describing this picture of reality, a commitment to be reflexive whilst 
accounting for the value laden experience brought to the study was maintained.  The underlying 
research intention was not generalisable knowledge creation but to add something to our 
understanding of public reform projects that was not perhaps known before. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
DCLG’s response to my request for information in relation to Government’s approach to 
procuring Mott MacDonald and George Bain for the consultations and resulting reports (as  
analysed in the research). This followed a number of earlier emails which were also denied 
progress (example below the letter). 
Department for Communities 
and Local 
Government 
Fry Building 
2 Marsham Street 
London 
SW1P 4DF 
Telephone: 030 3444 0000 
Ms Colette Russell 
Date: 21 October 2014 
 
Dear Ms Russell 
 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 
 
Thank you for your request for information received on 26 September 2014 concerning procurement 
and other related information relating to the commissioning of Mott MacDonald in its 1999/2000 and 
2003 reviews the operation of fire service control rooms; what the value of the Mott MacDonald's 
consultancy contracts were; what criteria were applied in appointing the company; and how many 
companies bid for the contract. Also the same procurement and other information relating to the 
commissioning of Professor Lord Bain in his Independent Review of the Fire Service, 2002, i.e. what 
was the value of the consultancy contract; what criteria were applied in selecting and appointing the 
'expert'; and how many companies bid for the contract? . 
 
From our preliminary assessment, we estimate that compliance with your request would exceed the 
appropriate costs limit under section 12 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. This is currently 
£600.00. We have decided to refuse the request because Due to the passage of time, we estimate 
that the cost of retrieving and extracting the information would exceed the cost limit of £600 provided 
under Section 12 of the Freedom of Information Act as this information has been archived and could 
only be retrieved at disproportionate cost. The Act provides that we are not obliged to comply with 
requests where the estimated cost of complying would exceed this limit. Please contact me if you 
have any queries or concerns.  
 
If you are dissatisfied with the handling of your request, you have the right to ask for an internal 
review which should be submitted within two months of the date of receipt 
of this letter and should be addressed to: 
TEMPLATE FRAMEWORK – NOT TO BE USED FOR SUBMISSION 
OF DRAFT ANSWERS 
Department for Communities and Local Government 
Knowledge and Information Access Team 
2nd Floor NW, Fry Building 
2 Marsham Street 
London, SW1P 4DF 
dclgkia@icasework.fcos.gsi.gov.uk 
 
If you are not content with the outcome of the internal review, you have the right to apply directly to 
the Information Commissioner for a decision. Generally, the ICO cannot make a decision unless you 
have exhausted the internal review procedure provided by the Department. The Information 
Commissioner can be contacted at: 
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The Information Commissioner's Office, Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow, 
Cheshire, SK9 5AF. 
Phone: 0303 123 1113 
Website: www.ico.gov.uk 
 
Yours sincerely 
Malcolm Lawrence 
Senior Procurement Policy, Process, Data and Systems Manager 
malcolm.lawrence@ccs.gsi.gov.uk 
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Appendix 2 
This request for information was entered into the Government website ‘They work for you” 
(www.theyworkforyou.com)40 
Thursday 28 February 2013 
 
[Dear Lord Heseltine, 
I am currently researching major project failures for my PhD at University of Liverpool.  I 
have read with interest your report; 'No Stone Unturned' and your thoughts and insights into 
major projects, their role in economic growth and their tendency for failure and wasted public 
monies.  I have worked for 12 years at senior levels of the Fire Service and was involved in 
both the Firelink and FiReControl reform projects (the latter was cancelled after five years 
and almost £500M spent, as you may be aware).  I have tried through freedom of 
information requests to access detail on the FiReControl case study to assist with my 
research into a major project failure.  DCLG have provided some, but certainly not all of their 
(non commercially-sensitive), project information, claiming it would take ‘too long’ and 
deeming my repeated requests ‘vexatious’. I have written twice to my local MP (Louise 
Ellman), also a critic of major project waste but unfortunately I am yet to receive a reply.   
Given your report's spotlight on some of the key issues in relation to project failure and the 
content of the inaugural speech you made during the recent naming ceremony of the 
Heseltine Institute at the University of Liverpool, can you offer any support/contacts/advice 
on how I might access DCLG-held information about FiReControl, which has been refused 
due to their ‘time constraints’.  My thesis is a constructive analysis of project failure.  It does 
not seek to lay blame on individuals and I aim to make academic contributions to our 
understanding of public project failure beyond concluding it is down to poor project 
management and poor procurement.  Please advise if you or your office can provide any 
further assistance to my research endeavours in relation to FiReControl information. 
 
Yours sincerely 
Colette Russell 
Management School 
University of Liverpool] 
 
                                                 
40 ‘They work for you’ is a Government website which allows the general public to make requests for information and detail 
about what politicians are doing for their constituents or to request advice or guidance on the democratic process. 
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659157d85363329922e3/a333405c4234b70be317 
(Signed with an electronic signature in accordance with subsection 7(3) 
of the Electronic Communications Act 2000.) 
 
This request was responded to on 6th March 2013.  The letter is copied below. 
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